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TRANSFORMATION & STRATEGIES

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Beograd, 2005

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Everyday Life in Serbia at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium

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Everyday Life in Serbia at the Beginning of the 3rd Millenium

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Andjelka Milić

INTRODUCTION

The Institute for Sociological Research of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy has been undertaking extensive surveys on representative samples of the Serbian population in an effort to continuously monitor the structures and processes in the Serbian society. Until the early 1990s these research efforts, headed by Prof. Dr. Mihailo Popović, resulted in the publishing of two collections of papers, predominantly addressing the social structure of Serbia and characteristics of certain stratification groups.[1]

The year 1991 marked the beginning of profound changes which shook the existing structure and the social system, as well as the everyday life of the population. This, second, series of surveys has so far resulted in three published collections. The first survey covering the 1991-1995 period addressed the wars and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the UN sanctions and the internal collapse of the social and state system (shortages, inflation, criminalization of society, etc.) along with the combined consequences for the families and households in Serbia. The second survey encompassed the 1996-2000 period and covered the "post-Dayton" stabilization of the authoritarian regime in the internal sphere and, on the other, the actualization of the Kosovo crisis ending with the NATO bombing of Serbia and Milošević's downfall. The third research spans the 2001-2004 period, marked by the pioneer steps in building a democratic social-political regime and the initial transformation of the economic system based on the adoption of market and profit considerations. The papers resulting from this survey were published in the Serbian language (2004), and we wanted to make their findings available to foreign readers by producing a somewhat shorter publication in the English language.

This collection of papers prepared by the Institute is in conceptual and problem terms similar to the previous two publications, but is thematically essentially different as it looks into the developments following two consecutive stagnant periods in the history of the Serbian society. Has the "October 2000 revolution" actually marked an turn from the previous decade and if so, what are its manifestations? That is the fundamental question this research tries to answer observing the different aspects and spheres of social life in the stage of a post-socialist transformation. But, before we reach for the answers we must offer several important conceptual and methodological clarifications pointing to the specific nature of the sociological approach, especially in the most recent of the three research undertakings.

[1] Social inequalities, 1987 and Serbia in the late 1980s: Sociological Research into Social Inequalities and Discrepancies, 1991.

Motives and reasons

The period of the previous decade and a half was in every respect a challenge for social theoreticians and researchers, and was fairly well covered by empirical research despite the scarcity of finance and objective difficulties for empirical studies. Most researchers approached this dramatic period from the global structural-institutional perspective. In contrast to this approach, usual in sociological observations, the three most recent surveys of the Institute opted to follow a different, "bottom up" procedure and look into the social events from the micro perspective, focusing on the everyday life of individuals, their families and social networks, including their existential daily activities and ambivalent feelings of fear, hope, pleasure and anxiety accompanying their efforts to survive and turn around the unfavorable circumstances they have long been exposed to. This perspective however, does not forego the interest in the global level, but tries to learn about it from the firm ground of everyday events, using analytical and theoretical mediation as appropriate. The difficulties of everyday life thus revealed are not merely the symptoms, but the very substance of a state marked by overall social destruction, confused minds and a weaking of norms and values.

The present collection confirms a sociological orientation specific for our conditions. Inspired by the search for the creative use of the principle of "sociological imagination" in the turbulent transformation processes, this orientation has, in the course of recurrent projects, grown into a group reflexive attempt of researchers to face the social reality of the 1990s and the end of the millennium: when everyday life becomes a problem for a multitude of individuals, a theoretical and empirical problematization of everyday life is required (Agnes Heller). This internal motive was, on the other hand, conveniently combined with the aspiration to open the research work in our midst for some non-conventional, reflexive-critical post-modern approaches where the inquiry into everyday occurrences finds a fertile as well as challenging ground. Namely, the profound world-wide transformation experienced by sociability as a sphere of modernity at the end of the millennium resulted in a radical change in sociology and its self-perception: not entirely without resistance, sociology has given up pretensions to be the "queen of social knowledge" and the prime mover of integrative social consciousness accepting to be "reduced" to the interpreter of experiences and events of ordinary individuals in their everyday lives. But, while most sociologists, still inspired by sociological positivism, tend to look upon this orientation in sociology as the end and collapse of its scientific paradigm, others, who are still the minority, are inclined to recognize in the "sociology of everyday life" its true transformation, guided by the humanist heritage of the past epochs.

Strategies of everyday life

In the first two published collections we sought to use the empirical evidence to round up and measure the effects of factors of any importance in the decomposition and destruction of the socialist system and its infrastrucutral and institutional bases. We were guided by the thought that the majority of individuals and social strata, or even the nation as a whole, did not indeed choose the wars, torment, poverty, exile, sufferings and shortages as the ways and means to carry out a social transformation. They were imposed on them, only some individuals, groups and parts of society embraced these imposed objectives trying to adjust to them, while others remained indifferent and others still tried to actively resist them. But, on the whole, we could say that everyday life and people, no matter what their individual attitudes towards the imposed "choices" may have been, turned up the victims of strategies pursued by a victory-seeking megalomania of the highest ranks of federal state and republics within the formerly socialist system. Those who subsequently yielded, the apathetic, as well as those who resisted are all losers – they have lost a decade of their lives and wasted enormous energy for mere survival – many of them unfortunately in vain!

The most recent research, the results of which are presented in this collection, deals with the time when it appeared that the circumstances were radically changing to the extent that the victims finally attempted to take things into their own hands and turn from recipients into actors, or even creators of new social prospects. We thought that it would be important to examine the whys and wherefores behind the actions of individuals, families, social groups, strata and entire social apparatuses, to see what sort of judgments and attitudes they took, what kind of importance they attached to the new principles, requirements and needs which were starting to take shape in the initiated social transformation of the post-socialist era, and what they actually did to respond, understand and act upon them. All these aspects of understanding, thinking and acting are jointly referred to as the "strategy of everyday life".

At first sight and according to the principle of dichotomy we use to divide our existence in the world into small things of everyday life and major historical events, it appears that everyday life and strategies are mutually exclusive and belong to different worlds. Everyday relates to specific situations and phenomena "here and now", or what the theoreticians call "natural situations", which are self-explanatory before and beyond any thought and reflection and outside any scientific calculation or anticipation. Their "natural" state is due to the fact that they relate to directly self-explanatory meanings and relations which are outside and above any theoretical discourse being concerned with the reality of self-existence.

Strategies, on their part, are the outcome and product of analytical and abstract thinking, construction based on accumulated perceptions, and intended to provide a long-term concept, direction and purpose to our actions, seeking to build a bridge between the past and the future through a meaningful interpretation of the present times. True, the concept of strategy (originating from the military terminology and theory) may in social theory have a more flexible interpretation, like the one given it by Bourdieu who deprives the concept of its rationalistic and normativistic reading.

Starting from the belief that each one of us is the architect of his/her own reality, we should not deprive this creative ability of the need and possibility to rely on its own strategic outlines and thoughts. The fact that these outlines and thoughts are occasionally, or even mostly, failing expertise, incompletely conceived, naive and unreal, should not divest them of their strategic importance for the actors who "set them in motion" and promote them in their own and other people's lives. To put is simply, everyone is an amateur in his/her own life, and the school of life is constantly exercised and mastered precisely by learning how to take the "right" stand in situations which never stop to surprise us! Goals and ideas are obtained in different ways; sometimes we are unaware of them as well as the means to attain them; in other situations we know what we want but not how to achieve it! When our goals evade us and we find ourselves in a difficulty, we try to establish what actually put us in that particular situation. In some cases our goals and ideas are borrowed or taken over from others who we consider more able, wiser or resourceful or simply knowing of what is right, appropriate or necessary; or else we try to be more creative ourselves, depending on the circumstances which predefine our choices and expectations, etc. There are various ways for individuals, groups and special social apparatuses to become reflexive of their own actions in everyday life. The very interpretation of everyday life, the understanding of the signs and meanings it places before us on daily basis, are proof and need of our own reflexivity of ourselves, others and the social community we belong to, not to mention the need for mutual understanding and harmonization of actions, reactions, interpretations and views in order to create the minimum stability wherein we can safely function without a constant anxiety that we may suddenly be "caught", defeated or entirely destroyed by unknown forces. In brief, to the extent that we understand everyday life not only as mere routine or peculiarity but as an expression of human phraxeology, the concept of strategy should not remain outside its frameworks.

Methodology

All three research undertakings applied the standard methodological procedure for large nationally representative samples, i.e. surveys. This, however, does no mean that it was used routinely or stereotypically, if something like that is at all acceptable without breaching the basic principles of sociological methodology. In the first two surveys we were interested in a "condensed" description of the war and post-war everyday life of the surveyed individuals and families. The questionnaire was intended to provide an abundance of detailed and objective data on the past events, but with the maximum simplicity of responses (most often only "yes" and "no).

The third survey, we are discussing now, carried out at a time generally assessed as one of restored individuals' trust in the society, its basic institutions and him/herself, used a questionnaire which in addition to the necessary information on the objective situation and the position of individuals, i.e. their households, also included a number of questions of attitudinal nature, namely value estimates or inquiries allowing the expression of personal dis/satisfaction with specific relations, situations and behaviors. This expansion of the information field was necessary due to the chosen object of observation – strategic reactions of individuals, families and groups under the new social circumstances. Naturally, in view of the breadth of the spheres, activities and behaviors monitored in this survey it was quite clear that complete, adequate and confidential information could not be obtained in all cases, and the researchers simply had to make do with certain basic indications.

However, we must note that the researchers spared no effort to enhance the adequacy and validity of the obtained information, using various methods to verify the facts, as well as different processes for analytical construction of complex indicators and typologies making the available material as precise as possible. In that sense, we should also mention the frequent use of comparative data and analyses in the papers of almost all contributors. For that purpose they drew on their earlier works and research projects (Antonić; Lazić and Cvejić), studies previously published by the Institute (A. Milić, S. Bolčić, S. Vujović), as well as their own or other papers addressing similar topics. In that context the scope of comparative insight was substantially expanded by the use of data, analyses and conclusions related to transition processes in other post-socialist societies (M. Babović; M. Petrović; M. Bobić), as well as the broad understanding of world-level experience in analyzing the views on privatization (Vera Vratuša) or parental attitudes in the case of Britain and Serbia (S. Tomanović). Comparative data were not used only to broaden, but also to deepen the insight: from the processes of "long duration" such as the one of modernization (of exceptional interest for modern Serbia) and its troubles (S. Antonić), through the monitoring of changes in transformation courses in the socialist and post-socialist times in the sphere of labor (S. Bolčić) and family (A. Milić), all the way to comparative insights into the previous periods of the "blocked" and "delayed" transition (Lazić and Cvejić; M. Babović).

Another thing that needs to be emphasized is that the researchers demonstrated great diversity and inventiveness in their use of sophisticated measuring instruments of different kinds, either in order to produce as precise as possible descriptions or characteristics like the class-stratal position of households (Lazić-Cvejić), typology of value orientations Cvejić), index of household economic status including as many as 25 measured variables (M. Babović); housing characteristics of households (M. Petrović), instruments related to the detection of specific behaviors or situations such as the existence of domestic violence (V. Miletić), classification of households' strategies (M. Babović), typology of partnership relations (M. Bobić), presence of household members requiring care (A. Milić), etc. Some researchers wisely used the data of the representative samples to expand the knowledge obtained on small samples or even in individual case studies to evaluate the scope, i.e. frequency of certain types of behavior, views and values (M. Bobić; S Tomanović; V. Miletić).

Results

The main issue we were interested in was whether there were any changes confirming that the society had definitively set out towards the transformation of social relations and institutions. From the very beginning, we were fully aware that the very concept of social transformation had very different and opposing meanings, both in our environment when viewed from different ideational-ideological and theoretical positions, and in the world in general. There is no doubt that substantial differences in that respect also existed among the researchers who participated in this project, but the agreement on the minimum definition was reached: namely, the social transformation in the given time and spatial framework of Serbia and its society is understood to denote the changes aimed at the political and economic liberalization of its society and the simultaneous stabilization of new institutions. So, what do our findings say in that respect?

We must first note that the changes belonging to the known repertoire of the transition, which, by definition, should lead to a developmental shift did unfold in a piecemeal fashion even before 2000: for instance, the initiated privatization in certain social sectors, inauguration of political pluralism and parliamentarism, media freedoms, establishment and reinforcement of the civil sector fighting for civil and human rights, etc. But, characteristic of these changes was their partial nature, their fragmentation, diffusion, absence of a strong strategic framework and the concept of activities, voluntarism and lack of mutual agreement and understanding of the main political actors on the social scene. It seems that the "affliction" of our transformation process has not been overcome yet and has serious consequences in terms of the efficiency and acceptance of the reforms by the general public. With the perception of decision-making by the highest social ranks as insufficiently conceived, spontaneous and voluntaristic, the public at large develops a feeling of insecurity, ambivalence, apathy and indifference, instead of expanding and strengthening its civic responsibility. Feelings of that kind, on their part, jeopardize the success of modernizing processes, as repeatedly confirmed by the history of Serbia (S. Antonić).

The second consequent moment indicated by our findings has to do with the gap between the actions and understanding of the necessary lines of changes and reforms among the elite parts and strata (entrepreneurs, directors and managers on different levels) and the remaining part of the society, i.e. its middle and lower strata. While the latter group in different aspects approaches a kind of a "mixed", social-democratic vision and understanding of the future arrangement and functioning of power and its objectives, the other side most often expresses overt and "crude" neoliberal or conservative aspirations (Lazić and Cvejić; V. Vratuša; S. Bolčić; S. Antonić).

At this point we should also mention a global factor important for the understanding of both the transformation standstill and its consequences in terms of the behavior and views of the majority population. Bearing in mind that transformation breakthroughs were not systematic or complete, but rather fragmentary and short-lived, often using the back and forth tactics, the socialist heritage is still maintained in all main institutional sectors of society, but its actual effects are shifted or relocated compared with their previous objectives and values. The preserved socialist heritage in the present circumstances has a distorted or even pathological effect on social relations. Under the present circumstances the norms and institutions from the times of the socialist system sustain the semblance of social justice and equality, modernism and progressiveness, but essentially prevent or impair the implementation of more radical changes to democratize the social relations and strengthen the market-oriented initiatives. A paradigmatic example of the deformed effect produced by the systemic remnants of socialism is seen in the sphere of housing policy and reform: one-off privatization of the housing stock – which is where the reform in this sector stopped long time ago - directly helps the enrichment of the corrupt building mafia and preserves the wide-spread uncontrolled gray economy in the renting of apartments and business premises and thus prevents the active solution of the housing shortage and the housing mobility of the prevailing part of the population (M. Petrović; S. Vujović). Another paradigmatic example of stagnant development accompanied by a false socialist phraseology about guarding the interests of the majority is the absence of any serious reforms in the sphere of agriculture, in state/social and even more so individual ownership sector. The consequence of this standstill is the ruin of the agrarian sector which has remained the mainstay of the national income and budgetary revenues (cutting the branch one sits on), along with the demographic, cultural, economic and civilization devastation of the village and, on the other hand, creation of false hopes and expectations among the rural youth about a "rosy" future awaiting them in the towns. Similar grotesque simplifications, deformations and stagnation also characterize the situation in the urban sector of society (M. Mitrović; S. Vujović).

The results show us that in the absence of a serious systemic global strategy of transformation of the social being, the society is dominated by fragmentary efforts of certain groups, strata, institutional segments and individual families and households to survive the prevailing chaos, i.e. to preserve their vitality pending a future more successful turn which will guarantee new, better and safer conditions for the realization of their needs and expectations. What kind of strategies are these? They are highly diverse, plural and often mutually exclusive and conflictive within one and the same actor's position (individual or group); they are passive as well as active; legal, semi-legal and illegal; modern and traditional; authoritarian and liberal; spontaneous, uncontrolled or calculated, but invariably short term. Speaking of households and their economic strategies they are for the most part active and diversified in the effort to combine different types of work and income within the same household (permanent job, supplementary work, gray economy, agricultural work, etc), but there is also a very limited and cautious entry into entrepreneurial activities, subject to the existence of appropriate conditions in the relevant households (M. Babović).

Work strategies of the population indicate ambivalence: work mobility and employment are on the decrease, and negative trends prevail: unemployment, retirement and return to agriculture. But these negative trends are not the outcome of individual strategic choices, bur rather of the inferior economic and infrastructural situation in the Serbian society. On the other hand, the population's readiness for work-activation again reveals an ambivalent nature, combining the readiness to work more or with greater intensity, to accept more flexible jobs and independent work, with the retention of the "old regime" of safe and regular employment (S. Boličić). This is a good example of the preservation of the "socialist heritage" which in this case is not a mere anachronism of consciousness: under the present circumstances, global as well as those specific of the Serbian society and economy, it is naive and romantic to believe that a social order of human values is attainable. Still, speaking of the strategies of survival as well as work strategies, it is extremely important to note the attitude of the young population, urban as well as rural. Proactive strategies, which are more open to risky undertakings and jobs are more often found in the towns than in the villages. But in both cases, the young overwhelmingly opt for the strategy of emigration to attain their long-term work and life ambitions. This fact, more than any other, shows that the Serbian society is still in the stage of stagnation and unstimulating changes which fail to reveal a prospect of a more intensive and rapid social transformation and development (D. Mojić).

Finally, speaking about the transformation of the private family sphere of life, our findings show not only stagnation in terms of modern change, but also a regression to pre-socialist patterns and life practices. On the whole, both in terms of their forms and contents, the changes manifested in the past decade indicate that we are on all fronts of the family life reverting to the traditional and patriarchal models of behavior and values. The nuclear family - the substance and form of the modern family concept - is on the retreat, as opposed to the traditional forms of extended family communities combining several generations and all elements of the authoritarian patriarchal order (patrilienage, patrilocality and patriarchal structure of authority) (A.Milić). On the other side, we have the increasing share of incomplete family and marital forms due to the rapid aging of the Serbian population, i.e. the atrophy of the primary social sphere. The segment of marital and partnership relations shows weak indications of modern trends of flexibility and the search of "pure" relations and individual intimacy, with the growing presence of traditional choices following the logic of utility or overtly patriarchal strategies in gender relations (M. Bobić). Patriarchalization of marital and family structures is substantiated by the findings of widely present and common forms of family violence in communication and interaction between partners, as well as between parents and children (V. Miletić). In the case of parenting there is a visible reliance on primary families of origin as the only "social capital" of parenthood that individuals trust, which again confirms the thesis of the overall re-traditionalization of family life in Serbia. Finally, Serbia is facing a rapid population aging resulting from the long-term demographic trends of the past. It turns out that individuals and the society are incapable of acknowledging this problem and looking for the solution in modern alternative public strategies, but rather postpone facing the issue by hiding it in the close family and domestic networks, which exclude the public and its active engagement (A. Milić).

Specific analyses of the relations and the functioning of the intimate family sphere of life give the impression of a highly unfavorable climate of members' interaction. It is a life blocked by the difficulties of individual, inter-individual and group frustrations and suppressed dissatisfaction which is why the outstanding problems and conflicts tend to surface in violent ways both in relations among genders and among generations. Unsatisfied family relations, on their part, exhaust individual energy and increase social anomy and apathy which, in turn, reduce the interest and responsibility for social reforms. Thus we end up in a circle of mutual accusations: the citizens denounce the authorities for being egotistic and incompetent, while the authorities reproach the citizens their lack of responsibility and apathy. Both are partly right. But, where is the way out?

Part I: GLOBAL CHANGES AND CONDITIONS OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Slobodan Antonić

THE SOCIAL BASE AND THE CURRENT MODERNIZATION ATTEMPT

ABSTRACT: Efforts made by the ruling political elite after the year 2000 to modernize Serbia and join the European Union represent the fourth modernization attempt in the last 200 years. But like any other societal endeavor, in order to succeed, it also needs a favorable arrangement of social structures in addition to its actors' will. Hence this paper addresses a major structural feature – the prevailing social mood (collective value orientations) in present day Serbia. This mood in many respects differs from what we find in other post-communist countries. It is basically non-capitalist and, in the opinion of many observers, constitutes the main obstacle on Serbia's way to the European Union. Since this mood has deep historical roots, the paper offers a historical overview of Serbia's social development during the past 200 years. This account clearly reveals how this non-capitalist social mood arose and took hold. Its basic characteristics are egalitarianism and state nationalism.

KEY WORDS: modernization, capitalism, social consciousness.

Efforts of the ruling political elite after the year 2000, to modernize Serbia and join the European Union are the fourth modernization attempt in the past 200 years (Antonić, 2003: 53-94). But, just like any other social undertaking, in addition to its actors' will, it also needs a favorable arrangement of social structures in order to succeed. In line with a realistic approach adopted by this author (Antonić, 2002: 19-22), a sociological discussion of an issue must cover both structures and actors. And, since the main modernizing actors in contemporary Serbia have already been partly described (Antonić, 2003: 87-94), this paper addresses the issue of social structures.

It seeks to examine the foundations and roots of the prevailing social mood (collective value orientations) in present-day Serbia. As subsequently explained in greater detail, this mood in many ways differs from that in other post-communist countries. It is essentially *non-capitalist*, and according to many, presents the main obstacle on Serbia's road towards the European Union. This mood has deep historical roots and can be best understood if these roots are brought to mind. To this end this paper provides a brief review of Serbia's social development over the past 200 years, which will explain how this non-capitalist social mood emerged and took hold. Its main characteristics are egalitarianism and state nationalism.

“Peasant republic” (1815-1911)

After six decades of home rule Serbia entered the year of its full state independence (1878) as an almost completely agrarian society. The entire industry of Serbia, even in 1881, comprised one military factory, two breweries, two sawmills, one gunpowder plant, one brick kiln, one candy plant, 14 steam mills and several workshops producing soap, leather products and textiles. There were no railways, while the roads were in poor state of repair and hardly serviceable. The people, for the most part, lived off agriculture – 88 per cent. They were almost exclusively small farmers – 73 per cent of land holdings had less than 5 hectares. As a rule, these peasants were also illiterate – over 90 per cent of them (*Table 1)*.

On the other hand, Serbia had neither nobility nor large landowners. Turkish nobles were banished during the struggle for liberation (1804-1815), and the domestic nobility was not created. Prince Miloš Obrenović (who ruled Serbia in 1815-1839 and 1858-1860) did not wish to see the emerging of a stratum that could rival his power in Serbia. Thus Serbia developed into a kind of a peasant’s republic. In addition to the dominant peasant stratum, which formed the basis of the social structure, there was also a thin layer of clerks, i.e. administrative and educational intelligentsia. But their origins, too, were rural. Having acquired high education in the West, part of this intelligentsia brought the idea of democracy to Serbia. More precisely it brought the idea of parliamentarism and limited power. When this idea merged with the peasants’ wish for greater influence on state administration, Serbia obtained a number of important democratic institutions – universal suffrage for practically all peasants (from 1869), a parliament to control the government (from 1888) and even elections which grew increasingly more honest and free (especially after 1903). Although a kingdom, Serbia was, in social terms, actually a peasants’ republic.

Table 1. Shares of agricultural and illiterate population in the total population of erbia in 1834-2002 (%)

Year	Peasants	Illiterate
1834	93	n.a.
1866	90	n.a.
1874	90	n.a.
1884	88	89
1890	87	86
1900	86	79
1921	86	55
1931	80	47
1948	71	27
1953	67	28
1961	56	22
1971	44	17
1981	25	11
1991	18	7
2002	19	3

For more on relevant sources, see Antonić, 2002: 30.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the spirit of egalitarianism and loyalty to the state prevailed in the 19th century Serbia. The peasants did live a difficult life, but they felt "masters on their own turf". Their holdings were small, but theirs (and could not be sold even in collection of a debt). They worked hard and long hours using the simplest tools (even in 1897 a third of village households did not possess any agricultural implements or animal-drawn carts). But, they worked their own land, for themselves, not for others. They lived in small and poorly furnished houses. But almost all of them were homeowners and could not be evicted by anyone at all. Although illiterate, they were becoming increasingly aware that education was the best way for the social ascent of their sons. Often, they were molested by the local bureaucracy. But frequent elections and political changes instilled hope that perhaps an effective and honest administration would be established in the near future. The state did ask them to pay taxes and serve in the army. But, at election time, the political elite came to them pleading for their votes. That state was far from perfect. But it was theirs.

In the late 19th century the development of industry and modern transport in Serbia gained momentum. By 1988, 522 km of railroads were constructed and in 1896 fourteen larger industrial enterprises were already operational, while the number of coal and metals' mines was tripled. In 1896 a layer of the wealthy, merchants and industrialists was created in Serbia, including a few millionaires and several semi-millionaires. The stratum of workers, shop assistants and apprentices also grew. Although they numbered over 60 thousand at the turn of the century they were still a distinct minority compared with the total population of 2.5 million. Serbia entered the 20th century as a country of small farmers, egalitarian economic requirements and egalitarian social consciousness.

In and between the wars (1912-1945)

Serbia passed the entire second decade of the 20th century waging exhausting wars (1912-1918). In these wars, Serbia lost 800,000 people (24 per cent of its population), or every second man between the age of 18 and 55 - thus the main part of its labor. The total war damage amounted to 14 annual national incomes (at 1911 prices), or the 182-year value of overall industrial production in 1911. Not only was Serbia exhausted and ruined by the wars, but after 1918 it found itself a central territory of an entirely different state – The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. A large part of social energy during the 1920s was spent on the constitution of that new state and the curing of the most difficult wounds sustained in the previous wars. When in the early 1930s the political elite finally turned its attention to economic development, the country was struck by the world economic crisis. Backward and insufficiently recovered from the war, the economy was hit hard. The main export product, wheat, lost its foreign buyers and the prices of agricultural products registered a 40 per cent drop by 1934. The small purchasing power of the peasants was halved, leading to a decrease in the prices of manufactures by over 40 per cent. Life in the villages and towns alike was difficult, often even more so than before 1912.

Still, the mid-1930s saw an economic recovery. That was mostly to the credit of the country's prime minister Milan Stojadinović (1935-1939) and his active economic policy. Public works gave jobs to 150,000 people in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, while a good part of small and medium peasants' debt (not only to the state) was written off. During Stojadinović's government in the Kingdom the total of 111 new factories were built and 100 new industrial enterprises established (92 per cent with domestic capital). For the first time after a long period budgetary years ended with surplus, and in 1938 the country's foreign trade balance was the best in its history thus far.

By the end of the 1930s the economy had recovered and industry was on the upswing. Compared with 1918 the number of factories in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia increased by 113 per cent (1938), the number of industrial workers by 87 per cent and the value of investments by 55 per cent. Production in certain economic branches tripled, e.g. in Serbia's mining and smelting in the 1925-1938 period. The GDP growth rate increased from a low 3.3 per cent per year (1911-1932), to a modest but promising 4.7 per cent (1932-1940). In 1939 the Kingdom's industry already contributed 45 per cent to the value of the national production and 52 per cent to that of exports, and had a greater share in the national income (8.75 billion dinars) than agriculture (6.75 billion). In general, the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s brought better life and a hope for tomorrow. The cost of life fell by a third in the 1929-1940 period, the purchasing power of the dinar grew by 53 per cent, while the workers' real wages increased by 32 per cent from 1930 until 1940.

Industrial strengthening brought about some change in the social composition of the Serbian population. The number of workers in industries and crafts increased compared with the beginning of the century. There were over 200 thousand people in Serbia working on such jobs and close to another 100 thousand in trade and transportation, along with over a 100 thousand in state administration, the army and free professions. Nevertheless, Serbia was still a weakly industrialized country. At least three quarters of its population still lived off agriculture (*Table 1*) which was 3.5 times more than in Germany or the USA at that time. The illiteracy rate was still high at about 40 per cent, even more than in the neighboring Bulgaria or Greece.

As for the social mood, it was substantially different than in the 19th century Serbia. The village had the impression that the government and the state did nothing for its benefit. Although the state received war damages, the compensation melted before it reached the village. Pensions for war widows and orphans were worse than miserable and war invalids were reduced to begging to feed themselves and their families. Facing the distressed and impoverished peasants were the few but gaudy rich men who came into money owing to political connections and war supplies. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1929, the unregulated relations among nations in the Kingdom led to the abolishment of parliamentarism. True, it started to renew in the mid-1930s but until 1941 Serbia did not manage to reach the level of democracy it had in 1914. The peasant was thus multiply dissatisfied: with the state's care for his welfare, with the fairness of the state administration and with the political order.

This dissatisfaction turned into a deep depression after the fast defeat of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in its war with the Axis Powers (in April 1941), and the disintegration of the south Slavic state. In the occupied Serbia two resistance movements emerged – the monarchist and the communist. However, the two movements soon came in conflict, which increased the war sufferings still further. And destruction hardly ever stopped during the four war years. Waves after waves of bombing and continuous internal struggles destroyed 36 per cent of industrial facilities and a quarter of the housing stock. The total war damage sustained by Yugoslavia was larger by a half than the one suffered by Britain and seven and a half times greater than the one of the U.S.A. Serbia was once again pushed years back in economic terms, almost to where it had been before 1912.

Communist modernization (1946-1973)

The communists come out of the horrible war as military victors. They certainly did not enjoy majority support in Serbia. But, the basis for their legitimacy was a vision of an industrially developed and just society. This vision was entirely in line with the prevailing egalitarian spirit in Serbia, as well as with the idea of a "people's" and "protective" state. That is why Serbia did not experience the communist rule as an entirely foreign body, especially because the communists enthusiastically set out to pursue their modernizing ideas. They proclaimed "industrialization and electrification the foremost all-national tasks". In order to implement them they needed capital, and thus on December 5, 1946 they carried out the general nationalization of the economy. All production property, except that belonging to small peasants and artisans, became state-owned. In a sociological sense, entire social strata of the population disappeared. But, the government was now in a position to substantially increase investments into industry. While investments into new production in the Kingdom, accounted for 5 per cent of the national income, the communists upped this share to 32 per cent in the 1947-9 period. Although few believed the communists' claims that industrial production already in 1947 exceeded the prewar figure by 21 per cent, there was no doubt that in the first three years of peace Yugoslavia took the road of accelerated industrialization.

Then in mid-1949 a conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet communist oligarchies broke out. Wishing to prove their orthodoxy, the Titoists in 1949 launched rapid "collectivization", i.e. destruction of small peasant holdings. By early 1950, 340 thousand households were forced into 6,238 "cooperatives", which precipitated a serious social and economic crisis. The peasants' resistance to collectivization grew and the cooperatives produced less food than independent peasants in earlier times. Thus at the end of 1950 Yugoslavia found itself on the verge of hunger. Even the official statements – invariably more propagandist than statistical – showed that in the 1950-53 period the country's national income not only failed to increase but registered a decrease at an annual rate of 5 per cent.

The communist Yugoslavia was saved by the Americans who soon understood the geopolitical importance of Tito's dissent from Moscow. Thus in 1950 they gave Yugoslavia a grant-in-aid of 95 million dollars worth of food (corresponding to 689 million dollars at present day rates) and saved the country from hunger. During the next five years the Americans, together with the French and the British, provided Yugoslavia with additional aid of 493 million dollars (or 3.5 billion at current rates). In addition, the communists gave up village collectivization and in 1953 permitted the peasants to leave their "cooperatives". In consequence five sixths of them immediately disintegrated, leading to a gradual recovery of agriculture and the relaxation of social tensions.

From 1953 until 1964 Yugoslavia registered "an exceptional 11-year development" (Mihailović, 1981: 13). During that period the GDP and industrial production grew at an annual rate of 8 per cent and 12.4 per cent per year. Not only was the GDP increased by 133 per cent, but the country also managed to cross the line separating the predominantly agrarian and the predominantly industrial society. Namely, in 1960, for the first time in the history of Yugoslavia, the share of agriculture in the GDP was bellow the one of industry, while in 1961 the numbers of agricultural population decreased to less than a half of the total. An important stage of industrialization and economic modernization was thus successfully completed.

Serbia's economic development has always ranged close to the Yugoslav average. Therefore it, too, substantially changed its social structure by the end of the 1960s (*Table 2*). The share of farmers in the labor force dropped to a half, while those employed in industry and crafts accounted for over 20 per cent. That was still a small share compared with the most developed countries. But, the spirit of modernization was in the air, economic development was visible and life grew better from one year to the next. In the early 1960s the communists gave up the concept of highly centralized production, wages and consumption were no longer neglected for the benefit of capital accumulation and the ruling elite shed some of its ideological burden which hampered personal and group enterprise. Infrastructure was built and after several decades enabled full-scale exploitation of the country's natural wealth, while the workers believed that good and hard work was worthwhile.

The overall social mood in Serbia during the 1960s was entirely different from that of the 1930s. The state administration remained authoritarian, but corruption was reduced to a minimum and large and undeserved wealth almost disappeared. There was no multiparty democracy and the political police was still very powerful. But self-management was introduced into enterprises to increase employee influence in management and bring elementary self-respect to an ordinary man. The standard of living was substantially lower than in the West, but the government tried to ensure that all have an approximately the same starting point for social advance.

Table2: Structure of economically active population in Serbia in 1931-2002.

Branch		1931	1953	1971	1991	2002
Agriculture	%	79	67	53	30	22
	No.	1,797,856	2,211,653	1,812,213	964,687	580,339
Industry and crafts	%	9	12	21	36	31
	No.	194,192	390,921	726,954	1,159,712	830,526
Trade, services, transport	%	3	6	9	18	25
	No.	76,325	198,960	299,864	579,100	655,968
Public services	%	5	4	10	16	16
	No.	109,119	117,805	333,850	514,402	422,304
Others	%	4	11	7	0	6
	No.	87,960	375,378	216,908	7,809	153,850
Total	%	100	100	100	100	100
	No.	2,265,402	3,294,717	3,389,789	3,225,710	2,642,987

Data for 1953-2002 are for Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija; the sources of all data are population censuses.

Generally speaking, a significant degree of egalitarianism prevailed in the society and almost nobody seemed to mind that. On the contrary, it was entirely in accord with the traditional popular spirit. In addition, the peasants were pleased with the possibility to keep their holdings, in contrast to farmers in other communist countries (excepting Poland). Their holdings were in 1953 limited to 10 hectares. But, Serbia was anyway a land of small peasants. Many peasant children found employment in nearby towns, or moved to live there. During the 1960s and 1970s about a half of industrial workers in Serbia still lived in villages, or relied on agriculture for additional support. This mixture of industrial and agricultural life enabled the peasants and workers quite a decent life, regardless of insufficient productivity in agriculture and industry. And the time of a really good life was yet to come.

Communist welfare society (1974-1990)

Never before or after have the people in Serbia earned so much and spent so much as in the late 1970s (*Table* 3). This was due to three specific reasons.

Table 3: Serbia's GDP per capita - 1910-2003 (in 2003 US $)

Year	GDP/pc
1910.	933
1938.	1.275
1950.	1.423
1960.	2.530
1970.	4.601
1975.	5.839
1986.	3.318
1993.	1.782
2003.	2.166

For more on the relevant sources and calculations, see Antonić, 2002: 29; the figure for 2003 is an estimate of the National Bank of Serbia.

First, the communists built an industry that enabled the exploitation of almost the entire natural wealth of the country. The industry manufactured products which, with the eastern wages of the workers, sold well in the West, and with their western design fared still better in the East. And, thanks to Tito and his political skill, both West and East were equally and almost completely open to Yugoslavia.

Second, precisely during those years the country was decentralized, and so was its economy. The republic political-economic elites, among other things, obtained the right to raise foreign credits. The West was obliging to Yugoslav credit requests, primarily for political reasons. This led to a proper surge in borrowings. Between 1965 and 1981 the Yugoslav foreign debt increased 23 times – from 0.9 to 22 billion dollars. Only in the 1974-1981 period new loans amounted to 16.4 billion dollars: a third each from the IMF, Western countries and a group of about 600 banks.

And, third, the earned, and still more borrowed money, was not spent on productive investments. The Yugoslav communists, seeing that they were doing fine, wanted their "working class, their working people and citizens" to start living well. Consumption was completely liberalized. The salaries began to grow, accompanied by cheap consumer credits practically anyone could raise. Some of that money was naturally invested. But, the investments were made less by economic and more by political criteria. The important thing was to employ as many people as possible and give them nice salaries. And the productivity of their work was not exactly a matter of primary importance.

Thus during the 1970s Yugoslavia became a proper "phenomenon" on the world scale. While throughout the planet a twenty-fold jump in oil prices caused an economic recession and arrested the increase in the living standard, Yugoslavia flourished. Only between 1974 and 1977, 850,000 people were employed, while the number of the employed in Serbia in 1980 increased by as many as 600 thousand compared with 1974. The growth of employment was accompanied by increasing wages and consumption. The share of wages of those working in the economy in the national income leaped from 23 per cent in 1953 to 41 per cent in 1971, to retain so high a level during the following years. Personal and social standard increased by 25 per cent in only a few years' time (1974-1977), while real income of employees grew by full 36 per cent.

The false, general employment, increase in salaries and cheap consumer credits raised the citizens purchasing power unrealistically high. This is best revealed by the data on households' savings. Towards the end of the 1970s savings deposits grew at an incredible rate of 30 per cent per year, so that in 1981 Yugoslav citizens had foreign exchange savings of 7.6 billion dollars and about 10.5 billion dollars worth of dinar savings on their bank accounts. This purchasing power was even more pronounced because the population was spared certain expenses, just like in any other socialist country. For instance, employees and workers were fairly quickly and for free, given apartments by the state, i.e. their enterprise (which accounted for up to 20 per cent of investments). Only in the 1974-1977 period the total of 580,000 apartments were built in Yugoslavia and distributed for free. In Serbia alone, until the end of socialism the number of apartments distributed without payment grew to half a million. According to some sociological researches, as many as 40 per cent of members of the middle class were given free apartments, as were about 25 per cent of workers (Vuković, 1994: 116). Occupants of this donated housing could live in it almost without paying a rent. While in Western countries the cost of rent accounted for 25-30 per cent of a worker family income, a four-member worker family in Yugoslavia in 1949 spent a mere 4 per cent for the apartment it lived in, less than for cigarettes and drinks. The reason for that was, naturally, the protective rent in the annual amount of 0.2 per cent of the apartment price. That was not enough for maintenance and let alone repayment of the housing unit concerned.

Relieved of the need to invest their savings into apartment purchase or rent, citizens comfortably spent their money on common consumption goods, plentiful in Yugoslavia. Since the end of the 1960s, the Yugoslav market was almost completely open to foreign goods. Although Yugoslav traders held the monopoly on imports and despite the substantial import duties, the supply of goods was almost as large as in a West-European country. And the citizens, on their part, had enough money to afford western cars and appliances, as well as expensive tourist travels all over the world. By 1979 almost one in each two families in the country had a car. During the 1980s nearly all members of the middle class in Serbia had a TV set, as did 93 per cent of workers; color TVs were owned by 83 per cent of the middle class and 31 per cent of workers; deep freezers by 93 per cent of clerks and other middle class members and 82 per cent of workers; and washing machines by 97 per cent of clerks and 75 per cent of workers (Vuković, 1994: 128; 136; Vujović, 1991: 294-5).

During these golden years life was good in the villages, too. About 60 per cent of agricultural households had at least one of their members employed in a factory or an office, while members of as many as 24 per cent agricultural households were *all* employed outside agriculture (Grbić, 1991:164). In addition, in the late 1960s, many peasants' sons went to work in Germany, France, Austria and other Western countries. During the 1970s about 200 thousand people worked in the West sending remittances to their kin in Serbia (Petrović, 1978:123). Thus, for the first time in its history, the Serbian village was getting the money. The building of new spacious houses started in all parts, while tractors, trucks and other vehicles appeared along with diverse agricultural machinery...

True, the Yugoslav economy revealed the signs of a crisis already in the early 1980s. Foreign financing taps dried out and the Yugoslavs once again had to live off their work alone. In the 1980-1990 period the average economic growth dropped to –0.1 per cent, productivity of labor to –1.2 per cent and the investment rate to –5.5 per cent. Annual inflation rate soared to 84 per cent. The weary economy did not employ new labor and the unemployment rate increased to 16 per cent of workforce. Salaries and pensions rapidly decreased and the standard of living dropped by a third, practically to the level of the mid-1960s.

Still, the society did not manifest strong discontent. People believed that the crisis was momentary and would soon be overcome. The overall social mood in Serbia was still very favorable. Although ordinary people, overwhelmed by egalitarian consciousness, continuously objected the "unjust privileges" of political and economic managers, sociological research shows that overall material inequalities in Serbia were far lower than in the West (Popović 1987). The political and economic elites were still open for recruitment of new members from all social strata and self-reproduction of the elite was practically non-existent. Even the most critical sociological researches revealed that the descendents of the so-called collective-owner class rarely managed to reach the ruling social positions themselves. The furthest they got was usually the professional strata, and a third failed to reach even that far (Lazić, 1987).

During the 1980s the people in Serbia realized that they still lived better than citizens of any other socialist country. At the same time, they were fully aware that their society was far more just than any Western capitalist society. They knew they had vastly greater personal and even political liberty than citizens of other socialist countries. At the same time, they also knew that they enjoyed the privileges many western employees could only dream of: namely that they practically could not be dismissed and did not work too hard, that they were treated in good hospitals and their children attended good schools... It was almost an ideal society for an ordinary man, a society of equal possibilities and openness for all, a society where life was relaxed, pleasant and full of traditional sociability. If only the economy was a little better...

But, in 1990 economy, too, was revived. This came in consequence of reforms initiated towards the end of 1989 by the new federal prime minister Ante Marković. The inflation rate dropped from 48 per cent registered in September 1989 to 0 per cent in May 1990. The internal convertibility of the domestic currency was introduced. State foreign exchange reserves grew by over 50 per cent - from six to ten billion dollars. Let us recall that at that time Polish foreign reserves amounted to 2.2 billion dollars (in 1990), Czech to 8.3 (in 1991), Hungarian 3.9 (in 1991), Bulgarian 1.8 (in 1991) and Romanian 0.4 billion dollars (in 1991). Export-import coverage was 110 per cent. The GDP per capita crossed the limit of 4,000 dollars of that time, which in terms of the real purchasing power in Yugoslavia actually meant 6.700 dollars. Yugoslavia was probably economically the most advanced socialist country of that time. After the multiparty system was legalized (in 1990) it seemed that Yugoslavia would be the first East European country to join the EU.

Milošević's decade (1991-2000)

And then, in 1991, Yugoslavia violently disintegrated. In the following years the Serbian economy suffered severe blows. The entire society was, in economic terms, relegated several decades back. The disintegration of Yugoslavia caused the breakup of the joint market (1991-1992). Then came the UN sanctions against Serbia with an almost complete trade isolation of the country to last more than six years (1992-1996 and 1998-2000). Military and material assistance provided to the Serbs in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia (1991-1995) additionally exhausted the country, while the NATO bombing of Serbia (1999), resulted in a direct war damage of four billion dollars. The total, indirect and direct damage Serbia suffered during the wars of Yugoslav succession (1991-1999) is estimated at close to a hundred billion dollars.

The Serbian economy was completely ruined. Industrial production dropped by a third. The GDP was halved. Salaries decreased by seven eights, and the third of the employed had to wait for their wages, small as they were, for months on end. One in each three households had one unemployed member. At one point of time (1993) inflation reached an annual rate of 35 thousand billion per cent. Already in early 1991 the banks stopped the payment of citizens' foreign exchange savings. After that they often could not pay even the regular salaries or pensions. Two thirds of Serbia's population was reduced to poverty and one in each three had the income insufficient for bare sustenance.

The wars, trade embargo and inflation dealt the hardest blow to the urban population with fixed income. The most endangered were, in the first place, the pensioners, as illustrated by the following account: "I recall a scene in a bakery in Belgrade in December 1993. The price of bread was tripled over night. Several old people queued for bread, and when they had to pay for it they realized that they did not have enough money – all of them were pensioners. The vendor, actually the shop manager, covered a part of the difference and called upon all others in the shop to contribute, if they could. We all gave what we had. The receivers-pensioners cried and the entire queue broke into sobs with them" (Avramović, 1998:19).

City clerks and workers were the second most severely hit category. The government adopted legislation (1992) prescribing that, while the country was under threat, no one could be dismissed. But, since there were no real jobs, the salaries dropped to such a low level that it was impossible to live off them. Workers and clerks started to engage in petty smuggling and resale. The authorities permitted that, since these modern-day peddlers supplied Serbia with cigarettes, food, clothing and gasoline. Still, social pride prevented many from standing behind upturned cardboard boxes in the streets, with their usual display of cigarettes, sardine cans and "Milka" chocolate. But the long-drawn-out deprivation and unemployment forced people into accepting all sorts of humiliation. "An unemployed doctor," for instance, "weighted down by poverty, was forced to take her two daughters to a soup kitchen. Seeing the strange faces of the starved paupers, a child asked her mother to explain what kind of a place was that. The desperate mother, trying to preserve the tiny bit of a pride she had left, could only say, 'This is a special restaurant, not everyone can it in'" (DR, 1994: 135-138).

In contrast to the impoverished majority, a thin layer of wealthy people was formed. Being political and economic managers they formed the top of Slobodan Milošević's regime. Milošević discontinued any further privatization in 1994. Thus 85 per cent of capital in Serbia remained under the state supervision. This also meant that Milošević and his government appointed all directors. Socialist directors were known to abuse their position even before. But, there was some control at least, by the workers, the party, and the police. Milošević, however, either abolished or reduced all these controls. Wishing to attach the managerial elite to himself as firmly as possible, he permitted its members to amass wealth illegally. And the more Milošević's legitimacy dwindled, the wider and deeper the system of corruption grew. Ultimately, corruption penetrated every single pore of the society – from company director to night watchman. A large portion of the society became part of the same clientelist network. People gradually became accomplices in the overall plunder of state property. The only difference was that what the night watchman took home with him was an electric bulb, while the director carried a bagful of dollars. And, the night watchman was ever poorer, while the director grew increasingly wealthier.

Sociological researches carried out in Serbia during the 1990s, indicated a remarkable increase in intrastratal inequalities with respect to material conditions of life. The top and the bottom of the social ladder grew more distant and at a rapid pace. A visible gap between the top and the middle part of the ladder also appeared. The economic status of professionals and clerks, who formed the basis of the middle class, was far closer to that of the workers than of the political and economic managers (Lazić, 2002:29). The peasants fared a bit better, since they were not overly dependent either on imports or exports. Their decline on the social ladder was substantially slower than that of other strata, which is why many workers and clerks were now bellow them. But, practically all parts of society, save the very top, went down and were extremely dissatisfied with their respective places on the social scale.

As time passed, their dissatisfaction increased. Initially, most Serbs, guided by their collectivist tradition, believed that certain sacrifices were necessary in order to attain the national interests. The large drop in the income of an average family was mitigated by using the savings, relying on parents in the villages, or intensive cultivation of one's own patch of land. The hardships of daily life were eased by the thought that this misfortune, too, will pass and that the troubles of everyday life spread across the whole society. But the troubles did not pass, and it became increasingly obvious that they were very unevenly distributed. While some fed their children in soup kitchens, others transferred millions of dollars to their accounts abroad. After the war with the West in 1999, even the largest dreamers clearly understood that Serbia would be excommunicated and their families left in poverty as long as Slobodan Milošević remained in power. Thus, on September 24, 2000 Milošević lost the elections. And then, after having refused to acknowledge defeat, he was deposed in a genuine popular revolution on October 5, 2000.

On road to Europe (after 2000)

The overthrowing of Milošević restored the nation's pride and gave rise to a lot of hopes. Serbia was soon returned into the international community, the sanctions were lifted, and financial and other aid started to arrive. In the next tree years Serbia received 2.9 million euros worth of assistance from the West, or almost the amount of the annual budget of the Serbian state. With this assistance, Serbia avoided an economic and social breakdown apparently inevitable in 2000. The annual inflation rate was reduced to 11 per cent (2003), and a stable dinar exchange rate was set. Foreign aid and a stable exchange rate resulted in increased foreign exchange reserves of the national Bank of Serbia, which grew from 0.3 billion dollars in October 2000 to 3.4 billion in April 2004.

Deep economic and social reforms were initiated and most importantly speedier privatization. Despite Milošević's moves limiting privatization, a substantial growth of the private sector was registered already during his rule. This sector with 160 thousand workers in 1991 employed 500 thousand already in 2000. Yet, employment in the private sector was still three times less than in the public sector. During the three post-Milošević years (2001-2004), 1,417 enterprises out of the anticipated 7,000 were privatized. Thus a third of the workers are employed in the private sector. The average monthly pay was tripled: from 80 dollars (September 2000), to 240 (April 2004).

Still, despite this improvement, an ordinary man in Serbia remained dissatisfied. He expected far more. He hoped that after Milošević's downfall, life in Serbia would at least approach the style of the 1980s. But these expectations came to nothing. True, his salary was increased. But 240 dollars were still a far cry from the 460 he had had in December 1990. True again, the foreign exchange rate was stable. But, the prices were not. Since Milošević's demise, the foreign exchange rate increased by 18 per cent, compared with the price increase of 156 per cent. Fifteen out of sixteen parts of the Serbian population's savings were in foreign exchange deposits. But now, their thousand dollars were actually worth 420, and the value of their small savings was practically halved.

Moreover, joblessness remained high. With two million employed workers, another million were looking for jobs. According to the official data, 200 thousand of the employed worked without pay and 40 per cent of employees in public enterprises were considered redundant (*Ekonometar*, 29 June 2004, p.12). In textile industry alone, 140 thousand workers received less than 50 euros per month. Among the unemployed as many as 870 thousand received no unemployment benefits (*Politika*, 8 April 2004, p. B1). The government claimed it its major success that in 2003, 100 thousand more were employed than dismissed. But this actually meant that those still unemployed would not be able to find jobs practically for years, and even decades ahead.

The economy was mending slowly and painfully, and many wondered whether it would fully recover ever again. The growth of the domestic product registered in the first post-Milošević year, small as it was (5.7 per cent), more than halved in the next two years (1.5 per cent in 2003). The overall GDP in Serbia in 2003 amounted to only 52 per cent of that in 1990. The growth of industrial product was also decreasing, and even registered a drop of 3 per cent in 2003.

The country's foreign debt increased from 10 to 13.5 billion dollars (1 January 2004). Together with the foreign exchange debt of the state to the citizens (3.5 billion dollars), this was more than the overall Serbia's GDP in 2003. True, on 1 July 2004 the London club, comprising 600 commercial banks, wrote off 1.6 billion dollars of Serbia's debt. But indebtedness remained an insoluble problem for Serbia, bearing primarily in mind that in the meantime its balance of payments deficit increased from 1.8 billion (in 2000) to 4.8 billion dollars (in 2003). This deficit was redressed by foreign aid and remittances (amounting to about three billion dollars in total) and there was also some inflow of foreign funds through privatization (862 million euros in 200 and 2003 combined). Still, Serbia is facing a real danger of a debt crisis, since with the receipts it has, it will not be able to service its debt (annual repayment due in 2009 will reach as high as 1.63 billion dollars).

To make things worse, foreign assistance is dwindling and Serbia's accession to the EU, which many people expected would set the economy straight, seems further away than ever. In mid-2004 Serbia was still among the last of the countries standing in line to be admitted to the EU. It did not have even the "feasibility study" and let alone a set date for accession to the Union.

Meanwhile the social strata grew increasingly far apart. On the very top of the social ladder Milošević's profiteers not only retained their capital but continued to enlarge it. The top of the social pyramid included about 300 richest citizens who, judging by their tax forms, earned over 30,000 euros in 2003. The most successful among them reported a monthly income of 215 thousand euro. Precisely these richest men were most often the buyers of privatized companies. Milorad Mišković (Delta M), e.g. bought "Pekabeta", PIK Bečej, Namateks (Subotica), Bazar (Novi Sad); Miodrag Kostić (MK Commerce) bought three sugar plants, Bačka sugar factory, Tehnoteks (Subotica), Proing (Novi Sad); Dragoljub Marković (Krmivo produkt) purchased Vojvodina produkt, PIK Moravica, IM Čajetina, etc. Privatization was expected to attract foreign investors whose knowledge and funds would get the economy going. But, the public impression is that the bulk of the companies were bought by domestic buyers, most often below price, and almost without any additional investments into development.

For most of the workers who had not been made redundant few things were changed, expect that they had a new boss. They were employed just as before, for a somewhat higher salary, but they worked more and with less management rights than ever before. A smaller part of the middle class, comprising those with high professional education and knowledge of foreign languages, was given the opportunity to work for the foreign employer and thus obtain a salary many times higher than the average. But vacancies of this kind were substantially fewer than those interested to fill them, and much too often, the keeping of such a job demanded the acceptance of a blackmailing and humiliating treatment by the foreign employers. The major part of the middle class – teachers, doctors, jurists – remained in state employ. Their salaries were somewhat higher than during Milošević, but still substantially below the status needs of the middle class. Small salaries provided the justification to continue the practice, widespread in Milošević's time, to "additionally award" providers of medical and other services (i.e. bribe taking and giving). This intensified the overall impression that changes in Serbia after October 5, 2000 were precious few.

Thus in the present day Serbia almost everybody is dissatisfied – the workers, and the lower middle class, and also the higher middle class. According to public opinion surveys done in May 2004, as many as 74 per cent of Serbian citizens were dissatisfied with their social status, 51 per cent of them described their economic position as "bad" and "insupportable", while 57 per cent believed that "developments in Serbia have taken a wrong direction" (Branković, 2004).

Generally speaking, this discontent was part of the prevailing social mood in Serbia, entirely different from other post-communist countries. Remembrance of the communists past for the former Soviet satellites, often recalled material deprivation and isolation from Europe, as well as state dependence from Moscow. And, however difficult their present may seem, they still clearly see and feel an improvement – at least for some strata of the population. Contrary to that, remembrances of the communist past in Serbia recall affluence, passports to travel all over the world and full national sovereignty. And as for a particularly visible improvement, it went missing practically for all, including even the higher middle strata.

In addition, the future of other post-communist countries is clearly defined by a strategic goal of joining the European Union. For most of these countries entry of the EU is a predominantly technical matter, one of adjusting the economy and legislature to the practices of the West. For Serbia, on the other hand, entry into the EU today (at the end of 2004) seems like a dark and entirely uncertain future, the overcoming of ever new, insurmountable obstacles. Serbia has already extradited to the ICTY two of its former presidents, one prime minister, one vice prime minister, several ministers and a multitude of generals. But it is still told not to reckon with entering the EU until it started to "fully cooperate with The Hague". After 1999, Serbia relinquished direct administration over Kosovo and left the protection of local Serbs to the USA and the EU. But it is now told, true still unofficially, that it may only count on accession to the EU if it agrees to a full independence of Kosovo and leaves the Kosmet Serbs to the "sense for tolerance" of the local ethnic majority. Serbia is quite clear that the road to the EU leads through integration into NATO. But, it is requested to waive the claims for damages for NATO bombing before The Hague's Court of Justice, while this same court threatens to make it indemnify Croatia and Bosnia for the war damage they sustained from 1991 until 1995.

It is therefore small wonder that for an average inhabitant of Serbia thoughts about the future often have a bitter taste. In order to enter the EU he is requested to calmly witness the sale of enterprises he believed were his and his children's, to look on as a handful of profiteers grow ever richer while he and his friends become increasingly impoverished; to start working for the patron he until recently recognized as a party secretary or war supplier; to listen to his daughter tell him about her foreign boss and his "offer one is well advised not turn down"; to watch the prosecutor of The Hague tribunal treat Serbia as a supermarket with free goods to be hoarded on the shopping trolley without a clear idea what to do with them; to stand by as the remaining Serbs are banished from Kosovo and hear others say that it is only because Serbia is opposed to an "independent, multiethnic and multicultural Kosovo"; to forget 88 children perished from NATO bombs, and all the ruined factories and schools, but never to let it slip his mind that he alone is obliged to pay for all the damage in the wars of Yugoslav succession (1991-1995). In brief, to be poor and work hard and forget about the last vestiges of national pride so that one day, in fifteen or twenty years, Serbia will finally deserve to be admitted to the EU. And then, after another ten years start living as he did in the 1980s, and after twenty more, as he once lived in the 1970s.

It is therefore hardly surprising that many people in Serbia do not find this future particularly attractive. That is why at least 40 per cent of its population – judging by the most recent election results – believe that the ticket for entry into Europe is too dear; that Serbia should give it back and turn towards itself; and, since Serbia will anyway remain a poor society, it will do better to remain a society of equals, because in equality poverty is easier to support; that it is better to have a smaller state, but its own, than a larger state framework with a foreign and unfriendly administration. Although this view is in Serbia still voiced by a minority, it is not inconceivable that at one point of time in the near future it may even prevail.

Therefore, this fourth attempt to modernize Serbia does not have a particularly bright future. The weak Serbian economy cannot sustain the inherited expectations of its population for European earnings and lifestyle with African productivity (working habits and quality of products). Neither can the weak Serbian economy sustain the continuing efforts of the international bureaucracy to end every single failure in the resolution of regional issues in the Balkans by punishing Serbia. Caught between the rock and the hard place, the society here will not be able to avoid the mounting of internal tensions. And increased internal tensions may easily end in violence – social, ethnic or political.

Bearing in mind that the European path of Serbia is increasingly less certain the local elites have the task to promptly develop the so-called exit i.e. reserve strategy for the Serbian society. Although accession to the EU as soon as possible probably offers Serbia the only chance to carry out its modernization (Antonić, 2003: 92), the possible breakdown of this project must not be accompanied by yet another collapse of the Serbian society. If the European Union treats Serbia without much understanding of its specific features, than at least the country's elite should have these specifics in mind. This also applies to the academic elite, which armed with the experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s, must not permit unfortunate developments to catch it unawares yet one more time.

Mladen Lazić,
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STRATIFICATIONAL CHANGES IN SERBIAN SOCIETY: A CASE OF BLOCKED POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

ABSTRACT: This paper is a comparative analysis of stratificational aspects of the prolonged post-socialist transformation of the Serbian society. The process of post-socialist transformation in Serbia is divided into two periods. The first, encompassing the years 1990-2000, is described as blocked transformation. The second period, from 2000 until today, is characterized as delayed transformation. It is our hypothesis that both phases of the transformation are "path-dependent" and deviate from the model of "successful post-socialist transition'‘. This does not imply just the evident fact that in the Serbian society a recognizable structure of the modern capitalist society has not yet been built, either in the forms of class composition and class reproduction, or in the social consciousness; it also implies a possibility that the critical social consensus for achieving this goal in the near future might go missing, due to a substantial increase in the underclass and the persistence of a nationalist political core. Stratificational changes have been analyzed in three dimensions: economic inequalities, class mobility, and value orientations. Each of these dimensions is operationalized on the basis of a set of indicators. The analysis is based on three large-scale surveys, conducted in 1989, 1997 and 2003.

KEY WORDS: social stratification, post-socialist transformation, economic inequalities, class mobility, value orientations, Serbia.

I Introduction

This work, in a comparative manner, deals with the aspects of stratification during the prolonged post-socialist transformation of the Serbian society. The process of post-socialist change in Serbia is divided into two periods. The first period lasted from 1989 until the second half of the 1990s and can be characterized as a " blocked transformation". The second period gained momentum in 2000 and may be described as one of "delayed transformation". Our hypothesis is that both stages of this transformation have been "path dependent" and deviate from what might be called a "successful post-socialist transition" pattern. This means that the processes of re-stratification and new class formation have taken a specific direction (involving different recruitment patterns of the elite, decreasing economic inequalities in the first transformation period and increasing in the second, and extended resistance toward systemic change). Changes in stratification are analyzed in three dimensions: social mobility, economic inequalities, and the value system. The analysis is based on three large surveys conducted in 1989, 1997 and 2003/2004.

1. Yugoslav socialism: quasi-market "liberal" model

Yugoslav socialism – including the Serbian society – was characterized by several important distinction marks. Command economy, political monism and ideological monopoly did represent its generic basis (cf. Lazić, 1987; see also Feher, Heller, Markus, 1984). But, the early confrontation of the Yugoslav communist leadership with the Soviet "nomenklatura" enabled the social system to develop some specific characteristics. The successful resistance of this leadership to Stalin in 1948 was itself the result of one of these specificities, namely the autochthonous origin of the Yugoslav communist regime. The regime was not installed by Soviet tanks, as was the case of other Central and Eastern European countries, but came to power owing to the war-time victories of the partisan movement (i.e. its own instruments of power – the army and the police – formed during World War II, as well as the legitimacy obtained by resistance to both the external enemy and the domestic chauvinist outrage).

In order to secure mass support of the population, as much as the necessary external helps of Western countries, the Yugoslav communist leadership started to build some institutional and legitimation patterns that in some respects represented counterpoints to the dominant characteristics of the Soviet system. Thus, in the early 1950s, e.g., the attempt to establish collective ownership in agriculture was abandoned and agricultural production, for the most part, left to small landowners (limited private ownership was also retained in crafts, trade and services sectors). Self-management, which proclaimed employee control of enterprises - thus also ideologically establishing "substantive democracy" as opposed to the "formal" one of the West - actually provided a legal framework to increase the autonomy of the managerial stratum within the collective-owner class.[1] That process went hand in hand with the introduction of a "socialist market" primarily of consumer goods, followed by a labor market (largely suspended in the early 1970s due to the high unemployment growth rate), and a capital market of a highly restricted scope. Increasing economic and political openness toward the West enabled a relatively free flow of goods, people (a million of Yugoslav "guest workers" were employed in Western European countries during the 1970s) and ideas ("liberal" socialism permitted a relatively high level of criticism, mostly in science and culture, and the level of repression was low).

[1] On directorial domination in "self-management" enterprises see: Županov, 1972; Obradović, 1974; Lazić, 1981.

These specific characteristics of the Yugoslav model of socialism also resulted in some peculiarities of the class system, and especially of the system of economic inequalities. Several sociological surveys in this field were carried out during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the data so obtained differed, in some cases significantly (cf. Popović, ed. 1977; Popović, ed. 1987; Lazić, 1987; Lazić, 1994; Saksida et al., 1977; Berković, 1986). Popović found that, despite the registered inequalities, the distribution of economic and political power in Serbia was not remarkably hierarchical. Saksida established the existence of substantial, but insignificantly interconnected inequalities in the distribution of economic wealth, power and prestige. Finally, Lazić's survey in Croatia and Serbia identified a high level of inequalities both in the distribution of economic wealth and in the overall social position of basic groups. Of course, these differences were based on different theoretical concepts and corresponding methodologies characteristic of the three surveys (see the critique of Popović and Saksida's approaches in Lazić, 1994, pp. 55-64). Common to all these (and other) researches was the conclusion that economic inequalities did exist in the Yugoslav (Serbian) society and were connected with the hierarchical distribution of positions (with the nomenklatura at the top of the social hierarchy, professionals in the middle, and manual workers and, especially, peasants at the bottom).

However, elements of a (quasi)market economy "intervened" in the system of distribution. A relative autonomy of enterprises enabled the managers to increase their incomes, and pay higher salaries to professionals (thus improving their relative position in comparison with skilled workers – in obvious contrast to other socialist countries). Another consequence of this autonomy was revealed in regional and industrial income differences (salaries and wages were higher in economically more developed republics – Slovenia and Croatia, and remained around the average level in Serbia; also, the incomes of all occupational groups were well above the average in some sectors – oil and tobacco industries, finances, for example, and below the average in others – cf. Berković, 1986). In addition, private property in trade and services secured much higher incomes to small entrepreneurs. On the other hand, legal obstacles to the expansion of private businesses prompted all higher income strata (entrepreneurs, managers and professionals) to channel their earnings into different forms of consumption, instead of economic investments.

2. Serbia during the 1990s: the period of blocked transformation

The collective owner class in Yugoslavia was destabilized in consequence of internal struggle for the top hierarchical positions during the decade after the death of Josip Broz Tito, which was also marked by a profound economic crisis. The struggle for power stalled the economic reforms almost until the end of the decade, and a new attempt at market reorganization under Ante Marković's government – initiated after the start-up of Eastern European post-socialist transformation – was interrupted by the violent breakdown of the country and prolonged civil wars. Peculiar to Serbia in this period of structural changes was the fact that the power was in the hands of a regime emerged from the ranks of the former nomenklatura, which resulted in a blocked (post-socialist) transformation.[2] By "blocked transformation" we mean the process in which the former League of Communists' "societal *monopoly* was replaced by interlocked positions of economic and political *dominance* in order to postpone the development of a market economy and political competition" (Lazić, in Higley and Lengyel, eds. 2000: 130). On the basis of its continuous domination this group managed a large-scale conversion of its previous monopolistic social position into economic (private) capital. The large proportions of this conversion are evidenced by our previous research finding showing that the members of the former nomenklatura and its networks (of family and friends), during the first half of the 1990s managed to take two thirds of elite entrepreneurial positions, far more than in any other post-socialist country (cf. Lazić, in Lazić, ed., 1995).

Quite obviously, the very fact of *conversion* of power positions into private capital proves that important changes in the society were (however slowly) taking place even during the period of blocked transformation. The multi-party system gained institutional footing, firm enough to ensure the electoral change of the regime (in 2000). Furthermore, a slow process of privatization of "social"/state property – which secured the legitimacy basis of the expanding market economy! – was accompanied by a much faster growth of an autochthonous private sector. Consequently, a survey done in 1997 revealed a significant increase in the number of people who climbed to the entrepreneurial stratum of the economic elite from the positions of small entrepreneurs or professionals (cf. Lazić, ed., 2000: 39).

The formation of a new class at the top of the social ladder was followed by restructuring in other parts of the social hierarchy. Conjunctural factors influenced these processes almost as strongly as systemic ones. In the early 1990s Serbia was simultaneously faced with a post-socialist transformation, civil wars, international isolation and sanctions, an enormous drop of the GDP and hyperinflation. The sudden pauperization of a huge majority of the population went in parallel with the enrichment of a small stratum of people who (while controlling the state apparatuses: the police, army and bureaucracy) engaged in economic activities connected with the war and violation of international sanctions (import of arms, oil, etc.). The dismantling of the command economy mechanisms concurred with the increase in the redistributive role of the state, which was unavoidable given the economic breakdown of the country. In this way, the increasing differentiation between the top and the bottom of the social hierarchy was combined with diminishing income inequalities among all social strata below the small uppermost circle, while other status characteristics remained mostly unchanged (unequal property, education, work conditions, etc.). In addition, re-stratification processes – on all hierarchical levels! – were more and more influenced by private property: peasants, who used to be a relatively ho-

[2] Socialist party – led by S. Milošević – a direct successor of the communist party, won the first multi-party elections in Serbia in 1990 primarily due to the successful nationalistic mobilization of the majority of the population achieved immediately *before* the breakdown of the communist system in Europe. Its new legitimation provided it with a firm power basis as long as interethnic and international conflicts enabled a strong internal homogenization of the population.

mogenous group, started to differentiate; the economic status of small entrepreneurs also improved; while large entrepreneurs reached the very top of the economic status pyramid; (cf. empirical findings on economic differentiation in Serbia during the 1990s in Lazić, ed. 2000).

3. Serbia after Milošević: the transformation "unblocked"?

It is our hypothesis that the basic social effect of the blocked transformation – controlled conversion of command positions into economic capital – was achieved by the mid-1990s, while afterwards the new economic elite tended to "normalize" the social system, in order to secure its new position. Although the unblocking of the transformation (the rise of an autochthonous private sector in the economy, electoral success of opposition parties at the local elections in almost all big cities in 1996, e.g.) started already during Milošević's regime, it took the war with NATO in 1999 to show the regime's inability to provide stabile conditions of social reproduction. That was the reason why a significant part of the new economic elite withdrew its support to Milošević and in this way helped his fall from power in 2000.

The change of the political regime spurred the transformation process, both internally and internationally. The arbitrary role of the state in the economy, established to replace the command role during the 1990s, was now changed into the regulatory one. Privatization was accelerated, the economic system was stabilized, inflation curbed (to less than 10% in 2003) and foreign trade substantially increased. Economic stabilization and foreign financial aid secured a significant increase in incomes and the living standard of the population (even if privatization actually led to a rise in unemployment and the stabilization of the system probably reduced the number of people engaged in the gray economy, which accounted for 40-45% of the GDP during the mid-1990s – cf. Mrkšić, in Lazić, ed. 1995). Therefore, we may suppose that the process of increasing social differentiation, which took the form of polarization during the 1990s (confronting a small minority at the top with the rest of the population), has been re-formed in recent years – spreading through the whole social pyramid, in parallel with the rising real incomes of most social strata. Therefore, we may also suppose the widespread increase in the living standard to be juxtaposed with the growing inter-class, intra-class and even intra-stratal economic differentiation. Of course, we may expect certain changes in recruitment patterns of the economic elite (representing a continuation of the already mentioned tendency, formed in the second half of the 1990s), with a diminishing proportion of former nomenklatura members within its composition and increasing upward mobility into this elite of small entrepreneurs, managers (coming from state/public enterprises) and professionals. In the sphere of values, we may suppose that the unblocked transformation has been accompanied by a weaker ethnic homogenization and the expansion of the liberal doctrine due to the end of the war and the strengthening of market economy elements. At the same time, the existential difficulties of some social groups, considered the losers in the transformation process (most peasants, manual – especially unskilled – workers, and the lower non-manual stratum), ensure the continuing presence of traditional values and the distributive ideology among their members.

4. Survey of re-stratification and value changes in 2003/04: methodological remarks

The survey, which represents the basis of this paper, was carried out in the period November 2003 – January 2004,[3] and allows comparisons with earlier surveys, conducted in Serbia in 1989, 1993, and 1997 (for the surveys and basic findings see, respectively, Lazić, 1994; Lazić, ed., 1995; Lazić, ed., 2000). The samples for these 4 surveys were of different types and sizes. In 1989 a quota sample of adults (above 18) excluding economically dependent citizens was applied. The quotas were based on social classes derived from a list of occupations, and the size of the sample was 4382. In the 1993, 1997 and 2003 surveys national samples of adults were multistage PPS, 1112, 1996 and 2997 large, respectively.

The four surveys were, in one part, planed as cross-sectional time-series. Therefore, large parts of the questionnaires were identical and allowed the comparison of all investigated dimensions: social mobility, economic positions and value orientations. Since the 1997 questionnaire did not contain attitude scales, the analysis of value orientations in the period of blocked transformation used the data of the 1993 survey.

The key unit of our analysis is the class, defined by the role of a group in the reproduction of a given system of social relations. Classes form a social hierarchy, based on differences in economic, political and cultural capital, which make their relations potentially conflictual. At the same time classes are internally complex, divided into groups made of individuals who share similar life conditions (for more on the concept of class, see Lazić, 1996). In our survey classes were operationalized by the occupation and education of respondents, to construe a hierarchy of seven: 1. small farmers; 2. unskilled non/manual employees; 3. skilled manual workers; 4. non-manual employees (with secondary education), self-employed (with secondary education); 5. professionals, self-employed (with university degree – attorneys, medical doctors etc.); 6. small entrepreneurs, lower managers; 7. medium and large entrepreneurs, medium and higher managers, politicians. The bearer of the class position is the household, and the dominance approach is used, which means that households are assigned the class position of their highest ranked members. Pensioners and the unemployed who previously had had jobs were assigned class positions based on their former employment. The permanently unemployed, housewives and students were classified according to their partner's position if married or, if not,

[3] The *Southeast European Social Survey Project (SEESSP)*, financed by the Norwegian government's Council for Science was led by Al Simkus, with Mladen Lazić as coordinator for Serbia.

according to their father's or their child's position if they lived in the same household.

II Social mobility

This chapter will deal with intergenerational class mobility in Serbia in 1989, 1997 and 2003. The purpose of the analysis is to estimate the changed flexibility of the structural hierarchy in the period of post-socialist transformation.

1. Basic characteristics of social mobility in Serbia before the 1990s

The class formation in a society is determined by the system of social reproduction, where individuals and social groups take positions in the social structure by combining different forms of capital (Lazić, 1996). Furthermore, mobility channels towards these positions are determined by the character of the social system. The change of the social system, as well as the change of the social mobility regime in Serbia, have been marked by developments at three levels: in the global system, in the regional transformation of post-socialist societies and at the level of specific historical features of the Serbian society.

In this sense, in the post World War II Serbia four stages in the change of the social structure may be distinguished: socialist modernization, the crisis of socialism, blocked post-socialist transformation and the process of un-blocking the transformation. In these stages different factors influenced the profiling of the social mobility model. In the first stage, class mobility was mostly influenced by deagrarianization, expansion of the education system and egalitarian legitimization of the system. During the crisis, important roles were played by the stagnating socialist economy and increasing social inequalities, expressed in the declining chances of lower classes to enter higher and middle class positions. In the period of blocked transformation, civil wars and economic isolation brought about a sharp economic downfall, which, together with the criminalization of the economy, caused a further growth of inequalities and class polarization. The last three years have been marked by a trend of gradual stabilization of transformation, but its course has, at the same time, become even more path dependent. The usual paradoxes of post-socialist transformation (Offe, 1995), which influence the formation of new and the positioning of the existing social strata, are even more emphasized, due to a prolonged economic crisis and increased unemployment. The change of the political elite, stagnation of small entrepreneurship, improved position of professionals, and declining social safety of the lower strata are all structural effects that we recognize as the post-socialist transformation in Serbian becomes unblocked.

Several studies describe the different aspects of mobility regimes at the end of the socialist period (Bogdanović, 1987; Lazić, 1987; Miladinović, 1993) and during the blocked transformation in Serbia (Cvejić, 2000; Lazić, 2000b). In general, these researches point to a trend of growing class inequalities and declining social mobility during the 1980s, as well as an apparent self-reproduction of classes and polarization of the social structure during the 1990s. In this sense, the crisis of socialism could be recognized even in the 1970s. The wave of modernization after World War II characterized by a rapid decline of the peasant class (from approx. 75% of active population in 1953 to around 50% in 1971 – cf. Radovanović, 1995: 243) and increase in all other classes, had a different effect during the 1970s and 1980s. The trend of structural mobility (a further drop of the peasants' share in active population to approx. 27% in 1991) was not followed by the same trend in real mobility, since the increase in the volume of the middle and collective-owner classes (the share of the middle class increased from 2.7% of active population in 1953 to 13.5% in 1991, cf. Radovanović, 1995) was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in their self-reproduction.

2. Characteristics of mobility during and after the 1990s

The increase in unemployment to over 30% and the extremely high share of the informal economy in the GDP during the 1990s (ranging, according to different estimates, from 31% to as high as 55% – cf. Krstić et al, 1998: 12; the figure was lowered to 33% in 2000 – c.f. Krstić and Stojanović 2001: fn. 27) stressed the problem of pauperization and gave an additional impetus to the already obvious process of class self-reproduction[4] (Cvejić, 2000; Cvejić, 2002). The effects of such dual structuring may be seen on graph 1[5]:

[4] "The price of labor on the informal market is higher than on the formal, but it is only because of tax evasion. On the other hand, the worker gets the smaller part of the withheld tax (46%), while the larger part of the amount goes to the employer (54%). This scheme additionally increases social inequalities by unjustly distributing the funds that should, among other things, cover the overall social and health insurance. That directly affects the strata on the social margin, and indirectly also the future of the major part of society" (Cvejić, 2000: 300).

[5] The graph was produced in an earlier cohort analysis of social mobility (Cvejić, 2000: 317). The definition of classes was basically the same as the one in this paper. Politicians, large and medium entrepreneurs and managers were merged into the 'ruling class'. Small entrepreneurs and professionals constituted the 'middle class' and the rest of the strata were combined to form the 'lower class'.

Graph 1. Selfdirection rates for 3 classes, absolute and relative to total immobility (DS model)



Obviously, the lines of absolute self-direction rates in intergenerational mobility for the three classes have been growing over time. The fact that the line of the relative self-direction rate for the lower class is decreasing means that the closure of the middle and ruling classes dominated in the overall trend of growing immobility.

Our examination now turns to the descriptive analysis of obstacles to upward intergenerational mobility. The following table gives the odds ratios for all pairs of classes of origin and destination based on our seven-class typology (explained in the Introduction), comparatively for the three years when our surveys were carried out. The odds ratios show how much higher are the chances of descendants in selected classes to stay in the class of origin than to move to either of the other two classes.

Table 1. Odds ratios for all pairs of classes of origin and destination, for 7 classes in 1989, 1997 and 2003

89 / 97 / 03	CLASS OF DESTINATION																	
CLASS OF ORIGIN	2			3			4			5			6			7		
1	10	*10*	**10**	23	*19*	**28**	94	*138*	**61**	955	*1104**	**1860***	35	*887**	**2204***	228*	*663**	**3294***
2				4	*9*	**7**	11	*20*	**31**	161	*535*	**451**	15	*433*	**1270***	46	*850**	**148**
3							4	*10*	**8**	21	*36*	**50**	15	*44**	**93**	12	*661**	**197**
4										4	*11*	**10**	10	*26*	**23**	3	*21*	**24**
5													13	*148*	**34**	2	*43*	**12**
6																25	*442**	**253**

* Value 0,5 was added to the cells in 2 X 2 contingency tables that have 0 frequency

Classes: 1 – small farmers, 2 – unskilled non/manual workers, 3 – skilled manual workers, 4 – non-manual employees (with secondary education), 5 – professionals, 6 – small entrepreneurs, lower managers; 7 – medium and big entrepreneurs, managers, politicians (for the full list see the Introduction)

The data in Table 1 might be interpreted following the horizontal, vertical or diagonal lines. If we start the analysis vertically, class by class, we can conclude, first, that class 1 descendants face a gradual increase in barriers to move upward from one year to the next (it should be noted that there are some variations in the upper part of the ladder). In 1989 and 1997 it was easier for them to enter class 6 than class 5, and in 1997 they entered class 7 easier than class 6. Comparing the years, it is apparent that the pattern of moving into the closest, class 2, has stabilized and that this is the most typical destination for those who are shifting to another class from their peasant origin. Secondary education, enlargement of a farm and intensified farm production are the next best solutions. But, ascent through entrepreneurial and educational channels for class 1 members is almost completely blocked from class 4 upwards.

Class 2 descendants also face a gradual increase in barriers moving up the hierarchy. Just as in the previous case, in 1989 and 1997 it was easier for them to climb to class 6 than class 5. However, unlike class 1 descendants, those of class 2 found it easier to enter classes 5 and 7 in 2003, and seem to bee shifting from the entrepreneurial to educational channel of ascent.

Class 3 descendants face a much more moderate increase in barriers compared with the former two classes. Same as class 2 descendants, they have been switching from the entrepreneurial to educational channel of ascent with time. The highest barriers for them are set for entry into class 7.

Chances for upward mobility of class 4 and 5 descendants are pretty much alike and can be presented together. Class 4 descendants encounter relatively low barriers climbing to class 5, and both groups have much higher odds to ascend than the lower classes, although they, too, face higher barriers after 1989. There are some differences between these two groups in the three surveyed years: class 4 descendants had better chances to enter class 6, especially in 1997. In that same year their odds for getting into class 7 were better than those of class 5 descendents, while in 2003 the trend was reversed. Finally, one of the most interesting findings in this sense is related to class 6 descendants. Namely, only descendants of classes 1 and 2 have steadily higher obstacles to enter class 7 than they do. Class 6 is relatively open to class 4 and 5 descendants, and partly also for descendants of class 3, but for them class 6 represents a substantially narrowed route of ascent.

If we analyze the table horizontally, by years, stagnation or rise of barriers could be seen all the way up to class 6 for descendants of the lower classes, except for class 4 as the destination for class 1 descendants. This exception may be related to further structural changes in the Serbian society, and the realistic appraisal of class 1 descendants that non-manual professions are becoming much more propulsive than manual and that it is more useful to obtain that kind of education. This appraisal is corroborated by the fact that odds of class 4 descendants to enter classes 5 and 6 are much higher than those of class 3 descendants. One could say that in this respect a trend of approximation of class 1 and 2 descendants does exist, which could explain a sudden reduction of obstacles for class 1 descendants to enter class 4 in the year 2003 (both findings are probably related to the relative growth of the tertial sector in Serbia).

Another finding which needs a comment concerns the sudden rise of barriers for class 5 descendants to enter class 6 in 1997. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, it seems logical for middle class descendants to refrain from entrepreneurial activities in a system in which market development was so wild and irregular and where, consequently, education and expertise were not adequately valued. Secondly, so high an odds ratio was partly produced by sampling bias in 1997.

This surprising growth of barriers in 1997 applies to ascent to the ruling class in general. In 2003 these barriers are getting lower for almost all classes, in comparison with 1997 (at this point we may also indicate some problems with the ruling class sample). An exception are members of class 1 whose descendants continue to face growing barriers in 2003, as well as class 4 descendants whose barriers, otherwise surprisingly low in 1997, are stagnating. We could say that, after the change of the political system in Serbia in 2000, overall mobility has been slowly increasing, compared with 1997, but mostly for descendants of non-manual classes. While the likelihood of getting to the ruling class positions grows, gradualness, which also means deceleration of ascent through the channel of education, becomes even more pronounced. A further strengthening of class 5 closure is apparent, and this opens the question of accessibility of higher education and labor market opportunities in Serbia for professionals of different class origin.

The above findings of inquiry into mobility by classes and by years may be best summed up with a diagonal analysis of the odds ratios table. In the case of a significant openness of the social structure, a straight line in this direction could not be drawn. In the case of Serbia, however, a diagonally directed line could be drawn in two ways. The first one would clearly isolate classes 1 and 2 from the upper half of the social ladder (professionals, small entrepreneurs and the ruling class), while the other, a little less marked, would add class 3 to the group of the marginalized. The close connection between small farmers and manual workers is one of the most apparent specific characteristics of the Serbian society and was carried over from the socialist period to the one of the deepening crisis (Cvetković, 2002). However, this mobility pattern should be observed as bilateral, since many workers whose fathers are farmers have been active in subsistence farming and very often live in the same household with farmers. Despite the fact that a smaller outflow of farmers to other destinations represents a common feature of mobility regimes in Europe (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 78), it could be, in the case of Serbia, additionally explained by the success of the mixed-economy strategy of peasant-worker households, which register the highest average score on the index of economic status (Babović, Cvejić, 2002).

A certain deviation from the rule of self-reproduction, apparent in comparison of 1997 and 2003, indicates a gradual increase in the flexibility of the social structure. However, while social mobility in Serbia in the 1980s could have been characterized as late in approaching the model of industrial societies, the ten-year period of the blocked transformation and the structural peculiarities which emerged in this period, open a possibility for the mobility regime in Serbia to diverge from those of most CEE countries, at least in the next few years. The structural peculiarities of some former socialist countries did not go unnoticed in mobility analyses (Domansky, 2000), but the significant variations in the openness of the ruling class in Serbia in the three analyzed years could be regarded as, what this author calls a rare phenomenon, a sudden turnover in stratification dynamics (Domansky, 2000: 45; see also Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 70). Therefore, it may happen that for some time yet instead of the "constant flux", self-reproduction of classes in Serbia will continue with an occasional sudden discharge. To the extent that social mobility is interpreted as the crucial intermediate process between structure and action (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 2, 30), these discharges may be expressed as radical political oppositions and sudden changes of class coalitions.

III Economic inequalities

In the Introduction we have outlined the problem of economic inequalities during the periods of late socialism and the blocked transformation. In this chapter we will addressed that problem in the recent times of the unblocked transformation and compare it with the two previous stages.

The processes of economic destruction of the system and of increase in social inequalities unfolded simultaneously during the 1990s to distinguish the ruling class with its economic power, from all other classes. However, after the political changes in the year 2000, the overall economic situation was stabilized and improved, with differentiated effects on social structuring. Macroeconomic stabilization and introduction of fundamental structural reforms during 2001-2002 had a twofold impact. On one side, the GDP registered a gradual growth of 5.5% in 2001 and 4% in 2002, while poverty decreased.[6] On the other, Serbia's GDP per capita in this period remained among the lowest in the region (1945,7 USD in 2002[7]), and a large number of households stood just above the poverty line (Cvejić, Babović, 2003: 17). Besides that, a heavy burden of internal and external debt was transferred from the past, and the foreign trade deficit rapidly increased due to abruptly expanded consumption, while economic inequalities continued to grow (GINI coefficient was .28 in 2000 and .33 in 2002).[8] Intensified privatization, macroeconomic stabilization (above all inflation reduction to less than 10% in 2003 and banking sector rehabilitation), as well as the initial reforms of the judiciary, were the most important factors that brought about a moderate revival of the economy and a further growth of the private sector. On the other hand, these factors contributed to the already high unemployment rate, or more precisely, made the hidden unemployment visible. We expect that all these structural shifts resulted in a further economic differentiation. The growth of privatization leads to the consolidation of the economic elite and the expansion

[6] The poverty index was 28.9% in 1995, 36.5% in 2000 and 14.5% in 2002 (*The Strategy for Reduction of Poverty in Serbia*, 2003).

[7] One should have in mind that the GDP in Serbia has constantly been underestimated due to the extremely large scope of the informal economy.

[8] All macro-economic facts are taken from *The Strategy for Reduction of Poverty in S*erbia, 2003.

of small entrepreneurship, while the strengthening of the public sector and the growing presence of international organizations help the middle class to stabilize its income and distinguish itself from lower classes. Peasants and unskilled workers are certainly the biggest losers of such socio-economic developments.

The following analysis addresses the data concerning the economic positions of classes in 1989, 1997 and 2003. Economic inequalities are analyzed through the composite index of economic status. The index sums up household scores for 7 components: gross household income, possession and value of real estate in which a household lives, possession and value of other real estate, the quality of infrastructure (central heating, etc.), household facilities, vacationing destinations and possession of an automobile. All components are defined as discrete variables weighted on the basis of their estimated market value. The index of economic position is itself an interval 5-point scale of low, lower middle, middle, higher middle and high positions. The questionnaire for the 1989 survey, carried out at the end of the period of collective ownership and economic egalitarianism, did not include questions on either the value of real estate or incomes. For the purpose of this analysis the former variable was constructed on the basis of an assumption that all users of "social housing" would very soon buy out the apartments they lived in at very low prices (which is what actually happened in the mid-1990s). The 1989 respondents were then assigned an approximate position on the interval scale of real estate value. This classification was tested by a multinomial logistic regression in which the size of an apartment, its infrastructure and the size of the settlement were covariates. The classification was correct for ¾ of cases. Household income was constructed on the basis of the respondent's occupation, corrected for the total number of household members and the number of dependents.

ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference in the economic status for all three years. The only difference that is constantly statistically insignificant at Tukey's HSD test, at a .05 significance level, is the one between classes 1 and 2 (see the list of classes in Table 1), which shows a deep structural interconnection of these two groups. In addition, the difference between classes 5 and 6 was not significant in 1989, because class 6 had just started to constitute itself under the market economy conditions. Furthermore, statistically insignificant is the difference between classes 6 and 7 in 1997, which may be explained by the fact that the systemic changes were deep enough to allow the expansion of small entrepreneurs, who rapidly improved their economic status operating on an irregular market (Lazić, 2000b: 136). In 2003 differences between classes 5 and 6, and 6 and 7 were not significant. The first case is the result of the improved status of professionals, while the second comes in consequence of the apparent drop of the average economic position of class 7, due to the sampling bias,[9] rather than the changed status of class 6 (which stagnates). Such shifts in the upper parts of the social ladder clearly show the fluctuations in the process of middle class differentiation, but also point to changes in the position and composition of upper strata. Namely, the economic power of managers receded,

[9] Managers dominate over politicians and entrepreneurs in the 2003 sample, and their average score on the index of economic position apparently falls from 4.5 to 3.6.

concurrently with a significant change in the composition of the political elite, thus causing a moderate decrease in the average value on the index of economic status for this group. The economic status of the ”new” part of the middle class – small entrepreneurs – shifts alternately from class 5 to class 7, depending on the year. Overall differences and shifts in the observed period are clearly charted on the following graph:

Graph 2. Average score of the 7 classes on index of economic position, comparatively for 1989, 1997 and 2003



Classes: see Table 1

Generally, Graph 2 shows the distance between three upper and the remaining classes to be constant, and also the stable position of class 4. Observing the development by years, we can see a transition from a system that is structurally differentiated, through the stage of a “clash of structures” between the old and the new-coming systems (Bolčić, 1994: 32) and of emphasized bipolarization, to the new system of differentiation. Lower parts of the hierarchy are characterized by small variations through the years. The lines for classes 1 and 2 almost overlap, with class 3 coming close. The upper part of the hierarchy is characterized by stronger fluctuations. We suppose that the direction of the line for class 7 is heavily dependant on the ever disputable representativeness of the elite subsample, but it seems that the joint path of lines for classes 5 and 6 can be best explained by the transformation of the middle class: from the socialist period, in which professionals and small entrepreneurs had similar economic positions; through the times of deep economic crisis and wildcat privatization, when professionals – who were mostly tied to the public economic sector – apparently fell behind the small entrepreneurs; to the period of unblocked transformation, when the middle class started to homogenize again, this time owing to the improving status of professionals more than the deteriorating position of small entrepreneurs. While the recovery of the economic status of class 5 matches our expectations, based on the analysis of structural changes, the moderate decrease in the economic power of small entrepreneurs is a bit surprising. One could say that a stronger role of institutions in market regulation (which helped curb the informal economy and tax evasion),[10] as well as the growing market competition, make this sector somewhat less profitable. In view of all that, our expectations about the further economic differentiation of classes may appear questionable. However, despite a certain convergence in positions visible in the upper part of the ladder, one could say that, overall, the trend of differentiation is continuing, in accordance with the presented growth of the GINI coefficient. The majority of the population (classes 1-4) is not able to keep up the direction or speed of change in economic positions. A decrease in the positions of classes 1 and 2 and their lagging still further behind classes 3 and 4 is obvious, while classes 3 and 4 keep the distance from each other. Even more obvious is the increasing distance of the three upper classes from the lower part of the ladder.

Further evidence of class differentiation may be found in the analysis of economic consistency of classes. ANOVA gives the following results:

Table 2 Results of ANOVA on the index of economic position for 7 classes in 1989, 1997 and 2003

Statistic	Year		
	1989	1997	2003
F	534	118	368
Between groups variance	349.6	93.8	318.6
Between groups df	6	6	6
Within groups variance	.66	.79	.87
Within groups df	4167	1839	5703

The table shows that economic differentiation was the clearest at the end of socialism, and that the internal homogeneity of classes was the strongest in the first of our three surveys. The period of blocked transformation witnessed a decrease in economic consistency inside the classes, as well as a significant reduction of differences between them. However, if we keep in mind the data about average scores on the index of economic status, presented in Graph 2, it is clear that the decrease in differences was primarily related to the tendency of approximation of economic positions of classes 1-5. In 2003 the variation between classes grew almost up to its 1989 value, but F statistic did not grow that much, due to a further decrease in the internal homogeneity of classes. This trend can be noticed on the following graph:

[10] Here we should recall Istvan Gabor's (Gabor, 1997) disagreement with the idea that informal entrepreneurial activities at the end of socialism in Hungary had mostly positive effects on the development of small entrepreneurship during the post-socialist transformation.

Graph 3. Averages and standard deviations on the index of economic position for 7 classes in 1989, 1997 and 2003



We could say that these days only classes 2 and 6 have higher consistency than before. It seems clear that the new social order has not been structured enough to allow for a clear crystallization of positions. Since the rules of social reproduction have not been defined yet, many individuals are still searching for their positions in the social structure, which supports our hypothesis about further differentiation, both between and within the classes. A long period of economic decline, high unemployment, huge informal economy and weak labor market could not produce a strong enough interconnection of education, occupation and economic position, which would mark the stabilization of the new social system (Mateju, Kreidl, 1998).

IV Value changes

1. Introduction

Research into the value orientations during the socialist period in Serbia registered the existence of a fairly inconsistent mixture of values, both among individuals and social groups. This mixture, on the one hand, comprised widespread traditionalist (mostly patriarchal) values, elements of strong authoritarian consciousness and collectivist ideology but, on the other, also included the so-called self-managerial consciousness, counterposed to the first group of values (and composed of "modernism…, openness toward the world, material and non-egalitarian orientation" – Pantić, 1977: 294). Furthermore, several surveys also found a relatively low level of nationalism among the population (cf. Pantić, 1989), even if strong nationalistic movements did appear among the Albanians (during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s), in Croatia (in the late 1960s and early 1970s), etc.

As it is well-known, the late 1980s in Serbia were marked by the abruptly increasing nationalist mobilization of the Serbian nation, which was initially spurred by the political and cultural elites on the basis of ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, but later on, following the action and reaction logic, spread among all ethnic groups throughout the former Yugoslavia. The rise of nationalism happened simultaneously with the breakdown of the socialist order in Eastern Europe, which brought about a retreat of collectivist socialist values and their substitution with liberal values in all other European post-socialist countries (cf. Inglehart, Ronald et al., 1998).

The ruling regime in Serbia, which built its legitimacy on a nationalist program, succeeded in keeping the power even after the socialist regimes had been deposed in all other former Yugoslav republics. However, exposed to external more than internal pressure, Milošević's regime was, too, forced to gradually make a number of systemic changes, related in the first place to the introduction of political pluralism and the removal of legal obstacles to private ownership in the economy (with market economy expansion). The result of the blocked transformation in the value sphere was the existence of several antagonistic value patterns: socialist (mixture of collectivistic and "self-managerial" values); traditionalist and authoritarian; nationalistic; but also liberalist (cf. Gredelj, 1995). The blocked transformation during the 1990s (with its contradictory characteristics – slow and controlled systemic changes, economic breakdown, etc.), along with four-year civil wars, followed by conflicts in Kosovo and, finally, the war against NATO countries in 1999, provided the grounds for the preservation of this confuse amalgam of different and even conflicting value patterns. In that light, it is clear that in the relatively short period of three years after the deposing of the old regime, accompanied by greater resolve to unblock the post-socialist transformation process, significant changes in the value patterns of the population could not have taken place (especially in view of two crucial facts: the still outstanding problem of the Serbian national issue due to the unresolved statuses of Kosovo and the union with Montenegro, and the accelerated market transformation of the economy – after a long period of dramatic crisis – with its usual consequences such as transitional recession, increased unemployment, greater social differentiation, etc.

Our 2003/2004 survey pays a lot of attention to the study of values, but the analysis in this paper will – to a limited extent – deal with only those areas that enable direct comparisons with 1989 survey results (the 1997 survey did not address the values, while in 1993 formulations of questions were not identical to those of the previous – and subsequent – surveys, which is why comparisons with the results of this particular survey may only be taken as indications, rather than a firm basis for conclusions). In other words, we will try to show the spread of four value orientations: traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism and liberalism, using the respondents answers to three questions for each one of them. The conclusions will be based primarily on the results of a PCA (applied to three items for each value orientation, in the form of a standardized Likert scale). In the case of liberalism, the PCA did not extract the plausible factor, which is why we will rely on single items in the descriptive analysis. The data obtained in 1989 and 2003 surveys were merged into a single file, and the seven above-mentioned classes were used to develop a unique 14-level classification. Average standardized scores for the principal components were calculated in the merged file, so that 0 represents the average for all classes in both years. The distribution of average factor scores for social classes – that make the basic analytical units of our paper – was analyzed for each value orientation.

2. Research results

2.1. Traditionalism

Earlier research efforts established a strong presence of traditionalist values in Serbia (cf. Pantić, 1977). Their widespread presence is essentially due to the belated modernization of the country where urban population exceeded a half of the total only in the late 1980s, while almost a quarter engaged in agriculture and less than 10% had university degrees, etc. (cf. Radovanović, 1995). One of the most important features of traditionalism is patriarchalism, which is why we operationalized traditionalism using the following statements: *If in a marriage only one person is employed, it should be the man*; *Most housework is naturally the woman's job*; *It is more natural for men to work outside their home, and for women to work at home*. A Likert's scale was used to show the degree of dis/agreement. The principal component explains 64.8% of the variance with a correlation of .803, .827 and .785 with individual statements respectively. The distribution of factor scores for social classes is shown in Table 3:

Table 3. Traditionalism, average standardized factor scores for seven classes in 1989 and 2003

Year	Classes*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1989	0.67	0.45	0.29	-0.01	-0.34	0.17	-0.86
2003	0.31	0.15	-0.12	-0.39	-0.64	-0.42	-0.72

*Classes: see Table 1

The data show that traditionalism prevailed among most classes in 1989 (and, in view of their respective sizes, in the society as a whole), while some 15 years later the presence of this value orientation decreased in all groups. In both cases there is a clear correlation between class and the spread of traditionalism, based on differences in education (which is one of the criteria for our definition of the class) and the way of life (rural life conditions are more characteristic of lower classes than urban conditions, etc.). In this way – because of the education level of class 6 members, and their recruitment from lower classes – it is possible to explain the only exception from the correlation between class position and traditionalism in the case of this group in 1989.

How can we interpret this decrease of traditionalism in a situation of a general – economic, political, social – crisis characterizing Serbia during the 1990s? At present, we may offer only one answer. Structural changes in the country continued even in times of crisis and the blocked transformation: the percentage of agricultural and rural population, and the population with lower education continued to decrease, reducing the basis on which traditionalist value orientations rested.

2.2. Authoritarianism

The few surveys done in Serbia in the 1970s and 1980s confirmed a close link between authoritarianism and traditionalism, and a fairly wide spread of the former value orientation (cf. a review of research into authoritarianism in Serbia in Kuzmanović, 1995a). Kuzmanović shows that many statements used to study authoritarianism are actually characteristic of the traditional culture in these parts (which is why the two orientations must necessarily be closely interlinked). On the other hand, the ruling – communist – ideology was characterized by strong authoritarian features, which additionally influenced the high scores on authoritarianism, often attributed to a lasting and profound non-democratic potential in Serbia (Kuzmanović, 1995a: 166). In view of the above-mentioned links, the findings of our survey are both expected and logical. The relevant statements in the questionnaire were: *Without leaders every nation is like a man without a head; There are two kinds of people in the world, the strong and the weak; The most important thing for children to learn is to obey their parents* (the data were processed as in the previous case; the principal component explains 54.5% of the variance with the correlation of .748, .716, .750 for the three statements respectively).

Table 4. Authoritarianism – average standardized factor scores for seven classes in 1989 and 2003

Year	Classes*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1989	0.43	0.44	0.22	-0.02	-0.59	-0.01	-0.94
2003	0.35	0.28	0.06	-0.19	-0.57	-0.45	-0.51

*Classes: see Table 1

In brief, it turns out that the findings on authoritarianism are largely similar to those on traditionalism – in terms of its overall spread, distribution by social groups and changes over the past fifteen years or so. We must note that, judging by the data so obtained, the cultural basis of this value orientation appears to be stronger than the systemic one. Under conditions of a general and dramatic social crises, which included long wars and provided a fertile ground for the growth of authoritarian orientations, these orientations actually declined. The most rational interpretation of this decline seems to be the continuation of overall "modernizing" changes referred to above.[11]

2.3. Nationalism

As already mentioned, research into nationalism in the SFRY registered a very small presence of this orientation until the end of 1980s (cf. the summary of inquiries into the ethnic distance in Kuzmanović, 1995; see research findings about the different aspects of nationalism in Lazić, ed., 1991). The second half of the 1980s was, however, marked by a general upswing of nationalism (in all parts of the SFRY, among all ethnic groups, in all social strata), and the prolonged civil wars provided its principal source. Therefore, we may assume that nationalism was widespread in 1989 and that after the year 2000 conditions for its decrease have been gradually created. Our survey findings are presented in Table 5 (based on the following statements: *Nationally mixed marriages are necessarily less stable than others; A man can feel completely safe only when the majority in his environment belong to his nation; Cooperation among nations is possible, but not full trust;* the principal component explains 57.3% of the variance and its correlation with the above statements are .767, .826 and .732 respectively):

Table 5. Nationalism, average standardized factor scores for seven classes in 1989 and 2003

Year	Classes*						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1989	0.32	0.13	0.16	-.19	-0.36	-0.39	-0.38
2003	0.36	0.21	0.24	-0.14	-0.29	-0.22	-0.22

*Classes: see Table 1

It is clear that our hypothesis about a decrease in nationalism was not corroborated. The distribution of predominantly non/nationalistic statements by social classes has remained unchanged (nationalistic orientation prevails in 2003, just like in 1989, among the farmers, unskilled and skilled workers, as opposed to non-nationalistic orientation prevailing in other groups), while its spread inside the classes has even somewhat increased. What should be stressed is that this happened in spite of the decrease in traditionalism and authoritarianism, which are expected to be connected with nationalism. In other words, it seems that the current political circumstances – the unsolved Serbian nation-state problem (outstanding territorial status of Kosovo and the uncertainty of survival of the union with Montenegro, along with the possibility it provides for mass mobilization of the population on the basis of ethnic

[11] The same tendency was revealed in the 1993 survey, done when the economic-political and war crisis was at its height. There too negative scores were obtained for classes 4 and 5 (data for classes 6 and 7 are not available), while the first three classes registered positive scores. The arithmetic mean of factor scores for the whole sample is closer to 2003 than 1989, which means that at that time authoritarianism was already on the decline.

appeals) – produce strong preconditions for the reproduction of this value orientation in Serbia on a broad basis, especially among lower social strata and people with low-level education.

At this point, we should add a few specific remarks concerning our data. For example, in 2003 only small farmers agreed with the statement about the instability of ethnically mixed marriages, while most members of all other classes disagreed with it (80% of respondents in cases of classes 5 and 7). On the other hand, agreement with the statement about the possibility of cooperation, but not trust among nations was expressed by the majority of respondents in all classes! The same distributions of answers were present in 1989. This may give rise to a hypothesis about nationalism in Serbia as a phenomenon directed mostly towards collective – and not individual – relations.[12]

2.4. Liberalism

Taking into account the "liberal" character of Yugoslav socialism (presence of small private property in the economy, limited political repression, openness towards the West etc.), it seems reasonable to expect a relatively wide spread of liberal value orientations among the members of different classes (especially among professionals) even before the 1990s. On the other hand, it is clear that the ruling socialist ideology was necessarily anti-liberal, so that it – helped by traditional and authoritarian value orientations – significantly limited the acceptance of positive attitudes towards the market economy, political competition and inviolability of individual rights. Because of these two lines of influence it is no wonder that our 1989 research found the population's relationship toward liberal values extremely confused. However, because of the changes that happened in Eastern Europe, and even in Serbia after 1989 (legitimization of the market and political pluralism), it could be expected that these values have become widespread and more deeply rooted in all social groups. Our findings, however, do not support such expectations.

As already mentioned, the PCA of 1989 and 2003 data could not extract a single factor that explains most of the variance. Therefore, we may only descriptively analyze the statements from our questionnaire (these statements were: *The less the government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for Serbia; The interest of the collectivity is more important than the interests of individuals; Social progress will always be based on private property*).

[12] The same characteristics could be noted in the data on the ethnic distance. On the basis of our research done in 1993, the author concludes: "All in all, it seems that certain official, institutionalized relations are more difficult to accept than relations which are usually considered personal and private..." - Kuzmanović, 1995: 249

Table 6. Percentage of acceptance of liberal statements for 7 classes in 1989 and 2003

Statement	Year	Classes*							Overall
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Government in economy	1989	30.5	17.0	28.0	34.7	48.3	34.8	61.8	30.9
	2003	39.6	36.6	38.4	37.9	36.2	37.2	37.4	37.7
Collectivity/ Individuals	1989	16.5	18.3	19.8	24.6	27.6	18.9	25.8	19.7
	2003	8.2	12.9	17.0	17.9	29.8	20.4	24.5	17.3
Private property	1989	61.4	42.3	50.3	52.8	58.8	49.4	50.2	54.0
	2003	39.5	32.0	39.4	42.1	49.6	66.5	53.1	41.5

* Classes: see Table 1

The majority of respondents in both surveys accepted private property, although in 1989 it was the absolute majority (54%) and in 2003 only the relative majority (41.5%). In the 2003 survey the acceptance of this view was registered in class 6 more often than in other groups, followed by class 7 etc., and was most often rejected by class 2. On the other hand, greatest acceptance of this attitude in 1989 was registered in class 1 and then class 5. However, the desirability of state intervention was also accepted by the majority of 1989 respondents (49.9%; i.e. it was rejected by a minority of 31%), while its acceptance and rejection in 2003 are even. Finally, the supremacy of the collective over the individual was accepted by approximately two thirds of respondents in 1989 and 2003 alike! In brief, it is no wonder that the dominant liberal component could not be extracted from these three statements.

It seems that ambivalent attitudes towards liberal value orientations are characteristic, almost equally, for the very beginning of the post-socialist transformation process (which could be considered logical) and for the contemporary period (15 years later!). The Serbian population, it seems, would rather combine the advantages of private property with the "safety" guaranteed by the state regulation of the economy – in both periods: at the twilight of the command economy and after the (re)start of the privatization process. It may sound paradoxical to discover that in 1993, at the apex of a dramatic economic crisis, when the state undertook the redistributive role crucial for the survival of the majority of the population (cf. Lazić, ed., 1995), most respondents – even two thirds of them! – were against state intervention (responding to the question formulated in the same way as in 1989 and 2003). However, this was the period when market transformation of post-socialist economies just started, and neo-liberal ideology was glorified everywhere, especially its promises of general dramatic economic improvements after a fast, radical privatization and marketization. The more distant that perspective was, the greater promise it seemed to offer in Serbia. When the consequences of market reforms for the lower classes became clearer, the original self-regulating panacea lost its attractiveness everywhere, including Serbia. This gave rise to an ambivalent consciousness, which combines the desirability of private property with preference for state regulation, based on the long history of the Yugoslav paternalistic socialism, which provided a relatively high living standard to a significant part of the population. At this point, however, we should bear in mind that with the formulation they were offered the respondents may have interpreted the relation between the collective and individual not on the general, but rather specific ethnic level, highly topical in both periods.

Very important for the interpretation of our data is also the fact that a linear link between the class position and the desirable value orientation, in this case, is impossible to establish. In principle, the choice was influenced by education, hierarchical position and the ownership sector of the respondents' employment. Thus, in one case the liberal value orientation was most often found among small farmers (!) – with the preference for private ownership in 1989; in another, the same statement was mostly accepted by the ruling class in 2003; in the third case we find it in the professionals' acceptance of individualism in 2003; while in the fourth instance this is the case of lower managerial and entrepreneurial groups – again in their preference of individual over the collective in 1989, etc.

3. Conclusions

Our research findings show that highly ambivalent processes of value formation are characteristic for Serbia during the whole period of post-socialist transformation (immediately before the transformation started; at the time it was blocked; and after it has been un-blocked): a decrease in traditional and authoritarian value orientations has been paralleled with the retention of nationalist orientations and a confused mixture of liberal values by a significant part of the population. The survival of widespread collective national stereotypes, despite the decline of the traditionalist and authoritarian value basis, resulted from the reproduction of political conditions, which generated their increase 15 years ago. And the absence of a more clearly profiled liberal orientation may probably be assigned to the fact that some of its elements have not taken firm hold at the time when they were overwhelmingly (and indiscriminately) accepted in Eastern Europe as the alternative to communist ideology, while in the meantime the institutional system these elements could more confidently rely on was not constructed. The continuing presence of nationalistic orientations and ambivalence toward liberal values primarily – but not exclusively - among the lower classes provides a precondition for the survival of a part of the political elite opposing the transformation (the actions of which help sustain these orientations). On the other hand, the absence of a linear connection between the "hard" factors such as education or class position and of value orientations points to the fact that even among the members of higher classes it is possible to find groups of those who have not adopted liberal values and/or are supporting nationalist values. This results in the divisions even within the body of the political elite with a generally pro-transformation orientation.

Naturally, the weak profiling, and even contrariety of basic value orientations go in parallel with the slowed-down process of class restructuring in the Serbian society indicated by the empirical analysis. Thus the examination of economic status points to the absence of a clear division between the social classes with a single, albeit highly important, exception: the class on the top of the social ladder is in all periods distinguished from the lower part of the hierarchy. The data obtained in the most recent research carried out in 2003, along with the fairly clearly formed narrow top of the social ladder, show that the preferential economic position of the middle, small-entrepreneurial and professional strata compared with the remaining (majority) part of society is only beginning to crystallize. The drastic economic regression of the country during the 1990s, followed by a slow recovery in the first half of this decade, does not provide the grounds for a faster and broader economic differentiation of classes. However, the data show that the impetus for this differentiation comes from another direction – the increased self-reproduction of social groups (i.e. the growing degree of class closure). This tendency is based on the general process of privatizing the key mechanisms of social reproduction, encompassing not only the economic, but also other forms of capital (in this case primarily cultural, through the education system).

Summed up, our findings show that the above-mentioned processes of inconsistent class differentiation of the Serbian society in the economic, group-reproduction and ideological spheres result in a remarkable social fragmentation which prevents a firmer and more lasting formation of wider interest-based inter and intra-stratal groups. A fragmented society, wherein social groups cannot establish a stable relational link between their structural interests and value orientations becomes susceptible to mass mobilization for diverse (easily changeable!) political paradigms. In other words, the direct consequence of the "society's destruction" in Serbia during the 1990s and the resulting course of post-socialist transformation after its unblocking in 2000, is revealed in the persistent and difficult problem of forming a stable and strong pro-transformation class block, such as could provide firm foundations for the establishment of a democratic and market-type society in this country.

Vera Vratuša (-Žunjić)

ATTITUDES TOWARD PRIVATIZATION IN SERBIA AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

ABSTRACT: The paper examines the factors influencing the content, intensity and direction of changes in attitudes toward privatization in Serbia since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, which is also a period marked by a violent transformation of social property relations. The research focuses on comparing the findings of a 2003 survey conducted by the Institute for Sociological Research with the rare relevant data gathered during and after the 1989/90 study by the Consortium of the Yugoslav Social Science Institutes.

This research, most importantly, establishes the existence of three main groups of respondents with different attitudes toward privatization. The "mixed" or "social-democratic" group ideal-typically comprises female clerks with a medium-level education, of middle age and economic status, who live outside of Belgrade and tend to support only partial privatization of small and medium-size enterprises, or up to 49% of a firm's value. In all analyzed surveys, either relative or absolute majority of respondents fall into this category. The second, "neo-liberal", group gathers primarily directors and other highly educated managers, private entrepreneurs, experts, pupils and students living in Belgrade – affiliates of the "winning" social block in the "transition" process, who tend to support complete privatization. Comparisons of different surveys' findings reveal a decrease in the popularity of complete privatization in 2003 in comparison with 1989 and a slower growth of this attitude among the respondents a year after the controversial change in power in October 2000, than it is the case with the opposite attitude. The third group of "self-management nostalgics" encompasses primarily female workers of all qualifications, housewives, less skilled workers over 45, and pensioners, living outside Belgrade - affiliates of the "losing" social block in the "transition" process. They tend to oppose privatization of social and state enterprises, and especially of public services and the power supply system. Longitudinal comparisons have detected an abrupt increase in the popularity of complete opposition to privatization in 2001, in sharp contrast with the contents of the 2001 privatization law prescribing compulsory and majority outsider privatization.

The related changes in attitudes toward participation in decision-making at the workplace will be discussed in another paper.

In conclusion, the author argues for a sustained construction and implementation of a unified research instrument for systematic research of attitudes concerning the optimal form of social relations' transformation. That will be necessary to create an empirical basis for the change of relevant legal norms, so as to better reflect the attitudes and interests of the majority of citizens.

KEY WORDS: privatization, transition, strategies of transformation of ownership relations, self-survey, participation, self-management

Hitherto research into privatization and the objectives of this research

The process of transformation of ownership relations, more fashionably referred to as the "transition" (Vratuša(-Žunjić), Vera, 1997a; 2003a) by the currently dominant line in the professional social-science literature, despite being crucial in the societies of the so-called real socialism since the 1980s, has not become a common subject of systematic-comparative and historical research by social scientists. Instead, in Serbia and Montenegro, both during the times of the SFRY and at present, in the narrowed demographic-territorial-political-cultural framework of the state organization, we generally have only **sporadic theoretical-ideological texts and fragmentary, insufficiently comparable, empirical inquiries** into the process of transformation of overall social and ownership relations. The relevant theoretical texts in typically monological, and only rarely comparative terms, present the opposing Neo-Marxist (e.g. Marković, Luka, 1978, Lazić, M., 1987), Neo-Smithean (e.g., Vukotić, Veselin, 1993, Madžar, Ljubomir, 1996) and Neo-Keynesian (e.g., Mitrović, Ljubiša: 1999, Stojanović, Ivica, 2000) explanations, understandings and evaluations of relations between the dominantly collective forms of ownership and the state-regulated production, exchange and consumption, on the one hand, and the primarily private forms of ownership and market regulation of reproduction, on the other.

The Neo-Marxists point to the structural source of the world-wide crisis, seen in the antagonistically opposed interests of the bureaucratic and technocratic factions of the state capitalist, i.e. collective-owner class, on the one hand, and the direct producers deprived of control over the conditions of their own reproduction, on the other. **Neo-Smitheans** and **Neo-Keynesians** share the striving to find the universal "remedy" for the systemic crisis without abolishing class contradictions, bound to generate ever-new crises. These two groups of theoreticians differ in that the Neo-Smitheans find the universal remedy in the "invisible hand of the market", while the Neo-Keynesians see it in the "visible hand of the state". Another shortcoming of theoretical-ideological works is their insufficient corroboration by the relevant empirical data. This deficiency can hardly be surprising in view of the scarcity of appropriate empirical studies. Thus, when in a situation of recessive economic developments and the general underemployment of production capacities, the necessary funds for a representative empirical research are finally found, the organizers unfortunately pay **inadequate attention** to a thorough investigation into the restructuring of the dominant social relations. Even if they do address this important topic they f**ail to use comparable measuring instruments** required to develop time series of the relevant data.

Why do we have this, at first sight surprising, absence of systematic and critical research into the contradictory processes of social relations' transformations? One of the above-mentioned authors explains the interest background of this phenomenon: "Bearing in mind the revolutionary nature of the changes caused by ownership transformation, especially in the dominant way of thinking and ideological concepts, it was imperative that **publicly presented attitudes, at least at the beginning, were not irritating**" (Vukotić, Veselin, 1993: 79). The "beginning" was the time when the quoted author, as a member of Ante Marković's government, implemented a destructive enterprise "bankruptcy program" sponsored by the World Bank. On the basis of this program over 1200 industrial enterprises throughout Yugoslavia, and mostly in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, were whipped out between January 1989 and September 1990 (Chossudovsky. Michel: 2000). That same man is still highly influential in organizing scientific meetings on the issue of "transition" with attendance by invitation, which occasionally lack the space for the publishing of dissonant opinions, as confirmed by the findings of this author concerning the resumed world-wide domination of supporters of the neo-Smithean functionalist paradigm or view of the world, development strategy and theoretical-methodological framework of research on the world scale, ever since the 1980s (Vratuša(-Žunjić), Vera, 1995a).

The **objective** of this paper is to analyze the attitudes on privatization collected in a number of surveys in order to **begin to systematize**, to the extent possible, the facts about the **who, why, since when, how much, with whom and against whom** seeks to implement a radical change of ownership relations, regardless of the possible "irritation". For that purpose, all available results of inquiries into the attitudes on privatization will be placed in a wider socio-historical **context**, bearing in mind two key aspects. The first has to do with the explanation of **economic developments and circumstances** wherein, in addition to the most recent survey of the Institute for Sociological Research of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy (ISIFF03), a number of other previous studies of attitudes on the desirable form of transforming the social relations were also carried out. The analysis of political-economic processes and conditions was often neglected in the atmosphere of "liberation from Marxism" (Milić, Anđelka, 2002:8). The other aspect of historical contextualization is the **identification of the main trends of** non/changing contents of attitudes towards privatization by matching the available research results, notwithstanding their insufficient direct comparability.

(Due to the limited space, the English version of this study does not include the chapters on *The global socio-historical framework for research into privatization* and *The results of several recent surveys on privatization.*

Circumstances of the ISIFF03 survey

The ISIFF03 survey was carried out in the year in which the Serbian **prime minister** and two prime suspects for his assassination were killed, during a **state of emergency** when 12000 people were imprisoned to finally bring criminal charges against only about forty of them. That same year, the attention of the respondents could be attracted by numerous scandalous **affairs** resulting from the theft of votes in the parliament, corruption behind the acceptance of damaging terms for additional capital investments into the National Savings Bank, sale of the metal industrial complex in Smederevo, electricity trading deals, fraudulent export of imported sugar and numerous others. All that happened against the background of the continuously **negative trends** of the industrial production index (reduced by 2.9% compared with 2002) and the decrease in total employment by over 7% (to an average of 1,800,000 in 2003). On the other hand, unemployment increased by 12.4% (to 947,000 in 2003 on average), as did the foreign trade deficit in goods (by 40% and 91% compared with 2002 and 2001 respectively).

Under such circumstances, the ISIFF03 survey finding that an **increased percentage of respondents found themselves worse off** than before October 5, 2000 (33%) is hardly surprising. A research into the economic and work strategies of individuals, households and social groups carried out by the Center for Policy Studies (CPS) in 2002 registered the same view with five percent less respondents. In this same period, a comparison of the composite index of economic status comprising the income, property and consumption indices, revealed a "**moderate increase in the economic status of households…** related to the increased value of property… and partly also income" (Cvejić, Slobodan, 2004). Furthermore, the percentage of households in the lowest category dropped from 14.5 to 12.7, and increased from 4.5% to 5.9 in the highest. This comparison prompts a **misleading conclusion** that the trends of change in the respondents' subjective assessments were less favorable than those of objective indicators. On the contrary, if the distribution of households in the lowest and highest categories of the **consumption index** in the CPS survey carried out before the 2000 elections (Centar za političke alternative, 2000) is compared with that in the ISIFF03 survey, it appears that both the assessments and indicators change along the same lines. The percentage of households in the lowest category increased from 23.6 to 36.2, and dropped from 4.1% to 3.5% in the highest. This suggests that the **gap between the highest and the lowest categories of households**, judging by their index of consumption, grew from a ratio of 1:6 before the change of power in 2000 to 1:10 in 2003. At this point, we must emphasize that the total of 60% of respondents in the ISIFF03 survey considered a ratio of 1:6 the maximum permissible difference in salaries as an important condition of consumption. Only 9% thought that the ratio of minimum and maximum salaries might be over 1:6, including the one of 1:10, reached in the year of this survey. However, we must also point out that almost a third of respondents (31%), believed that the differences in incomes should not be limited at all.

Measuring instruments of the ISIFF03 survey

The CPS survey, regrettably, did not repeat some of the previously used questions relevant for tracking the change of the respondents' views on privatization. Still more regrettable is the fact that the CPS mostly **failed to include any questions** which at least indirectly relate to this sphere of key importance for monitoring the ongoing process of social relations' transformation.

The review of the research projects carried out so far reveals that, in general, identically formulated questions on privatization, as an instrument to measure the attitudes on the process of transformation of fundamental social relations, do not exist. Instead of the question used by the Center for Politicological Studies and Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, and in a series of three "mini" students' **self-surveys** incited by this author among first-year students of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy as an interactive instruction form (VV(-Ž)99-01), which integrated the aspects of attitudes towards the preferred form of company ownership and decision-makers, the ISIFF03 survey included a number of **general** questions about **de-nationalization** and **privatization**, and a **whole battery of questions on attitudes towards the privatization of certain large systems and public services**. The answering options were: "privatize state and social enterprises", "privatize small and medium-size enterprises", "privatize maximum 49% of state and social enterprises", "do not privatize social and state enterprises" and "I do not have a clearly formed attitude on that issue".

Therefore, while comparing the results obtained through answers to specific questions in the ISIFF03 survey with those of earlier inquiries, we must always bear in mind that these results **are not directly comparable**.

General findings and discussion of attitudinal factors related to 2003 privatization

Asked about their general attitude towards the privatization of social and state property over half the respondents (54%) in the ISIFF03 survey **supported some degree of privatization**: complete privatization of social and state firms (19%), privatization of up to 49% of the company capital value (25%) and privatization of only small and medium-sized enterprises (10%). Three percent more respondents (22%) were against privatization than for complete privatization, which is 12% more than the percentage of those who completely disagreed with the view of private property as the foundation of progress in a survey carried out by the **Consortium of Yugoslav Institutes of Social Sciences** (KJIDN) in Serbia in 1989. One in each four respondents said he/she did not know the answer to this question.

Correlation between the respondents' answers about their general attitude towards privatization and their work place, confirmed the existence of a moderately expressed - due to the internal heterogeneousness of individual socio-professional categories of respondents - but statistically important **class-strata specific depar-**

ture from the average for certain answering modalities (CC=0.364, Pearson's R= 0.187) (cf. Graph 1).

Graph 1: Attitude towards privatization by current workplaces of respondents



According to theoretical expectations and the research work carried out so far, unlimited **privatization** of state and economic enterprises was, once again in the ISIFF03 survey, most often supported by large, medium and small **entrepreneurs** and **the self-employed** (46%). Unfortunately, just as it had been the case with the previous research, **the sample f or the 2003 survey did not actually include large** entrepreneurs, with the exception of only one, who, according to the composite index of income (CC: 0.429), property (CC: 0.476) and consumption (CC: 0.549) belongs to the higher middle category of economic status (CC:0.511). Until September 2000 this large entrepreneur was a medium-level director (CC: 0.967). The 2003 sample included only **three medium-level** entrepreneurs who, according to the composite economic status index, belong to the highest category. Two of them were in the same category in 1989, while the third one was a professional. Out of **30 small** entrepreneurs 31% were pupils in 1989, 20% were clerks, 9% each small entrepreneurs, students and foremen, 7% each lower managers and unemployed and 2% each self-employed, technicians, skilled workers and others. Out of **36 self-employed** in 2003, 19% were self-employed already in 1989, 17% were skilled workers, 13% each clerks and pupils, 6% each experts, students and highly skilled workers, 4% lower directors, farmers and unemployed and 2% small entrepreneurs, technicians, housewives and others (CC:0.917).

So diversified a composition of the entrepreneurs category is reflected in their economic status index. Somewhat surprising is the fact that **45% of small entrepreneurs belong to the high economic status category**, with another 30% ranked in the middle. This gives rise to the question of whether the **criteria for classification** into the highest categories according to the economic status index were **too low**. As for the self-employed 23% and 17% of respondents belong to higher economic status categories, while most of them are ranked in the middle (36%).

Also expected was the finding that the respondents-entrepreneurs in above average numbers possess shares in their own and/or other firms (27% in total). To this we should add that **support to privatization was the strongest among entrepreneurs who own shares in other firms** (9% in 67% of cases support privatization). Efforts of entrepreneurs to retain or increase their capital stock in other firms under their control is evidenced by the fact that merely 3% of them sold shares, and moreover of their own firm.

Another expected finding is that second most frequent supporters of complete privatization (after entrepreneurs) are higher, medium and lower **directors** (45%).

They have neither sole, nor majority control over the conditions and means of production they work with, but 58% of them are ranked in the highest category according to the economic status index, and **18% have shares in their own firms**, which they did not sell.

Due to the actual **absence of the category of politicians** and the insufficient representation of directors (11) in the sample of the ISIFF03 survey, it is unfortunately impossible to draw reliable conclusions on the proportions of **personnel changes** in the composition of the group of economic and political executives after the **change in power** in October 2000. However, the relevant findings should still be presented as an impetus for future research. The cross-tabbing of data on the work place and socio-economic status of respondents in September 2000 and the November 2003 survey, shows that only one lower director remained in his position. One lower politician became a clerk, three higher directors retired, two more are unemployed, one medium director became lower director, another one became a farmer and another yet turned up in the category of "others", while the remaining three lower directors became professionals. The fact that before 2000 two of the six currently higher directors were self-employed, two were clerks and two unemployed, and that out of five medium-level directors one was an expert, two were pensioners and two pupils, seem to confirm the folk saying that "one man's day is another one's night".

Less expected for directors is the fact that they opposed privatization four times more often than private entrepreneurs. Part of the explanation probably lies in the fact that 45% of directors are trade union members compared with only 5% of entrepreneurs, and that 73% of directors belong in the 45-59 age category as do only 40% of entrepreneurs. These directors are either opposed to privatization on principle or else do not think that they are capable of transforming their managerial status into that of private owners, as many former directors did.

Every third respondent **professional**, lower manager or member of a free profession (33%) also declared in favor of complete privatization. *It is interesting to point out that those among respondents professionals who own shares outside their own firms (6% of them) expressed agreement with complete privatization twice more often than those of these respondents who own shares in their own firms (7% of them) and sold them in 5% of cases.* Above average support to privatization among those who represent the potentially **main recruitment basis for managerial roles** in the social division of labor may be partly explained by their expectations that an environment marked by predominantly private ownership relations will value their professional competence more, with less insistence on meeting the basic requirements of all, and will thus ensure their higher living standard. The fulfillment of these expectations is evidenced by the finding that of all the class-strata categories of respondents, professionals most often say that their lifestyle turned for the **better after 2000** (51%, average 21%) (CC: 0.314). According to the economic status index 45% of professionals belong to the middle category, another 10% to the higher middle, and one in five in the high category. A small share of opponents to privatization among the professionals is partly explained by the fact that 51% of respondents in this category belong to the 30-45 age group, which was socialized in the spirit of self-management values for a shorter period of time than the older cohorts.

Hopes for a better future under conditions of privatization also give explanation for the fact that **27% of students and pupils educated** to become professionals and managers, also favor **privatization**. The survey has revealed that the pupils' **optimistic** view of their upward mobility in the near future, has no match among other respondents. Almost four fifths of this category of respondents (79%) see themselves near the very top of the social hierarchy in two years time, which is six times more than the average (13%) (CC:.441). The real basis for this optimism lies in the fact that according to the economic status index **50% of them already live** in households classified in the higher middle, and 10% in the high category. Their expectations equally (32% each) rely on good schooling (5% above the average) and their **ambition** (23% above the average) (CC:.380). At the same time, they think about going **abroad** where private ownership prevails, seriously or a little in 30% of cases, or three and two times more than the average (CC:.358). Subjective assessments of students as to their position in two years' time are somewhat more **modest** – two fifths believe they would be mid-way up the social ladder, but they, too, expect to be near or on the very top three and four times more often than the average. In reality 28% and 16% of male and female students respectively, **already by their birth belong to the middle and higher categories** based on the households' economic status index. Still, we should point out that despite being above-average materially provided, students and pupils relatively **most frequently supported partial**, up to 49% (32%), rather than complete privatization.

The finding that **merely 2%** of respondents said they **planned** to improve the conditions of their life by starting **their own** businesses (CC: 0.739), with the largest share of the unemployed (25%) as expected, and less predictably 14% of pensioners, only 4% of students, 3% of professionals and no pupils at all, **does not promise a substantial rejuvenation and increase in the level of qualifications in the category of small entrepreneurs and the self-employed**.

Privatization was supported by almost a quarter of respondents **clerks**, foremen and technicians (**23%**), two fifths of whom belong to the middle category of the economic status index, with another quarter ranked in the lower and higher middle categories each. However, this category of respondents even more frequently than pupils and students opted for privatization only up to 49% (38%). A part of the explanation for their **preference of partial to complete privatization** should be sought in the fact that clerks own **shares practically only in their own firms** (10%). This kind of shareholding is the **residue of internal distribution of shares or employee buy-outs** under favorable conditions, which most employees do not experience as genuine privatization, believing that they, with **their previous work created** the property of socially owned enterprises, as revealed by the 1992 CPIJM IDN survey. Their support to privatization is below average (14%) and they have not sold their stock for the time being. Another part of the explanation for lower support to privatization among the clerks lies in the fact that they, by a fifth **less than professionals** thought their lifestyle improved with speedier privatization after 2000.

The surveyed **highly-skilled workers**, two fifths of whom fall in the middle and lower middle category according to the economic status index, with another 13% in the higher middle category, **support complete privatization almost twice more often** than their **skilled** colleagues (31%:16%), 6% of whom are in the lowest category and over half in the lower middle, and **even four times more than their unskilled colleagues**, one in three of whom is ranked as having the lowest economic status, with just as many in the lower middle category. These views of highly-skilled workers is contrary to the situation registered during the KJIDN89/90 survey, when five percent less workers with lower skills expressed their complete disagreement with the position that private ownership is the foundation of progress than those with higher skills (Vratuša(-Ž), 1995b: 487-513). The described interchange and increased **difference in attitudes** towards private property and privatization registered **among workers with higher and lower qualifications** happened after almost four-year experience with privatization. This phenomenon may be explained by a far greater ability of the most highly skilled workers to retain their jobs or find new ones compared with their less qualified colleagues. This explanation is substantiated by the finding that a quarter of highly skilled workers **fear or strongly fear dismissal**, as do 29% of skilled workers, along with as many **as two fifths of semi-skilled and unskilled workers**, while the average fear of dismissal is 23% (CC:.386). Precisely the category of workers with lowest qualifications includes the largest number of opponents to any privatization **(40%), twice more than those who in 1989 rejected the position that private ownership was the foundation of progress**. This increase in opposition to privatization may be largely explained by the negative experience with privatization the category of less qualified workers has meanwhile acquired. This explanation is supported by a 2003 survey finding that the respondents with lower qualifications **most often stated that they lived worse than in 2000 (48.5%)**.

Another reason why workers with **higher skills** favor privatization more than their lower skilled colleagues is found in the fact that in the rare cases when they **did own shares in firms other** (4%) than their own (16%) their **support to privatization was above average** (33%) and 4% of them even sold the shares of their own firm, while workers with lower skills even if they owned shares in other firms (5%), rather than only their own (11%), did not support privatization at all and neither did they sell their shares. The latter fact came as a surprise to the author of this paper, in view of **unconfirmed rumors** that the management and/or new owners of successful companies try to persuade or force the **workers to sell them** their shares at a depreciated nominal value, or even less. True, the low percentage of sales of shares has so far largely been the indicator of a still **insufficiently developed securities market** in Serbia.

It is important to note the fact that only a little less than a fifth of the respondents **farmers** (67.5% of whom are women, CC: 0.343) as private owners of land, supported complete privatization (18.5%). Somewhat contrary to stereotypical expectations, farmers **more often declared against privatization** than in its favor, or did not know the answer to the relevant question (29% each). Part of the explanation is certainly found in the fact that **one in each ten among them has the lowest economic status**, with **a half of them in the lower middle** and a **third in the middle** category.

Housewives, including 1% of men, are the closest to workers with lower skills in terms of their support and opposition to complete privatization (9% and 34% respectively), which is in agreement with the finding that **just as in the case of farmers, one in each ten housewives belongs to the lowest** economic status category with **almost a quarter each in the lower middle and middle category**, and also that 44% of housewives believed that their **way of life deteriorated** over the past three years. In contrast to workers will lower skills housewives almost three times more often (32%:11%) responded that they **did not have a clear** attitude towards privatization.

The **unemployed** respondents, including 56% of women, supported privatization only a percentage more than the pensioners (17%). However, the unemployed show markedly **less (17%) opposition to privatization than pensioners (24%)**.

The explanation for this phenomenon should probably be sought in the fact that the perspective of privatization threatens to reduce the achieved level of fixed income and social-health protection acquired on the basis of employment prior to retirement. The respondents laid off from state and social sectors or those seeking their first job, hope to find employment, and with it also health and social protection, more easily in the private sector. The thesis that the unemployed **are more optimistic** about improving their position than the pensioners is evidenced by the fact that they see themselves near or at the top of the social hierarchy (20%) in two years' time three times more often than pensioners (6%). The currently unemployed, who account for **only 12%** of the ISIFF03 sample were, in 1989, most often found among the pupils (28%), highly skilled workers and technicians (22%), those who were obviously long unemployed (21%) and workers with lower skills (13%).

Respondents from the **ranks of the army and the police** - numbering only 12, all male - supported privatization two percent less frequently than their unemployed colleagues. This category of respondents came first in terms of support for **partial privatization** up to 49%, or the one including only small and medium-sized enterprises (55% and 30% respectively). **Two fifths of them rank in the lower middle economic status category**, a third are in the middle, but there are also **9%** of them **in the higher middle and 7% in the highest category**. Over two fifths of the respondents, which is twice more than the average, say that their **life improved after 2000 (44%)**, while a third of them claim the opposite. The fact that only 21% of the current members of the army and the police were in the service in 1989, sheds some light on this finding. A fifth of them were unskilled workers and unemployed, 16% were students and pupils and 5% were foremen, which means that they **obtained the first or a better paid job** after the year 2000.

The surveyed **pensioners'** (including 55% of women) support to full privatization was only a percent higher than that of the protective services staff. **One in each seven of them was in the lowest category according to the economic status index, over a half were in the lower middle**, and one in five in the middle category, but they were also found in the higher middle **(8%) and the highest category (2%)**. Almost every fifth respondent said he/she was better off after the year 2000, and almost **one in each three stated the opposite**. In contrast to the protection services staff, 7% of pensioners own **shares** in firms they used to work for, and another percentage also have shares in **other firms**. Precisely this one percentage of pensioners **supported privatization five times more than the average**.

The issue of privatization viewed against the level of the respondents' education **due to the higher homogeneity of categories in the table**, gives a **somewhat stronger rank correlation** (CC: 0.352, Pearson's R: -0.298) then it is the case with the workplace, which reveals **education-specific departures** of relevant categories from the average values for individual modalities of answers to the question on privatization, already noted in previous surveys. This correlation is largely explained by the increasing influence of the respondents' educational level on the workplace they would take, already since the 1950s. Namely, in accordance with the theoretical forecasts and findings of previous research, **full privatization was given largest support by respondents with higher or university education (35.1%)**, medium by holders of secondary school degrees (20.3%), and the smallest by those with **elementary (15%) or incomplete elementary education (10%)**. Conversely, absolute disagreement was most often manifested by respondents with lowest education (33%) and least frequently by those with highest education (9%). Respondents with incomplete elementary education still more often (41%) said they did not have a clearly formed attitude towards the subject in question, while such responses were most rarely found among those with higher or high education (12%) (cf. Graph 2).

Graph 2: Attitudes towards privatization by education of respondents



So high a percentage of answers “I do not have a clearly formed attitude” among the insufficiently educated categories of respondents points to the need for careful interpretation of their responses.

An element for interpretation of so opposing answers given by individual educational categories of respondents should be sought in their **different experiences with the privatization process during the last three** years. Thus **39% respondents with the highest education said they lived better**, while just as many least educated respondents said they lived worse than before 2000 (CC: 0.222, Pearson’s R: -0.146). More educated respondents live less stressfully, since they **fear or strongly fear dismissal almost three times less (13%)** than their colleagues with lower education (37%) (CC: 0.249, Pearson’s R: -0.138).

Previous research findings revealing interdependence between the **age** of respondents and their attitude towards privatization were confirmed by the ISIFF03 survey (CC: 0.242). Some indications to that effect have thus far in this paper been given by the data on the attitudes towards privatization expressed by **students, pupils and pensioners**, who, by definition, belong to the youngest and oldest age categories of respondents. Those in the **18-29 age group** by far most often supported **full privatization (25%)**. They are followed by the 45-59 age cohort with 20% support to full privatization, and the 30-45 age group with 17%, while respondents between 60 and 99 years of age expressed this attitude with least frequency **(14%) (cf. Graph 3)**.

Graph 3: Attitudes towards privatization by respondents age



The **oldest respondents** in this age group, including 62% of women, **least frequently support complete privatization** because, among other things, the changes of the past three years **least frequently** improved the lifestyle of this particular group (17%), in contrast to the youngest age category whose members found their lives better than before 2000 with highest frequency (29%) (CC: 0.155). Members of the oldest age group most often reported that they occasionally (26%) or mostly (24%) felt alone and abandoned (50% in total), while 25% and 4% of the youngest felt like that occasionally, i.e. mostly (CC: 0.255) More than one in each four respondents (27%) in the oldest age group said they felt more lonely and abandoned by others than before October 2000, compared with the 9% of the youngest (CC: 0.248).

Still, the **largest deterioration in the lifestyle was registered in the 45-59 age group (39%)**. That is largely explained by the fact that precisely the respondents in this particular age group **were the most exposed to changes in managerial positions** and loss of jobs either as redundancies (40%) or because their employers closed down (20%) after 2000 and had no prospect of finding new employment, which is above average for these two causes of unemployment (17% and 13%) (CC: 0.594, Pearson's R: -0.457).

The ISIFF03 survey also confirmed the findings of previous surveys concerning the existence of a small, but statistically important correlation between the respondent's **gender** and attitude towards privatization (CC: 175, Pearson's R: -0.173). As already indicated by the data on the housewives' attitudes towards privatization, **female respondents of all socio-professional categories less frequently supported**

complete privatization (15%) and were more often opposed to it (24%) than their male colleagues (24% and 19%) (cf. Graph 4).

Graph 4: Attitude towards privatization by respondents' gender



The explanation for the higher frequency of female respondents' opposition to privatization compared with their male colleagues should be sought both in their objectively somewhat lower economic status and their subjective experience of accelerated privatization after the change in power. Female respondents enjoy a high economic status (5%) less frequently than their male colleagues (7%) (CC: 0.071 with a significance level of 0.004). In addition, female respondents clearly less often (19%) than their male colleagues (25%) find their life changed for the better after the 2000 (CC: 0.073), and more often (19%) than men (15%) complain of feeling more lonely and abandoned than before 2000 (CC: 0.101). Women also have negative experience with the distribution of family private property, due to the privileged position of male children.

Women are still **almost twice less often (36%) than their male colleagues (64%) employed in leading posts such as directorial, whose occupants are more inclined to support privatization**, while they are almost equally frequently found in subordinate work places such as those of low skilled workers (48%:52%), the occupiers of which tend to oppose privatization (CC: 0.343, Pearson's R:.-153). It is important to note that even the interviewed **directresses opposed privatization (40%) more often than their male colleagues (29%)** (C: 0.356 for women, 0.423 for men). This finding is also confirmed by the fact that female respondents with a high economic status index supported complete privatization only 7% more often than women in general (CC: 0.329, Pearson's R: -.241), while their male colleagues of the same economic status advocated full privatization almost twice more often than the average for man and their female colleagues (44%), (CC: 0.343, Pearson's R: -0.321).

It is important to note that in the ISIFF03 survey **female respondents only three percent less often (10%) than their male colleagues** (13%) (CC: 0.146) **had higher or high education as an important conditions for a managerial role in the social division of labor**. Although all conclusions about the interviewed directors and directresses should be taken with **a grain of salt because the whole category including female and male respondents is, as a rule, insufficiently represented** in all surveys, including the ISIFF03 sample, it is still possible to refer to a continuing trend, noted in previous surveys, that **highly educated women are under-represented in managerial posts** (Vratuša(-Ž), 1999b).

The existence of certain **subjective obstacles** among female respondents that prevent them from stating clear and unambiguous opinions which ought to precede decision-making is evidenced by the finding that the interviewed directresses more often (20%) than their male colleagues (14%) **did not have a clear attitude** on privatization. A still greater average difference in choosing this answering option between all female (30%) and all male respondents (18%) (cf. Graph 4), is largely attributed to the larger number of female respondents with incomplete elementary education (27%) who tend to give this type of answer compared with male respondents (18%) (C: 0.146).

The 2003 survey also provides opposing **indications of some change** with respect to the presence of women in managerial posts, which should be examined in a future survey with a larger number of respondents in relevant categories. Namely, the correlation of respondents' gender and workplace using a more detailed classification reveals that although women are fewer in the overall category of directors **there are no man at all in the higher directors sub-group**, while the group of lower directors comprises 83% of men (CC: 0.343, Pearson's R: 0.-153). Another manifestation of this same phenomenon is seen in the fact that women in their respective firms generally **have the chief executive role** (91%), while their male colleagues do that more rarely (58%), i.e. they are only one of the managers (Pearson's R: =.257).

The ISIFF03 survey has also confirmed the findings of previous research efforts about the existence of a still smaller, but nevertheless statistically important correlation between the regions where the respondents live and their attitudes towards privatization (CC: 0.127). Full support to privatization is most often expressed by respondents from Belgrade (22%). **Complete privatization is least frequently supported by respondents from Vojvodina (16%), while complete opposition to privatization is most often found among respondents from Serbia, excluding Belgrade (24%)** (cf. Graph 5).

Graph 5: Attitudes towards privatization by regions of the respondents residence



This result is due to the fact that the ISIFF03 survey **Belgrade sample** included **more** respondents with **higher and high education** (21%: 9%: 8%) (Pearson's R: -0.220), between **18 and 29 years of age** (24%: 19%: 18%) (Pearson's R: 0.065), as well as **directors** (0.8%: 0.2%: 0.3%), **entrepreneurs** (5%: 3%: 3%) and **professionals** (8%: 3%: 4%) (Pearson's R:0.064), thus members of socio-professional and demographic categories whose members manifest above average support to privatization, compared with those in the sample for Vojvodina and Serbia without Belgrade. The reasons for the largest number of the undecided in Vojvodina should not be sought only in the above-mentioned structure of the respondents, bearing in mind that, e.g. the sample for Serbia without Belgrade included the largest number (28%) of uneducated who are the most inclined to this modality of response, and not the one of Vojvodina (25%).

The respondents' full support to privatization in the ISIFF03 survey was still less manifest, while their **total opposition was three times stronger** when it had to do with **public utilities**, electric power industry (12%:71%), health institutions (14%: 68%)[1], water supply and sewerage (15%:67%), and oil industry (16%:62%). In the

[1] The fact that opposition to privatization of public services has been only slightly reduced compared with the situation before the representatives of neo-liberally oriented parties came in power is confirmed by a **CPS** survey carried out in the first half of **2000**. Asked "Which is, in your opinion, the best **way to regulate pension, social and health care funds?", 74% of respondents said that the "state** should regulate all situations where people need assistance", 14.5% responded that "every man capable of work should himself bear the relevant costs in critical situations and in old age", 2% believed that one "should rely on closest friends and relatives", while only **9%** of respondents chose to answer that "**private** pension and health insurance schemes would be the best" (Center for Policy Studies, 2000).

case of public transportation complete opposition to privatization remained above average (54%), despite the increasing private involvement especially in urban areas. Twenty five percent of respondents favored complete privatization of transport. Only with respect to the banks did the complete opposition to privatization drop to below half the respondents (48.5%). Although bank privatization was a *fait accompli*, complete support to privatization fell short of a third of respondents (30%), while just over a fifth of respondents (21%) supported majority state and social ownership of the banks (privatization up to 49%).

Some **inconsistency** in the attitudes of respondents concerning privatization is revealed by the fact that a mere 8% were totally opposed to denationalization, while **complete denationalization** obtained the support of more than one in each two respondents (55%), including **those who fully opposed privatization** (23%). This fact reveals that a high percentage of the Serbian population claims inheritance of once nationalized private property. These respondents probably had in mind the enterprises and real estate currently sold to third persons, despite the existence of living heirs of their owners before nationalization. An additional survey should establish whether the respondents had in mind that complete denationalization of enterprises and other real estate such as land would also entail restitution to their **foreign owners** prior to the Second World War. This aspect of denationalization was apparently taken into account mostly by the respondents from Vojvodina, who least frequently expressed complete agreement with it (51%), as opposed to those from Belgrade who most often advocated complete denationalization (56%) (C: 0.077 with a significance level of 0.006).

Conclusions and incentives for further research

This research has explained the global and local circumstances wherein the relative scarcity of inquiries into the attitudes on privatization was, in addition to the lack of finance, also attributable to conflicted social interests. That is why the knowledge of this crucial ideational component of the ongoing transformation of social relations in Serbia still remains fragmentary and unsystematic.

Measuring instruments formulated in an identical and unambiguous way still do not exist. In order to enable greater reliance of the social development policy on the knowledge of the citizens' views concerning the desirable form of organizing social relations, this substantial shortcoming should be addressed and the conditions provided for the construction of a comparable database in the near future. The key theoretical-methodological condition for that is to **work out and adopt unique and mono-semantic scales for a systematic, longitudinal, deepened, multidimensional and reliable comparable research** into the changes of a wide spectrum of attitudes on privatization and participation in decision-making. It is to be expected that the use of such measuring instruments over several years in succession will reduce the percentage of respondents who, perhaps partly due to the **lack of understanding** of the used terminology, respond that they **do not have a clear attitude** towards these important issue, or give inconsistent responses. Responses of this kind in the ISIFF03 survey accounted for 23-35%. Future research should pay special attention to the motives leading the respondents to say “I don’t know” or choose another similar options. It will be necessary to examine to what extent that choice is due to the actual lack of information or, conversely, the lack of interest for the subject matter in question.

An important reason which decided the ISIFF03 research team against creating a comparable database by taking over the formulations of previous surveys such as the CPSIJMIDN96, was their dislike of the fact that **aspects** related to attitudes towards desirable **ownership relations**, on the one hand, and towards **participation in decision-making**, on the other, were both incorporated within the same question. Therefore, in order to separate these two aspects, two batteries of **new questions** examining attitudes towards participation and privatization were included into the questionnaire. The analysis of the ISIFF03 survey findings, which due to the limited space could not be completely presented in this paper, proved this separation justified by establishing a fairly weak link between the respondents’ attitudes towards privatization and participation (CC:.125).

At this point, we must still note that **respondents who opted for complete privatization also displayed the highest above average opposition to participation (32%), and vice versa**, than those who opposed privatization on the whole, at the same time showed above average (56%) support to participation in decision-making in all firms. It therefore appears that it would least-wise do no harm if future surveys included the combined CPIJM-IDN96 question, its shortcomings notwithstanding.

The table showing the correlation of the respondents’ attitudes towards privatization with their basic socio-demographic data clearly reveals the **structural base for three ideal types** of respondents profiled by their profession, education, gender, age and regional characteristics. The insufficient presence of highest socio-professional categories in the tables, i.e. the internal class-strata heterogeneity of members in such categories as protective services staff, pensioners, pupils, students and housewives, substantially reduces the values of correlation measures.

A **linear regression analysis** using a step-by-step method reveals that of the five chosen independent variables the respondents’ education is the best predictor of their attitudes towards privatization (30%). Introduction of the respondents’ **economic status index, gender and region** increases the degree of explanation of their attitudes towards privatization to 37%. The same analysis shows that the best predictor of the participants’ attitudes towards participation is their **age** (10%), while the inclusion of data on the respondents’ **gender** and region, adds a mere 2% to the explanation of the dependent variable. Attitudes towards participation are more difficult to predict due to the fact that respondents of all categories most often opted for some form of participation in decision-making.

The first ideal type of respondents already referred to as **“social-democratic”** or **“mixed”** for short, primarily includes female respondents of medium-level education, middle age and economic status living outside Belgrade. Representatives of the remaining two ideal types take diametrically opposed attitudes towards privatization and participation. The one we call **“neoliberal”** gathers in the first place managers and other highly educated executives, private entrepreneurs, professionals, pupils and students who live primarily in Belgrade. Current and future members of this **“winning”** social block in the “transition” process are above average found in the higher middle and high category of the economic status index and the 18-29 age group, and have shares in other than their own firm. They most often say that their lifestyle improved after the year 2000 and do not fear dismissal if employed, and also expect further improvement in their way of life in the next two years. The other, opposite ideal type is referred to as the **“self-management”** type, although the term does not reflect the actual content of social relations which are no longer characterized even by a formal-legal equality of access to the socially-owned means of production. This **“losing” social block** in the “transition” process includes primarily female workers of all qualifications and housewives, and lower skilled workers over 45 years of age and pensioners, especially outside Belgrade. Members of this block are above average ranked in the low or lower middle categories of economic status index, own shares only in their own firm, if at all, say that their lifestyle deteriorated after the year 2000 and fear dismissal if still employed.

Bearing in mind that the ISIFF03 survey **did not cover a sufficient number of members of individual categories** within the composition of relevant ideal types of social blocks of actors with opposing interests, **future research works have yet to respond** to a large number of outstanding questions brought up by the findings of this exercise. The most important of these questions will be listed below.

How representative is the finding that the single major entrepreneur in the ISIFF03 survey was a medium manager at the time of adoption of the first law on transformation of social ownership in 1989, i.e. **to what extent did the former directors** of socially-owned basic organizations of associated labor **carry out the privatization process to their own advantage**?

What is the **scale of downward and upward mobility in the group of directors and security services’ staff after the change in power in 2000** (only glimpsed in the ISIFF03 survey by comparing the workplaces of the few respondents in these categories in September 1989 and 2000)?

Which categories of professionals and pensioners have “fared” the best in acquiring **shares outside their own firm** and will they continue avoiding their sale and supporting complete privatization almost twice more often than their colleagues, shareholders in their own firms?

Will the currently low percentage of students, pupils, professionals and the unemployed who will **look for** a better life perspective and attainment of their above-average expectations of upward mobility **in entrepreneurship increase**, and if so to what extent?

Is the share of various types of **“entrepreneurs” in the so-called gray economy** already too high?

How widespread is the **small internal shareholding of clerks, high and low skilled workers and pensioners retained from the times of the previous legislation** governing the transformation of social ownership and enterprise privatization, which is, according to the survey findings, linked with below-average support to privatization, and **do the management and external investors apply** pressure on small shareholders in successful companies to sell them their stock?

Will there be a further increase in the multiple difference in the acceptance of privatization, fear of dismissal and subjective assessment of the change for the better or worse in the way of life after the year 2000, **between** the increasingly instrumentally-materialistically oriented **highly skilled workers**, who particularly often support privatization and oppose participation when they own shares in other firms, and the lower skilled and less educated workers who show above-average opposition to privatization and support participation as a condition for survival even when they own shares in other firms?

Will there also be **an increase in inequality among the farmers** who, according to the ISIFF03 survey have a **predominantly lower middle economic status** just like less skilled workers and also like them **oppose privatization more often** than they support it?

How long will we have the **trend of lower representation of women in managerial posts compared with their male colleagues**, although only a few percentage points behind in terms of high education, or is this situation **already changing**? Is this only the case of intentional **discrimination** against women in a patriarchal environment brimming with prejudices concerning their managerial abilities, or does it also reflect the **lack of readiness among the women themselves, doubly burdened** with paid and family work to accept managerial positions involving the **stress of responsibility** for the consequences of important decisions which **leave no room for undecided attitudes** characterizing the members of the female sex above the average? Does the finding that female respondents, even when they assume managerial social roles and enjoy high economic status, oppose privatization more often than their colleagues, indicate that the female sex better than the male, notices the **destructive effects of privatization on the social integration and solidarity**, reflected in a deteriorated way of life and increased feeling of loneliness and isolation?

Has the **criterion for the highest and lowest categories of the composite economic status index** in the ISIFF03 survey been placed too low? In view of the categories so defined, is this survey's finding that **the lowest category has only about twice more (12.7%) respondents than the highest (5.9%) equally "reliable" as** the one that the working or adult population in Serbia includes merely **12% of the unemployed**? Should the structuring of this complex index **give greater weight to the consumption** index, which reveals that the lowest category of this index has as many as ten times more respondents (36.2%) than the highest (3.5%)? Wouldn't it be possible to more reliably monitor the trend of inequalities in the economic positions of households on the basis of the composite index of economic status such as it is structured now only after the small shareholders **sell their shares** of their free will, or under pressure, and the pensioners and all others who cannot pay the permanently increasing electricity bills, **sell the apartments** they live in, taking the advice of the former minister of energy?

Despite the fact that directly comparable longitudinal data on the respondents' attitudes on privatization do not exist, it is still possible to monitor the **degree, mutual relations and direction of changes** in the respondents' attitudes towards this key form of social relations' transformation by comparing the responses to the questions of similar contents asked in surveys carried out in different social and historical circumstances.

The overall agreement of the respondents in the **ISIFF03 survey with some form of privatization** of social and state enterprises of **54%** is lower than in the **CPIJM IDN 1992 survey**, when the total of **61%** of respondents supported employee ownership of small and medium sized enterprises or their sale on the market. This fact suggests that **despite the criticism** of the implemented privatization already audible in 1992, **the initial experience of respondents with internal, additional investment of capital before the hyperinflation** of the next year, **was better than it is after another 11 years** of varying experience with privatization, including the annulment of the majority insider privatization and **introduction of obligatory majority outsider privatization**. The share of respondents who supported different forms of privatization in 2003 decreased even further compared with the level registered in the SFRY and Serbia way back in **1989/1990**, that is if, in addition to those who at that time **with a lot of hope and immediately before their direct experience of privatization** partially (23%) or completely (30%) supported the view that private ownership is the basis of progress, we also included those who only partly opposed it (19%).

The respondents' support of **complete privatization** of 19% in **2003** is also eleven **percent less** than the number of respondents in Serbia who in **1989 fully agreed with private ownership as the basis of progress**. As could be assumed, the respondents who supported full privatization at the same time most often declared **against limited differences in incomes** (37%, average 31%). On the whole, **privatization of any form or degree** was in **2003** opposed by 22% of respondents, or full 12% **more than** the share of those who manifested completed disagreement with the view of private ownership as the basis of progress in Serbia in **1989**. As expected, these respondents below the average (25%) thought that **differences in income should not be limited**. The increase in opposition to privatization was initially mild – from 10% of respondents who completely disagreed with the position that private ownership is the basis of progress in the KJIDN89/90 survey to 13% of respondents in the CPIJM-IDN96 survey who said the employees should be owners and allowed to choose directors, i.e. 14% respondents who said the same in the first of the series of students' self-surveys (VV(-Ž)99). The **abrupt increase** in this answering modality, after the drop to 10% of respondents in the VV(-Ž)00 survey carried out in the **"revolutionary" 2000**, was registered already in the **next year** in the VV(-Ž)01 survey, when as many as 21% of respondents answered in this way.

The main longitudinal finding of this research is that in all the analyzed surveys **the relative or absolute majority or respondents in Serbia supported only partial privatization, as well as a form of employee participation in decision-making**. The degree of popularity of this "mixed" type of response depended on the previously described social and historical circumstances and experiences in the privatization process at the time of the survey. Thus in the KIDNJ **1989/90** survey the total of **41%** respondents only partly accepted (23%), i.e. partly rejected (19%) the view that private ownership is the basis of progress. In the CPIJM IDN **1996** survey **35%** of respondents supported employee participation in decision-making together with private owners and management. In the **2001 VV(-Ž)** survey the same response was given by **51%** respondents, while in the **ISIFF03** a modified variant of this response (consultation of employees in taking the key decisions) was chosen by **54%** of the respondents, i.e. over three fifths when the election of managers, dismissals of workers and investments were concerned. Further research work should more thoroughly examine the problem already noted in literature (Vratuša(-Žunjić), Vera, 2000) concerning the **feasibility of these "mixed" and " social-democratic" ideas and strategies of transforming the social relations**, which tend towards establishing the equality of chances in a "just" distribution, based on a double foundation of an "equitable" market competition and a "fair price of labor" (Mrkšić, Danilo, 1990).

A comparison of results from several surveys also established **overall decrease in the popularity of the "neoliberal" strategy of social relations' transformation or slower growth** in its popularity than the growth in the popularity of the opposing strategy. Champions of this strategy support complete privatization and oppose employee participation in decision-making (from 30% of respondents who in the KJIDN89/90 survey fully agreed that private property is the basis of progress), between 19% of respondents (supporting full privatization) and 27% of opponents to participation in the ISFF03 survey.

A comparison of various surveys' findings also indicates the opposite **trend of increase in the popularity of the "self-management" program of transformation**, the supporters of which advocate employee ownership and their decisive influence in strategic decision-making. This increase was especially **visible a year after the change in power** (from 10% of respondents who declared in favor of employees becoming owners and deciding on everything in the VV(-Ž)00 students' self-survey, to 21% in the VV(-Ž)01 survey, i.e. an average of 20% of respondents who in the ISIFF03 survey requested the right of veto to key decisions and opposed privatization especially in the case of electric power utilities (71%) health institutions, and water supply and sewerage (67%) (cf. Graph 6).

Grafikon 6. Trendovi popularnosti tri strategija transformacije društvenih odnosa



Future research should show whether this **increase in the number of respondents supporting mixed forms of ownership and employee participation in decision-making**, or even their crucial role in taking decisions, **will be translated into collective action**. A hint of such a trend is seen in the fact that the **ISIFF03** survey registered three times more respondents-trade union members (42%) **than the CPS 2000** survey (14%), and that the trade union members show less opposition to participation (22%) than non-members (31%) (CC:.292). The fact that **skilled workers prevail in the structure of respondents who are trade union members (42%)**, followed by professionals and clerks (16% each) and low skilled workers (12%) (CC:.292), points to the conclusion that even if an organized trade union request for higher employee participation in privatization and decision-making is made, it will not, **at least for the present, favor the "self-management" model**, which in the ISIFF03 survey had grater support of the socio-professional categories currently outside of employment and therefore not **organized in trade unions**, e.g. pensioners, farmers, housewives and the unemployed. **Skepticism** concerning the action abilities of trade unions to protect and attain the interests of their members is suggested by the fact that **even among trade union members only 34% of respondents believe that the unions provide the best protection of** employees' interests, while about two thirds of them thought that everyone did that by him/her self (23%), did not think about it at all (20%), or trusted the state (4%), company management (7%) or NGOs (2%) to do it. Only in the latter two cases is this trust greater among the union members than among non-members (4% and 1%) (CC:.271).

The presidential **election of June 2004, acted as a kind of an all-comprising survey**, and confirmed the existence of two polarized "camps" of adult citizens with opposing views on the need for and the scope of privatization and employee participation in key decision-making. The only difference between the result of the ISIFF03 survey and the 2004 presidential election is the fact that the **abstention of over a half of an increasingly apathetic as well as intimidated "silent majority"**, which, according to the results of all surveys carried out so far, supports "mixed", social-democratic solutions, enabled about a quarter of the electorate to claim the victory for the champions of the neoliberal strategy in transforming the social relations, the popularity of which seems to have taken a downward trend, if recent research results are anything to go by.

Comparing the substance of the relevant legal provisions governing privatization and labor with the majority attitudes of respondents as to how ownership and labor relations should be regulated reveals a deep gap between them. **On the one hand**, these **legal provisions, contrary to the still effective Constitution of Serbia** which grants equal protection to the "plurality of ownership forms", prescribe obligatory and majority outsider privatization, i.e. cancel the previously institutionalized forms of employee participation in decision-making, while, on the other, **a convincing majority of interviewed citizens accept only the forms of partial privatization or else are resolutely opposed to it (25%+10%+22%=57%), i.e. think that employees should at least be consulted on strategic decision** in companies or even demand their right of veto. Increasingly numerous **strikes** of public utility services, which the proponents of the neoliberal strategy of transformation seek to privatize, despite the opposition of the large majority of citizens, confirm that the conflict does exist and is even intensified. The remarkably **negative phenomena which accompany such privatizations like price increases, power shortages, increased risk of breakdowns** even in industrially developed countries like the USA and UK (Hoefle, John, 2001), warn against indiscriminate condemnation of efforts to "block" the notably bad "transition reforms", as some of the former World Bank high officials have already admitted (Palast, Greg, 2001). An important condition **to stop the further sellout of socially produced wealth for a song** based on minority decisions for the benefit of minority, is to **redress this discrepancy** between the legal regulations and the majority will of the interviewed citizens. Attempts of the domestic adherents of the "neoliberal" strategy to **impose and retain the legal solutions favoring the minority by force**, aided by a combined military, diplomatic, economic and media aggression of the transnational financial oligarchy, **threaten to renew the armed conflicts** in this geo-strategically important region, which is what is already happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan…

The current economic recession of world proportions caused the increase in unemployment and gave rise to efforts of the speculative financial capital to overcome the crisis by means of war destruction. The crisis also encourages the search for alternative **post-capitalist** forms of organizing the social reproduction, occasionally by recalling the "golden" era of self-management when it yielded better results than other forms of reproduction organization (Horvat, Branko, 1984). Instead of focusing on profits in the hands of the financial oligarchy, these organizational forms would rest on diverse types of collective ownership, participation in strategic decision-making and self-management on the local, national, regional and global levels (Michael, Albert, 2000).

Silvano Bolčić

POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION AND NEW WORK ORIENTATIONS: SERBIA 1990-2003

ABSTRACT: At the level of actual developments in Serbia during the 1990s a new socio-professional and spatial mobility of working population has appeared. In the area of work orientations there are increasingly more people who expect to move during their working career, because of the job or better paid job; they also expect not to work just in jobs matching their basic occupation, but also in other (well or better) paid jobs. Hence, in order to adapt to the situation in the labor market, people become ready (or more ready) to work more, more intensely, on a more up-to-date basis, more "flexibly", to acquire new knowledge and skills, and to assume more initiative and personal responsibility for their work involvement and earning their livelihood. The former "socialist" pattern of secure and stable employment, "taken care of" by the state, though persisting in a significant measure in people's consciousness in Serbia, is being gradually replaced with a new social reality characterized by increasingly profound economic and social transformations, less security in employment, and proliferation of the so-called atypical forms of employment increasingly prominent in the developed parts of the world.

In this paper, socio-professional mobility of the working population is analyzed from the perspective of the changing labor sphere rather than from the perspective of global changes in the social structure of Serbia in the 1990s. Therefore, instead of inter-generational social mobility the focus is on a specific aspect of intra-generational socio-professional mobility. Starting from the evidence made available by the 2003 survey of the Institute for Sociological Research, in this paper professional moves of the working population are analyzed, on the basis of their occupation in 1989, in 2000, and in 2003.

When we analyze changes of occupation in the 1989-2003 period we notice, for instance, that 52 % of 1989 managers have remained in the same socio-professional category in 2003. Yet, compared with other groups, the managers were the most mobile and open social group, since 48 % of them have moved to other occupations. Moves to other occupations were fewer among entrepreneurs (30%), manual workers (18%), clerks (16%), professionals (13%) and extremely rare among farmers (1%).

The analysis presented here warrants several important conclusions:

- In the years of post-socialist transformation of Serbia, in spite of the institutionally blocked transition, the "secure employment" and "stable work career" pattern has been disappearing. A portion of employees have had the chance, or have

been forced, to change their occupation. Still, the number of such people is smaller than expected. Most "working people", instead of changing their jobs or occupations, have moved to the ranks of the unemployed, or retired (often prematurely).

- Though limited in scope, socio-professional mobility has enabled the necessary adjustment of people's work to the changing needs of the market. In this way people were at the same time acquiring a new experience – that their work career depends only to a limited extent on the occupation they have been trained for and chosen at a particular moment, and partly on changing circumstances in the labor and services market, i.e. the labor market.

- With the disappearance of the "secure employment pattern" the previous trajectories of work-related social rise or fall, relatively clear as they were, have also changed. Today it is difficult to say, especially on the basis of occupation alone, what constitutes the top and what the bottom of the social pyramid in Serbia. For many former managers (particularly lower- and middle-level ones) the transition to entrepreneurs today means most probably an advance rather than a decline in social status. Similarly, in today's Serbia the transition from manual worker or some other non-agricultural occupation to farmer does not mean necessarily "downward social mobility", as it was usual in times of "socialist industrialization". People are aware of such changes in "trajectories" of social advance or fall and this probably helps them face the situations when they have to change their job, their occupation etc. It is presumably under the influence of such factors as well, and not just of market constraints, that people now display more readiness for professional mobility, for changing their workplaces, and "work arrangements"as a whole, when this is the way to find a job, or to find a more challenging and better paid job. This new readiness for professional mobility, along with other institutional conditions, facilitates further assertion of the market regulation of labor as a necessary aspect of the overall market regulation of economic life in Serbia.

We may interpret as positive the fact that, generally speaking, readiness to adapt to the demands of the labor market is slightly higher, sometimes even much higher, among those who are already employed. This indicates that those who are already located within the "world of labor"view more realistically the new social circumstances than others, "potential employees" and former employees (pensioners). Therefore they are more willing to adapt to the new demands of the labor market, and consequently their "transformative capacity" is consonant with the changes characterizing the contemporary world of labor, to which the post-socialist transformation of Serbia is geared as well.

Still, survey data show a below-average readiness of people in Serbia, at the beginning of the new millennium, for clearly atypical forms of work, such as temporary, unstable work, contract work, simultaneous work in several enterprises, at several jobs at the same time; the readiness for "self-employment" or starting one's own business is also modest. In the prevalent consciousness there persists a belief in

the normality of permanent employment, that is, work in a given (chosen) occupation, as well as working for a long time in the same firm. Evidently, a more radical "flexibilization" of labor in today's Serbia, leading more prominently to "flexible" work patterns argued for in developed post-industrial societies, would at this moment meet with strong resistance and discontent.

People in Serbia, however, are ready to work more, more intensely, to work longer than the regular working hours, work on supplementary side jobs along with their permanent job. This is certainly a major prerequisite for a more succesful economic performance of the country.

Another evident finding is that readiness to change place of residence (because of one's job) declines quite regularly with the respondent's age. This readiness is slightly lower though for the youngest group (under 20) than for the next age group (21-20), where the percentage is the highest (76% in 2003). The available data indicate an important conclusion concerning spatial mobility of Serbia's adult population in the years of post-socialist transformation: during these years people's subjective readiness to change their place of residence for professional reasons has been rising. Such tendencies are consistent with the demands of post-socialist transformation and overall modernization of Serbia.

When the findings of this study are viewed in a comparative perspective, it may be seen that in Serbia, in the 1990-2003 period, the scope of professional mobility, i.e. transitions from one occupation to another, was slightly lower than in some other "countries in transition", but that transitions from the ranks of the employed into the ranks of unemployed and formerly employed (pensioners) have been more frequent.

Finally, as another peculiar feature of Serbia's post-socialist transformation during the 1990s we may cite high rates of transition of the employed and the "formerly employed" (pensioners) to farmers, since this tendency is contrary to both prior tendencies in intra-generational professional mobility in Serbia, and tendencies in today's developed societies.

KEY WORDS: post-socialist transformation, socio-professional mobility, spatial mobility, work orientations, atypical work forms, flexibilization.

Introduction

Despite the long-drawn-out *blockade of transition*, the *process of post-socialist transformation* in Serbia did unfold during the 1990s (Bolčić, 2003). Integral to that process was not only the *new institutional framework of work* – in privatized or newly-formed private firms, with changed ownership and management arrangements – but also a *changed distribution of workforce* by activities, socio-professional groups, and even individual work organizations. This called for a *new socio-professional mobility and people's readiness to work in changed work arrangements* compared with those they had grown used to throughout the decades of "socialist construction".

At the level of actual developments in Serbia during the 1990s a new socio-professional and spatial mobility of the working population appeared. As concerning *work orientations* an increasing number of people contemplated a change of residence during their working careers, in order to look for employment or a better paid position, and expressed readiness to take up not only the jobs matching their basic occupation, but also other (well or better paid) work. Hence, in order to adjust to the situation at the labor market, *people develop (or increase) readiness to work more, with greater intensity, modernity and "flexibility", and to acquire new knowledge and skills, as well as to show greater initiative and personal responsibility for their work engagement* and earning their livelihood. The former "socialist" pattern of secure and stable employment, "seen to" by the state, though still significantly present in the consciousness of the Serbian people, is being gradually suppressed by a new social reality characterized by increasingly profound economic and social transformations, lower employment security, and proliferation of the so-called atypical forms of employment increasingly prominent in the developed parts of the world (Castells, 2000: 281-290; O'Reilly, Fagan, eds., 1998; Laky, 2003: 34-47). *Modern work organizations grow more flexible* in terms of all their important elements (Watson, 2000: 348-349), including their employees. Along with a fairly small number of *key personnel*, who form the "core staff", *modern "flexible" work organizations "employ" an increasing number of people on other than permanent basis"*, for a specified period of time or a "project", on part-time basis, etc. Modern work organizations of this kind are still few in Serbia, but their numbers will keep increasing once the initiated *transition blocked* during the 1990s is resumed.

The *specific* characteristic of the global social transformation (thus including the labor sphere) in Serbia of the 1990s is revealed in the long-lasting *social destruction and collapse of the dominant social-state sector* (Bolčić, 2002a: 97-106). Therefore, instead of a normal socio-professional mobility to adjust the existing work structure to Serbia's new development chances, cases of temporary or more lasting "dropouts" from the labor sphere became increasingly frequent,[1] taking the form of *mass* unemployment and informal *work in the gray* economy. These processes specific to the post-socialist transformation in Serbia explain the findings of the most recent ISI FF[2] 2003 survey which, in the sphere of *actual developments* as well as in the domain of *work orientations*, reveal contradictory trends, only partly comparable with the developments in the modern world and other countries undergoing post-socialist transformation. Bearing in mind that a more substantial transformation in Serbia is

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[1] These may also include people who during the 1990s left the country for good or an indefinite period of time, since most of these emigrants were in the *work* contingent, and moreover younger and more educated persons (Bolčić, 2002c: 159-166).

[2] ISI FF – Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade.

still forthcoming this paper will draw on the data obtained in the ISI FF 2003 survey to focus on the following:

- *socio-professional mobility of the key actors of work* (managers, professionals, entrepreneurs, workers; and
- *people's readiness for adjustments to the changed requirements of the labor market,* including readiness for spatial mobility.

In addition to noting the general trends in social-professional mobility, this study also seeks to analyze the distinctive *work orientations of the specific categories of social groups* - employees of work organizations of different ownership nature, as well as those of various age, education and occupation brackets.

Specific characteristics of socio-professional mobility of the working population in Serbia in 1990-2003

The social-professional mobility of the working population is, in this paper, approached from the *angle of transformation of the labor sphere,* rather than the one of *global changes in the social structure* of Serbia during the 1990s.[3] Therefore, it does not focus on *intergenerational*, but only on one specific aspect of *intragenerational socio-professional mobility*. Drawing on the empirical material available from the ISI FF 2003 empirical research, this paper analyses the *professional movements of the working population* based on their occupation in 1989, and then again in 2000 and 2003. The data so obtained limit the possibility to directly compare the intragenerational professional mobility in "pre-transition" times (before 1989) with that of the subsequent "transition" period. Namely, the previous analyses of intragenerational mobility (Bogdanović, 1991: 510-524) compared the respondents' "present" occupation (at the time of the interview) with his/her "first occupation". This research monitors the changes in the occupations of respondents in the three above-mentioned points of time, seeking to elucidate the social-professional mobility in the *blocked transition* years (1990s), as well as in a brief period after the year 2000, when Serbia experienced a "transition reactivation", primarily in the form of a new wave of privatizing socially and state-owned work organizations.[4]

Taking into account the previous analyses of intragenerational mobility (Bogdanović, 1991), we could again expect substantial *career stability*, i.e. assume that people will keep the professions they had at the beginning of the "transition" period. At the same time, under the influence of global social transformations in Serbia during the 1990s, it was only normal to expect that people would be forced to change their respective "positions in the social division of labor" either by changing

[3] On global changes of social structure in Serbia, see M. Lazić, 2002: 17-34.
[4] On privatization, growth of the private sector and entrepreneurship in Serbia during the 1990s, see Bolčić, 2002b: 107-122. The new privatization wave after 2000 is discussed in Transparency Serbia, *Privatization – What Have We Accomplished so far and What Remains To Be Done,* Belgrade, 2004.

their profession ("job") or temporarily (if unemployed), i.e. permanently (if retired) "exiting" the working segment of the population. Naturally, both "career stability" and socio-professional mobility, broadly understood, differed from one social group to another.[5]

The findings of the above-mentioned survey reveal approximately equal percentages (50.2% and 49.8%) of those who in 2003 retained the *same status* they had occupied in 1989, and those who *changed their* status, among respondents whose "socio-economic status" was registered in the survey.[6] Naturally, the ratio of "career stable" and "mobile" varies between groups. It is understandable, for instance, that only 18% of 1989 pupils and students retained the same "status" in 2003, since it was only realistic to expect that they would complete their schooling and transfer to the *working* population in the intervening period. Unfortunately 26% of the 1989 pupils and students turned up among the *unemployed* in 2003. Furthermore, 45% of the 1989 unemployed remained in the same circle in 2003. Some of them, presumably, went in and out of work during the 14 years following 1989 but, judging by the data of previous research efforts (Milošević, 2002: 146), there is no doubt that many of them remained unemployed throughout this period.

The available survey data indicate that the *ranks of the unemployed* during the 1990s and after the year 2000 kept "*structurally" increasing*, so that the *share* of the unemployed in the total population practically doubled and in 2003 included not only the 1989 unemployed, but also many of those who, in that particular year or in the following period, had a job, i.e. an occupation, but at one point of time, due to the adverse effects of a "distinctly Serbian transition", had to "leave" it and become "unemployed". The figures reveal that out of the total number of those who changed their "place in society" in the 1989-2003 period about 10% ended up among the unemployed. A number of people in this broadly understood circle of the "mobile" exited the sphere of labor definitively *through retirement*. These findings lead to the conclusion that the *actual professional mobility* during the years of post-socialist transformation in Serbia has so far been of a very limited scope. Namely, if we focus on those who changed their *profession* (thus excluding pupils, students, unemployed, pensioners and housewives) it turns out that 85% of respondents in the 2003 survey remained in the same profession as in 1989, compared with only 15% who made this change.

The available data indicate certain variations in the intensity of professional mobility between two sub-periods, i.e. 1989-2000 (the time of "*blocked transition*") and 2000-2003 (the years of "*reactivated transition*"*)*. The *average annual mobility rates* calculated on the basis of "cumulative" mobility rates for the two periods (the cumulative rate of mobility" for the 1989-2000 period included about 8% of "professionally mobile", compared with 5% in the 2000-2003 period) lead to the

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[5] This is revealed by the available analytical tables of the above-mentioned ISI FF 2003 survey.

[6] This refers not only to the respondents who directly participated in the survey, but also the *members of their households* the data on whom were provided by the respondents, including information on their occupation at the three specified time points. Accordingly, the total number of such persons was three times the figure which would have been obtained by taking into account only the respondents directly participating in the survey.

conclusion that *the average annual professional mobility in the years of "reactivated transition" was double the one of the "blocked transition" period (1.5%:0.7%).* This conclusion is consistent with *theoretical expectations of increased professional mobility during transition* (because "post-socialist transition" primarily means *conversion to a market economy*, which requires more frequent "reallocation" of all production factors, including labor). This finding also corresponds to the empirically noted trends in some other "transition countries" (Sabrianova, 2000: 30). It thus appears that the *specificity* of Serbia is not so much the comparatively *small* total volume of professional mobility,[7] as the somewhat *more pronounced "mobility" of the working population towards the ranks of the unemployed and retired.* These two forms of "mobility" were also registered in other countries undergoing transition, especially in its initial stages, although to a slightly lower degree.

As already noted, certain variations in the socio-professional mobility of individual groups of the working population are perceivable.[8] An analysis of changes in profession throughout the 1989-2003 period, reveals that 52% of 1989 *managers* remained in the same socio-professional category in 2003. Compared with other groups, *managers were the most mobile and most open social group, with 48% of them changing profession*.[9] Transfers to other occupations were fewer among entrepreneurs (30%), manual workers (18%), clerks (16%) and professionals (13%) and extremely rare among farmers (1%).

Speaking about specific rates of professional mobility, one could say that the trends registered in the "pre-transition" period have persisted in Serbia's post-socialist transformation (Bogdanović, 191: 515-519). A similar pattern of mobility is observed if the analysis is expanded to include "movements" towards the *ranks of the unemployed and retired*, although in that case all groups display greater "mobility" and "openness". Managers thus appear even more mobile (77%) especially due to the increasing frequency of retirement.[10] Similar trends were observed among professionals and clerks, with quite a lot of retirement, while the *relative "openness" of the workers' group* was, in addition to retirement, also substantially conditioned by their *increasing transfer among the unemployed*.

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[7] We have no systematic findings to that effect. But, K. Sabrianova (2000: 37) provides the data for Russia revealing that between 1991 and 1998, 42% of the employed reported a kind of a change in occupation, although her research equally registers the change of "place of work", i.e. work organization and the change of occupation. Bearing this in mind, one could assume that *professional* mobility in Russia could not have been substantially larger than the one registered in Serbia by the ISI FF 2003 survey.

[8] This is evidenced by the following graphic representations of individual groups' mobility.

[9] This "openness" of the managerial strata is not necessarily its inherent characteristic. It is probably a consequence of the social-systemic changes in this period, when replacement of former managers with new teams was only logical. Naturally, numerous former managers have retained their managerial roles under the new regime although often in a different managerial sphere, e.g. by changing from political to economic management.

[10] Twenty five percent of 1989 managers were among the 2003 pensioners.

Graphic representation of professional mobility







These data reveal some change in the trajectories of mobility registered in the years of "blocked transition" compared with the ones of the "reactivated transition". Thus while the managers who failed to keep their positions in 1989-2000 most often retired, in 2000-2003 they more often than before transferred among professionals (which is probably where they initially belonged), and then the unemployed, although they also moved to other occupations (entrepreneurs, clerks, workers).

It appears that after the year 2000 the overall social circumstances became somewhat more favorable for *entrepreneurs*, 90% of whom in 2003 retained their entrepreneurial status of 2000. Bearing in mind the professional mobility throughout the years of post-socialist transformation in Serbia, the *largest "career stability" was manifested by professionals* who were the fewest to become unemployed. Compared with professionals, as well as all other professional groups, *workers most often moved to the group of the unemployed*, while in the latest period (2000-2003) their relocation among farmers has become somewhat more frequent.

Throughout the period of "socialist industrialization" it was usual for people to *move from agricultural ("peasant") to other, non-agricultural occupations*, and the very *transfer among the workers* meant *their rise in society.* Nevertheless, many farmers remained on their land, so that their stratum shows the largest, already previously registered, rate of *intergenerational self-renewal* (Bogdanović, 515). In the years of post-socialist transformation, due to the ruin of the *social* economy, as well as the newly introduced, more favorable social and systemic treatment of private ownership in all spheres including agriculture, work in *private agriculture* offered better livelihood than the poorly paid *industrial work*, which accounts for the increased frequency of *returns to the ranks of farmers.* This is evidenced by the following data of the ISI FF 2003 survey, showing the 1989 and 2000 statuses of 2003 farmers, i.e. the groups they were "recruited" from.



It is obvious that the ranks of farmers in 2003 include only 40% and 51% of those who had that status in 1989 and 2000 respectively. The group of 2003 farmers comprises increasing numbers of previous pensioners, unemployed, workers, pupils and also people of certain other occupations. All of them, during the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, opted to earn their livelihood by farming. In view of the world trends of remarkable decrease in agricultural work,[11] this trend of

[11] M. Castells (2000: 304-316) gives extensive data on the share of employment by activities for the 1920-1991 period in the most developed countries, revealing, e.g. a 2.9% share of agriculture in the USA in 1991, 3.2% in Germany (in 1987), 7.1% in Japan (in 1990), 6.3% in France (1989), 9.5% in Italy (in 1990). All these cases displayed a visible "secular" trend of decreasing employment in agriculture. The long term trends in Serbia were the same (Petrović, 1978: 91), although, in view of Serbia's overall underdevelopment, the share of employment (or "active population") in agriculture in the 20th century Serbia was certainly much higher than that of the most developed countries.

return to agriculture is a specific characteristic of a long-blocked and only recently unblocked transformation in Serbia, where many people, left jobless in the non-agrarian sector, found agricultural work at least a temporarily better solution than unemployment or poorly paid jobs in numerous non-agrarian spheres.

In-depth analyses of data on the socio-professional mobility of people in Serbia in the 1989-2003 period would certainly reveal other specific features of Serbia's post-socialist transformation. However, the evidence already presented in this paper allows us to make a few important comments:

- Despite the blocked transition, the patterns of "secure employment" and "stable work career" gradually and spontaneously disappeared during the post socialist transformation in Serbia. A number of the employed were given the chance to change their occupations, or forced to do so. Still, their percentages are much lower than one would expect. The majority, however, instead of changing *jobs or occupations*, joined the ranks of the unemployed or (often early) retired;
- Although of limited scope, *socio-professional mobility enabled the necessary adjustment of people's work to the changing needs of the market*. People thus acquired new experience – that their work careers partly depended on the occupation they had qualified for and chose to pursue at a particular moment, and partly also on the changing circumstances on the market of goods and services, i.e. on the labor market;
- With the disappearance of the "secure employment pattern" the previous trajectories of work-related social rise or fall, relatively clear as they were, have also changed. It is today difficult to say what constitutes the top and the bottom of the social pyramid in Serbia, especially on the basis of occupation alone. Many former managers (particularly on lower and middle levels) probably see the transition to entrepreneurship as a rise rather than decline in their social status. In the similar vein, transition from manual work or some other non-agricultural occupation to farming in present day Serbia does not necessarily stand for "downward social mobility", as it usually did in the times of "industrialization". People are aware of such changes in the "trajectories" of social rise or fall and this probably helps them to cope with situations when they have to change their jobs, their occupations, etc. Presumably under the additional influence of these factors, rather than market forces alone, people now display greater readiness for professional mobility, for changing their workplaces and "work arrangements" as a whole, if that is the way to find work, or a more challenging and better paid job. This new readiness for *professional mobility*, along with other institutional conditions, helps to *affirm the market regulation of labor* as a necessary aspect of conversion to market rules in Serbia's overall economic life.

Readiness of people in Serbia for professional mobility

During the years of "socialist construction" substantial *planned relocations of labor* were possible, from one work organization, activity or sector to another, although in the countries where individual freedom was greater in all forms of social action, such as the "socialist" Yugoslavia and Serbia, so was the people's "mobility" (professional as well as spatial) influenced by individual decisions and motivations. In the years of post-socialist transformation of Serbia, in the context of important, more or less spontaneous economic-structural changes brought about by world and local market trends, a *new social-professional mobility* appears, *essentially defined precisely by individualized factors*, personal motives and decisions, which is why it is important to know about *individual work orientations*, preferences and *readiness for socio-professional mobility.*

It is only realistic to expect that people will tend to hold essentially the same job during their lives, engaging in an occupation they have chosen as their life vocation, and that the rate of "career stability" is therefore higher than the one of socio-professional mobility. That is because a longer occupational tenure usually implies maximum utilization of natural talents, acquired knowledge and skills - thus, "capitalization" of a person's own investments into his/her "socio-cultural capital".[12] We should not disregard the people's *need for security* and it also depends on their being "rooted" ("embedded") in a familiar working environment and their ease of coping with the job. However, there are situations when people, precisely due to their own needs and interests, change workplaces, jobs, occupations, to better harmonize their *work qualities* (knowledge, skills, etc.) with whatever their jobs have to offer. That is one of the lasting factors of socio-professional mobility characterizing all modern societies based on the *principle of freedom of work* and the freedom of choice of occupation. Naturally, there are also situations that in a certain manner *force* people into socio-professional mobility.[13] This applies to a substantial part of socio-professional mobility in the countries which embarked upon post-socialist transformation during the 1990s. That has certainly been the case in Serbia.

In comparatively stable societies the scope and character of socio-professional mobility are largely "stabilized". In societies where important social transformation develops, such as the one of Serbia in the 1990s, it is difficult to estimate the "normality" of socio-professional mobility's scope and patterns, especially without adequate methodical insights into the relevant trends in the "pre-transition" period and comparative studies on socio-professional mobility for the group of "transition countries".

As suggested by the previous paragraph, despite a few specific characteristics in the scope and directions of socio-professional mobility in Serbia during the

[12] We are speaking about "social-cultural capital", comprising "social" and "cultural" capital as defined by P. Bourdieu, 2001.

[13] This is addressed by K. Sabrianova (2000: 1-3), who emphasizes this forced professional mobility as a specific feature of re-allocation of human capital in Russia during the recent post-socialist transformation.

1990s, tendencies similar to the so-called intragenerational mobility in this country in the "pre-transition" period are noted. Regrettably, *there is no knowledge of the population's readiness for mobility in that earlier period*, which is why it is difficult to compare people's present readiness to change jobs and work arrangements with prior patterns of behavior in that domain. It still seems that in the context of new social circumstances in Serbia, we should expect people to show greater readiness for socio-professional mobility, especially those segments of the working population whose chances for work and employment are changing in the course of this country's post-socialist transformation.

All countries undergoing post-socialist transformation registered a significant increase in unemployment, especially in the initial years. That was, presumably, in addition to *objective reasons* for the growth of unemployment (economic "restructuring", loss of previous markets, technological and organizational modernizations, ownership restructuring, global social disorganization, etc.), also caused by *insufficient readiness of many people to change the type and manner of work they have grown used to in "the years of socialism".* In all likelihood, the gradual decrease in unemployment in most "transition countries" in the subsequent years should not be attributed only to their success in dealing with the *objective* causes of unemployment, but also to their peoples' *growing readiness for diverse adjustments to the labor market.* The "unblocking" and "reactivation" of transition in Serbia after October 2000 may have temporarily added to the growth of unemployment, in the way it happened in other former "socialist" countries in the initial years of their transition. The depth and duration of the so-called transition recession shall, in the case of Serbia, depend on many objective circumstances, some of which are unknown to most "transition countries" (Serbia's involvement in the war in the formerly "Yugoslav territory", international community sanctions, global destruction of society, etc.), as well as on the speed of development of a *new social consciousness, befitting a "post-socialist" society* seeking a new way to join the global world relations and trends. *People's readiness to adjust to the changeable circumstances at the labor market is part of this new social consciousness appropriate to a society undergoing post-socialist transformation.* This widening and deepening of people's readiness to do other than their habitual jobs, and in changed work arrangements, may facilitate the overcoming of the "transition recession" and speed up Serbia's course to catch up with the normal developed part of the world today. In view of that long-term social importance of this phenomenon, a research into people's readiness for socio-professional mobility and new *more flexible work arrangements* was given a special place in this paper.

The ISI FF 2003 survey, carried out on a sample of adult population in Serbia (excluding Kosovo) covered some of the possible changes in work arrangements, due to the strengthening role of the labor market in regulating people's behavior in the work sphere:

- A more frequent *change of the type of* work, implying overall readiness to do "any paid work", to simultaneously tackle several jobs in different firms, to take up jobs bellow one's qualifications and, finally, to be ready to acquire new qualifications, knowledge and skills:

- *Change of intensity of* work including readiness to work longer than normal hours, and to have a supplementary (legally permissible) part-time job;
- *Change of security of employment* and therefore readiness to leave permanent employment in order to work on a specific job ("project") on contract, especially if it enables higher overall earnings;
- *Greater individual independence in work and personal responsibility to find* work, which means readiness to be *self-employed, establish one's own firm, etc.*

Even under the "socialist work regime" people were occasionally forced to work more intensively or longer hours and to acquire new qualifications, while some of those engaged in the sphere of the so-called personal work (personal services and agriculture) were self-employed and thus independent in their work, as well as personally responsible for their economic existence. With the onset of the "transition" after 1989, including the legalization of privately-owned enterprises and liberalization of conditions for setting up private firms in all spheres of work, the number of the self-employed and personally responsible for their employment and earnings kept increasing. In the years of the "blocked transition" and also after the year 2000, possibilities for work in the *gray economy* were multiplied many times over. This kind of illegal work did exist in the "pre-transition" period, but did not take such proportions or the form of practically everyday, regular work, which in many respects equaled employment in the "formal" economy, except that all work arrangements between the "employees" and "employers" remained informal. *Certain forms of modern flexible "atypical" work are occasionally registered in new private firms in Serbia*[14] (work on a project contract, a specific job or part-time work, which enables simultaneous engagement in several firms and often on different jobs, etc.), although many of those "flexibly employed" are actually informal parties to such arrangements.

Therefore, despite some experience with several variants of work different from the typical "regular employment" (involving clearly defined jobs) acquired during the previous decade of "blocked transition", that was the case of but the minority of the working population, which is why it is realistic to assume that in the *mass consciousness of the people* the conviction that the *normal working arrangement* is the one that takes the form of *permanent, safe, legally regulated employment* prevails. This would suggest a still *small readiness for different variants of "atypical" modern flexible work.* The findings of the ISI FF 2003 survey, although difficult to interpret from a *dynamic perspective* due to the absence of data for the previous years, or other comparable societies, allow for somewhat different conclusions about this readiness.

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[14] According to T. Laky (2003: 37), out of the total number of the "employed" in the European Union in 2001, 18% were in "part-time" arrangements, 15% were "self-employed" while 13% worked "under contract". Naturally, the employment structure of most developed countries is still dominated by "full time", permanent employees; see, also Castells (2000: 283, O'Reilly, 1998: 38).

The above-mentioned survey provides an insight into the overall readiness of people in Serbia for the new work arrangements referred to above, as well as the readiness of individual groups of the working population to accept each one of them. The respondents were asked the following question: *In order to provide your and your family's livelihood, will you be prepared to...* (follow the modes of different work arrangements, listed in Table 1, and the respondents answered with *yes* or *no*). The table gives the percentages of positive responses for each of the modalities of work behavior, for the sample of all respondents as well as the sub-sample of the employed.

People, clearly, display different readiness for specific adjustments to the requirements of the labor market. *Majority readiness* (63%) has been registered for work longer than normal working hours. *Over half* the respondents were prepared to take up another legal part-time job along with regular employment (57%), and to work on jobs bellow their qualifications (60%).

People in Serbia today seem to be *split* (into practically equal groups in favor and against) on the issue of accepting "any paid job" as well as of acquiring new qualifications.

The majority lack of readiness is registered for all other *arrangements of "atypical" work* (leaving permanent employment to work "on contract", working for several firms at the same time), as well as for setting up one's own firm and "self-employment". *The majority (52%) are not ready even to change the place of residence in order to find employment or a better paid job*. Finally, *people show least readiness (26%) for informal employment, in the gray economy)*.

Table 1. *Readiness of people in Serbia for "more flexible" work arrangements*

Are people ready to:		All respondents	Sub-sample of the employed
Change the place of residence to find employment or increase earnings	Yes (%)	46	63
Take up any paid job	Yes (%)	49	61
Work longer than normal hours	Yes (%)	63	86
Do several jobs in different firms	Yes (%)	36	51
Take jobs below their qualification, for higher salary	Yes (%)	60	75
Leave permanent employment for "work on contract", but with a better pay	Yes (%)	32	36
Take additional, part-time jobs along with regular work	Yes (%)	57	79
Acquire new qualifications, knowledge, skills	Yes (%)	50	70
Start working independently and become "self-employed"	Yes (%)	45	58
Establish their own firm, alone or with others	Yes (%)	35	50
Work informally, in the gray economy	Yes (%)	26	32
Total number of respondents		1615	561

The fact that readiness for adjustment to the requirements of the labor market is, in general, somewhat - and occasionally even substantially - higher among those already employed may be considered as a favorable characteristic. It reveals that those already in the "world of labor" see the new social "circumstances" more realistically than the "potentially" or "formerly" employed (pensioners), that they are therefore readier to adjust to the new requirements of the labor market, and that their "*transformative ability"* concurs with the changes characteristic of the modern world of labor, which is also where the post-socialist transformation of Serbia is aimed. Naturally, the below average readiness for atypical forms of work such as part-time and temporary employment, work on contract, simultaneous work in several firms and on several jobs, as well as self-"employment" or establishment of one's own firm, leads to the previously mentioned conclusion about the prevailing consciousness that *permanent employment is normal,* thus work in a given occupation and probably also in the same work organization. It is obvious that a *more radical "flexibilization" of work* in the present day Serbia, more strongly conducive to patterns of "flexible" work advocated for the developed post-industrial societies (Bridges, 1994, Watson, 2000, Castells, 2000) would, at this point of time, be bound to encounter serious *resistance and* discontent.

However, people are ready to work more and more intensively, longer than normal working hours and on part-time jobs supplementary to their permanent employment, which is certainly an important precondition for more successful economic operation in this country.

It is interesting to note the *remarkably low readiness of people to work in the gray economy*, despite the fact that many of them over the past years already tried their hand at this "work regime" and that informal work has to this date remained an important reliance for the survival of quite a few. This attitude of the respondents probably reflects the increasingly frequent requests of the official state bodies, as well as the public at large, to curb the thriving gray economy, essentially clashing not only with the state's efforts to ensure reliable and higher budgetary revenues from the real economy, but also with *people's needs to work within institutionally arranged frameworks, with clear-cut, predictable rights and obligations.*

The largest readiness for new forms of flexible work is shown by the employees of newly-established private firms. Close to that group are those employed in the *privatized,* formerly socially-owned firms. Similar, although somewhat smaller readiness for most above-mentioned forms of flexible work is also noted among those still employed in social-state firms. It may be that the *different degree of readiness* registered between the employees of private and social firms is partly due to the *difference in their age structure.* It was noted that the percentage of younger workers in social-state firms in Serbia during the 1990s was somewhat lower than in private firms (Bolčić, 2002: 104), partly because the employers of newly formed firms tended to take on younger staff and partly also because the "*collapsed" social firms*[15] were more often left by young and more educated cadre. Variations in people's readiness for different forms of "flexible" work noted for the employees

[15] See, S. Bolčić (2002a: 99-106).

of work organizations of different ownership also apply to their readiness for "self-employment" and establishment of their own firms.

We also note a fair number of those with the "socialist work socialization" among the employees of newly-formed private firms, because many of them previously worked precisely in socially-owned firms. Still, *younger people* who found their first employment in newly established companies are substantially more numerous. In the same way, all employees of these firms, regardless of their previous employment, directly pointed to the *advantages of the firm's ownership status* and, consequently, revealed larger interest to see themselves in the owner role. This appears to provide part of the explanation for the increased readiness of those employed in newly formed private firms for self-employment and establishment of their own businesses. Finally, it is possible to assume that those who found employment in new private firms, for the most part, had *similar basic value orientations* and were more inclined towards *modernity and private enterprise*[16], which was also an important factor of their greater readiness for these, more flexible and modern forms of work. However, we should add that the *employees of newly-formed firms in Serbia still account for a small segment of the employed* (22% in this sub-sample of the employed), which is why, at this moment, the assessment of general readiness of the employed for greater individual responsibility in securing their own employment and livelihood relies more on the "ambivalent readiness" for new work behavior of employees in social–state firms and those created by the ownership transformation thereof (mixed, privatized firms)...

The data obtained by the ISI FF 2003 survey indicate that *age* (i.e. generational belonging) is the specific characteristic which is, clearly more than others, associated with the respondents' readiness to accept more flexible, modern and independent forms of work[17].

Table 2. *People's readiness for more flexible forms of work, by age groups*

People's readiness to:		Age groups			
		18-29	30-44	45-59	60 and over
Take up any paid job	Yes (%)	48	68	59	23
Do several jobs in several firms	Yes (%)	49	52	41	10
Work below their qualifications	Yes (%)	76	82	66	23
Work on contract without permanent employment	Yes (%)	47	42	34	9
Become self-employed	Yes (%)	73	63	42	11
Eestablish their own firm	Yes (%)	63	48	34	6
Total number of respondents		289	488	432	406

[16] The data of the ISI FF 2003 survey indicate that the ranks of employees of new private firms, as well as mixed firms with majority private capital and privatized formerly social firms include more supporters of full privatization of all social-state firms, and less opponents to this privatization. The largest resistance to privatization is manifested by employees of social-state firms.

[17] This may also be argued using the contingency coefficient (Cramer's V). Correlation of the data on people's readiness to do any paid job with their *age* gives the contingency coefficient of. 349, occupation.322, *education*.172, *firm's ownership status*.155, and *gender*.112.

These data clearly reveal that *the oldest generation is remarkably unprepared for all forms of more flexible and independent work.* This could be understood as a consequence of the normal "old-age inflexibility", as well as a logical reaction to the really small actual needs and possibilities of older people to work in general, but may also be viewed as a result of a long-lasting "socialist work socialization" where the emphasis was on permanent employment, with a specific occupation and for a stable employer such as the state or a "social" work organization.

Members of the youngest generation show greater readiness for self-employment and establishment of their own firms than those of other generations, although their real possibilities to actually do that are fairly limited, in view of their, as a rule, modest overall economic, as well as "social capital". However, this generation does not excel in readiness to take up any job that pays or to work under less secure, flexible "work regimes".

A finding which may well be considered encouraging is the one pointing to the *remarkable readiness of the "younger-middle" generation (30-44) to accept all forms of more flexible and independent* work, and especially (82%) jobs below their qualifications. That is obviously a generation of the employed which has already faced the requirements for "flexibility" during the difficult years of the blocked transition in Serbia. Its members often turned up unemployed for different periods of time, took various jobs, such as were to be found on the formal and informal labor markets, and it is only understandable that they would be prepared to accept such work arrangements in future.

The "*older-middle generation" (45-59)* shows somewhat less readiness for modern forms of work compared with the "younger-middle" generation. But its members, too, display a relatively high readiness to accept less certain, and more flexible forms of work compared with those they have grown used to during their work careers. Bearing in mind that these two "middle" generations represent the *majority* of Serbia's working population, we could say that their relatively high readiness for more flexible forms of work opens prospects for a new socio-professional mobility and indicates the creation of more favorable "*human conditions" for speedier transition and new modernization* of Serbia in the coming years.

The data on verbally manifested readiness to accept more flexible and modern forms of work however do not allow for reliable conclusions about the real *transformation abilities* of Serbia's working population at the beginning of the 21st century. It would be realistic to assume that the *respondents in this survey expressed higher readiness* to work in a more flexible and modern manner than they would have been ready to do in a *real* life situation. We know that in this country, even at the time of large unemployment, many of those registered as "job seekers", refused employment offered by unemployment bureaus, if it was different from their basic occupation, below their qualifications, etc. Such behavior is today presumably somewhat less frequent then before. Therefore, taking due account of all the reservations applicable to the survey results, it would be appropriate to say that *people in Serbia at the beginning of the new millennium are prepared to work more, with greater intensity and* *to change jobs according to the demands of the labor market to a higher extent than they were used to under the socialist "regime of secure employment".*

According to the analysis so far, new work orientations are unevenly distributed among different social groups. The essential thing is that a pronounced readiness for more flexible and independent work is noted in *all groups of the employed, unemployed, and, especially workers*, since their readiness, in view of their share in the working population, crucially influences the success and speed of post-socialist transformation in Serbia.

Although many believe that the "*old mentality"* - *expectations of greater rights than obligations of the employed* entrenched during "socialism" and hopes for *protected employment and secured "state wages"* - remains the critical obstacle for efforts made by formerly "socialist" societies, including Serbia, to overcome their low economic and overall social efficiency faster, the findings of this survey announce brighter prospects for the change of these prior "patterns of work". It seems that at this point of time *the problems in the global social politics and inadequate institutional frameworks in Serbia represent a more important obstacle to a speedier and more successful post-socialist transformation than do the weaknesses of its "human factor".*

Spatial mobility and readiness for spatial mobility

Along with the socio-professional mobility, *spatial mobility* of the people to find work or "a better job" should also be *characteristic of a modern labor force* which appreciates the changes at the labor market. The times when people lived their whole life in the environment they had been born into and spent their entire working life doing jobs within "their occupation" are long gone. In time, ever more people moved from one place to another, some more than once, sometimes to take up residence in the place where their life partner lived, often for their own or their children's education, and increasingly also because it brought them the desired employment. The longer a given society is *included in modernizing processes, the larger the spatial mobility of its overall and especially working population will generally be.* Naturally, under the influence of numerous factors, there are "more mobile" and "less mobile" societies.

The Serbian society, for a long time already, has not been considered a spatially "mobile" society, especially in terms of larger relocation distances. According to the available data on migrations, 78% of the total population of Serbia in 1948 lived in the places of their birth, compared with 58% in 1971 (Petrović, 1978: 142). Among those who changed residence in 1971, 31% relocated within the same municipality, 41% moved in from another (usually neighboring) municipality, while only 18% came from places in other republics of the then Yugoslavia (Petrović, 1978: 141) or abroad. It appears that these characteristics of limited spatial mobility of the Serbian population were not essentially changed in the subsequent decades. As the findings of the ISIFF survey in 1999 indicate, 56% of the respondents did not change the place of residence until that time, 27% did that once and 17% two or more times.

Compared with the previous tendencies of *real spatial mobility,* established on the basis of the data on people's subjective readiness to change the place of residence (the ISIFF survey inquired into that within the context of finding a job) the 1999 survey, and even the one of 2003, reveal that people, especially the *younger ones,* are reasonably ready to move to another place on account of a job.

Table 3. *People's readiness to change the place of residence (on account of a job): age groups in Serbia in 1999 and 2003*

Readiness to move on account of a job		Age of respondents						
		Do 20g.	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Total (%)
1999	Yes (%)	64	70	62	46	22	7	46
2003	Yes (%)	68	76	61	56	35	15	48

It is obvious that *readiness to change the place of residence (on account of a job) registers a rather regular decrease with the age of respondents.* Notwithstanding some reservations, partly due to the different samples of respondents in the 1999 and 2003 surveys, the data in this table indicate yet another important conclusion related to the spatial mobility of the adult population of Serbia in the years of post-socialist transformation, namely that *people's subjective readiness to change the place of residence grew* in time. The same conclusion could be made by comparing the data of previous ISIFF surveys looking into people's readiness to change the place of residence (on account of a job) as indicated in the following table (4):

Table 4. *People's readiness to change the place of residence on account of a job: Serbia 994-2003*[18]

Readiness to move on account of a job	1994. %	1995. %	1999. %	2003. %
Yes (%)	26	31	46	48
No (%)	74	69	54	52
Total	100	100	100	100

Although we have already pointed to the absence of a complete match between the actual spatial mobility and people's subjective readiness to change the place of residence, and cautioned that the data were obtained on the basis of somewhat different samples, it would not be amiss to reckon with *a gradual growth of actual spatial mobility in Serbia's social reality and assume that these trends are consist-*

[18] The data of surveys done by the Institute of Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy (ISIFF) in Belgrade for the specified years. Methodological details of the samples used for the surveys and the basic data are available at the Institute.

ent with the requirements of the country's post-socialist transformation and overall modernization.

Certainly important for the social actors, employers and investors participating in channeling the social transformation in Serbia, is *to learn* of the *high readiness of the workers, the unemployed and the professionals* (including a number of narrow groups, unspecified in this paper) *to change the place of residence in order to find a (better paid) job* (as substantiated by the ISI FF 2003 survey data). This *readiness for spatial mobility*, with the already analyzed readiness of these same groups for *socio-professional mobility*, may facilitate the necessary structural changes in the Serbian economy ensuing from its post-socialist transformation and its reintegration into the world business courses.

Here again we must note that verbally manifested readiness for spatial mobility is probably greater than the one registered in real social situations. *People often find it hard to change the place of residence*, where they have formed many things of importance for the quality of their life, just as they find it hard to change their basic occupations. Still, the subjective readiness of people to change the place of residence in order to find a job, or a better job, which, as already indicated, has recently registered an upward trend, is a good indicator of the possibility for better adjustment of the work potential to the new development chances of this country.

To the extent that "knowledge" is an essential "resource" which a *modern society* uses to develop its potential and establish a more favorable position in the world community, we should hope that *this presentation of the specific characteristics of the socio-professional mobility and work orientations of the people in Serbia in the years of the blocked,* and as of recent times *unblocked and "reactivated", transition* could offer the *relevant points of reliance* in conceiving and implementing *new social actions* to speed up the processes of the post-socialist transformation of Serbia and its *true "integration" into Europe and the modern world of the future.*

Sreten Vujović

ACTORS OF URBAN CHANGE IN SERBIA

ABSTRACT: The aim of the paper is to present major actors of significant socio-spatial changes taking place in Serbian post-socialist cities at the turn of the millennium. The place and role of main actors in the "production of space", their hierarchy, mutual conflicts, horizontal and vertical alliances are described, primarily from the perspective of urban sociology. In order to achieve a better understanding of urban transformation, different aspects of current urbanization processes (tertiarization, privatization, commercialization, residential mobility, dualization, social segregation...) in Serbia and other countries in transition are analyzed. It is demonstrated that the actors of urban change make up a hierarchy, whose top is occupied by politicians, followed by businessmen and urban planners, while citizens (users) are at the bottom. "Urban actor" here means an individual or group occupying a particular position in society, hence controlling certain social resources, pursuing particular interests and values, sustaining relations with others, shaping their own identity in interaction with others, and offering projects for developing the city and everyday life they wish to implement (Bassand). A more general context for the analysis is provided by the triad: society/state – town/local authorities – citizen, home, neighborhood, district... A global-local approach to transformation strategies of individuals and social groups in Serbia is applied.

KEY WORDS: globalization, post-socialist transformation, urbanization, urban change, power, conflicts, urban actors, politicians, businessmen, urban planners, citizens.

Introduction

This paper seeks to present the main actors of important socio-spatial changes in post-socialist towns in Serbia at the turn of the millennium, i.e. to outline the place and role of these actors in the "production of space", their hierarchy, vertical and horizontal alliances, primarily from the point of view of urban sociology. The analysis of urban changes starts from the changes in the Serbian society under the influence of globalization and post-socialist transformation – at the macro level, through socio-spatial changes in the towns – at the mezzo level, to those in the everyday life of citizens – at the micro level. Actually we are talking about a triad of society/state – town/local administration – citizen/home, neighborhood, district... In other words we try to apply a "glocal" approach to the transformation strategies of individuals and social groups in Serbia.

In the era of globalization and transition large towns become places of increasingly manifest social problems affecting the global society. Latent tensions in metropolitan cities often surface in the form of fierce conflicts. Factors conducive to situations wherein tensions and multiple social problems take the form of urban conflicts include: poverty, ethnic divisions and antagonisms, crime and insecurity. Insecurity, in effect, derives from the first three types of factors, regardless of whether they have a direct bearing on an individual or not. Social polarization with poverty at one end, creates disenfranchised underclasses, socially excluded groups concentrated in separate city localities, which points to the spatial aspect of social exclusion. The prevailing view in professional circles holds that the abandonment of the welfare state in the West and the collapse of the socialist redistributive system intensified social polarization, i.e. the growth of various forms of social differentiation and segregation.

Our concrete empirical analysis of changes in Serbia's post-socialist towns will rely on different sources of data including the 2003 ISI FF survey.

Following Michel Bassand, we take it that the term urban actors denotes individuals or groups occupying specific positions in society - and hence controlling certain social resources - who uphold specific interests and values, shape their own identity in interaction with others and offer projects for developing the city and everyday life they wish to realize (Bassand, 2001)... At this point we should note that urban power governs urban development, which means that urban development results from the power structure, i.e. a system of actors some of which are superior while other are subordinated; together they structure the urban phenomenon. In modern towns, socialist included, we may distinguish between four main types of actors: 1. spatial experts (architects, urbanists, engineers, etc.); 2. economic actors (various industrial enterprises and services, owners of town land, banks, etc.); 3. political actors (political leaders, their parties, movements, etc.); and 4. inhabitants, users/citizens differentiated by their social status, lifestyle, age, education, etc.

In view of their objectives and values, our urban actors may, at present, be roughly divided into reformists and anti-reformists.

Following this introduction, we will first, give a brief overview of changes in the structure, functions and form of post-socialist towns, and then point to the main characteristics of urban actors in Serbia.

A difficult road from a "statist" to a "liberal" town

In order to better understand the transformation of Serbian towns during the past ten years or so, we shell outline the main characteristics of urbanization in its socialist period, including: 1. a belated, centrally planned and managed, urbanization; 2. an overemphasized role of industrialization in urbanization, i.e. disregard of the tertiary sector and infrastructure as allegedly unproductive; 3. the continuing importance of the rural sector in urbanization due to the high share of mixed households among the employed, although important differences between towns and villages have remained to the disadvantage of the letter; 4. the weak internal cohesion of the urban network, revealed in the absence of economic local and regional networks, i.e. central decision-making; 5. a dominant role of enterprises in securing housing, indicating the superiority of workplace over the place of residence; 6. a different structure and functioning of the urban society in socialist compared with capitalist towns, since their elites consisted of party leaders, managers of state enterprises and administration executives. To this we should add the absence of the civil society and the fact that professional, cultural and other associations were established and controlled by the state (Enyedi, 1996: 115). However, the crucial economic difference between the socialist and capitalist urbanizations is marked by the absence of an operating market and town's rent in the former.

Contrary to urbanization outcomes in the developed capitalist world, the socialist system did not manage to create the so-called post-industrial or information city. Treading the difficult road from a "statist" to a "liberal" town few metropolises of formerly socialist countries reached the rank of "global" cities (Moscow, Budapest...) as control and check points for the flow of people, capital, goods, finance and information on a world scale. The socialist system failed to carry out the changes successfully completed in the liberal capitalist post-industrial system, where metropolitan cities saw the restructuring of economic and social life since the early 1970s. Modern metropolises are characterized by deindustrialization, changes in the structure of production, labor market and the professional structure, reflected in the reduced numbers of the employed in the secondary sector and their rapid growth in the tertiary, and especially quaternary sector. The focus has shifted from the production of goods towards the development of the services sector.

This raises the question of socio-spatial consequences of the post-socialist transformation in this context. Although expected, migration from villages into towns did not increase, and neither was there a pronounced growth in the degree of urbanization. By way of illustration, the degree of urbanization in Serbia, low as it was, registered a small growth in the 1991-2002 period: from 54.1% to 56.4%. The economic crisis resulted in a growth of urban poverty and the development of survival strategies, which rely on agricultural production for personal needs. The importance of the dual economy of mixed village households intensified. The slow pace of urbanization continued because the number of workplaces in the industrial sector of the towns is limited, and those industries which managed to survive and are on the upturn, require younger and highly qualified population, as does the tertiary sector. On the other hand, the period of transition marks the opening of the national economy, and even imports of cheaper food, thus exposing the domestic village economy to competition. That, along with other unfavorable conditions, accounts for the fact that rural poverty in Serbia and Montenegro is greater than urban.

Nevertheless, the development of the towns proceeded from homogeneity towards heterogeneity. Private enterprise and commercialization of town centers resulted in a fast growth of small shops, restaurants, different services, street vending, etc. Street vending and the gray economy became the main survival strategies for quite a few citizens. In this way, a parallel economy - its negative aspects notwithstanding - became necessary in order to survive.

The structural transformation of the economy, including street vending as its component part, was marked by: 1. the ruin of the social sector retail trade; 2. the opening of borders; 3. the weakening of the previously strong paternalistic state; 4. an increased consumer culture; 5. a drastic drop of the living standard for the majority of the population (Sik, Wallace, 1999: 701). On the other hand, retail trade in post-socialist towns experienced a boom with the construction of large shopping centers (hyper markets, shopping malls). International retail chains became the most conspicuous signs of market development, and even globalization.

The commercialization of public space in central parts of post-socialist towns is the most obvious on the semiotic level: countless new signs, signals and symbols, graffiti, new street names, adverts, billboards... Instead of the sickle, hammer, five-pointed star and other real socialist symbols and banners with messages written in red letters against a white background or vice versa, the new designation of the public space bears the marks of a westernized "spectacle of consumption" and "consumption of spectacle", "reclamocracy" and marketing. The appearance of the "public space" syntagma is linked with the crisis of the modern town: functional zoning, large-scale planning, isolation of suburbs and a chaotic suburban situation. "At first sight, we may define public space as space open to all (where everybody can appear and move freely) but also as an empty space - 'tension creator' between parts of a skeleton, a space for communication (exchange, confrontation, movement, advertising, information...) and, finally, a space for presentation of values, symbols, signs of urban culture" (Lajak, 2000: 95).

In addition, ethnic heterogenization is on the increase in East-European cities, Serbian included. Socially deviant phenomena are also on the increase: homelessness, crime, prostitution, drug abuse, pornography... The safety of socialist towns has disappeared. Increased social inequalities became territorialized through new forms of social segregation, gentrification and residential suburbanization.

The coupling of destructive external and internal factors also affected the changes in the towns of post-socialist Serbia. As we know, the Yugoslav model of socialism ended in the worst possible manner. We went through wars, disintegration of the state, slow and blocked transition and are still plodding on in a painful and conflicting post-socialist transformation.

Just as the citizens in post-socialist transformation may roughly be divided into winners and losers, so can the towns and regions. While in developed European countries differences between regions, municipalities and towns fit into a 1:2 ratio, according to the Republic Institute for Development the most developed town in Serbia is Apatin, with a national income three times higher than the republic average, or 15 times higher than the least developed. Preševo, which has barely reached 20% of the republic average. The gap between Belgrade and towns inland Serbia has also increased. But, just like elsewhere in the world, although for different reasons, the worse predicament befell the monofunctional industrial centers – "factory cities", prosperous settlements in socialist times. These are e.g. Kragujevac, Bor, Majdanpek, Priboj, Vranje … The first three in 2002 registered a drop of population compared with 1991. These towns have become the sites of poverty, unemployment, insecurity and social revolt manifested in the form of "wildcat strikes".

Generally speaking, the most important changes in the social structure of post-socialist towns are revealed in the reinstatement of the superior class of owners and the subordinate class of the poor, as well as in a changed middle class. East-European, and especially our towns face a specific problem of strongly manifested unlicensed construction of apartments, houses, business premises, etc. It is estimated that the number of unlicensed buildings in Serbia reaches about a million. During the times of self-management socialism, the main actors of unlicensed construction were workers (about 80%), mostly with lower qualifications. In the "wild capitalism" they are joined by war refugees, private building contractors, war profiteers and individual members of the local and central elites. Although this practice is, strictly speaking, illegal, it is believed that a reference to an informal or "gray" economy is more appropriate to the numerous "self-help" variants of construction.

Whatever the case may be, during the 1990s the centrally planned urban system transformed into different, more or less market-oriented urban systems. This transformation was influenced by internal actors (individuals and groups transforming the system) and external actors (participants in the process of globalization and expansion of the European Union). According to Tosics, the internal reform-oriented actors seek to eliminate state control over the building lots and housing stock, promote privatization and restitution, as well as the devolution of decision-making – from the central to the municipal, local level. The most important change is seen in the suppression of the state as the main actor of urban development planning and the appearance of actors (entrepreneurs) of town commercialization (Tosics, 2003: 229). This author assumes that the development paths of post-socialist towns will be different and are not dependent only on the speed of change, but also on the strategic choice from the different variants of capitalism.

It is well known that a fundamental transformation of the political and economic subsystems is a condition for urban change, but this does not exclude reform initiatives from the towns themselves and their citizens (NGOs, urban social movements...). In that respect, numerous transition countries have carried out ownership transformation (privatization) of housing units, business premises, building lots, i.e. the transfer of ownership from the state to private persons and local authorities. The experience of post-socialist East-European towns has demonstrated that the decentralization of power gives rise to a series of questions: how many levels of power should there be, what kind of a relation between the central and local authorities should be established, how should the status of large towns and the capital city be regulated, etc.? These transformations are accompanied by a change in the way of town management: from the "traditional" towards the "entrepreneurial" type. This new type of management implies: 1.public-private partnership; 2. market orientation of all activities; 3. town authorities sharing part of the risk of private investments;

4. state participation in real-estate transactions by shaping the urban and cultural environment (Bassand, 2003). Serbia has not yet adopted a law on its capital city (Belgrade) - the only really large town in Serbia and Montenegro - but it did pass the legislation on local self-government, which substantially increases the powers of town mayors. Furthermore, this legislation also introduces the office of the chief town architect.

Spatial experts as actors of urban change

Findings of a survey carried out by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy in 2003 show the following ranking of actors in urban changes, according to the degree of their social power on municipal level: 1. politicians (87%): 2. businessmen/entrepreneurs (45%); 3. professionals (12%) and 4. citizens (3%). As for the hierarchy of actors there has been no substantial change from the times of "self-management socialism" to those of "crony capitalism". However, not infrequently do we here, as elsewhere in the world, see a personal union of politicians and businessmen, or their interest-based coalitions which, depending on the circumstances, may be joined by other actors: professionals and "ordinary people".

Spatial experts are facing an identity crisis. The new social ambience is not favorable for city planners. During socialism they mainly functioned as transmission belts for politicians (one-party political elite), but their power and efficiency were greater. Now, they are confronted with a larger number of problems and doubts as well as a multitude of actors such as the heterogeneous unlicensed constructors, various NGOs, war refugees, political parties, real estate agencies, foreign investors, renewed construction activities of the church, domestic private entrepreneurs, private architectural, urban and construction bureaus, etc. In addition, specific laws governing the sphere of urbanism and construction are largely missing or else are anachronous. The legislative incompleteness of the state in this sphere, along with inadequate payment for the work of competent professionals and clerks, create a favorable ground for corruption and the gray economy in the sphere of urbanism and building construction..

According to an analysis (Petrović, 2004), the majority of Belgrade spatial experts (63%) believed that the efficiency of urban development planning was greater within the market and democratic institutions of society than it had been in the centrally planned system. Inclination towards the social-democratic model of planning was revealed in the professionals' responses concerning the nature of ownership of town land. Namely, most professionals had a more or less affirmative attitude towards the public ownership of development sites, and considered it a precondition for efficient urban planning. Furthermore, most respondents thought that the introduction of market principles into the urban economy did not imply privatization of building lots, which ought to have the status of public goods, and that the leasing system would be the best solution for Belgrade (Petrović, 2004: 204). Another important finding of the above-mentioned study should also be mentioned, namely that in the period of post-socialist transformation the political elite retained the largest degree of power, without a clearly defined strategy of urban development, while the autonomy of professional knowledge in taking the relevant decisions was fairly reduced. But, although aware of the need to redefine the place and role of knowledge in the structure of institutional decision-making powers, spatial experts are also conscious of the scarcity of resources required for new urban planning. On the other hand, the views of professionals display insufficient certainty concerning the desirable measures and the general concept of state intervention in the field of urbanism. The mixture of views of economic neoliberalism and socialist protectionism is considered typical of actors of post-socialist transformation here as well as in other transition countries.

Politicians as actors of urban change

According to our survey (2003) most respondents believe that politicians have the largest influence on decision-making at municipal level. We should recall that according to the Serbian law urban and spatial planning are within the competence of municipalities and the republic respectively.

Members of the political elite in Serbia (M. Lazić's survey of June 2004) are in most cases affiliated to various political parties. Out of 85 interviewed republic officials only 12 were non-partisan, while seven out of 54 city officials were not card-carrying members of a party. Party-mindedness (partisanship) essentially influences personnel policy not only of the power structures on central and local levels, but also of businessmen (directors of state firms, members of managing boards, heads of educational, health, cultural, public utility, urbanism and other institutions). For example, according to our (2003) survey, asked whether party membership influenced decision-making on municipal level, most respondents answered affirmatively, and the majority of them - over a third (35%) - said "yes, only if the person concerned is a member of the ruling party". The respondents see the most important "channels" for the exercise of influence on the municipal level in political parties (32%), municipal councilmen (26%) and personal connections and corruption (22%). These are followed by decision-making "channels" such as: local communities (7%), trade unions (12%), NGOs (1%) and petitions (0.8%).

According to the results of M. Lazić's survey (2004: A8) the Serbian political elite is a mixture of political actors who speak and act both as reformists and anti-reformists, i.e. are guided by the values of liberalism, nationalism and even socialism. This is in a specific way evidenced by the multiparty composition of the current Serbian government as well as the party nature of its support in the parliament.

Not long ago (2004) the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce organized a round table on the "Legal aspects of problems related to real estate". The key message of this round table is that without privately-owned building land, there will be no market either, and that the solution might be found if the politicians amended the Constitution of Serbia, which in Article 60 prescribes that building lots may be either socially or state owned and that the right to use them could be acquired under the conditions specified by the law. The participants in the round table believed that the legal institution of social ownership should be abolished and building land privatized. The existing legal provisions should be modernized with respect to expropriation, competences, definition of general interest, privatization of building lots, development of and trade in real-estate, legalization and denationalization, etc. One of the obstacles in doing that is the incomplete cadastre, done for 60% of Serbia's territory, but not for the large towns. Another problem is the absence of a law on denationalization and restitution, the adoption of which is constantly postponed and currently depends on the balance of political power in the Serbian parliament.

Businessmen as actors of urban change

Members of our economic elite are fairly educated, relatively young and more reform-oriented than their political counterparts. However, there is clearly a symbiosis between individual politicians and their groups on the one hand, and businessmen, on the other. As concerning the economic elite, as a rule, the share of party cadre increases among managers of larger firms. They are also more numerous in state enterprises, less so in mixed and are the fewest in private firms (Lazić, 2004 survey). Let us add that economic experts are predominantly of liberal (market) orientation.

According to one of our urban economists of neoliberal orientation, the inherited model of ownership over building lots in Serbia, as well as the model of town planning and building, are based on the following elements: a) monopolistic public ownership of city land; b) non-existence of a market of town land; c) administrative allocation of building lots; d) discretionary decisions of state officials; e) compensation as a parafiscal mechanism for securing public revenues; and f) unrestricted and corrupted state/local authorities (Begović, 2003).

Privatization of apartments, houses, business premises and building lots is linked with economic and political problems of compensating and restituting the property confiscated from its former owners by the socialist regime. Numerous post-socialist states, including Montenegro (2002), passed denationalization and restitution laws. The Montenegrin 2002 legislation had been declared unconstitutional, and a law regulating the restitution of rights and compensation of previous owners was adopted instead on 23 March 2004. Only at first sight it seems paradoxical that this law is only partially implemented in Montenegro, and only in the municipalities where the opposition is in power. In Serbia, however, a law of this kind has not been adopted yet. During the 1990s and after the year 2000, many parties promised that as soon as they came in power they would return the citizens' property seized after World War II on various grounds: confiscation, expropriation, nationalization or sequestration. But, except for demagogical statements invoking law and justice, practically nothing has been done. Political promises to this effect continue.

The Foreign Investors Council in Belgrade (a non-profit business association established on 15 July 2002) as a foreign urban actor meeting in 2004, concluded that the laws on denationalization, ownership and restitution of land, and on urban planning and construction were among the ten legislative priorities. The foreign actors advocate the abolishment of the government agency's monopoly in controlling the supply of town land to enable the market formation of prices. Furthermore, they demand the abolishment of time limits for the performance of works and introduction of a temporary mortgage register. The findings of the Belgrade Institute for Market Research (2004) also confirm that one of the main obstacles for foreign investments is the outstanding issue of the town land, which is, for the time being, state-owned. In some post-socialist countries "during the 1990s, many towns became more independent in administrative, political and economic terms and are therefore in the position to influence their own development and immigration of population. However, local development now depends on the amount of private capital, readiness to invest at the local market, emerging of new private actors, tendencies in the spatial mobility of the population, institutions, commercial development, private enterprises" (Backović, 2004: 20).

Serbia is, unfortunately, running late with reforms, its GDP has only reached the half of its 1990 figure, and it takes the bottom end of the scale in terms of foreign investments per capita. Numerous transition countries make much faster progress. In addition, it is estimated that 34% of the population is unemployed and that people are disappointed and impatient. According to the October 2001 data, the population of Serbia and Montenegro had about five times lower social product than the Hungarians, Czechs and Poles, and almost eleven times less than the Slovenes. The gravest obstacle for increased foreign investments is political instability. In addition, as a representative of foreign investors says, "Serbian companies do not have their own assets, cannot raise credits, have obsolete technology, which naturally affects the quality of products and services, and lack the know-how in production and marketing. And foreign investments bring new knowledge, technology and sales outlets" (Grojsing, 2004).

Still, Belgrade and other large towns in Serbia show the initial signs of influence of globalization, such as the increasing presence of foreign banks, participation of foreigners in the construction of supermarkets and their lease of business premises for different purposes. Domestic entrepreneurs also show some initiative. A survey carried out among the citizens and private entrepreneurs in Novi Sad (Pušić et al, 2002) indicates that the most important positive outcome of entrepreneurship is seen in the fact that it has made it easier to satisfy the population's needs for certain types of goods and services. But, almost a quarter of entrepreneurs also refer to the negative consequences of entrepreneurial activity: too many kiosks and container shops, "everybody wanting to be an entrepreneur, which is absurd", many people doing the jobs they are not qualified or educated to do and "adding to unlicensed construction, since money can buy you everything", etc. It is indicative that over half the entrepreneurs stated they did not know whether they had the urbanists' favor or not. In any case, the relations between private entrepreneurs and urbanists as actors are unregulated and extremely ambivalent.

Citizens as actors of urban change

The question here is whether the citizens, and if so to what extent, exercise their "right to their town", i.e. why is their influence on decision-making at town level the smallest compared with all other actors mentioned above? Many citizens lack the motivation for public action, since they believe that the prospects for co-decision-making on the local level are small or non-existent, and that the effects of so meager a participation would be worthless. This does not mean that they do not realize that the local and central elites have grown more or less distant from their co-citizens. In a word, we believe that citizens' participation in local decision-making is insufficient, and practically negligible in the specific case of the urban and housing sphere. Instead of partnership in decision-making what we have in our towns is the "local status hierarchy with the recognizable local elite on the top".

Ljubinko Pušić rightly notes that "in the first transition wave (actually its announcement) it so happened that those who obtained economic power became the 'owners' of institutional levers of power over night, supported by owners of political power (it is possible that the two roles would soon be switched or combined), while the citizen still stands alone on the opposing end. If the citizens cherished any illusion that they were participants in making the decisions related to space (in fact themselves in that space), they are today no longer deluded, but neither are they willing to take any part in it. Urban disorganization which is clearly noted in this case (even if only through the passivity of citizens), follows the patterns of social disorganization. Citizens get the impression that in their town any construction is possible, without anyone being responsible for it. It seems that the rules no longer exist: everything is on the market" (Pušić, 2002: 120).

However, if we take a better look at the transformation of life and survival strategies of "ordinary people" we could not claim their complete passivity in "the production of space", even if it were only on the outskirts of our towns. On the contrary, depending on their own possibilities they resort to self-help by building informally. Since this phenomenon is so widely spread we can speak of a vertical interest alliance between the actors of unlicensed construction and politicians, who by "tolerating" it and permitting its subsequent legalization secure themselves electoral votes. In other words, this kind of "self-help" has elements of a system, since numerous actors have found their interest in it, so we could actually speak about a "consensual chaos", the creators of which probably find it the most perfect form of state and town arrangement under our present conditions. This state of affairs is appropriately described as "organized non-responsibility". In the gray zone of construction and urbanism we see the reactivation of solidarity micro-networks motivated by necessity more than sentiment. These are horizontal networks, contrary to clientelist links we also find there and could describe as vertical. Horizontal solidarity networks function between equals and vertical between hierarchized actors. Both types of networks are in play where unlicensed construction is concerned.

According to the "urbanologists", the "European Urban Charter" and the "European Charter on Local Self-Government", the basis for urban development is seen in the direct participation of citizens within local communities, which themselves should enjoy a certain degree of financial autonomy and fiscal independence. The citizens have the right to be consulted on all major projects related to the future development of the local community. Urban management and planning should be based on information on all aspects and potentials of the city and its created capacities and resources.

We could say that in the Serbian towns today there is more democracy then in the period of "self-management socialism", or Milošević's rule of terror, but that there is not enough of it when it comes to citizens' participation in decision-making on local level, and that its absence is the greatest in Serbia's largest towns. Interviewed citizens (ISI FF 2003 survey) mostly (67%) believe that the prospects of equal participation in decision- making (partnership) through local self-government are small (39.5%) or none (28.4%), while 80% of respondents believe that the citizens' influence compared with other actors in decision-making at municipal level is – null.

Conclusion

Bearing in mind that the prevailing part of mankind is today, for the first time in history, living in towns and that the actors of largest power as well as the resources are concentrated therein, we could conclude that the role of the towns, especially the global (world) cities is increasing. The old rivalry between the national state and the metropolis continues with an uncertain outcome. A. Giddens believes that the city authorities can manage certain global changes better than national governments. That is because cities may contribute to the economic productivity and competitiveness, promote social and cultural integration and be favorable locations for political activities. Certain towns develop strategic plans to promote their image, either in order to organize international events or implement programs of city reconstruction or economic development. Thus mayors become important political factors in promoting town life (Giddens, 2003). This practice is, along with numerous socio-spatial problems discussed above, characteristic of central developed and highly urbanized countries, whose cities rank high in the world hierarchy of towns. The situation is worse in dependent semi-peripheral transition countries and their appropriate metropolises (e.g. Belgrade), and the worst in dependent metropolises of the peripheral countries of the third and fourth (Africa) worlds.

Cities and urbanization imply a precise institutional and political framework. A municipality may take highly different democratic forms, which does not mean that they cannot be transformed into structures of remarkably pyramidal power. Still, the actors play within an institutional framework comprising the elections, referenda, public debates, relatively independent media, etc. However, in the current state of metropolitanization, the metropolises lack an adequate democratic political institution. The complex reality of different urban actors (economic actors, local, regional, national and international political actors, professionals, and inhabitants) faces the deficit of democratic political institution. Actors of various types occasionally engage in negotiations of varying azimuths trying to deal with numerous city problems. With situations of this kind, Bassand distinguishes two viewpoints: 1.an optimist view which starts from "good management" because negotiations in different directions enable efficient pragmatic solutions for all problems; and 2. a pessimistic view which holds that negotiations do exist, but the question is to whose benefit. Inhabitants and users are not consulted at all or only at the end of the procedure (Bassand, 2001: 12). All in all, metropolitanization develops under the sign of a social crisis. This means that it implies a configuration of controversies, conflicts and violence, naturally of different degrees. Social crises appear when inequalities are huge and are manifested in social segregation. Metropolises are often the personification of malfunctioning, since almost all equipment and services are jeopardized by the size of the population. All metropolises are on a search for democratic political institutions.

Speaking of urban and land policy some of our experts recommend the following: 1. centrally located town plots have special importance and should remain in the ownership of the municipality, while their appropriation should be strictly supervised in order to prevent abuse; 2. not one lot may be expropriated for public purposes without proof of existence of a public, i.e. overall social interest; 3. restitution of the nationalized lots with payment of market price for the previously expropriated land must be carried out, which requires the adoption of a law on denationalization; 4. maximum use must be made of the total potential of rent under market conditions; 5. economic prices of all public utility services should be gradually introduced, in parallel with the economic recovery of the whole society, except for poor population whose utility expenses should be subsidized; 6. the market of building lots should be formed freely, with profitable prices for the lease of premises and land; 8. a state governed by law and responsible for the harmonization of private and public interest, must exist (Pucar, 2001).

By concluding this paper with the conviction that the choice of the type of capitalism in a given society largely influences the quality of life in its towns, as well as the transformation strategies of the relevant actors (individuals and social groups) we shall point to one of the central issues for the prospect of post-socialist development of the Serbian and other East-European societies.

The neoliberal ideology of transition imposes a utopian emancipatory conception that the very act of change of ownership, i.e. introduction of private ownership and market economy, or joining the courses of globalization, will bring about a fundamental change in the development potentials of dependent semi-peripheral East-European societies and their towns. In this context, Allan Scott suggests that although we may accept that the complete victory of political over the economic factor is conducive to inefficiencies of the type manifested in (no longer existent) socialism, and at the same time argue that the kind of economy's victory over the social and political factor once and for all, as envisaged by neoliberalism, may only be attained at a high social cost…. the demise of communism, even if it does prove greater efficiency of the market as a means to organize economic life, in itself does not support the neoliberal requirement that the logic of market relations should displace all other principles of social organization, outside and on the other side of the economic sphere. Thus, Scott says, the victory of either the economic or political factor cannot be achieved once and for all (Scott, 2003). Applying this to our ideational (ideological) scene, we find the view of egalitarian liberals closer than that of libertarians, and still more so the one of the "renewed social democracy", i.e. Giddens' "third way". But, it is a major question if in these parts we have a sufficiently strong alliance of political and other actors to support that particular choice.

Milovan M. Mitrović

SERBIAN COUNTRYSIDE AND PEASANTS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
- Between Survival Strategies and Modernization -

ABSTRACT:The Serbian countryside in the 20th century underwent an epochal civilizational change in the ways of life and work of all its inhabitants. The first part of this paper discusses the most important modernizing waves manifested through innovations in the social life of the Serbian village and peasants, gaining momentum especially in the mid-to-late 20th century. In this period a new global social and political framework was created, in which industrialization, urbanization and modernization of the Serbian countryside accelerated in a remarkably contradictory fashion to produce a whole range of positive and negative social effects.

In the second part of the paper the current, turn-of-the-century (mis)developments in the Serbian countryside and agriculture are examined along with the prospects for overcoming them, though the most recent political and economic reform and an alternative agrarian policy.

KEY WORDS: Serbian countryside, peasants, agrarian sector, innovation, agrarian policy, European integration.

The life of a peasant is a daily struggle to survive even in the most difficult natural and social circumstances, with scarce material resources and relying primarily on himself, his closest kin and neighbors in the local community. In situations of that kind innovations are usually reduced to "ingenious" moves to "make ends meet" with least difficulty. The priority is, then, given to the bare necessities, such as food, clothing, footwear and some kind of accommodation for the peasant and his family, and then also feed and shelter for the livestock. Peasants have, for centuries, satisfied their elementary existential needs living a life they could afford – spending what they had or could spare, and that was invariably small and humble.

Larger changes (innovations) in the ways of everyday peasant life emerge only after the change in the global social environment, when the waves of the new industrial (and now already post-industrial) civilization reached the countryside to essentially alter the manner of work, housing conditions, eating and clothing habits and also the ways of communication.

The Serbian countryside is today swept by the changes in the manner of work and the life of all its inhabitants brought about by this civilizational revolution. In these parts, the main changes in the ways of social life developed during the 20th century, starting sooner in some places and later in others, and unfolding at a different pace. Without the knowledge of these changes it is impossible to explain or understand the social portraits of our "peasants" and "petit bourgeoisie", or their typical "life-styles". On the other hand, only in the light of these huge civilizational differences between the conditions prevailing at the time of birth and growth of our older contemporaries (over 60 years of age) and those characterizing their own and their descendents' present life and thoughts, is it possible to explain and understand the tragic dissent and sharp generational contrarieties revealed in the political views, value orientations and life aspirations of the young and the elderly in our modern society. That is because generational and civilization differences and contrarieties in the relations between the younger and the older population have converged in the Serbian society, here and now.

The economic crisis, war and international blockade Serbia endured during the 1990s, put a stop to the initiated modernization of the Serbian agriculture. Moreover, this gave rise to a kind of retraditionalization in agricultural production with the return of draft-animal teams, substantially reduced use of fertilizer, inferior seed material, shortage of fuel and spare parts even for the old models of agricultural machines, and the lack of funds for the purchase of new equipment. The official statistics and all sociological studies show that investments into the expansion of land holdings, purchase of new mechanization, farm buildings, new houses and household equipment, as well as all other forms of production and non-production consumption were, in this period, either drastically reduced or discontinued altogether.

All this affected the yields and put a stop to any further development of agriculture, decreasing the living standard and overall quality of life of those who lived in the countryside and made their living in agriculture, as well as the overwhelming majority of the Serbian population, rural and urban alike. Development and modernization were interrupted, not only in agriculture and the countryside, but also in non-agricultural sectors and the towns, and thus also the Serbian society in general, forced to revert to its traditional survival patterns. If it is right to say that the countryside hinges on traditional social-cultural patterns, and that the peasant way of life is a typical model for the survival of individuals and groups living in poverty and under difficult conditions, we could maintain that in the last decade of the 20th century (at the turn of the century) the towns, too, and therefore the Serbian society in general, underwent a specific kind of peasantization of their entire way of life. Naturally, this slowdown in the development and a degree of reversal to the obsolete forms of social life fit in a wider context of the major civilizational revolution in the overall lifestyle which took place in (rural and urban) Serbia during the 20th century. But, the changes in the work, housing, food, communications and all other important aspects of social life in the Serbian countryside were epochal in every respect.

1. Several modernization waves in the Serbian countryside and agriculture

During the 20th century the Serbian countryside and society as a whole were exposed to several modernization waves, which thoroughly changed the prevailing style of social life formed over the past centuries. The changes in the methods of agricultural production account for the most important difference in the peasant way of life in general. Crucial for those changes was the influence of the scientific-technical revolution on the industrialization of society and modernization of agriculture, through numerous production innovations developed during the 20th century and spread out in these parts in the last five or six decades. The changes were primarily induced by mechanical, chemical and biogenetic production innovations, enabling the mechanization, chemicalization and biogenetic and technological modernization of the Serbian agriculture.[1]

Some earlier sociological studies into innovative processes in our agriculture indicate the primary influence of structural changes in the rural environment on the village life and agricultural production methods. Only in a favorable wider environment do the village and peasants activate their internal mechanisms of change, and failing that tend to close up and conserve all forms of their usual social life. Naturally, in both cases the villages and villagers display local and individual differences, which however, do not question the above-mentioned regularity on a more general level. Studies into the, e.g., different aspects of accepting the use tractors in agricultural production confirm the assumption that the innovativeness of peasants depends on a number of different factors: (1) characteristics of the local environment; (2) characteristics of households and farms; and (3) personal characteristics of householders.

A greater degree of innovativeness is displayed by peasants in more developed settlements, where the population is, on the average, better informed and materially better off, and has a higher purchasing power, along with a developed market of agricultural products. Statistical correlations also indicate that production innovations are introduced by purely agricultural more than mixed households; those with intact, large family groups as opposed to the incomplete and small ones.

Innovativeness, as a rule, increases with the education of the householder. This rule went unobserved in these parts in the previous period, since the more educated tended to focus on non-agricultural activities and lacked the interest for production innovations in agriculture. However, with the professionalization of farmers this general rule is here, too, increasingly confirmed.

It also turned out that our peasants most often receive information on innovations in agriculture (and not only that) from the TV, but are most strongly influenced to

[1] Various aspects of innovative processes in our agriculture are addressed by a large number of descriptive papers and several sociological studies. Živojin Petrović synthetically elaborated this issue in his doctoral thesis under the title “The Influence of Social Conditions on the Development and Spread of Production Innovations in Our Agriculture”, defended in 1997 at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad.

accept them through personal contacts with experts or the relevant experience in their local environment (e.g. seeing their neighbor at work).[2]

Individuals from innovative environments tend to display greater innovativeness themselves, especially if their closest friends and neighbors – whom they occasionally imitate – have a positive view of the innovation concerned. Innovations in agriculture are also influenced by cooperatives and other agricultural organizations, and in particular by local professional-advisory centers. Finally, innovativeness is invariably influenced by the potential innovator's "mental flexibility", which is usually dependent on the family background, educational level, spatial mobility and exposure to mass communication media. Still, the most important thing is that the cost of adopting an innovation does not exceed the financial possibilities of the person concerned. That is why, their equal interest notwithstanding, the wealthier will adopt a particular innovation sooner than their less affluent fellow farmers.[3]

Sreten Vukosavljević makes a good case that a peasant in the traditional Serbian village was, too, ready to "innovate" whenever he could be convinced of the relevant advantages first-hand and had the resources to introduce them. Especially important is Vukosavljević's remark that the peasant is not "conservative" due to his eternal, mystical and metaphysical nature, but that the peasant economy is more "conservative" than others, since its elements take deeper roots and cannot be changed at will without too much of a risk. The entire make-up of a peasant's way of life does not allow him to "run ahead with innovations", since it can cost him dearly, and he therefore has the impression of constant dangers lying in wait. Anyway, that is precisely what all researchers in other rural environments also note. The market has always encouraged innovation in agriculture, while a firm collective regime of agricultural relations sustains economic conservatism. The peasant is highly inventive when it takes "making something out of nothing", when coping with poverty requires improvisation, but he remains conservative with respect to major economic and social undertakings.

In these parts, mechanization on a larger scale started in the mid-1990s, followed by chemicalization in the second half of the century. These developments display large regional differences, especially due to the particularly advanced position of Vojvodina where a host of natural and historical factors favoring a faster modernization of agriculture converged, such as flat land, good position and communications with the developed part of Europe, developed physical plans, etc.

Vojvodina's agriculture, in certain areas, keeps almost abreast of the most developed countries. At the same time, only a few decades back, the less developed parts of the country still used a wooden cow-drawn plough. Therefore, one of the large paradoxes of our agriculture is the parallel existence of not only the old and new, but rather of the archaic and highly modern.

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[2] See: Edhem Dilić, TRAKTORIZACIJA INDIVIDUALNE POLjOPRIVREDE (Tractorization of Individual Agriculture), *Sociologija sela (Sociology of Village)*, 1976, No. 53-54, pp. 67-84.
[3] Ibid, p. 108.

Housing is a basic human and social need, which the peasants meet in different ways, but invariably with their own family house fitted into their local living and working environment. Sociologically speaking, the peasants' inhabitation of their own family houses differs from that of the urban population, living in large or small apartment buildings, always apart and often very far from their place of work. By contrast with the townsfolk, the places where peasants live and work are not separate. That is why a peasant's house is not only a place where he lives, but also the center of his economic and overall social life. The peasant's aspiration for comfortable housing was once pushed into the background, by greater precedence of all other considerations, namely that it was: built on a site well-suited for his husbandry (e.g. halfway between the farming and grazing land in the village area, or on the family holding, convenient for various "homestead chores"); made of cheap and easily obtainable material (usually wood, stone or earth and straw); unobtrusive, but discretely suggesting the status of the family head in the local community, etc.

Autochthonous innovations in the housing style emerge in response to new economic needs, when, in addition to houses, the peasants start constructing farm buildings for other purposes they are gradually adopting. Indigent and uneducated peasants of the early 20th century lived in poor housing and sanitary conditions. More important innovations in rural housing appear only when the village is, as a whole, swept by the global developmental processes of urbanization and modernization. Changes of this kind in our most-developed villages started in the 20th century, gaining momentum in the 1950s. Houses are constructed of new hard materials produced by building material industry (bricks, concrete, tiles, etc.) Thus, for instance, of all the houses built in 1919-1930 and 1931-1940 periods in the territory of Serbia before the First Balkan War only 11% and 12% respectively were made of bricks.[4]

Empirical sociological studies register large and fast changes in the housing style - the so-called housing standard and outfitting of village households with "consumer durables" - in the 1960s and 1970s in many of our villages and most village households. Foremost in this respect are more developed areas, villages closer to cities and mixed agricultural households. That is where all necessary and sufficient conditions for housing innovations converge: larger household income, more developed local public utility infrastructure and new cultural needs and habits of the people.

Rural electrification is one of the basic infrastructure innovations. In this respect, the turnabout took two decades: in 1951 four fifths of the villages in the former Yugoslavia did not have electricity, compared with one fifth still unconnected to the grid in 1971. Before that, light was provided by the fire from the hearth, an oil lamp (often without a glass chimney), a wax or tallow candle, or a torch.

Local village water supply systems (at first using gravitation, and then also various water pumps) enable the building of bathrooms and hygienic indoor toilets.

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[4] Petar Marković, PROMENE U USLOVIMA STANOVANjA NA SELU - RAZDOBLJE 1900-1960 (Changes in Village Housing Conditions - 1900-1960 Period) , *Sociologija sela*, 1964, No. 4, p. 9.

Various household electrical appliances appear (stoves, refrigerators, radio and TV sets), along with modern furniture and interior furnishings (wall paper, parquet and ceramic floor tiles), new clean bed linen, steam heating, etc.

However, the effect of innovation surges was unequal in different regions, villages and households. Until recently we still had villages without electricity supply, while a fair number of rural families still live in houses built in the first half of the 20th century, poorly equipped and furnished, and without adequate hygienic conditions. Their yards are non-functional with old fashioned farm buildings, made of inferior material and lacking functional specialization. This is particularly true of backward mountain villages, which is also where the largest number of old, abandoned and uninhabited houses are found.

On the whole, we may note two main trends of global social changes, which also substantially change the social structure of the modern Serbian village:

1. a rapidly diminishing peasantry as a statistical-demographic category and its social and cultural transformation in line with urban life patterns;
2. an increasing separation between the modern village (which is being urbanized) and modern agriculture (which is industrialized).

However, these trends of change are themselves burdened with a host of internal and external contrarieties, which are not so strongly manifested in numerous less developed and still predominantly peasant (Asian, African and Latin-American) societies, although there too, they have emerged and are gaining momentum. As for the more developed (European and similar) environments these social changes are already fairly far advanced, but are neither continuous nor evenly distributed by countries.

However, what they have in common includes an increasingly similar technical and technological basis for modern agro-industrial production, which in a contradictory way gradually spreads to underdeveloped countries and their agricultures; an increasingly interlinked world market of agricultural products, where trade and capital break up the traditional peasant subsistence economy and social autarky; greater exposure of peasants to mass communication media and their more or less enforced and manipulated cultural uniformity based on the patterns of urban life in developed Western societies. Modernization of rural culture is thus mainly reduced to massification as a means of a global "westernisation", which destroys local identities.

The fact that the Serbian village and peasantry, belonging to a small European country, are far more directly exposed to these dominant influences, should always be borne in mind while projecting the future rural and overall social development. That is why it is extremely important for us to recognize and timely adjust to the trends of agrarian and rural development of West-European countries, where most important civilizational changes for us have been originated.

In the modern Serbian society, still in a state of acute post-traumatic stress due to the most recent war it was exposed to and the structural transformations accompanying the so-called transition of post-socialist societies, the village as a living environment shall for a long time yet fail to be the value choice for those living in it. The population which has remained in our villages consists of those who did not manage to go to the city, or those who came back having failed to work their way up in the town or go abroad. They are today making the village look like an "oasis of the unsuccessful". For these categories of rural population the village is a forced solution, the only possible course in an impasse, and it is only understandable that the frustrating social situation is accompanied by a corresponding degree of their social depression registered by all social research efforts.

2. Strategies to overcome the "impasse"

The most recent empirical sociological research into the "Transformation Strategies of Social Groups in Serbia" to a certain extent enables a methodologically relevant comparison of answers given by respondents in rural and urban environments, as shown in the following table:

Type of settlement	Frequency	Percentage
Town	1418	46
Village	1662	54
	3080	100

The most numerous in the total of 46% of respondents from urban environments, are those from Belgrade (14.6%) and major towns inland Serbia (13.3%), compared with 4.9% from regional centers, 5.3% medium size and 7.8% small towns.

Respondents from rural environments were grouped in three statistical and analytical categories:

1. villages in the vicinity of Belgrade (1.4%);
2. villages adjacent to regional centers, larger and medium size towns (15.3%);
3. villages close to small towns and inside rural areas (38.6%).

This enabled us to compare the social circumstances, living conditions and attitudes of the population in rural and urban areas, and also different village communities, depending on their distance from large or small city centers, as basically determining the socio-economic status of peasants. Distance from the town also determines the possibilities for communication, cultural status, ways and lifestyles of inhabitants in different villages, along with other internal determinants such as education, age, profession, family status, etc.

One of characteristic indicators in the above-mentioned research shows the prevailing reliance on agriculture as the main form of supplementary informal activity in the widespread "economy of survival". According to the respondents, of the total number of those engaged in the informal economy, 48% work in agriculture, 12%

in trade and 11% in crafts, 9% do unskilled manual work, while 5% engage in intellectual activities and arts, and 3% each in construction and housework.

On the other hand, only 29% of agricultural households have plans for production expansion in the next two years, which testifies to the overall unattractiveness of our economy for investments into production. Indicatively, over half of those who intend to expand agricultural production have holdings of less than 5 hectares, which means that they could hardly rely on agriculture as the only source of income. The 29% indicator reveals that agriculture in Serbia has not yet become attractive for entrepreneurship, but the fact that small landowners plan production expansion does indicate that agriculture will continue to be an important additional pillar of the mixed economy, just as it has been so far.

Rather interesting, although expected, are the differences in the responses given by the villagers and townspeople, which reveal their numerous characteristics, but also point to a number of similarities.

Thus, for instance, over 75% of respondents from both the villages and towns stated that over the past year their households did not invest more than 1000 euros into education, consumption or real estate (purchase of a car, furniture, mechanization). Those who did, were mostly from the towns (50.4%). On the other hand, town-dwellers also account for the relative majority (46.3%) of those who in the past year had to sell or swap some property below par. That means that people in the towns find it more difficult to survive critical times than those in the villages, where about 90% of respondents did not sell part of their property. This however, does not indicate only the greater difficulty of survival in the towns, but also the traditional peasants' attachment to their property, non-existent among city folk.

On the whole, the Serbian village and agriculture share the fate of the global Serbian society in the usual and, theoretically, expected manner: the village at all times and in all respects lags behind the town *and the average indicators of the global society's quality of life in the periods of fast development and of crises and downfalls, as well as those of gradual rise and expectations of new development. The only specific characteristic is seen in the fact that the village, having fallen somewhat behind the town, finds it comparatively easier to cope with the overall social straggling and less painful to go through the crises and downfalls, although that is also why it takes longer to "awaken" and set in motion in the case of a renewed rise.*

This social situation is paradoxically accompanied by an entirely contrary fact of economic more than a social nature: comparatively speaking, investments into agriculture could be the fastest way to start a new production cycle in the Serbian economy, stifled by its gray economy and speculative trade. This strategy of Serbia's economic recovery is also favored by the fact that it requires least financial assets (scarce as they are). An entirely new aspect in the present situation is the reality that, this time, the state cannot rely on the village, the peasants and their traditional holdings in implementing a promising strategy of Serbian agrarian and rural development. After everything is has been through, the Serbian village is today economically still more dependent on the state, and has meanwhile largely grown socially devastated. That kind of village lacks one or more conditions for agricultural development: land, labor, livestock, capital, lasting interest or motivation of both older peasants and younger farmers. This, in developmental terms, unpromising category includes the households with land holdings of up to one hectare (numbering 270,033 or 27% in Serbia) - registered as agricultural estates for statistical purposes, although not really production units – also comprising the farms whose owners live in towns or engage in farming as a hobby. The same category embraces old households in Serbia where 25% of active farmers are over 60 years of age. Their numbers include pensioners, single persons, the sick and the poor and therefore unmotivated to invest in the development of agriculture.[5]

On the other hand, the villages in closer proximity to large towns or in developed regions, have somewhat more vigorous (progressive) agricultural households with larger holdings, relatively well-off in terms of farm buildings and mechanization, with the heir of the family living on the property and a fair number of able-bodied family members, some of whom may be employed outside agriculture. That, too, confirms the assumption that mixed households may be highly prosperous if, in addition to income outside agriculture, they also have large holdings and other production resources.

Some changes in this respect have recently been made, e.g. by giving the peasants' farms the status of legal persons, but that alone is not sufficient to place them on equal footing with agrarian companies. The so-called farmerization of our peasant land-holdings must not be reduced to political campaigning, and ought to be devised as a modern development project of restructuring the traditional organizational form of agriculture, including the measures to support the consolidation of land holdings (provision of credits for land purchase, amendments to the law on inheritance, new shareholding), encourage production specialization and, especially, establishment of vertical (not only horizontal) links to form wider agro-industrial systems (through co-operatives and agricultural companies). In a more favorable and stimulating systemic (legal and economic) environment, an institutionally transformed Serbian agriculture (with modern private farms, new cooperatives and agrarian companies) could, together with a network of complementary small and medium size enterprises in various non-agricultural production and services spheres, accelerate rural and overall social development manifold and increase the quality of life in the villages and towns alike.

In order for agriculture in Serbia to become a strategic pillar of the national economy, it should be given an appropriate systemic, diverse as well as lasting, backing by the state, instead of the occasional political village campaigns and demagogic manipulation of the peasants by politically irresponsible parties.

State support to Serbian agriculture should be developmental, thus not only institutionally guaranteed, but also based on real foundations, market motivation,

[5] V. Grbić, op.cit., p. 78; cf. also: V. Grbić, AGRARNE NEUSKLAĐENOSTI U SRBIJI (Agrarian Imbalances in Serbia), in a book by a group of authors *Srbija krajem osamdesetih, Sociološko istraživanje društvenih nejednakosti i neusklađenosti (Serbia in the Late 1980s, Sociological Research into Social Inequalities and Imbalances)*, Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, 1991, pp. 157-179; *Sociologija sela*, 1974, No. 46, special thematic edition "Mješovita gospodarstva i seljaci-radnici" (Mixed Estates and Peasants-Workers), with a selected bibliography; Vojin Radomirović, REPRODUKCIJA SELjAČKOG GAZDINSTVA (Reproduction of Peasant Holding), Prilozi sociologiji sela i poljoprivrede, Radnički univ. "Radivoj Ćirpanov", Novi Sad, 1979.

long-term program and orientation towards comparatively selected priorities on the national, regional and local levels. Financial support to Serbian agriculture must be permanently intensified since it is today, comparatively speaking, the least in Europe (ten times less than in Slovenia and still less than in European countries with a more developed agriculture). If it wishes to develop, the Serbian agriculture is forced increasingly to compete with stronger actors, on both the international and the domestic market of agricultural products.

On the other hand, the economic logic itself justifies increased investments into the Serbian agrarian sector: under the present circumstances in Serbia the largest production potentials can be activated with least financial assets precisely in agriculture (estimates range up to a ratio of 1:8 of investments and direct and indirect effects).

Doubtlessly increasing and badly needed state support to the agricultural sector would have to be in line with the principle of equality of all social and economic subjects in a democratic political system. This means that the special systemic treatment of agriculture should reflect the model of justified "positive discrimination" more than unjustified privileges based on political and economic monopolies. Therefore, a good and developmentally promising agrarian policy would economically and legally observe the relative importance of agricultural production and its main natural, organizational and technological specifics of agricultural production, without establishing economically unwarranted privileges for certain segments of the agro-business or agriculture as a whole.

A discontinuity in the Serbian agrarian policy should enable ownership transformation (reprivatization) and structural modernization of the agricultural sector observing the conditions for its European integration, but it should not break up the technologically functional and economically viable units or permit foreign ownership of Serbian land, waters, forests and genetic resources.

The transition model of agrarian policy should harmonize the possibility for state intervention with the domestic and foreign markets of agrarian capital and agricultural products, and both of these with the natural and social resources, as well as the national interests of Serbia. In that respect, the agricultural policy measures of the state should first be adjusted to encourage all with market-development prospects and protect the limited national natural resources. The Serbian agrarian policy must be socially viable, but not a substitute for an inefficient social policy.

An alternative agrarian policy is possible only within the framework of thorough political reforms in Serbia, such as would enable appropriate transformation of the agrarian sector in a kind of a "new agrarian reform", different from the previous ones in terms of being more economic and modernizing than political. That would create a new systemic institutional-legal framework for alternative agrarian policy in Serbia, indispensable for a modern agricultural and rural development of Serbia and its integration into European agriculture. Systemic solutions in the above-mentioned agrarian legislation would harmonize the experience of European agriculture with the most important real parameters of our agrarian development such as the inherited agrarian structure, natural, economic, social and cultural resources of Serbia, its developmental objectives viewed against the background of domestic needs and prospective European integrations, and the transition experience of structurally similar and comparable countries.

Dušan Mojić

WORK STRATEGIES OF URBAN AND RURAL YOUTH IN SERBIA

ABSTRACT: The paper offers a comparative analysis of the social status and work strategies of urban and rural youth in Serbia. Special attention is paid to identifying the correlations between formal employment and involvement in the informal economy, i.e. various ways of combining basic and supplementary jobs. Adoption of particular work strategies, as well as differences in this respect between urban and rural youth, are also analyzed. These differences are explained by unequal social statuses (i.e. different levels of "accumulated" economic, social and cultural capital) of the two categories of the young. Yet, these differences notwithstanding, thinking of emigration is the most frequent response of young people ("exit strategy") in the unfavorable socio-economic conditions currently prevailing in Serbia, and it is here viewed as a specific form of work strategy.

KEY WORDS: urban youth, rural youth, social position, work strategies, exit strategy

Introduction

The study of work strategies (and economic strategies in general) of individuals and households is the "topical field of research" of our empirical and theoretical sociology (for more on this issue see a pioneer work of this kind here: Babović, Cvejić, 2002). Bearing in mind that the concept of strategy (thus including work strategies) stresses its "active" nature (planning followed by implementation), it seems both appropriate and interesting to look into the strategies adopted by the Serbian youth, or precisely the contingent of the population which is only entering the "world of labor" (aged between 18-29 in this survey).

Thus established, the above-mentioned sphere research may, to a certain extent, be viewed as a specific continuation of studies into the professional aspirations and expectations, fairly frequent at the time of the "second" Yugoslavia. And since this prior research mostly looked into the expectations and aspirations of the young it would seem appropriate to "turn" the attention of our analysis precisely towards the problem of work strategies of this particular group.

The concept of work strategies is primarily of an activist nature, in contrast to the above-mentioned aspirations and expectations, which are more "value-oriented".

The difference in the focus of the research is not purely theoretical, and may be justified both by the remarkably different nature of the global society "before" and now, and the specific characteristics of the "world of labor". Although the above-mentioned studies, too, clearly distinguished aspirations (as a desirable state of affairs with respect to employment) and expectations (as actual possibilities, i.e. reality), "getting" a job was something that was expected "by definition", and more or less required no special "strategy" (unless we, strictly speaking, consider it to include education, i.e. the relevant level of qualifications).

On the other hand, the period of the "destroyed society" of the 1990s as well as the present times in Serbia, are necessarily characterized by a proactive attitude towards employment. Naturally, the need for this approach in "finding a job" does not derive from the above-mentioned situation in the society, but rather from the fact that the labor market, although divided into a formal and informal - "gray" segments, nevertheless exists (Krstić, Stojanović, 2001: 15). That is why the concept of work strategies, the importance of which "derives from analytical possibilities to better understand the combinations of formal, informal and household work, as well as the division of labor between these different forms of work activities" (Babović, Cvejić, 2002) is all the more appropriate.

Generally speaking, the social everyday life (including the working part of it) has been highly unfavorable for the young people in these parts over the past fifteen years. Some even (rightly in my view) claim that this social group is the largest loser in the disastrous social developments (war, sanctions, economic and overall social crisis – the circumstances of the "destroyed society"). That claim could be considered unquestionable.

A specific indicator of the difficult social position of our youth is the fact that during the 1990s only a few empirical research projects addressing the youth were carried out (Vujović, 1999; Mihailović, 1994; Savin, Korać, 1997, etc.). Despite the hardly disputable claim that precisely the youth was the social group to pay the largest "price" of the times of the disastrous social crisis, wars and uncertain future, our society (and science) seem to have lacked the energy, and even need, to look into the social position and role of this particular social group.

In this respect, the situation was, at least seemingly, much more favorable in the Yugoslav sociology before the war and the disintegration of the "second" Yugoslav state. Seemingly because, despite the existence of a practically separate field of research (the so-called youthology) the theoretical and empirical achievements of the related studies were not only modest but most often also ideologized, as well as superficially conceived and implemented. A. Milić, in general terms, classifies these research efforts in terms of the following three approaches:

1. Moralistic-revendicative approach, which starts from the ideological-dogmatic understanding of youth as the "pillar" in the construction of socialism, and on that basis requires from the society to meet the needs, demands or potential possibilities of the young;
2. Positivistic-justificatory approach, which uses induction (empirical research) to confirm the ideological assessment of youth as the progressive segment

of society or testify to the transformation processes leading precisely in that direction; and

3. Somewhat less frequently used approach, which sees the young as the proponents of the critical-emancipatory consciousness and the potential vanguard in revolutionary social processes (Milić, 1987: 116).

As for the current approach to the study of Serbia's youth, it seems that the similarities and differences of their social positions and work strategies will be most appropriately addressed in light of the rural-urban relation. The dramatic pace of deagrarianization and urbanization after World War II crucially influenced the character of the society as a whole, and thereby also the position and orientations of specific social groups in it. The youth was no exception in that respect. The policy of price disparities to the disadvantage of agricultural products in particular influenced the overall marginalization of the village and agriculture, giving an additional impetus to accelerated deagrarianization and flight from rural areas. Naturally, the forceful industrialization "sucked in" in the first place the most vital contingent of the rural population – its youth. All that resulted in substantial inequalities in the social statuses of the urban and rural youth. Bearing in mind that "one remains, rather than becomes a peasant" (V. Puljiz), it is quite clear that the "unattractive (push)" factors of rural and "attractive (pull)" factors of urban life failed to prevail upon only the rural youth from remarkably progressive estates (which made intensive agricultural production possible) or those who due to the lack of sufficient or adequate education had no chance on the labor market.

The period of war and disintegration of the "second" Yugoslavia brought along a dramatic economic and overall social crisis, accompanied by turbulent changes in the positions and orientations of all social groups, including youth. The initial steps of the market economy in the Serbian society, "timid" and controlled by its criminalized authorities, were, as far as youth was concerned, generally reduced to work in the "gray economy" or on the "black market" (unregistered), or else uncertain "formal" employment which failed to provide even the minimum required for existence or professional fulfillment. Increasingly frequent among the youth – mostly urban (and naturally other social groups) became a new strategy of "exit", or emigration. This so-called new emigration generally had above-average education, so that the resulting "human resources" losses dramatically affected the prospects of the Serbian society to break the vicious circle of stagnation or even regression.

However, the political changes in 2000 marked the long awaited turning point to finally "unblock" the transformation process. Changes along the lines of market reforms, also meant a somewhat different valuation of all types of capital: economic, social and cultural. That is where, apparently, two different possibilities (strategies) to improve the position of the young appeared: for the rural youth from progressive households the accumulation of economic capital (cultivable land, agricultural mechanization, etc.) offered a chance for a more intensive agricultural production and improvement of its economic and social status, while the urban youth could increase its cultural capital (learning of foreign languages, computer and other skills) and competitiveness on the labor market under the new conditions.

The main purpose of the research is to identify the most frequent forms of work strategies of the urban and rural youth in Serbia at the beginning of the third millennium, and offer a comparative analysis of their similarities and differences. The starting hypothesis of the research is that substantial differences exist between the strategies of the urban and rural youth in Serbia today. The assumed differences will be explained by different “starting positions” or, in other words, by the more favorable position of the urban compared with rural youth. Therefore, the basic independent variable (although naturally not the only one) in this research is the place of residence (village – town). To that end, the town is seen as the “projection of society in space” (H. Lefebvre) and a specific social-spatial framework for accumulation of different types of capital: economic, social and cultural (P. Bourdieu). Precisely the fact that the town offers greater possibilities for accumulation of the above-mentioned forms of capital provided the basis to formulate the above-mentioned starting hypothesis.

The analysis of work strategies of urban and rural youth was done on the basis of interviews with 291 respondents aged 18-29, 175 of whom are from urban and 116 from rural settlements. The subsample of urban youth has 56% of women and 44% of men, while the rural subsample has 62.9% and 37.1% of women and men respectively. In view of the fact that the overall sample is representative for Serbia it seems that the results obtained even from so small a number of respondents (291) still have a scientific value, as well as practical importance in addressing the problems of youth employment in this country.

Social status

The study of work strategies would doubtlessly be incomplete without the understanding of their “embeddeness” in the actual social status (both objective and subjective). Naturally, an all-comprising analysis of social positions of the urban and rural youth is not the subject matter of this paper and it will only point to some of their essential aspects. The intention is to relate the possible differences in work strategies primarily with the hierarchical positions of social groups and thus explain them at least to some extent.

Table 1. Economic status of urban and rural youth

	Economic status				
	Low	Lower middle	Middle	Higher middle	High
Urban youth	1.7	25.7	30.9	26.3	15.4
Rural youth	7.8	41.4	31.9	16.4	2.6

The assumed differences in work strategies of urban and rural youth are clearly based on their different economic positions. As shown in Table 1, the rural youth much more often lives in households of lower economic status and, vice versa, the households of urban youth more often have a higher economic status. If this five-point scale is reduced to three categories (low, middle, high) we will see that almost twice more rural youth (49.2% and 27.4% respectively) live in households with lower (low and lower middle) economic status.

Graph 1. Assessment of household lifestyle after October 2000 change



The assessment of households' lifestyle after the political change in 2000 is, one could say, consistent with the starting assumptions and previous research. Namely, as Babović and Cvejić point out, members of the middle class (specifically professionals and small entrepreneurs) are more frequently than other social strata found among those who notice some improvement. Other prominent factors are education of respondents and the degree of urbanization of the settlement the household concerned lives in. Thus the inhabitants of Belgrade and respondents with higher education are prominent among those who speak of a change for the better (Babović, Cvejić, 2002: 104). In view of the above-mentioned results, it is clear that the pattern established for the general population is repeated in the case of youth. Thus, an improvement is noted by 35.6% of the urban, compared with 23.3% of rural young, while over a half of the letter group (53.4%) believe that the way of life of their household has remained unchanged.

Table 2. Social status - subjective

		Don't know	1 – Bottom	2- "Lower" middle	3 - Middle	4 – "Lower" top	5 – Top
Urban youth	A year ago	4.0	8.0	14.3	65.1	7.4	1.1
	Now	4.0	8.0	12.6	66.3	9.1	-
	In two years	9.7	5.7	6.9	37.7	30.9	9.1
Rural youth	A year ago	6.0	7.8	22.4	58.6	4.3	0.9
	Now	4.3	9.5	22.4	56.9	6.0	0.9
	In two years	13.8	3.4	8.6	46.6	19.0	8.6

The data in Table 2 reveal the differences in the subjective social statuses of the urban and rural youth. Namely, it is clear that the rural young more often see themselves on lower ladders of the social hierarchy compared with the urban youth. This pattern applies to all three points of time the assessment refers to (a year ago, now and in two years). What the urban and rural youth have in common is a relatively optimistic view of their own social position in the near future. Namely, both expect a social rise compared with the past and present times.

Table 3. Assistance in finding a regular, supplementary or better job

	Friend	Acquaintance	Relative	Neighbor	No one
Urban youth	40.5	2.3	20.2	1.2	35.8
Rural youth	28.4	1.7	18.1	3.4	48.3

In view of the nature of this text, when social capital is concerned, attention is focused only on the assistance the respondents may expect in finding a job. The generally more favorable social status of urban youth (objective as well as subjective) is revealed in their larger social capital to resolve that particular problem. It is interesting that even the traditionally stronger kinship relations in rural parts do not give the rural youth an advantage over their urban peers. The most important difference is noted with the possible assistance of friends, which the urban youth may expect more often and the absence of assistance from any one at all reported by almost half the rural youth in the context of their chances to find a job.

Table 4. Possession of good knowledge in any of the following areas

Response options	Urban youth		Rural youth	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Foreign languages	51.7	48.3	23.8	76.2
Computers	50.3	49.7	25.7	74.3
Musical or other arts	28.7	71.3	14.9	85.1
Technical knowledge and skills	33.1	66.9	18.8	81.2
Driving	60.8	39.2	52.5	47.5

The analysis of cultural capital logically completes the picture of the overall social position of urban and rural youth, and acts as an additional factor in explaining their work strategies. Naturally, not unexpectedly, the urban youth dominates with respect to almost all kinds of knowledge and skills (with a more or less doubled frequency of positive answers). An exception, to a certain extent, is the possession of a driver's license where the difference to the disadvantage of the rural youth is lower, but the overall incomparably higher "possession" of cultural capital doubtlessly gives the urban youth substantial initial advantage on the labor marker (formal as well as informal), where certain kinds of knowledge (especially of foreign languages, computer skills and driving) may often be considered a necessary (and occasionally sufficient) condition for finding a job.

Work strategies of urban and rural youth

In view of the high unemployment of the young in Serbia (which is naturally shown in our sample, i.e. subsample) the analysis of the current workplaces was done with a substantially smaller number of respondents, which is why only the most illustrative data indicating the processes of greatest importance will be mentioned. In the first place, it is interesting that a quarter of rural respondents declare themselves as farmers, which somewhat contradicts the most recent trends to the effect that the rural young (for different reasons) prefer to register as unemployed rather than as farmers. That is why it is important to take a closer look at the "resource basis" of this specific work strategy of the rural youth (naturally compared with the urban) – namely agricultural work today and still more in the future.

In contrast to the situation here, foreign literature has already adopted the term "rural restructuring" denoting "a series of social, economic and cultural changes taking shape within rural areas across Europe, the defining features of which include: the demise of primary sector employment in agriculture, fisheries and forestry; changing migration trends and demographic patterns and the emergence of new consumption patterns and interests in the countryside based on tourism, residential property and other lifestyle values. Against this backdrop, we can observe not only the social and economic differentiation of rural areas but the redistribution of opportunities and life chances among rural households in significantly unequal terms" (McGrath, 2001: 481). Naturally, most (unfortunately only unfavorable) processes can be recognized in our rural parts, too, while the positive aspects of "rural restructuring" (rural tourism, residential ownership and the like) may only be referred to highly conditionally.

That is why this modest analysis of relations between rural youth and agricultural occupation focuses on the "traditional" approach in addressing the possibilities to increase the efficiency of agricultural production. A decision to engage in agriculture (except as the last resort and most often for mere survival) is "resource-based" and economically justified only subject to the possession of a larger area of cultivable land, appropriate agricultural machinery and facilities.

Table 5. Economic position of rural households by age of respondents

	Economic position of households (in %)				
	Low	Lower middle	Middle	Higher middle	High
Age 18-29	7.8	40.5	31.9	17.2	2.6
30-44	11.0	50.2	26.9	10.1	1.8
45-59	9.9	49.3	26.6	6.9	7.4
Over 60	24.0	55.5	17.0	2.2	1.3

Bearing in mind the remarkably unfavorable population processes in our rural areas throughout the entire post-World War II period (vividly described by V. Puljiz as the "exodus of farmers"), the very existence of young members in the households of respondents in our subsample already gives them some advantage. The economic status index of all rural households (775 in this survey) proves that that this is not an "abstract and immeasurable" fact. Table 5 shows that households of respondents aged 18-29 are strongly differentiated from others in terms of their more favorable economic status.

It is interesting to note that a quarter of households of respondents from the ranks of urban youth own land. Naturally, the relevant percentage is much higher in the case of rural households (61,2%). Our analysis will deal only with rural households, bearing in mind that ownership of land for urban household is most often of purely formal nature and that the land is either not cultivated or else is leased. Anyway, due to the nature of this paper (work strategies) it seems justified to address only the rural households. First, if we have in mind the fragmentation of holdings in Serbia (with an average size of 2.4 hectares according to the 1991 census), it is important to point to those households (holdings) with at least a bit more favorable conditions in this respect (in other words, somewhat larger surfaces of cultivable land). Thus out of all landowner households of young rural respondents, 50.7% own land larger than average (2.4 hectares), while 26.8% have holdings of over 5 hectares which, conditionally speaking, may be considered larger:

Naturally, mere possession of land is not sufficient for large-scale agricultural production, since appropriate agricultural mechanization is also necessary. This factor already gives an unfavorable picture since only 37.9% of households of rural respondents have tractors and 23,3% motocultivators. Another 26.7% have tractor-drawn implements, while only two rural households have combine harvesters.

The next dimension which testifies to the material preconditions for engagement in intensive agricultural production are appropriate farm buildings. The situation is not particularly favorable in this respect either. Namely, only 30.2% respondents' households (thus less than a third) have modern stables or pigsties (with concrete floors), 5.2% have mills, while the share of farms with grain elevators, glass or plastic covered hot houses (over 50 square meters) or larger poultry farms (more than 100 birds) is negligible and falls short of 1%.

After the analysis of possibilities of rural youth to engage in agriculture it would be necessary to present the data related to the characteristics of formal employment. The survey results show that over half the rural youth (53.8%) is employed in the social/state sector. Contrary to that, the urban youth reveals the reverse pattern: over half of them (55.0%) work in newly established private firms. That fact already clearly points to the differences in the everyday working life of the two groups, bearing in mind that the private sector is the most vital part of our economy, while the situation of social enterprises (especially the so-called giants) has for some time already been extremely difficult and, perhaps even worse, offered no prospect of recovery. But, regardless of the situation with formal employment, the young share the predicament of the entire work contingent and have to make up for their low earnings (if any) by supplementary work or combination of different work strategies.

Table 6. Supplementary work

	None	Regular (every month)	Occasional (5-6 times a year)	Rare (1-2 times a year)
Urban youth	58.9	19.4	16.6	5.1
Rural youth	60.3	19.8	17.2	2.6

The figures for supplementary work do reveal practically no substantial differences between the urban and rural youth. About 60% of both groups say that they do not have any supplementary work, while about 20% do that regularly (every month). The overwhelming majority of urban and rural youth who take up supplementary work do so either for informal employers (31.0% of urban and 30.4% rural youth) or work independently for themselves (50.7% and as many as 63.0% respectively). The latter percentage (as indicated by Table 6) may be explained by agricultural work done on one's own land. It is interesting that rural youth more frequently engage in crafts, while the urban young (as expected) dominate in trade, intellectual and artistic activities.

Table 7. Most frequent types of supplementary work

	Agriculture	Crafts	Trade	Manual work	Construction work	Intellectual and artistic work	Childcare, housework, care for the old and sick	Other
Urban youth	7.0	11.3	31.0	7.0	1.4	16.9	1.4	23.9
Rural youth	26.1	17.4	10.9	10.9	2.2	8.7	4.3	19.6

Motives for supplementary work are perhaps the most illustrative of the difference in the social status and work strategies of the urban and rural youth. Bearing in mind that the statements we are dealing with were made by the respondents themselves, their assessments of their own positions may be objected some personal bias, but that is apparently also what makes them credible and a true reflection of their actual life situations. Survival as a motive for supplementary work is much more frequently referred to by rural youth (61.3%) than by urban (44.8%), as proposed to the aspiration for a higher standard of living (22.6% and 37.9% respectively).

Graph 2. Motives for supplementary work



In order to establish the value basis of the work strategies of the young it is important to analyze their perceptions of the most important factors for advancement in society. The survey offered the possibility to rank three factors in order of importance, and the following text shall refer only to the three most often mentioned factors for each of the ranks (first, second and third most important).

Table 8. Most important factors for advance in our society

	Rank	Factors of advance		
Urban youth	I	Good education (34.3%)	Wealthy family (17.4%)	Knowing the right people (17.4%)
	II	Ambition (23.8%)	Knowing the right people (23.3%)	Hard work (15.1%)
	III	Readiness to take business risks (18.6%)	Knowing the right people (15.7%)	Hard work (15.1%)
Rural youth	I	Good education (32.7%)	Knowing the right people (15.9%)	Hard work (15.0%)
	II	Hard work (20.4%)	Ambition (17.7%)	Knowing the right people (16.8%)
	III	Knowing the right people (19.6%)	Obedience (17.0%)	Readiness to take business risks (14.3%)

Somewhat surprising, but certainly gratifying, is the fact that the urban as well as rural youth see good education as the single absolutely most important factor (about a third of each). In general, as shown in the table, the whole exercise is about ranking the different aspects of specific types of capital (cultural - education, economic – wealthy family and social – knowing the right people) and personal characteristics (ambition, hard work, readiness to take risks). The only factor which departs from this pattern is obedience, referred to by respondents among the ranks of the rural youth. But, bearing in mind various survey results which, in these parts, invariably confirm greater authoritarianism of the rural population, this fact may be considered both expected and understandable. Overall, we could say that the young, although aware of the channels of social ascent in this country (importance of economic and social capital) still give priority to education (i.e. cultural capital) and personal characteristics, and thereby indirectly manifest the internal locus of control, i.e. belief that after all they themselves still have the largest influence on their own lives.

Table 9. What do you personally intend to do in the next year or two in order to improve your life? (answers over 3% only)

	Become employed, find a job	Find another, better job	Advance in his/her job	Work more	Start his/her own business	Acquire education, get a university degree	Go abroad	Nothing	Other
Urban youth	15.2	10.4	3.0	4.9	3.0	35.4	11.6	3.7	3.7
Rural youth	31.1	7.8	-	7.8	1.0	16.5	11.7	7.8	6.8

The link between work and life strategies in general is interesting in itself. The rural youth places the emphasis on employment, i.e. finding a job of any kind, while the urban young focus on advancement or finding a better job. As expected, the urban young more than twice as often than their rural counterparts opt for the strategy of investing into their cultural capital, more specifically education. On the other hand, the rural youth is more inclined to passively await future developments, without any intention to do a single thing to improve its own position. These results are corroborated by the fact that almost 2/3 of young urban respondents (64.6%) have devised plans for their career in the next five years, compared with only 46.1% of the rural young.

Concrete options to improve the status of one's own family provide the best illustration of the degree of acceptance of specific work strategies. Bearing in mind that Table 10 is illustrative enough, suffice it to draw the attention to the most essential differences between the urban and rural youth in this respect. The general impression is not inconsistent with most findings of this research: the urban youth is more inclined to accept active and more risky possibilities, as opposed to rural youth who tend towards the passive and safer options. Thus the former are ready to change the place of residence, acquire new knowledge, start their own businesses, etc., while the latter are more inclined to take up any paid job, and work below their qualifications as well as in the "gray economy".

Table10. Readiness to accept specific work strategies

In order to ensure your family's livelihood, would you be prepared to:	Urban youth		Rural youth	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Change the place of residence to get a job or higher earnings	78.2	21.8	71.9	28.1
Take up any paid job	42.0	58.0	52.2	47.8
Work longer than normal working hours	80.5	19.5	78.1	21.9
Work simultaneously on several jobs, for several firms	53.8	46.2	44.7	55.3
Work below qualifications, but for a substantially higher pay	72.3	27.7	80.9	19.1
Leave permanent employment for occasional but better paid work on contract	49.7	50.3	43.4	56.6
Along with regular employment take up supplementary part-time work on contract	82.8	17.2	71.9	29.1
Work informally in the "gray economy"	31.0	69.0	35.1	64.9
Acquire new knowledge, skills and qualifications	89.0	11.0	83.5	16.5
Start your own business (become "self-employed")	75.3	24.7	69.6	30.4
Establish your own firm, alone or with partners	71.3	28.7	52.2	47.8

Given the possibility to select only one of the options, the rural young most often choose spatial mobility in order to find work or bigger pay, and then part time work with the existing job followed by acceptance of any job that pays. The most frequent choice of the urban young is the establishment of their own firms (independently or with others), followed by supplementary part-time work on contract, acquisition of new knowledge and skills and spatial mobility in search of a job or higher pay.

Table 11. Which of the options do you prefer?

Option	Urban youth	Rural youth
Change the place of residence to get a job or higher earnings	12.7	19.1
Take up any paid job	6.6	14.5
Work longer than normal working hours	8.4	8.2
Work simultaneously on several jobs for several firms	3.6	1.8
Work below qualifications but for a substantially higher pay	3.6	8.2
Leave permanent employment for occasional but better paid work on contract	1.8	0.9
Along with regular employment take up supplementary part-time work on contract	15.7	16.4
Work informally in the “gray economy”	-	-
Acquire new knowledge, skills and qualifications	15.1	11.8
Start your own business (become “self-employed”)	12.0	9.1
Establish your own firm, alone or with partners	20.5	10.0

The direct question whether the respondents intended to establish their own firm is most revealing of the differences between the urban and rural youth. In the first place, 4% of the urban youth is already engaged in legal private businesses. The rural young are in 71.9% of cases adamant that they do not intend to establish their private firms and only a quarter of them think about it, while 54.6% of the urban young have no plans to start a private business.

Table 12. Do you intend to establish your own firm?

	Urban youth	Rural youth
I already have it	4,0	-
No	54,6	71,9
Yes, I have though about it	36,2	25,4
Yes, I am collecting (already have) the relevant information	2,3	2,6
Yes, I am raising the capital, looking for premises, purchasing equipment, etc.	2,3	-
Yes, I have everything ready for registration	0,6	-

In conclusion of this analysis of work strategies it would be necessary to take a closer look at the so-called exit strategy, which in a certain manner may be considered a work strategy of a kind. In view of the generally difficult social situation in our country, it seems that young people find it the hardest not to be able to attain their work objectives and thus ensure themselves “a better life here and now”. That is why the thoughts about leaving abroad, widespread among the young, are only expected as well as completely understandable. Although this analysis of the social position and work strategies pointed to certain differences between the urban and rural youth, this is where their thoughts are more or less the same: over a half of both groups think about leaving Serbia for a longer period of time (meaning practically forever). It seems to me that a better and more relevant indicator of the present status and future prospects of our youth cannot be found.

Table 13. Do you think about leaving abroad for a longer period of time?

	I seriously think about it	I sometimes think about it	I do not think about it
Urban youth	22.9	32.6	44.6
Rural youth	19.0	33.6	47.4

Conclusion

The analysis of social positions and work strategies of the urban and rural youth has confirmed the starting hypothesis of this research. Namely, it proved the assumption that there are certain differences among the work strategies chosen by the urban and rural youth in this country. The main impression is that the former group is more inclined to embrace proactive and risky strategies, in contrast to the latter who find passive and more certain possibilities for work more acceptable. This difference is largely due to the overall more favorable social position of the urban youth compared with the rural (better economic position, possession of greater economic, social and cultural capital) and dissimilarities in their everyday work and life. Due to all that the urban youth is more often in a position to plan its future career and invest into it (education, learning new skills and improving the existing, etc.). The town and the village are observed as a social-spatial environments with different possibilities for the acquisition of all types of capital which, in consequences, provide the young people with a basis for the selection of different life, and thus also work strategies.

But, quite independently from the above-mentioned differences the results have shown that over half the urban and rural youth think about going abroad for a longer period of time. The relatively more favorable position of the urban youth implies a higher level of life and work aspirations, which is why its members see emigration from Serbia as a “natural” way out of its gloomy reality. Bearing in mind that the members of this “most recent emigration” (real as well as potential) represent the most vital and most educated segment of the overall population it is quite clear that it is high time to formulate the strategies for the improvement of their position and future work and, more generally, life chances. That, on its part, requires a more extensive and thorough research in order to obtain systematic and precise insights into their social reality and everyday lives.

Part II: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF EVERYDAY LIFE OF FAMILIES

Marija Babović

ECONOMIC STRATEGIES OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF SERBIA

ABSTRACT: Households and individuals adapt to the changing global social circumstances by (re)defining their economic actions. The way economic activities are articulated and combined in a household may be understood as its economic strategy, whose outcome may be either social reproduction or change in social status. The selection of economic actions and strategy articulation are constrained by the resources available to the household: economic, cultural, social and human ones. According to the type of economic strategy they deploy, households are classified into categories with: passive, self-provisioning, strategy focused on single type of work, and strategy diversified between different types of work. Type of strategy is significantly correlated with a household's structural position, and demonstrates the lack of crystallization of social positions explaining particularly the inconsistency between a household's social status defined by occupations and educational levels of its members, on the one hand, and its economic status, on the other. Viewed from the angle of economic strategies of households, survey results show that the "winners" of the delayed transformation in Serbia are the households with diversified work strategies, especially those that combine formal employment with supplementary work.

KEY WORDS: household, economic strategy, resources, economic status, structural position.

The post-socialist transformation in Serbia may essentially be divided into two stages: the stage of "blocked transition" during the 1990s and the one of "reactivated transition" after the change of the political regime in 2000. During the period of "blocked transition" a number of fundamental institutional novelties were introduced – multiparty political subsystem and the market economic subsystem – but substantial changes within the new institutional framework were arrested by the still centralized power of the ruling political (firmly linked with the economic) elite's top ranks, the continuing regulatory role of the state in the economy, postponement of a more extensive privatization, etc.[1] Despite the fact that the process of thorough systemic transformation was blocked in order to preserve the position of the elite, the last decade of the 20th century saw some changes which substantially altered the nature of the global social system.[2] The second stage - one of reactivated transition, which

[1] For more on the characteristics of post-socialist transformation in Serbia, see Lazić, M., 1995, 2000; Bolčić, S., 2003.
[2] This in the first place relates to the emerging of a group of new entrepreneurs, growth of the private sector primarily due to the establishment of new private enterprises, development of market institutions and of market relations in the informal economic sector (the informal markets of money, goods, services and labor) wherein the transformation

started in the autumn of 2000 - is marked by efforts to build new institutions and transpose the existing from the informal "para-system" into the formal order. That is why the first years of the third millennium in the Serbian society are characterized by the existence of a specific system, which, in addition to transformed institutions, also includes some remnants of the socialist order (socially owned state-controlled enterprises) along with elements of informal arrangements carried over from the blocked transition period.

Theoretical-methodological approach of research into the socio-economic strategies of households

In view of the complex nature of the post-socialist transformation of the Serbian society the question is how the households adjust their economic actions to the existing circumstances and what is the link between their economic strategies and positioning in the new stratification framework. The approach to household socio-economic strategies used in this paper relies on the concept of economic strategies of households developed over the past two decades from the abundance of relevant researches in an effort to better understand and explain the influence of global social changes on the economic behavior of households. This approach is a valuable analytical instrument for the study of changes in the social status and socio-economic actions of households and individuals under conditions of salient social transformations.

By including into the analytical framework the positions of household members on the formal labor market, with substantial qualitative differences depending on their occupations, forms of employment (full or part-time, with additional social benefits or without them, etc.), informal work, household production of goods and services, reliance on social networks for exchange or support, as well as the ways of combining the above-mentioned activities, this approach offers a deeper insight into the economic actions of households, as well as the link between their economic actions and social positions. In addition, the study of *socio-economic strategies of households also enables a better understanding of global systemic changes that, in different degrees and for different groups, open the spheres of economic action within the system of economic reproduction of the global society.*

The term socio-economic strategies in this paper denotes relatively stable patterns of economic action aimed at collection and (re)distribution of economic resources (including the conversion of different forms of capital) to ensure the social reproduction of households within their existing social positions, or to change their respective social statuses. This definition of the strategy does not overcome the diffi-

processes, restrained in the formal sector, found room for development. Precisely these transformation processes, well under way in the informal "para-system", played an important role in the change of the political regime in 2000 and the unblocking of changes).

culties also encountered by other (especially "stronger") definitions, and thus allows for at least two types of objections:

1) that a household is assigned the subjectivity it does not actually possess, i.e. that the existence of household strategies implies at least clearly defined objectives and an appropriate organization to implement them;
2) that the objectives are formulated as if the households consciously take the decision to be reproduced within the same, i.e. changed social status.

Objection of the first type starts from the possibility that households are not sufficiently coherent groups, so that their strategies are, in effect, basically the combinations of individual strategies of their members, and are not necessarily the outcome of joint decisions, while the analysts a posteriori assign them the subjectivity of actors. Unfortunately, the database this study draws on does not include empirical findings that could be analyzed in order to obtain a deeper grasp of the internal processes of articulating the households' objectives and establishing their organization, but there are at least two facts which provide the grounds to observe the economic action on household level, rather than as a sum of individual efforts: a household is a community of members who occupy the same dwelling and have at least a degree of joint consumption (survey results indicate that 82% of households have completely centralized budgets). Even in the absence of explicit decision-making about objectives or the division of roles, organization in a household is established by mutual adjustment. In that sense even where the households are extremely complex (comprising several nuclear families, generations and members of different socio-professional groups), without a clearly, rationally and explicitly established organization, they still represent a union wherein individual actions are adjusted to the needs and activities of other members, which is why action on household level is a phenomenon that cannot be reduced to an aggregate of individual actions, i.e. strategies.

As for the other type of possible objections concerning a household's orientation towards the reproduction or change of its social status, we should stress that this means *action orientation towards the reproduction or change of a household's lifestyle, which is marked by its class-stratum placement.* Here again, a problem may arise because complex households may be highly heterogeneous, and even class divided (e.g. the older generation belongs to a different stratum or has a way of life different from the younger generation). However, the very fact that these heterogeneous households do survive as communities, gives us a picture of the strategies of adjustment under conditions of a pronounced social change in the Serbian society.

The starting premise of the theoretical-analytical model at the basis of this analysis is that the *profiling of economic strategies is to a great extent determined by the relation between the resources and needs* (i.e. objectives) of households (Graph 1). *The resource basis of a household is, on its part, largely defined by the structural position of the household, i.e. its place in the system of global social reproduction, and determined by the combinations of positions held by its individual members in the system of reproduction, as well as its overall resources which go beyond the mere sum of individual assets.* Resources relevant for strategy profiling are: *economic* *capital* (including financial resources, movable and immovable property, means of production), *cultural capital* (which, in its wider form, in addition to household members' education also includes their values, norms and social consciousness), *social capital* (social networks household members may activate in the attainment of their objectives, as well as their social power) and, *human capital* (for these purposes narrowly understood as the number of members able to work). The resources of a household should enable it to meet its material, cultural and social needs. *Depending on the relation between the resources and needs, a household may be in the state of: static balance,* implying that the resources and needs are reproduced on the same level and with the same structure, and that the resources are least-wise sufficient to meet the existing needs; *dynamic balance*, where the resources and needs develop evenly so that the increase in resources is accompanied by the development of needs, and vice versa, while the resources are at least sufficient to meet the needs; and *deprivation,* which implies that the resources are insufficient. *The type of the relation between resources and needs provides the impetus to (re)define economic strategies, while the structure of household resources limits the choice of available strategies*, not only in terms of material, physical resources, or cultural and social capital in the strict sense, but also in terms of the norms and values, and the prevailing culture in the household which influences the shaping of its economic strategy.

The strategies may be so profiled as to bring about a *change in household resources* (e.g. direct increase in economic capital, education of household members which augments cultural capital, fostering and development of social networks, etc.), *a change in household's needs* (e.g. reducing the needs when resources are scarce, their restructuring or changing the ways to meet them, e.g. by self-provisioning instead of going to the market), *a change in the environment*, or a simultaneous change of two or all three dimensions (resources, needs and environment). Household environment is complex and influences the position and action of households from the global society level to the one of its microenvironment (e.g. neighborhood). Under conditions of pronounced global social changes, changes in the environment may strongly affect the resources (for instance, an economic crisis and a high inflation may reduce the value of economic capital, changes on the labor market may depreciate the cultural capital, etc.), disrupt the balance of resources and needs and thus impose the redefining of economic strategies. On the other hand, the socio-economic strategies of households may be directly oriented towards the change in the environment – from the place of residence to political actions to change the political regime, or elements of the global social system. Depending on the outcome, strategies may lead towards the social reproduction of households or the upward or downward change of their social status on the scale of economic positions or social stratification.


ENVIRONMENT
Household resources:
- Economic capital
- Cultural capital
- Social capital
- Human capital
Static balance
Dynamic balance
Deprivation
Household's needs:
- material
- cultural
- social
strategy (re)defining
CHANGES IN THE ENVIRONMENT
Changes in resources (increase, decrease, conversion, etc.)
Changes in both resources and needs
Changes in needs:
- In structure
- In volume
- In the manner of satisfaction
Social reproduction
Change of social status

Types of households' socio-economic strategies

The analysis of socio-economic strategies of households presented in this text draws on the data obtained by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy in a survey carried out in November 2003, on a sample of 1636 households. Unfortunately, the empirical research could not cover all dimensions of the above-mentioned general theoretical model, which is why the analysis has been limited to several aspect, only two of which will be presented here: classification of households by types of strategies and the correlation between the strategies and class positions of households.

Bearing in mind that a strategy is understood as a mix of economic activities in a household the combinations of which are often impossible to encompass by a single classification, a relatively general basic typology of strategies was established based on three primary elements: 1) work on the formal labor market; 2) work on the informal labor market; 3) self-provisioning, i.e. satisfaction of the household's needs by household work, outside the market, to produce food for its own needs, make or alter clothing, do different kinds of work on the house/apartment, repair appliances, etc.

According to the basic types of strategies households are differentiated as: *passive*, households with *self-provisioning strategies*, households with *focused work strategies* and those with *diversified work strategies.*[3] Passive households are those whose members do not perform any economic activities on the labor market, or within the household economy (except for the basic activities of preparing food, regular maintenance of the premises, etc.).[4]

The second type – self-provisioning strategy – includes only the economic activities carried out by a household to meet its own needs (whether by subsistence production or services), which are in "modern" societies linked with the markets of commodities and services. We must note that the activities of household production of goods and services are also on the increase in the developed post-industrial societies, but their functions and forms are different from those of Serbian households.

[3] The typology was established using the method of multidimensional classification. Each household member was given an appropriate value on special variables used as classification elements: formal employment (1 if employed or 0 if formally unemployed), supplementary work, work in agriculture, subsistence production and self-servicing. After that, the households were classified on a new variable of types of strategies, using logical conditions to group households by elementary variables. Households with 0 value on all elementary variables were classified as passive. Households with 0 value on all variables but subsistence production and self-servicing were classified as households with self-provisioning strategy. Households with value 1 on any one single variable: formal employment, supplementary work or agricultural work, were classified as households with focused work strategies. Households with value 1 on more than one elementary variable were, depending on the combination, classified into appropriate categories of households with diversified work strategies. It is important to note that the criteria for classification do not include the number of household members engaged in a specific activity, so that i.e. the group of households with work strategy focused on formal employment includes those with only one formally employed member as well as those with several formally employed members; while the group of households with work strategies diversified to formal employment and supplementary work includes households with a member who simultaneously holds a formal and supplementary job, as well as those where one member does formal and another supplementary work.

[4] The absence of activity raises the question of whether households of this kind could be viewed as having a strategy at all. Some authors believe that a conscious decision not to act may also be considered a strategy (Anderson, Bechofer & Kendrick, 1994: 20).

In the first place, these activities in developed societies do not include production of food, but mainly gardening and home refurbishing (so-called do-it-yourself activities), reflecting a new culture of consumption and a system of values stressing the quality of life and greater creative participation in shaping one's own space. Characteristic of Serbian households is that domestic production and self-servicing primarily have the nature of substituting for market mechanisms to meet the needs with household work, most often due to insufficient financial resources. In addition, these activities also differ in terms of their contents, since they include food production (in one's garden or land plot, etc.), the making or alteration of clothes (most often due to inability to buy them on the market), repair of household appliances and "major" refurbishing or maintenance works (wall-painting, installations repairs, etc.).

The third type of strategy is termed *focused work strategy* because the economic activity of a household is focused on a single type of economic activity, regardless of how many household members are engaged in it. Depending on the type of economic activity, households are classified as having: a *formal employment strategy* (including entrepreneurial households relying exclusively on entrepreneurship - remarkably few in the sample), a strategy of engaging only in occasional or regular *supplementary work*[5] (is most cases in the informal zone) and a *strategy of agricultural work.*

The fourth type of strategy is referred to as *diversified work strategy*, because it denotes a combination of two or more forms of work of the previous type. The last two types of strategies start from the forms and combinations of work activities and do not differentiate the households by their engagement or non-engagement in domestic production and/or self-servicing activities.[6]

According to the relevant data the most widespread are work strategies – in over 4/5 of households – with almost equal shares of focused and diversified work strategies. (Table 1).

[5] The syntagma supplementary work is generally accepted in literature to denote occasional or regular work done in addition to regular employment or outside the status of formal employment, whether related to the legal or gray economy. However, this kind of work is the basic and only activity for certain individuals and households, which is why it is inappropriate to call it supplementary. But, if one wishes to remain consistent, and preserve the difference between the formal and substantial in the position and action of individuals (and households) then persons without formal employment may be considered formally unemployed and doing supplementary work. The same applies to other categories outside the status of formal employment for whom the work they do practically is not supplementary (pensioners, housewives, students, etc.).

[6] Bearing in mind that 45% of households in the sample engage in a kind of subsistence production to meet their own needs, and that as many as 64% of households themselves provide the services required for the maintenance of their household furnishings and premises (other than everyday upkeep), it turned out that self-provisioning activities do not substantially differentiate households with another type of work strategy while they unnecessarily increase the number of categories.

Table 1. Households by types of strategies

Type of strategy	% of households
Passive	6.4
Self-provisioning	12.4
Work focused - total	41.1
Formal employment	20.6
Supplementary work	10.3
Agricultural work	10.2
Work diversified – total	40.1
Entrepreneurial combined with other types of work	2.5
Formal employment combined with supplementary work	25.3
Formal employment combined with agricultural work	8.4
Supplementary work combined with agricultural work	3.9
Total	100

A fifth of households do not engage in any market, i.e. work activity (passive and households exclusively oriented towards self-provisioning). The group of passive households includes an extremely high share of households living off pensions (86.4%). But, 13.6% of households in the passive category base their economic existence on welfare, as well as financial assistance of social networks (relatives and/or friends in the country or abroad). Over 2/3 of passive households live in towns, while among those living in rural areas old households prevail, which explains the absence of production, not only for the market but also for their own needs.

The group with the self-provisioning strategy is dominated by households with at least one pensioner, which is why the main source of economic existence is pension - in 86.2% of cases. The remaining households live on welfare, financial assistance of social networks and, in a few cases, rent. Two thirds of households in this group live in the villages where they own land and produce food for their own needs, but not for the market. The remaining third of households in this group live in towns and a third of them also own land and produce food for their own needs. Two thirds of households with the self-provisioning strategy make clothes for their members, and over a half of them repair household appliances and installations themselves as well as do major home refurbishing work.

Subsistence production and self-servicing are also registered among households with other types of strategies (except passive), but to a lesser extent. The essential difference between the households with self-provisioning strategies and those with work strategies is that subsistence production and self-servicing are the only economic activities in the former group, but are supplementary to market activities, in the latter.

Households relying on entrepreneurship alone are remarkably few (0.3%), which is why they have been included into the group of households with the formal employment strategy. Although the sample for the survey is not appropriately representative of entrepreneurs, and any conclusion about this group requires a cautious approach, it is interesting that most entrepreneurial households still combine other types of work and/or activity with entrepreneurship.[7]

Exclusive reliance on formal employment represents the dominant pattern of economic strategies of households in societies of developed industrialism. Although the post-industrial phase shows a decrease in this pattern of economic action with simultaneous increase in flexible forms of employment, supplementary work and even self-provisioning strategies, it still remains the most widespread form of economic behavior of households, although the previous model of one employed household member (mostly the head of the family – the „breadwinner") changes to dual breadwinner model, with the increased employment of women. This type of economic strategy is registered in a fifth of surveyed households, although if we exclude those households which engage in self-provisioning activities, the percentage of households that base their existence only on formal employment of their members drops to 8.7%. The group of households with the work strategy of formal employment shows 14.3% of cases where all employed household members do work characteristic of the so-called primary labor market, i.e. work which requires high qualifications and means larger average income and possibilities to develop career patterns. However, employed members of most households in this group (74.6%) work on the secondary labor market (lower skilled non-manual and manual jobs), while members of 11% of households are simultaneously employed on both the primary and secondary market.

Over 10% of households base their existence exclusively on "supplementary work", namely on occasional or regular work activities most often in the sphere of the informal economy. In this group, 53% of households base their existence on regular supplementary work, and 28.6% take up supplementary work occasionally. Members of 10.2% of households rarely engage in supplementary work (1-2 times a year), while 8% of households combine regular work of certain members with occasional supplementary work of others. Supplementary work is still mostly done in the gray economy: members of only 12.2% households do part-time work on the basis of contracts with specific firms or through cooperatives, members of 84% of households exclusively work for informal employers or independently for themselves, while 3.4% of households combine legal part-time work with that in the informal economy. Prevailing activities in terms of supplementary work, include agricultural, unskilled and skilled manual labor, followed by trade and, finally, intellectual and artistic work. Although supplementary work is the single economic activity registered among households in this group (excluding self-provisioning) income from supplementary work is not the only source of existence for the majority of households with this type of strategy. About a half of them also have receipts from pensions, and a fifth are on the welfare. Almost two thirds of households with work strategy focused on supplementary work have problems with unemployment, which is more than in

[7] Out of 86 entrepreneurial households, only 10 engage exclusively in entrepreneurial activities while 76 households have diversified work strategies, i.e. their members in addition to entrepreneurial also carry out other activities in the form of formal employment, supplementary or agricultural work.

other groups of households with different strategies. In addition, half the households facing the problem of unemployment have one unemployed member while the other half have several. The above-mentioned features of supplementary work give a very different picture from the one of modern flexible forms of labor characteristic of developed societies. Except for a very small number of households whose members are engaged in modern forms of part-time work doing professional jobs, supplementary work as the main economic activity is the only way for these households to tackle the problem of their members' unemployment, or add to their receipts from pensions or welfare. Therefore, supplementary work in this case serves the purpose of survival and does not reflect the choice of more flexible forms of work.

The last type of focused work strategy – work in agriculture – is reported by 10% of households. Very important is the finding that as many as 31% of households which at the time of the 2003 survey engaged in economic activities exclusively in agriculture, according to the relevant data on their socio-economic status did not have a single agricultural worker among their members in 1989. This means that even if these households actually did some work in agriculture before entering the post-socialist transformation, that work was subsidiary to employment in other sectors of the economy. Increased unemployment forced these households to transfer to agricultural production completely. Households oriented exclusively towards agricultural production predominantly have small land holdings: over a fifth of them have up to two hectares of land, close to two thirds have from two to 10 hectares and 12% have over ten hectares of land. In most households the traditional type of diverse agricultural production prevails – only 18% of households have specialized production, which is revealing of a more pronounced market orientation. Over half the households continue with diverse, unspecialized production that, according to the respondents, suits them, while 26% would make a shift to specialized production if they had the prerequisites to do so (more land, better mechanization, etc.).

The most frequent modality of the work diversified strategy is the combination of formal employment and supplementary work, followed by a combination of formal employment and agricultural work – typical of mixed households.

In view of a small number of entrepreneurial households in the sample, this group cannot be analyzed in greater depth. However, the basic descriptive analysis shows a high share of those who combine entrepreneurship with other economic activities in the household – primarily formal employment of other household members who are not entrepreneurs, supplementary work, mainly in the zone of the gray economy, and even agricultural work. This image of entrepreneurial households is partly due to the absence of large entrepreneurs in the sample. The predominantly small entrepreneurship gives a substantially different picture of economic strategies than could be expected from households of large entrepreneurs. But, even these basic insights are important indicators of insufficient reliance of small and medium entrepreneurs on their entrepreneurial activity alone, and their need to hedge and mitigate the risks related to entrepreneurship by diversifying their household's economic activities.

The strategy of combining formal employment with supplementary work is most often found among the surveyed households. Over half the households with this type of strategy (53.6%) register *regular* supplementary work along with formal employment of their members, 40% report *occasional* supplementary work (5-6 times per year) combined with regular employment, while 6% *rarely* (1-2 times a year) combine supplementary work with formal employment. Supplementary work unfolds in the *informal economy* for 87% of households, or takes the form of legal *part-time work* in 9% of households, while 4% of households combine part time work with that in the gray economy. The largest share in supplementary activities is the one of agricultural work (35% of households in this group), followed by skilled manual labor like artisan or construction works (23% of households), trade (15,6%) and intellectual and unskilled labor (13% and 12.5% respectively). Moreover, 19.5% of households combine *more than one type of supplementary work* with formal employment.

Formal employment is combined with agricultural work by 8.4% of households, and this type of strategy is found in the traditional mixed households. The difference between these households and those with the previous type of strategy is that agricultural work in mixed households, just like formal employment, represents the main, rather than supplementary activity of certain household members (with the status of farmers). The group of mixed households also differs from the next group which combines work in agriculture with supplementary work, since employment in non-agricultural sectors of these households takes only the form of supplementary work, outside the formal employment status.

In this last group of households with the strategy of combining agricultural and supplementary work, supplementary work has essentially different characteristics. In the first place, legal part-time work is substantially less frequent (5), as opposed to unskilled and skilled manual labor (30% each), while work in trade is found less often (9% of households) and professional work not at all. Finally, these households are somewhat less inclined to combine several different types of supplementary work – about 15%.

The main insights into the economic activities of households indicate that in the whole sample, economic strategies of over half the households (54.3%) include formal employment, alone or in combination with other activities, that over a third of households (39.5%) have strategies including supplementary work, while the strategies of 40% of households in one way or other include farming, either as the basic activity or as supplementary work of a household member. Survey findings indicate that *the most frequent type of economic strategy is work strategy diversified to formal employment and supplementary work.* The remarkable diversification of economic strategies of a large number of households, as well as the presence of informal work and work in the traditional agricultural sector within work focused strategies, offer a highly complex picture of economic activities of Serbian households. *At the same time, engagement of households in different spheres of the global system of social reproduction (formal employment, work in the gray economy, agricultural work, etc.) results in their uncrystallized social positions and makes the process of post-social-*

ist restratification of society more difficult. On the other hand, the survey findings show that *the systemic changes have not advanced far enough to enable the efficient focusing of strategies on specific spheres of the economic system of social reproduction, and instead impose the need for most households to either become remarkably diversified in economic action in order to ensure their own reproduction or, lacking the possibility to join the formal labor market, enter the informal or marginal forms of economic activities, or else stick and even transfer to the traditional (agricultural) forms of work.*

Economic strategies of households of different economic and class positions

The link between the types of socio-economic strategies of households with their socio-demographic characteristics and resource basis has been analyzed elsewhere (Babović, 2004). The results of these analyses indicate a significant correlation between the average age and size of households with the type of strategy - *activity decreases with the higher average age of households, and increases with its size. The existence of children in households adds to the probability of diversified strategies profiling, while the place of residence* (city/village) *does not substantially influence the focusing, i.e. diversification of strategies, but rather the types of work and their specific combinations (strategies implying formal employment are less represented in rural households, as opposed to strategies including agricultural work).*

The analysis of the relation between the resource basis of households and the types of strategies reveals that only some of the resources show statistically important correlation with the type of strategy. *The strongest correlation exists between human capital*[8] *and type of strategy*, and then between *cultural capital*[9] *and type of strategy.* More precise establishment of the relation between economic capital and type of strategy requires additional variables assumed to mediate between economic resources and strategy profiling, while any inference about the link with social capital would be unreliable, since the way of measuring the social capital is not adjusted to the research into economic strategies.

The study of economic strategies of households of different class positions, aims to show whether specific types of strategies are characteristic of specific social strata. In addition, a comparison between households belonging to the same social stratum, but using different economic strategies, may show which types of economic action improve the economic status of a household. Finally, the link between the households' class positions, economic strategies and statuses reveals their (non)crystallized social (class) positions due to the aggravated transition of the Serbian society.

[8] Human capital is operationalized as the number of household members able to work.
[9] Cultural capital in its narrow sense is operationalized though the average length of education of household members over the age of 18.

The strata are operationalized though the occupations and education of household members, using the so-called dominance principle. This means that households are assigned the status of the member with the highest individual position. The households were classified into the following classes: 1. managers (directors and politicians); 2. entrepreneurs[10]; 3. professionals (including the self-employed and highly educated members of free professions); 4. intermediate stratum (non-manual employees with secondary education, self-employed with secondary education); 5. skilled manual workers (highly-skilled and skilled manual workers, self-employed with worker qualifications); 6. unskilled manual workers (semi-skilled and un-skilled workers); 7. farmers and, 8. marginal social stratum (underclass), encompassing the groups excluded from the sphere of economic reproduction of society (where not a single household member has been, or is now engaged in an occupation that would allow their classification). Households without a single active member are classified according to the previous occupation of their retired members.

The type of economic strategy of a household shows an important correlation with its class positioning (Table 2).

Table 2. Households by type of strategy and class position (in %)

Type of strategy	Class position of households				
	Professionals	Intermediate stratum	Skilled workers	Unskilled workers	Farmers
Passive	6.9	4.3	4.8	14.1	0.6
Self-provisioning	7.7	6.5	8.7	27.0	8.5
Formal employment	31.6	35.0	24.8	12.7	-
Supplementary work	7.4	3.8	12.4	20.4	6.4
Agricultural work	-	-	-	0.8	61.0
Formal employment and supplementary work	39.8	40.3	33.8	15.4	-
Formal employment and agricultural work	6.6	10.1	15.4	8.7	-
Agricultural and supplementary work	-	-	-	0.8	23.5
Total	100		100	100	100

Cramer's V = .523
p = .000

The multistage PPS sample used for the survey does not sufficiently cover the groups from the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, which makes the statistical analysis of intra-group differentiation by different characteristics, and even the type

[10] Since the sample included only one large entrepreneur, it should be borne in mind that the entrepreneurial stratum referred to in this paper covers medium and small entrepreneurs.

of economic strategies, impossible. Due to insufficient coverage the table does not present the data for managers, entrepreneurs and the marginal class.[11]

The tabular presentation of the distribution of strategies among the social strata shows that two types of strategies are dominant for the professionals, intermediate stratum and the one of skilled manual workers, namely work strategy diversified to formal employment and supplementary work, and work strategy focused on formal employment. Differences between the three strata are revealed in a somewhat higher share of passive strategy among professionals (presumably partly due to their higher pensions and consequently lower pressure to find supplementary work following retirement); and in a stronger presence of strategies focused on supplementary work alone and on the combination of formal employment with agricultural work among skilled manual workers. Unskilled workers largely differ from other groups in terms of their twice higher share of passive strategies and remarkably high shares of self-provisioning and the work strategy focused exclusively on supplementary work. Despite their stronger passive, i.e. defensive orientation, households, even in this group, register a higher frequency of combinations between formal employment and supplementary work, compared with reliance on formal employment alone. The only stratum where the focus on the "basic work" is more pronounced than combinations of the main activity and supplementary work is the one of farmers, which also shows a practically complete absence of passive strategy.

Although the operationalization of social strata is based on the occupation and education of household members it still reflects economic inequalities. In the developed societies the actors' positions in the division of labor reveal a firmer correlation with remunerations, which is why the link between the class and economic positions is firmer. In a situation of aggravated transition in Serbia, in view of the uncrystallized positions and diversified strategies, not only a household, but also its individual members (especially in the event of diversified strategies) may simultaneously take different positions in the social division of labor, i.e. the global system of economic and social reproduction of society. That is why class placements are not sufficiently crystallized, and it is not possible to expect an equally firm link between the class position defined on the basis of education and position in the division of labor, and the economic status of a household. Still, even with so relativized relations between the variables of the class and economic positions, differences in economic statuses of the strata are clearly manifested (Table 3).[12]

[11] Out of 41 households in the managerial class, 15 registered a strategy focused on formal employment and 18 work strategy diversified to formal employment and supplementary work. Out of 83 entrepreneurial households 10 showed orientation to entrepreneurship as the single economic activity, while 73 households combined entrepreneurship with other types of economic activities (most often formal employment and supplementary work). Dominant in the 45 households of the marginal stratum is the strategy of self-provisioning (34 households) followed by passive strategy (8 households).

[12] An average value of the economic status of each stratum was calculated with the minimum and maximum set at 1 and 5 respectively.

Table 3. Households by class and economic positions

Social stratum	Average value on economic status scale	Standard deviation
Managers	4.19	0.74
Entrepreneurs	4.03	0.99
Professionals	3.24	1.01
Intermediate stratum	2.88	0.99
Skilled manual workers	2.39	0.90
Unskilled manual workers	1.86	0.75
Farmers	2.33	0.86
Marginal stratum	1.42	0.50

A higher average value for managers on the scale of economic positions compared with entrepreneurs is largely due to the absence of large entrepreneurs in the sample. Further down the hierarchical ladder the average economic status decreases, except for farmers who show a higher average than unskilled workers and come close to skilled workers.

The relation between class and economic positions is substantially mediated by the type of households' economic strategies. Namely, households of the same stratum show differences in economic position precisely depending on the type of economic strategy. That however, does not mean that a single, "most successful" or "winning" type of strategy may be distinguished, but that different strategies in the same social stratum point to a link with a specific (higher or lower) economic status and that the same strategies in different strata may show a different correlation with the economic position (Table 4).

Table 4. Average economic status of households by class positions and type of economic strategy

Social stratum	Type of economic strategy	Average economic position	Standard deviation
Professionals	Passive	2.86	0.81
	Self-provisioning strategy	2.55	0.90
	Formal employment	3.31	1.04
	Supplementary work	3.24	0.66
	Agricultural work	-	-
	Formal employment and supplementary work	3.39	1.04
	Formal employment and agricultural work	3.25	0.91
	Agricultural and supplementary work	-	-

Intermediate stratum	Passive	2.39	1.03
	Self-provisioning strategy	2.06	0.72
	Formal employment	2.88	0.92
	Supplementary work	3.01	1.14
	Agricultural work	-	-
	Formal employment and supplementary work	3.05	1.02
	Formal employment and agricultural work	2.87	0.85
	Agricultural and supplementary work	-	-
Skilled workers	Passive	2.11	0.67
	Self-provisioning strategy	1.90	0.65
	Formal employment	2.32	0.89
	Supplementary work	2.17	0.84
	Agricultural work	-	-
	Formal employment and supplementary work	2.54	0.94
	Formal employment and agricultural work	2.73	0.87
	Agricultural and supplementary work	-	-
Unskilled workers	Passive	1.80	0.58
	Self-provisioning strategy	1.83	0.78
	Formal employment	1.75	0.76
	Supplementary work	1.83	0.79
	Agricultural work	-	-
	Formal employment and supplementary work	1.83	0.72
	Formal employment and agricultural work	2.41	0.58
	Agricultural and supplementary work	-	-
Farmers	Passive	-	-
	Self-provisioning strategy	2.09	0.79
	Formal employment	-	
	Supplementary work	1.93	0.71
	Agricultural work	2.36	0.88
	Formal employment and supplementary work	-	-
	Formal employment agricultural work	-	-
	Agricultural and supplementary work	2.47	0.86

The table does not give the results for groups with less than 25 cases, which again leaves out the managers, entrepreneurs and the marginal stratum. The data in the table indicate that generally, for all strata, diversified work strategies go with higher economic positions, compared with focused work strategies. In the case of professionals and the intermediate stratum, the combination of formal employment and supplementary work is accompanied by higher average economic positions, although the intermediate stratum shows a somewhat more conspicuous difference in the economic status of households with these two types of strategies. It is interesting that the ranking of strategies in terms of their "successfulness" in the two strata is different: the professionals start with the combination of formal employment and supplementary work and follow with reliance on formal employment alone, and then combination of formal employment with agricultural work (mixed households) and orientation to supplementary work (although with a negligible difference between the last two average values). With the intermediate stratum second ranked in terms of average economic status is the strategy focused on supplementary work, followed by formal employment and the combination of formal employment and agricultural work. In addition, in these two strata, as well as the one of skilled manual workers, self-provisioning strategies are linked with the lowest economic positions, i.e. households with these strategies on the average have an even lower economic status than passive households.

However, the combination of formal employment and supplementary work which is linked with the highest average economic position of professionals and the intermediate stratum, does not show the same trend with manual workers. In the households of skilled and unskilled manual workers, the highest economic positions are linked with the strategy that combines formal employment and agricultural work (again mixed households). Despite this similarity, the two strata of manual workers substantially differ in the ranking of other strategies by values of average economic positions. While with skilled workers the strategy combining formal employment and agricultural work is followed by a combination of formal employment and supplementary work, and then strategies focused on formal employment alone and supplementary work, second ranked among unskilled workers are strategies diversified to formal employment and supplementary work, focused on supplementary work and self-provisioning, followed by passive, and only then the strategy of relying on formal employment alone.

Finally, characteristic of farmers is that the diversified strategy of combining agricultural work with supplementary work is linked with the higher average economic position than that of households engaged in agricultural production alone.

As already mentioned, *the results not only indicate that intrastratal differences in economic positions result from different types of economic strategies, but also that differently profiled economic strategies equalize certain differences between households belonging to different strata, and even turn them to the advantage of households with lower class positions.* The fact is that households with lower social status and proactive orientation, i.e. diversified work strategies have a higher average economic position than passive or defensive (self-provisioning) households of higher social status, or are coming fairly close to households of higher social status with focused work strategies. This trend is clearly revealed when the average economic position of skilled worker households using a combination of formal employment and agricultural work is compared with that of households of the intermediate and even professional strata with self-provisioning strategies. In addition, skilled worker households with the strategy characteristic of mixed households largely approach the households of the intermediate stratum focused on formal employment alone. Furthermore, the households of unskilled workers with the strategy combining formal employment and agricultural work, have a higher average economic status compared with households of skilled workers relying on formal employment alone.

Concluding remarks

The results of the research into the socio-economic strategies of households show that economic actions of households in the post-socialist transformation of Serbia are strongly marked by its postponed and aggravated unfolding. In the process of adjusting to the changed systemic conditions, wherein the new institutional frameworks and the new system of global social reproduction have not been sufficiently crystallized, a large number of households seek to preserve or change their socio-economic existence by redefining their economic strategies, predominantly focused on formal employment (with relatively marginal self-employment), agricultural work, or combination of the two activities in mixed households throughout the socialist period. The main trends in redefining the economic strategies include:

1. *A remarkable diversification of household economic* activities not only with the inclusion of different households members into different positions in the system of global social reproduction, but also with the simultaneous inclusion of individual members in multiple work activities which do not necessarily imply the same level of qualifications or an appropriate service contract;
2. *Increasingly frequent supplementary work* mostly on the informal labor market;
3. *Compensating for the shortage of resources by resorting to self-provisioning* strategies, i.e. by subsistence production and satisfaction of other needs by the household itself, especially when active work strategies are unavailable;
4. *Recourse to agricultural activities* of households which have the factors of production necessary for agricultural work and have long lost formal employment;
5. *Cautious entry into entrepreneurial* activity generally while retaining other work activities intended to cushion the risk.

The types of strategies show a strong correlation with the class position of households and act as the mediating variable between the class and economic posi-

tions of households. The insufficient consistency between the class and economic statuses of households points to their remarkably uncrystallized social positions, while the types of economic strategies additionally explain this state of affairs. Intrastratal differences in economic statuses are explained by different economic strategies of households, and diversified strategies seem to give better average results in terms of economic positions of all strata. *The "winning" strategy for the professionals and the intermediate strata is the combination of formal employment and supplementary work,* while *manual workers find it in the combination of formal employment and agricultural work.* The above-mentioned trends also suggest the insufficiently crystallized institutional frameworks (elements of the new are still mixed with the remnants from the period of the "blocked transformation", and even socialism), incompletely restructured economic sub-system and a relatively low level of the overall economic activity.

Mina Petrović

HOUSING STATUS AND RELATED STRATEGIES OF HOUSEHOLDS IN SERBIA

ABSTRACT: After a radical housing privatization the character of the housing system in Serbia formally changed, since almost all households became homeowners. Bearing in mind that during socialism higher-quality housing units in the public sector were used by privileged social strata, their privatization enabled a further reproduction of social inequalities based on market principles. This study has confirmed that social differences in housing have been retained in terms of the quality, i.e. market value of the housing property. Thus, dwellings of highest market value are owned by the households of the elite - 61%, entrepreneurs - 66%, professionals - 51%, clerks - 33%, skilled workers - 15%, unskilled workers - 9%, farmers - 6% farmers, and underclass – 3%.

Housing mobility is low with no major differences across social groups, while the prevalence of private ownership in housing prevents its increase. Private renting accounts for the largest share of households which changed housing, including those who relocated several times. Change of dwelling is rarely linked with other life strategies, such as education of children or employment of a household member, reduction of housing costs etc, primarily due to the lack of spare housing and high external costs of housing mobility such as the change of habits, loss of social contacts etc. Housing emerges as easy to plan option only when it coincides with the setting up a new family household. In this respect the households in Serbia rely almost exclusively on the assistance of kin/friends, most frequently by sharing flats (31.9% of households in the sample, without differences in terms of social background), then inheritance, support in the construction/acquisition or division of housing on the market (sale of a larger flat in order to purchase two smaller ones). Housing mobility in further life course is relatively rare, especially moving to a better/higher quality housing, which, as a reason for this step, may suggest adjustment of the size of housing to the family needs (composition) and possibilities (social promotion or decline).

KEY WORDS: housing, tenure status, (housing) strategies, (housing) mobility,housing standard, households

Opening remarks

The spread and type, as well as the causes of social inequalities in housing consumption are the most frequent topic of sociological research in the housing sphere.

For that purpose the social status of an individual and/or household is related to the following housing status indicators: 1. *housing tenure/ownership status* (whether a household/individual is a homeowner or renter, and if so, in which sector, private or state/social), 2. *housing standard* (level of infrastructure equipment of housing and its surroundings; crowding conditions - housing size compared with the number of household members and their needs in terms of space), and 3. *type of housing* (individual - family houses or collective - apartment buildings, as indicators of different lifestyles and housing preferences). Special analytical attention is focused on the effects that housing tenure has on the security in housing, and/or economic position of different social groups. The housing status of individuals/households is not determined only by the structural characteristics of the housing system (diversity of tenure arrangements and measures to socialize the housing costs in the related policy regime, physical characteristics of the housing stock, etc.), but also by their strategic action within the given structural framework (social and housing). That is why housing strategies, too, represent an important research issue in the studying of social inequalities in housing.

The specifics of socialist societies compared with capitalist derived from the systemic differences in primary principles of the allocation of housing resources (redistributive vs. market), while the characteristic housing positions of main social groups within these two types differed with respect to two essential dimensions: ownership status and the type/location of housing. The revision of the housing system in post-socialist societies gives special significance to identifying the scale of social inequalities in this sphere. The situation marked by a transformation of stratification principles and inconsistent social positions (primarily in terms of income levels compared with education and/or profession), almost complete privatization of dwellings and an underdeveloped housing policy, reveals formal similarities in the ownership status and strategic behavior of different social groups in Serbia that may conceal smaller or greater differences in other dimensions of their housing status. The following text seeks to illustrate these differences. It is based on the findings of a survey conducted in November 2003 by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy on a sample of 1636 households in Serbia.

Basic dimensions of the housing status

a) Ownership status

Changed ownership status of certain social groups in the housing sphere is one of the key dimensions in the transformation of post-socialist societies. While during socialism tenants of social/public sector housing were above average members of the political elite and professionals and homeownership was more commonly found among the lower social strata, precisely the opposite is characteristic of market-based, i.e. capitalist housing systems, taken as the typical models of transformation. The fact that housing units were treated as collective consumption goods made public sector housing a privileged option of the socialist housing policy, since dwellings were acquired without incurring personal costs, while in terms of their use, inheritance and even trading there were practically no differences between the holders of tenancy rights to a state/socially owned housing and private owners. That, in a specific way, indicated the relevance of social differences in the consumption sector (Saunders, 1995), although political measures preventing profitable investments into housing reduced the possible material advantages related to its ownership. Households which had to buy their housing faced affordability problems due to the policy of low wages, and mainly relied on strategies of self-building or illegal construction. Private renting unfolded in the realm of the gray economy, leaving the position of tenants completely unregulated. Private renters were most often newly-formed urban households, employees in low-productivity branches, uneducated and those who could not count on the intergenerational flow of resources (for more on the socialist housing system see Petrović 2004:67-98).

In post-socialist conditions dwellings became personal consumption goods and a gradual increase in the positive correlation between income-earning possibilities and homeownership is expected. In developed capitalist countries, housing ownership is considered one of the key elements of social divisions, since the possibility to dispose of the capitalized market value of one's housing essentially influences not only the overall differences in economic statuses, but also the development of strategic decisions and appropriate life choices (Saunders, 1995: 241-287). Rental (public and/or private) sector users also include members of higher social strata (depending on the quality of housing), but as far as they are concerned this tenure status is of a transitory nature (linked to a period of life when they are reluctant to accept the obligation of repayment and/or capital maintenance of their dwellings, namely when they favor a lifestyle with a high degree of spatial mobility). In addition, renting is considered as widespread among newly formed households, singles and one-parent families, whereas homeownership is linked with the classical type of a nuclear family (Kending, 1990:133-139).

Privatization of state/socially-owned housing carried out in Serbia after 1990 equalized the ownership status of all social groups, by granting the higher social strata the expected ownership rights. On the other hand, this, almost complete, privatization and deregulation of the housing system, along with the absence of mechanisms for new construction in the public sector,[1] made the option of renting state-owned housing inaccessible even to the most vulnerable social groups. Private renting, although legalized, remains completely unregulated. Furthermore, housing shortage limits the scope of housing supply and results in a relatively high level of rents. It also affects the availability of this option and additionally reduces the scope of the rental sector which, according to experts, should meet the housing needs of about 25-30% households in any society, in view of the inevitable differences

[1] The mechanism of financing solidarity apartments from the wage and sallary fund on the local level is insufficient to provide for a more substantial construction of housing units in the public sector and, moreover, the criteria for its use, i.e. target groups, have not been defined. The portion of state/socailly-owned housing units their occupants failed to buy out remains inaccesible due to the unchanged regime of the time-ise unlimited tenancy rights.

in their economic statuses (possibilities to buy apartments), lifestyles and/or life cycle stages, as well as the need for an appropriate degree of spatial mobility of the population in a modern society and economy.

The ownership status of the surveyed households confirm that Serbia has become a society of homeowners (Table 1), i.e. that a substantial difference[2] between the social strata[3] concerning homeownership no longer exists.

Table 1. Serbian households and homeownership – survey results by social status and 2002 census data

Social Stratum	Ownership status					Total
	Privately owned	Socially/ company-owned	Relative/ friend's	Landlord-owned	Other	
Elite	90.2%	0.0%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Entrepreneurs	88.4%	0.0%	8.1%	3.5%	0.0%	100.0%
Professionals	88.4%	2.5%	3.9%	5.0%	0.3%	100.0%
Clerks and technicians	88.9%	2.1%	5.3%	3.8%	0.0%	100.0%
Skilled Workers	6.0%	2.2%	5.4%	5.5%	0.8%	100.0%
Unskilled Workers	84.1%	8.4%	5.2%	2.0%	0.3%	100.0%
Farmers	97.4%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Underclass	73.3%	0.0%	24.4%	0.0%	2.2%	100.0%
TOTAL	88.4%	2.9%	5.1%	3.3%	0.3%	100.0%
CENSUS 2002	83.0%	1.7%	5.8%	4.3%	0.6%	100.0%

Cramer's V = .124
p= .000

A high share of homeowners in the underclass is due to the fact that these are mostly old households of formerly active farmers who are no longer capable of working and/or do not have the land, and have not acquired the right to a pension during their working life (which according to the classification applied for this pur-

[2] The importance of the corelation between the variables observed in the tables is given as Cramer's V, statistically significant at .300.

[3] The strata were operationalized by the occupation and education of household members, using the so-called dominance approach, meaning that the houshold was assigned the position of the member most favourably rated in terms of these characteristics. The strata defined in this way are as follows: 1. managers (directors and politicians); 2. entrepreneurs; 3. professionals (including the self-employed and members of free professions with high education); 4. intermediate (non-manual employees and self-employed with secondary education); 5. skilled manual workers (highly skilled and skilled manual workers, self-employed with worker qualifications); 6. unskilled manual workers (semiskilled and unskilled workers); 7. farmers and 8. marginal social strata (underclass) including cases where it proved impossible to classify a household in a particular social strata due to the absence of active members engaged in a certain profession or pensioners, whose positions while employed, served as the basis for classification of households without members with an active occupation.

pose ranks them into the underclass – see note 3). Bearing in mind that during socialism, social sector housing was a typically urban phenomenon, that the tenancy right was predominantly acquired on the basis of employment in the social sector, and that the presently few holders of such rights in this sector mostly obtained them by 1990, rather then on the basis of their currently critical housing situation (with the exception of refugees) further clarifies the paradoxically high percentage of homeowners among the members of the underclass, although, as shown bellow, their units are of a small market value and low standard compared with those of other social groups (excepting farmers).

Distribution of households by age and ownership status, indicates that the rental sector is the necessary housing option especially at the beginning of the housing history of households, since homeownerships among younger households is less frequent than other types of housing tenure.[4] The fact that the surveyed households include as many as 32% of multifamily households and/or extended families indirectly points to a forced sharing of family life due to the shortage of available housing options, especially in large towns.[5]

b) Housing standard

During the times of socialism the differences in the quality of housing generally differentiated the social sector (better equipped and built) from the private (somewhat larger units). Depending on the social strata, there were also important differences within the same ownership sector, so that e.g. the housing quality in the state/social sector ranged from nationalized villas and luxurious apartments of the elite to extremely modestly equipped and standardized units in new housing tenements intended for parts of the working class. Therefore, the privatization of housing such as it was, did not provide only a possibility to acquire ownership of housing at very low prices but also, as a rule, higher quality units of greater market value. Given the equalized ownership status, the housing standard, in addition to signalizing the reproduction of housing privileges formed during socialism,[6] also became the basic

[4] For analytical purposes households were classified into categories according to their average age: "young" (up to 35 years.), "middle-aged" (35.01-55 years.) and "old" (over 55.01 years). 76% of young households own their housing, compared with 93.9% of middle-aged and old households. Young households live in apartments of their relatives/friends in 19% of cases (compared with 2.2% of others); 8.3% rent their dwellings (compared with 1.5% and 1% of middle-aged and old households respectively), while 4.7% live in public sector housing, compared with 2.5% and 2.9% of middle aged and old households respectively (mostly those with the status of refugees/displaced).

[5] Multiplefamily and extended family households mostly live in smaller settlements where the individual housing type prevails (84.8% and 85.1% of the total number of these households live in the villages/towns with the population of up to 50 thousand), although 11.2% and 14% of these housheholds still live in central parts of large towns, presumably crowded in the limited space of apartment buildings. The prevalence of individual housing in other settlements somewhat reduced the housing privation of multifamily and extended family households, although not the need for the individualization of family nuclei.

[6] A syrvey done in Belgrade in 2000 on a sample of newly married couples revealed that in terms of the quality of apartments entrepreneurs are the only social group whose position substantially changed compared with the socialist period, not only because it, incomewise, reaches the top of the middle class ladder, but also largely owing to the high share of professionals who during the transition period become its important segment bringing along the characteristics of their own housing position (Petrović, 2004: 191-193).

indicator of social inequalities. In other words, social differences in housing are no longer primarily linked with the ownership status but with the quality/standard[7], i.e. value of the housing property (Table 2).

Table 2. Social strata and housing standards

Social stratum	Housing standard				Total
	Low	Lower Middle	Higher middle	High	
Elite	0.0%	0.0%	39.0%	61.0%	100.0%
Entrepreneurs	0.0%	3.5%	30.2%	66.3%	100.0%
Professionals	0.6%	12.2%	35.9%	51.4%	100.0%
Clerks and technicians	4.0%	21.1%	41.7%	33.2%	100.0%
Skilled workers	5.6%	36.1%	43.8%	14.5%	100.0%
Unskilled workers	20.4%	47.1%	26.9%	5.6%	100.0%
Farmers	27.4%	49.9%	20.1%	2.6%	100.0%
Underclass	23.5%	2.9%	4.7%	8.8%	100.0%
Total	10.8%	32.5%	34.6%	22.1%	100.0%

Cramer's V= .335
p= .000

In view of the uneven shares of individual social groups in different types of settlements, as well as the fact that values of housing units are largely influenced by the characteristics of the local market, an analysis was made based on the median value of the housing standard by types of settlements, for the strata with over 30 households in all types of settlements, in order to allow for multiple correlation (Table 3). Differences in the housing standard of various strata are noted in all types of settlements, but are still the most pronounced in large towns and the least in village-type settlements. As for intrastratal differences, they are far more noticeable between urban and rural settlements than between large and small towns.[8]

[7] A composite index including the value/price of apartment, quality of apartment infrastructure and the accompanying household facilities.

[8] Among other socio-demographic variables the one of age appears to be statistically relatively important only if we exclude old households (all members over 65 years of age) (Cramer's V= .272), with a a housing standard substantially inferior to that of others (28.7% old households have a low standard compared with 8,2% of other households, while high standard is registered in only 7.9% of old compared with 23.7% of other households). Furthermore, although the distribution of households in terms of refugee status and housing standard is not statistically important, housheholds with members holding the status of refugees/displaced persons most often have low (22.6% compared with 10.4% of households without refugees/displaced), and. least frequently registered a high housing standard (9.4% and 21.9% respectively).

Table 3. Social strata and median value of housing standard by place of residence

Social stratum	Type of settlement	Median index value	Std. deviation
Professionals	Large towns	3.6506	0.51126
	Small towns	3.5608	0.56809
	Village	2.4524	0.59248
Clerks and technicians	Large towns	3.4536	0.63978
	Small towns	3.2824	0.67086
	Villages	2.4425	0.79438
Skilled workers	Large towns	3.1323	0.63282
	Small towns	2.9885	0.75314
	Villages	2.3488	0.71150
Unskilled workers	Large towns	2.8715	0.76168
	Small towns	2.7135	0.67786
	Villages	1.8777	0.67878

c) Occupancy

Although occupancy certainly influences the housing standard, being a dimension of this housing status indicator, socio-psychological studies have established that it is most directly linked with the possibilities for appropriate fulfillment of household members' needs in their dwelling and their harmonization in the available space. Although it is impossible to speak of universal norms of housing density, and every attempt to define them leads to reductionism as it addresses human needs of flexible and developmental nature, several minimal criteria necessary for meeting the basic housing needs have been established. Using these criteria, a housing occupancy index[9] was developed, and its distribution across social groups does not reveal statistically important differences.[10] Differences in the dwelling density of households are relevant only in terms of demographic variables, so that e.g. households with children below the age of 18 register higher or high housing occupancy in 38% of cases, compared with only 6.7% of those without members below the age of 18.

[9] For the purpose of this research housing occupancy of up to 10m^2 is considered very high, 10-15m^2 high, 15-25 medium, 25-30 low and over 30m^2 very low. As for the other criterion of dwelling density, the number of persons using one room, the housing occupancy of households is ranked as high if they have 3 or more members per one room, medium high - 2-3 members per room, medium - 1.5 members per room, low - 1-1.5 and very low if there are more rooms than household members. Based on these indicators a cummulative housing occupancy index was defined. Although joint life of two or more households in one housing unit represents a special form of inhabitation, that fact was not taken as a separate criterion since it is registered with only 0.6% of households in the sample.

[10] This situation is the outcome of the housing shortage created during socialism, manifested in quantitative terms as the lack of sufficient number of housing units compared with the pace of increase in the number of households, as well as in qualitative terms, due to the construction of units of limited size precisely in oredr to resolve the problem of the quantitative shoratage of housing in the public sector by building more smaller apartmetns. Apartments constructed in the private sector were somewhat larger, but there again the limited resources caused the qualitative shortage of housing space.

d) Type of housing

Individual type of housing of higher social strata was not characteristic of suburbanization during socialism, bearing in mind that they were the privileged holders of tenancy rights in town apartment buildings, as well as the fact that central town areas retained the status of prestigious housing locations regardless of life cycle stages, primarily due to the insufficiently developed infrastructure on the periphery and the absence of the rental mechanism in assessing the value of town land, i.e. its purpose, which enabled housing to remain the dominant function even on the most valuable inner city locations. The actors of suburbanization during socialism were immigrant households of lower social status who resolved their housing problem by self building or illegal construction of detached houses on city outskirts. Regular statistical data for the past decade in Serbia indicate that new building construction in large towns (including Belgrade) reveals the individual type of housing as dominant,[11] and also as characteristic of higher social strata. However, this trend still does not suggest the expected suburbanization of middle and higher strata according to the capitalist model, bearing in mind that peripheral city parts with inferior infrastructure are still avoided.

The type of housing in Serbia is primarily determined by the type of settlement as the place of residence, rather than by social status.[12] Still, the crosstabbing of the type of housing with social status and the type of settlement confirms the patterns of differences inherited from the socialist period. Of the social groups which allowed for multiple correlations, professionals most often live in apartment buildings, i.e. show a positive correlation between the social status and living in apartment buildings, regardless of the type of settlement (Table 4).

Table 4. Social strata by type and location of housing

Social stratum	Type of settlement	Type of housing			Total
		Family house or	Apartment Building	Other	
Professionals Cramer's V= .351	Large towns	34.7%	65.3%	0.0%	100.0%
	Small towns	49.6%	48.7%	1.7%	100.0%
	Villages	98.6%	1.4%	0.0%	100.0%
Clerks and technicians Cramer's V = .330	Large towns	45.3%	53.9%	0.9%	100.0%
	Small towns	56.8%	43.2%	0.0%	100.0%
	Villages	92.6%	4.5%	2.9%	100.0%

[11] The data for Belrade indicate that the share of individual buildings in the total number of newly constructed housing units substantially increased during the 1990s, accountig for 33.6% in 1991, 75% in 2000, and keeping above 65% ever since 1995.

[12] Living in apartment buildings exceeds 50% of households only in large towms and, in terms of social position, only among the members of the elite. This distribution by type of housing is partly due to the over-representation of the ruraal population in the sample.

Skilled workers Cramer's V =.333	Large towns	57.3%	41.4%	1.3%	100.0%
	mall towns	54.5%	40.7%	4.8%	100.0%
	Villages	91.9%	3.3%	4.8%	100.0%
Unskilled workers Cramer's V = .380	Large towns	76.8%	21.1%	2.1%	100.0%
	Small towns	4.1%	43.9%	2.0%	100.0%
	Villages	87.9%	0.5%	11.6%	100.0%

Table 5 illustrates the importance of differences by types of housing bearing in mind that living in apartment buildings implies a higher standard with all social strata, although intrastratal differences are also observed within the same housing type, with the exception of skilled and highly skilled workers living in apartment blocks, whose housing standard is even.

Table 5. Social strata by median value of housing standard and type of housing

Social stratum	Type of housing	Median Value	Standard deviation
Professionals	Family house	3.10	0.762
	Apartment building	3.70	0.512
Clerks and technicians	Family house	2.80	0.817
	Apartment building	3.54	0.625
Skilled workers	Family house	2.56	0.755
	Apartment building	3.26	0.560
Unskilled workers	Family house	2.11	0.733
	Apartment building	3.24	0.630

Housing and housing mobility as elements of other life strategies

Low housing mobility in socialist societies was caused by the shortage of housing, limited income and undiversified housing options, and especially by the time-wise unlimited tenancy rights in the social sector, as well as the low mobility of labor. That is why most households, regardless of their social status, were attached to only one dwelling and the establishment of a family frequently did not mean the setting up of an independent household.[13] This model of housing mobility greatly differs from the experience of market/capitalist societies wherein housing mobility is substantially larger. It implies the adjustment of households' income and housing characteristics and is moreover linked with the changes related not only to the main stages of the life cycle (marriage, childbirth, adult children leaving the household), but also to the working/professional history. The intensity of housing mobility of

[13] A research carried out in Belgrade in the early 1990s, using the method of housing history, revealed that in the mid-1980s, 43% of married couples in Belgrade started their joint life by living with their parents (Petrović, 1994: 94-95). Another survey, also carried out in Belgrade in 2000 on a sample of newly married couples showed that 47% of them started their marriage by sharing a housing unit with their parents/relatives (Petrović, 2004: 190).

individual social groups is related to the housing sector (ownership, i.e. rental) where the mobility takes place. Bearing in mind that mobility is generally higher in the rental sector (due to the permanent controlling influence of households' incomes, i.e. sizes) the lower social strata generally display higher housing mobility.

Changes introduced into Serbia's housing system after 1990 may have both positive and negative effects on housing mobility. On the one hand, privatization of apartments and legalization of the (secondary) real-estate market encourage the development of housing strategies based on the rearrangement of existing housing resources, which, in turn, may be conducive to a higher housing mobility. On the other hand, however, the domination of the ownership sector does not favor the increase in housing mobility or its clear differentiation by social groups and stages of household life cycles. In this context, the legalization of the private rental sector does not have a major influence either, primarily due to the problem of affordability (with rents beyond the means of average income households).

As for the possible link between the housing strategy and strategies aimed at resolving other important existential issues, the rearrangement of housing resources on the real-estate market also obtains potential importance (sale of a larger flat to buy a smaller/cheaper one and obtain funds for existential needs, investments, etc.). On the basis of data provided by real-estate agencies, trade in housing is not particularly large, since the structural characteristics of units compared with the needs of average families essentially limit the manipulative options of households and/or deepen the qualitative shortage of apartments (e.g. in the case of selling a larger to buy two smaller units) (Petrović, 2004:181).

Table 6. Households' ownership status and housing mobility since 1991

	Did/did not change housing Since 1992		Number of changes						Total
	No	yes	1	2	3	4	5.6	7+	
Ownership	88.1%	11.9%	8.9%	1.2%	1.0%	.3%	.5%	.0%	100.0%
State/ Company	67.0%	32.3%	21.6%	5.2%	2.1%		2.1%	2.1%	100.0%
Relative	55.0%	45.4%	35.8%	7.3%			.7%	1.3%	100.0%
Private	29.7%	70.6%	26.3%	7.6%	17.8%	8.5%	3.4%	6.8%	100.0%
Other	54.5%	45.5%	8.2%	18.2%			9.1%		100.0%
	83.3%	16.7%	11.4%	1.9%	1.6%	.6%	.7%	.4%	100.0%

Cramer's V= .368
p= .000

The survey data provide an insight into the housing mobility of the surveyed households since 1991 and indicate a substantial correlation with the ownership status (Table 6). Private renting accounts for the largest share of households which changed housing, including those who did that several times. Furthermore, it is also clear that the share of young households which changed apartments is higher (26.6%

compared with 11.5% of middle-aged and 10.6% of old households), namely that they are the main actors of multiple relocations.

Other dimensions of households' social and housing status do not reveal important correlations with housing mobility, including social status and housing standard. Still, mobility does register a slight upward trend with the increase in the housing standard (change of residence is registered with 9% and 23% of households with the lowest and highest housing standard respectively). Furthermore, an increase in social status is, in all ownership categories, accompanied by a slow growth of the share of relocating households.

The most frequent reasons for housing mobility of households which changed housing only once included: moving to a larger/better apartment, leaving the shared household, setting up one's own household and termination of lease by the landlord (Table 7).[14]

Table 7. Households which changed housing once since 1991 and reasons for housing mobility

Reasons for mobility	Percent
1 – setting up a household	18.4
2 – leaving the shared household	19.0
3 – entering a shared household	2.4
4 – sale of housing to split the household	6.0
5 – reduction of housing costs	6.3
6 – moving to a larger, better apartment	23.2
8 – household member's schooling	4.6
9 – household member's employment	2.7
10 – termination of lease by landlord	0.7
11 – return to the place of origin	1.4
12 – other	5.3
Total	100.0

The reasons stated by the respondents are significantly related to the ownership status and age of households, while the relation with their social status and other characteristics is not significant. Still, interpretation of these results calls for caution, since the relatively small number of households which changed housing after 1991 claiming numerous reasons for the move, does not allow for reliable conclusions. It will, therefore, be sufficient to point to the most frequently invoked reasons. Setting up of one's own household is most often the reason for private renting and confirms the importance of the rental sector for newly-formed households. Leaving the shared

[14] The questionnaire was used to collect the data on the reasons for the mobility of households which reported multiple relocations, but due to their small number in the sample and the high degree of repetition of the same reason, these data are not considered sufficiently reliable.

household is a more important reason for the private renting of those living with relatives/friends, while moving to a larger/better housing is characteristic of home-owners. As expected, the setting up of one's own and leaving of the shared household are more often invoked by young households, and so is moving to a larger and better apartment by the middle-aged ones, while termination of lease by the landlord is most often referred to by old households.

The above-mentioned reasons for housing mobility point to the fact that housing is not frequently linked with the realization of other life strategies. That accounts for the small share of answers that the relocation was due to children's schooling or employment of a household member (Table 7). Also rare are references to the reduction of housing costs as the reason for transferring to another apartment. Although the review of these reasons by the social status of households has a limited reliability due to the small number of households for the correlation of two complex variables, we should note that of the numerous social groups (professionals, clerks, skilled and unskilled workers' households) the reduction of housing costs as the reason to change residence is more often invoked by workers' households (unskilled – 17.2%; skilled – 10.7%) than those of clerks and professionals (3.4% each). Furthermore, a household member's schooling as the reason to move is, although rarely, found only among professionals and clerks (3.4% each), while the employment of a household member as the reason to relocate figures only among professionals (10, 3%). Asked about the possibility of linking housing with future economic strategies of household members, 45.7% respondents expressed readiness to change the place of residence if that would mean employment or higher income. These responses were more frequently given by the young and unemployed household members and therefore cannot be considered as reflecting the real strategies of their entire households.

It is indicative that the surveyed households mentioned no reasons suggesting other forms of rearranging housing resources to ensure the funds for education or starting a private business, knowing that housing is one of the most valuable resources in their possession. That, on the one hand, shows that households do not have spare housing, especially the younger ones with children, while, on the other, it confirms the fact that one's dwelling is not perceived as a resource to be easily reshuffled, either because households are not used to housing mobility, or because it implies certain costs, which, in addition to material expenses, also include the change of habits, environment and lifestyle, the loss of social contacts, etc. Under such circumstances most households probably decide not to undertake any action in this respect, judging that the benefits would fall short of necessary costs.

As concerning dwellings as resources of economic strategies, we should note that only 10% of households in the sample have another housing unit, while only one in each ten households uses that additional unit for gainful purposes (rent). This fact makes us assume that these are mostly weekend cottages, as confirmed by the review of households possessing another housing unit broken down by their social status (ownership of another housing unit is reported by 35% of elite members, 22% professionals, 13% entrepreneurs, 12% clerks, 6% skilled workers, 3% unskilled workers and 5% farmers). On the other hand, 2.6% of households which do not have additional housing units and use their housing space to earn income, i.e. rent part of their apartments, reveal no important differences in terms of social status, available income, place of residence or housing occupancy.

Responses to the question concerning the existence of strategic plans for the near future (the next five years) show that 29.9% of respondents have specific plans related to their apartments, which suggests that housing is the most plannible dimension (compared with schooling, career and family planning). The above-average frequency of these answers was registered among the young/younger household members (51% of respondents aged 19-35), unmarried (whether never married or divorced) and respondents with steady partners (over 60%), thus those who expect to set up a new household or leave the existing one. As expected, 44% of respondents in young households have housing plans, compared with only 8% among the old. Differences in terms of kinship structure, show that respondents with well-conceived housing plans are the most numerous in non-kinship households (68.4%) and the fewest among the singles (11.8%). These are, at the same time, households of diametrically opposed age groups (predominantly young, i.e. old). Thus, we may conclude that housing appears to be an easy to plan option only when it coincides with the crucial points in the life cycle, e.g. the setting up of a family household, where respondents may expect the assistance of relatives/friends, who most often give them parts of their housing (as many as 14.8% of households in the sample are extended families, while 17.1% are multifamily households, without differences by social groups), make bequests, help in the construction/purchase of dwellings, or grant them the use of their flats (examination of reasons for housing mobility reveals that the option of apartment sale to divide the household or return to the place of one's origin is characteristic of old households' strategies to assist the emancipation of the young). Housing mobility is relatively rare further on in the respondents' lives, especially if it has to do with moving to a better, higher quality apartment, which, as a reason, may be indicative of adjusting housing characteristics with the households' needs (expansion/contraction of families) and possibilities (social promotion).

Concluding remarks

Privatization of apartments in Serbia enabled the continued reproduction of social inequalities in this sphere. Social differences are obvious in terms of the quality, i.e. value of owned apartments, despite the uniformity of the ownership status. Actually, under the new circumstances, apartments as household property of highest market value become an essential dimension of overall economic inequalities. Bearing in mind that the value of an apartment is substantially determined by the supply and demand on the local market, it largely contributes to intrastratal differences, as well. Housing as a form of status consumption gains increasing importance, and this phenomenon has yet to be addressed by further research.

Differences in terms of housing mobility are predominantly defined by demographic variables and the ownership status, while social status is of lesser importance (although it is realistic to assume that the related differences are also on the increase). The survey shows that the legal regulation of the rental sector is necessary not only in view of the housing needs of the (newly-formed) households, but also of the precarious position of those in the rental status, including old households. In addition, without appropriate housing policy measures it is not realistic to expect a greater impact of strategies based on the rearrangement of housing resources, or activation of the so-called dead housing capital (spare housing predominantly in old and/or single households, another housing unit), in resolving housing or other existential problems.

Andjelka Milić

POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS IN SERBIA: STAGNATION, REGRESSION AND SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

ABSTRACT: Transformation changes in the Serbian family during the last decade have been developing under the circumstances of a "delayed transition" and "destroyed" society. Such circumstances generate long-ranging negative effects in family life and impose strategies of adapting to the existing conditions. This study lays special emphasis on the following aspects of family life: 1. changes in family and household structure at the global level; 2. characteristics and operation of informal social network of relations among families, and 3. meaning of the family for individuals, their attitudes and expectations. At the structural level major shifts as well as disruptions have been registered: Family forms regressive in structural and normative terms (old households, multi-family households) are on the rise, while the nuclear family – the most vital family form and the principal structural and normative actor of the modern reproduction of society and individuals – is declining. The described structural disturbance in turn strongly influences the networking of families, where links of kinship have both quantitative and qualitative priority. In this way a rather closed family-kinship framework of individual existence is created, hindering the promotion of individual needs, desires and identities This situation and such behaviors also reflect in the perception of the family as the irreplaceable, main and only support to individuals. Yet, apart from generating dependence, such circumstances also pave the way to a new, modern critical and skeptical view of the family. This is a new moment in family transformation, giving rise to hopes that modernizing trends have not been completely annihilated by the destructive processes of the past decade.

KEY WORDS: familiy's forms, changes, social capital.

INTRODUCTION

Family belongs to a group of social phenomena that are changed and transformed in "long" processes, slowly and almost imperceptibly, not only in the deep internal transformations of intimate family life, but also in the externally visible family aspects such as its form, structure and household functions, number of children, manner of family's representation in the public, institutions of family management and decision-making, etc. Even the modern family, which is fully subjected to legal regulations, manages to preserve certain patterns of behavior, relations and norms inherited from the past. Phenomena of this kind may be explained:

- first, by the fact that the family as a social institution in its existence and actions relies on the deeply hidden layers of social heritage in the form of extremely durable structures and cultural patterns; and
- second, because everyday family life is regulated by customs all individuals adopt in the early socialization within their family group, and these layers of memory and consciousness are difficult to cancel or change by transitory, even if highly traumatic, subsequent experience.

Precisely for these reasons, when family change is concerned, the social awareness and science reveal sharp divisions and ambiguities as to whether the family is changed at all and if so in what direction? Observing family evolution in the second half of the century, the well-known researchers Berger and Berger in 1980s concluded with surprise that "it is in many ways very unusual that the European family has changed so slightly" (1983:32). A similar comment was made by another observer who referred to the "exaggerated talk of family change" (Crow, 2002) speaking about the late 20th century period.

Contrary to them, it is a period most theoreticians and researches of family link with radical changes in the structure of a Western family, assigning them an almost revolutionary nature. Namely, demographers place these changes in a wider context of the "second demographic transition" (Cliquet, 1991; Lastheaghe, 1992; Avramov, 1995). While the "first demographic transition" had to do with the revolutionary changes in demographic processes (natality, mortality, population growth, migrations), the second is characterized by changes on the structural level (age, education, work structure of the population), with strongest effects on the microstructures of marriage, family and household.

Sociologists believe that the depth of these changes requires – on the theoretical level – a "deconstruction" of the concept of the family and the entire "family domain" of relations (Cheal, 1991), but on the empirical level indicates a "decomposition" (Milić, 2001) of marriage, family and household – a process that impinges on the bases of modern family constitution. The consequences are revealed in the separation of the institution of marriage from partnership relation, parenthood from marriage, kinship from domestic union, and, finally, separation and fragmentation of households. The ultimate outcome of these developments is the multiplication of new forms and structures of shared life in the intimate sphere, in the first place the emerging of a range of the so-called non-traditional (Macklin, 1987) or non-family forms of life, such as the pre-post-extra marital and alternative forms of family unions (homosexual, one-parent, reconstituted, etc.). The changes extend to cover the institution of household which is, on the one hand, visibly constricted with diminishing family contents (single and various types of non-kin cohabitations), while, on the other, it is expanded to include several separate kinship and residential units which exchange information, goods and services on daily basis (Jarrett, 1986).

In addition to indicating the radical nature of changes in the forms, structures and functions of family groups the observers of these developments are, in the first place, interested in the explanation of these new phenomena. In that sense, they point to the crucial importance of the process of individualization placing the individuals, their needs, interests and wishes, at the center of institutional and collective changes in the sphere of intimate relations (Giddens, 1992; Beck, 2001; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; Milić, 2001) at the beginning of the new millennium.

The most recent approaches reveal a trend to view the families and households as actors who, by intervening in the social courses with their own strategies, influence the changes in their immediate environment and thus avoid the hardest blows, while at the same time their actions divert the social courses towards some "milder" consensual and more egalitarian ways of social communication. But the discussion of the strategic character of family actions needs to take into account the parameters that enable strategic undertakings, e.g.: the power to influence other actors, resources enabling the choice of alternative ways of reaction and the time factor. Otherwise, it may happen that any "intelligent adjustment" to the changed conditions is categorized as strategic action, or still worse according to some sociologists, that strategic action is not clearly distinguished from "daily improvisations to make ends meet", i.e. everyday survival (Saraceno, 1989).

There is no doubt that families and households find themselves in different structural and situational positions to react to external changes and influence their courses (adjusting them or to them), but I am disinclined to dismiss either "intelligent adjustment" or "survival" patterns as ways of families' strategic positioning and action towards external conditions. "One uses what one has" - naturally in accordance with the structural conditions and characteristics of different types of families: some strategies are adjusted to conditions of deprivation, others to the social mobility of individuals and families and others still to maintaining the acquired positions, etc. The important thing is that common to families in all these cases is the effort to preserve the integrity of the family group in unstable social situations and to increase or maintain the available resources. That is doubtlessly where their activity as subjects capable of strategic action is reflected, contrary to family groups which fatalistically resign to circumstances (good or bad as the case may be).

In the context of strategic "maneuvering" of families and households to overcome the main risks of uncertainty in the post-modern age, discussions prompted by the most recent family transformations focus on the concept of "social capital". The concept is, according to both its promoters and critics, fairly diffuse, vague and "slippery" (Molyneaux, 2001), although in broadest terms it could be defined as the "degree in which people share the feeling of joint identity, uphold personal values, believe one another and reciprocally act one for the other", which can be summarized as "collective social agreements and relations" (Edwards, Franklin and Holland, 2003:2).

From the point of view of an individual and society family is equate with an important, or rather central, capital development resource; individuals, through their families, avail of different resources and energies of the family group they can set in motion in order to attain their strategic ideas and objectives, just as, on the other hand, the families and households as collective actors, through their intertwined relations in social networks, may influence and facilitate the changes initiated and implemented in other social subsystems. Particular emphasis, in this sense, is placed on the potential role of the family as the social capital for economic reforms in transition and post-transition societies (Finch and Mason, 1993), i.e. a factor of democratization and breakthrough of individual and liberal values and patterns into political and cultural institutions of post-modern societies (Walters, 2002; Bawin-Legros, 2001).

Within the context of the new valuation of the role of the intimate, micro sphere of social relations and its influence on global social developments, kinship relations in modern society are, too, revalued. While in the previous modernization courses this relation was treated as outdated social and cultural heritage that burdens the functioning of the nuclear family (Parsons, 1965) we now see the renewed interest in the study of diverse structures of kinship relations and reciprocity (Deshaux, 2002) and the uncovering of their strategic "capital" importance for the functioning of modern family and domestic unions.

References to the new world trends and developments naturally give rise to the question of the place and direction of the family in Serbia? Throughout the past century transformation of the family and household did unfold in Serbia, true with varying holdups, oscillations and pace, but with a long-term orientation towards the modernization of family life. Particularly intensive changes in this direction started after World War II when the processes of socialist industrialization, accompanied by deagrarianization, urbanization, ideology of gender equality and female employment outside the family resulted in the resolute departure from the traditional forms and structures of family life and the rejection of authoritarian and patriarchal mores, relations and behavior in the family.

Towards the end of 1980s Serbian families gave the picture of a transformation oriented towards modern values and ways of life, both in terms of the size, forms and structures of family groups and some essential internal relations (Milić, 1981, 1994). Family size kept a continuing downward trend for several decades, reaching the average of 3.5 members at the end of the period, thus marking the victory of the nuclear form which became the prevailing type of family and domestic life of the population (Milić, 1981). Family was consolidated at the marital dyad, although the relationship was powerfully decentered towards the progeny. Nevertheless, this concealed the still strong mainstays of old traditional relations of possessiveness, camouflaged as excessively protective and paternalistic behavior of parents and family closure, which indicates the presence of a modified authoritarian pattern (Milić, 1994).

Despite these inconsistencies and contradictions, it seemed that the Serbian family definitively crossed the threshold of traditionalism and patriarchalism and donned the new modernizing attire. Such views nourished the real hope that stronger modernizing trends would finally result in the abandonment of the patriarchal heritage. But, any such hope was destroyed by the events that took place in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia after 1991. Most families, exposed to the powerful blows of dramatic social and personal impoverishment, reproduction losses and existential danger (Milić, 1995,2000) focused on strategies of everyday survival and reverted to some previously rejected traditional forms and ways of family life. The process of family retraditionalization in Serbia started to emerge in the early 1990s.

On the other side, family life in Serbia at the turn of the millennium registers certain phenomena characteristic of the post-modernizing stage of family changes rapidly developing in the West ever since the 1980s (sexual emancipation of the young, dropping natality, increase in extra-marital childbirth, LATs and other co-habitation unions, increased divorce rates, etc.) (Bobić, 2003). To what extent these phenomena result from the automatism of family and individual behavior carried over from the previous transformation period, or actually reflect formal similarities which conceal essentially different structural, ideological factors and motivations is a matter requiring careful study. How this transformation, or more precisely disorder in family patterns and behaviors came about and what will be the long term meaning of these developments for the actual modernization and individualization is something we shall try to answer, once we have examined and analyzed some of the facts and views collected in our empirical survey.

The data were gathered in a representative survey of Serbian households (2003). Our examination will be focused on the functioning of families as social capital for individuals and social community. In that context we shall take a look at the disruptions on the structural level of the surveyed families and domestic units in Serbia.

PART I
GENERAL PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE FORMS AND STRUCTURE OF FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS IN SERBIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MILLENNIUM

Comparative statistical data and the family and household censuses done by official statistical services and the data stemming from the 2003 survey of the representative sample of Serbian households carried out by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy reveal important shifts in certain forms, i.e. types and structures of households and families which took place during the stormy decades of the Yugoslav disintegration. However, we must warn that due to methodological reasons comparisons of these two data sources cannot be systematically and precisely completed. In the former Yugoslavia important changes in the statistical systems for the classification of households and families were made between two censuses, and the continuity in observing certain extremely important family structures and forms was thus lost. On the other had, classifications of family forms and household structures in our survey are more elaborate than those used by official statistics and are moreover adjusted to the observation of different dyadic and generational relations therein.

Without entering into the details we shall only point out several basic and most important trends in the distribution of family units:

First, there is a significant increase in single and childless married couple households. Taken together they account for over a third of all households in the sample (34.9%), which is quite a significant share. In addition, this group of households is characterized by social and economic deprivation.

The second large group comprises households of nuclear, one and two-parent families, with a share of 39.4% of the total.

The third large group consists of multi-family households or the so-called extended families (30%) evenly divided in two subgroups: vertically extended families (15%), which represent a traditional family form with an aged married couple sharing a household with their married son and his descendents. Characteristic of this group of households is a classical patriarchal order (.Milić, 2005) where violence against younger female household members is not unusual (Miletić-Stepanović, 2004). The second subgroup is the one of horizontally extended families which are, judging by their composition, created in consequence of deteriorating life conditions of the Serbian population and reinforced family solidarity: incomplete families due to the death of one spouse or divorce, refugees, unemployed young members and others who find shelter among their closest kin. Households of this kind register an obvious increase, almost by leaps.

Finally, we should note the growing share of non-family multiple-member households, which, contrary to the previous group, reveal modernizing trends in the domestic domain (increase in pre- and post-marriage unions and cohabitations).

The analyses done so far reveal bipolar trends in the grouping of the largest part of households and family forms at the present moment. On the one hand, we see the accumulation of households with few members (singles, childless marriages and one-parent families) and, on the other, households with a large number of members (extended families and non-kin groups). The consequence of this bipolar tendency in the grouping of households is that the <u>central position occupied by the nuclear family experiences a dramatic drop compared with the previous period.</u>

On the whole, we may conclude that this essentially changed distribution of households by family structures and forms reveals a clear discontinuity compared with the developments of the 1980s and before. Instead of movements leading towards the modernizing transformation of households and families, by downsizing the families and households along with the introduction of new alternative or non-traditional family forms and partnership relations, events took a regressive course. In terms of some indicators we have practically gone back to the years immediately after World War II (share of extended types of households), while on the other hand, there are also significant groups of families and households which have finished their reproduction and are facing physical disappearance in the near future. The basic family form for the modernization and individualization of the intimate sphere of life – the small nuclear family – is obviously declining precisely due to developments of this kind, which not only affects the overall reproduction of the population but also has wide-ranging importance for the future economic and social renewal of the Serbian society.

This structure of households and families in Serbia was primarily influenced by three negative and destructive demographic processes: rapid pace of population aging (Rašević, 2002), high mortality of the middle-aged population (Panev, 1999) and high emigration rate of the younger, educated urban population (Bolčić, 1995; Milić, 2001). The most far-reaching negative effects are certainly those of the rapidly aging population, a trend which will be difficult to reverse in the coming decades. These negative demographic trends have been either aggravated (population aging) or directly caused (mortality and emigration of the young and middle-aged population) by the destructive processes in the Serbian society over the past two decades.

The most obvious effect of negative social developments in the past period on the families and households and their structure is revealed in the drastic impoverishment which forces them to engage in a daily "struggle for survival". Instead of developing strategies for advancement, development and individualization, households and families turn towards the strategies of collecting traditional scarce resources. One of the most efficient among them is the kinship and generational association within a single domestic unit. Individuals, households and families who lack the resources even for this kind of social "capitalization" are forced to vegetate on social and economic margins. These are, as already mentioned, predominantly small households of old, non-provided persons.

PART II
FAMILY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

As already mentioned in the introduction, family has today become the focus of the socio-political interest as the center of the social network of mediation and trust with multiple positive effects for individuals, families themselves and the society. The effects of "capitalization" in families are diverse: our survey opted to systematically monitor the effects of kinship and friendship networks that families construct around themselves. The existence of these networks in modern society is manifested in everyday association, reciprocated meetings, jointly spent leisure and exchange of communications, "chatting on everything and anything". That is precisely why the respondents are often unable to recognize the deeper and socially more important purpose of these links and relations for themselves and others (Finch and Mason, 1993). Actually, hidden under their everyday routine is the identifying "prestigious" meaning (Finch and Mason, 1993) and, on the other hand, a practical, functional purpose of facilitating the performance of certain daily family obligations and providing reliance in the resolution of problems and critical family situations.

Our approach to this examination sought to identify three characteristics of family social networks: intensity of association, density of the network, i.e. its composition and, finally, the manner of its concrete operational functioning in the everyday life of a family.

1. Intensity of association

Responses to the question about the frequency of the respondents' association within their social networks show the following distribution:

Often, Several times a week	Occasionally, Several times a month	Rarely, Several times a year	Never	Total
58.7%	30.9%	8.2%	2.2%	100.0

Association within the network of relatives and friends is obviously very intensive. Almost two thirds of respondents see other people, maintain mutual communications and exchange visits on daily basis. On the other hand, the percentage of respondents who do not practice this type of contacts is really negligible (2.2%), and we may even assume that in their case it is due more to objective obstacles than their personal predisposition.

The results so obtained enable us to establish the factors related to a lower or higher frequency of association of surveyed families. For instance, it is interesting that low education appears as an obstacle since the respondents with low-level education say that they have no such contacts ten times more often then their peers with highest education. Occupations, too, show an interesting U distribution: association is more frequently practiced by those on the extreme ends of the socio-professional ladder (farmers, dependents and pensioners, on one side, and large entrepreneurs and managers, on the other), while the middle positions reveal a kind of moderation in this respect. It is interesting to note a remarkable bipolarity among the farmers, with a high frequency of contacts for some and a complete absence of connections and communications with the environment for others.

What kind of a link exists between the type of household and association in one's leisure time? Associations are most often practiced by nuclear family households. On the other hand, single and one-parent households seem to incline towards less frequent socializing or even complete isolation. In both cases the behavior of families derives from their objective characteristics of economic and age type, as well as some subjective factors (ideology, motivation) which, in turn, result in increased deprivation and isolation of certain groups of households.

Finally, responses on association viewed against the structure of partnership relations reveal an indicative correlation. Extramarital unions with children most often respond negatively when asked about their association with others (as many as 29%), in contrast to married families and childless couples whose links with their environment are the most regular. This once again shows that, in our society, the illegitimacy of a partnership relation implies certain restrictions and frustrations in the social sphere. The only question is whether this isolationist "policy" is the result of views and behavior of the environment or is initially generated by one's own anxiety over the illegitimate relationship. In any case this proves our immaturity where modern values and practices in the intimate sphere are concerned.

Finally, we should point to the high regularity of the link between the households' economic status and frequency of association (Graph 1).

Graph 1: Frequency of association and households economic status index



Namely, frequent association is in a strong correlation with the high economic position of the household and vice versa. The number of families with the high economic status which have frequent contacts within their networks on weekly basis (62%) is almost double the number of families on lower positions (37.2%); and the other way round, while over 40% of families in the group with the lowest status say they "never" associate with others, this percentage drops to a mere 6% in the highest-ranked group.

This information shows that social network is in the direct function of "capitalization" of individuals and families. There is no doubt that the frequency of contacts has not only a relaxing and recreational function in one's leisure, but that the intensity of contacts tests and reinforces mutual relations of solidarity, trust and loyalty which makes it easier for individuals and families to get on in their environments, facilitates the performance of diverse family responsibilities and also confirms the family's social reputation in its surroundings. Precisely these effects of frequency of association, give rise to an interesting question, namely the one of the main "partners" in the social network, i.e. the density of the network itself.

2. Density of social network – types of social relations

In order to obtain the data of this kind, we used a question intended to establish which of the above-mentioned groups our respondents most frequently associate with. Their responses show the following distribution:

Closest kin inside and outside the household	Friends and godparents	Colleagues	Neighbors	All equally	Total
26.7	19.6	2.8	15.9	34.9	100.0

Before analyzing this distribution, we must point out a methodological deficiency of the question, bearing in mind the possibility of certain persons having a multiple status within the social network of an individual or a family. Namely, in the case of informal relations there is a tendency of transferring from one status to another: relatives become friends, friends become relatives (e.g. witnesses at marriages and christenings), colleagues become friends, or even relatives , etc. (Milić, 1988). Naturally, a broadly conceived survey could not go into such details (otherwise very important for the uncovering of the deeper social importance and functions of these relations), which is why we shall stick with the definitions of these relations as understood by our respondents, without going into their social genesis.

Even without any research work, on the basis of the researcher's primary experience alone, one could expect that kinship relations will certainly be foremost for the largest number of respondents, as confirmed by our survey. For a little less than a third of respondents their relatives are the group they most often maintain connections and relations with. On the other hand, the ramification, i.e. density of the social network is rather surprising, since all other forms of informal links also have an important share in the networking. Particularly interesting is the fact that a third of respondents (34.9%) maintain equal relations with all of the above-mentioned persons. In brief, we could conclude that the social network of the surveyed families is characterized not only by the high intensity of association and communication, but also a very high density of diverse social relations (relations, friends, godparents, colleagues, neighbors).

It is interesting to continue the analysis by inquiring into the existence of preferences towards certain types of links and contacts in the network, depending on the specific demographic, social, professional and other characteristics of respondents, i.e. their families.

From the point of view of the respondents' age it appears that there is a regularity in terms of the social network narrowing with age, so that respondents mostly associate with household members, relatives and neighbors, while contacts with friends and colleagues are highly reduced. And vice versa, the younger the respondents the more important their association with friends and colleagues is (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Who the respondents mostly associate with and the respondents' age



A very similar regularity is revealed with respect to education. Respondents with the lowest education mostly maintain contacts with their relatives (37.6%) and neighbors (29.0%), as opposed to those with highest education who choose friends and godparents (32.4%), while their contacts with neighbors are few (7.8%). It is interesting that respondents with medium-level education have the least discriminatory "policy" and most of them respond that they associate with all equally (40%). The influence of the households economic status works in the same direction: the lower the material position the more the resource groups are reduced to household members and neighbors, while the higher it is the stronger the orientation towards friends and colleagues becomes.

It is interesting to note that the village, which used to be the proponent of all types of social links and traditional overall solidarity, has now almost completely lost that identity. Members of village communities show a very low density of social networks, both with respect to old customary kinship ties and new links with friends and colleagues. This piece of information clearly reveals the high degree of anomy prevailing in rural areas today, with negative repercussions on the possibilities of economic and social revitalization of the rural community in these parts.

Links established by type of household, i.e. partnership relations reveal the traditionalist, i.e. modern contents of domestic units. It so happens that household members are the first choice for association of individuals from extended families, and the last for married childless couples. It is obvious that the former are in many ways self-sufficient communities, closed to their environment and thereby also traditionalistically oriented. On the other hand, old households of parents and the widowed are forced to embrace a greater degree of openness, although it is nevertheless reduced to the few relatives outside their households and their neighbors.

Friends and godparents are most often the chosen company of one-parent families and nuclear family households, which shows a greater modernity of their orientation. Neighbors are predominantly turned to by singles' (old) households, and that is also the case of women who most often opt to associate with household members, relatives and neighbors, in contrast with men who tend to seek the company of friends and colleagues.

In conclusion of this review we should take a look at the responsibilities and functions of members of these social networks in terms of everyday needs and functions of families.

3.The functioning of social network of family ties

The respondents were asked if they sought the assistance or, in general, reliance and support in performing some everyday duties and activities within their family and households from members of their informal social network, and if so who they generally turned to? The attached tabular review of their answers (Graph 3), leads to two important conclusions concerning the manner of use, i.e. "capitalization" of social networks by the respondents.

Graph 3: Which member of the social network most frequently provides specific services



First, the two groups of persons our families associate with the most and with greatest frequency at the same time represent their best support in everyday activities and performance of individual obligations. These are, on the one hand, household members - closest kin and relatives outside the household, which reflects the traditional, inherited sociability, and, on the other, friends and godparents reflecting the transformed modern sociability in our midst.

Another important conclusion is that between these two “support” groups a kind of functional specialization is established, to the extent that the respondents are mindful of the occasions and purposes when they will turn for assistance to a specific group of persons. This does not apply only to the two above-mentioned groups, but also to all others, less frequent forms of relations (acquaintances, colleagues, neighbors).

Let us now take a look at some of the most interesting relations. When looking for a job is concerned friends come ahead of relatives, but the situation is reversed on the issue of a family member’s health. It is symptomatic that in the case of solving the housing problem, which is certainly of greatest importance for every individual and family, and moreover the most difficult problem to solve here, 80% of respondents said they do not ask anyone’s assistance or support? Is it because this is treated as a purely family, private matter others should not be involved in, or else as a service beyond the possibilities and nature of relations within the network? It is interesting that this reluctance does not exist in looking for administrative “shortcuts” to deal with diverse household problems, when services are solicited from friends, as well as relatives, although somewhat more often from the former group.

However, financial borrowings belong to the narrow circle of relations involving exchange among kin, where one’s relatives probably appear as the “last resort” and are expected to deliver without fail (Finch and Mason, 1993.). This means that the family shall first seek to resolve the problem of the acute shortage of money through all formal channels, and failing that will turn to relatives who are expected to provide the requested assistance without reservations.

Neighbors are the reference group with the highest participation (11.2%) in providing information about housework help of different kind (from the nursing of a family member, to craftsmen and other service providers), while their use in all other activities is negligible (less than 5%).

Finally, individuals ask for large support, and find it with relatives and friends (60% combined) when they require advice or emotional support and trust. We assume that in this respect the attention and trust of relatives comes first, and is not considered the "last resort", since in this case there are no significant variations depending on the social-economic positions of households.

Contrary to that, when a job is to be found, or else a financial borrowing or an administrative "shortcut", the "capitalizing" value of informal network of family and individual ties is very much revealed. The lower the professional, social and economic position of the household is, the smaller the "capitalizing" value of the social network will be, bearing in mind that in that case the network itself is very much reduced, if it exists and functions at all. The higher the status, the more the family will be inclined to turn to friends, godparents and colleagues. Kinship assistance in these situations shows the "most egalitarian" distribution, indicating that in these relations the traditional obligation of solidarity is maintained.

All in all, we may conclude that kinship-friendship and other informal social networks of the surveyed families and households are highly intensive, ramified and extremely operationally functional in everyday life. It is obvious that these links, under our conditions marked by social disintegration, insufficiently strong and efficient institutional networks for the exercise of rights and obligations and poverty of the public services sectors, cater to a very large range of family responsibilities and activities. It is almost impossible to imagine the functioning of a family under such conditions without the support and interventions of their "informal sector". In a situation of this kind the fact that the services of this "sector" represent the "privilege" of families which by themselves own greater and more abundant material, economic, social and personal resources compared with the families which do not have any or enough of them, has a far reaching importance. It is obvious that the support of these networks ensures the reproduction of social inequalities, and the "capitalizing" function of these social mediators is, in this sense, quite clearly manifested (Bourdieu, 1999). On the other hand, we should not neglect the possibly strong corrupting effect of these social networks in a situation of social anomy and crisis that have for a decade and a half marked the social situation in Serbia.

PART III
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAMILY AND ONE'S OWN FAMILY LIFE

While the previous deliberations provided an opportunity to examine the objective characteristics of family and domestic units and observe their behavior in the local context of social sociability networks, the following pages will address the subjective relation of the respondents towards the family as an institution in general, and towards the family as part of their own life achievement, including their satisfaction with what they have personally achieved in this respect. The purpose of these deliberations is to show the degree of the existing value transformation with respect to the family and the related expectations and show to what extent this transformation is endangered by the difficult and dramatic social events transpiring over the past decades. Our deliberations start from the general views moving towards the more concrete and personal attitudes.

1. Relation towards the family as an institution

The behavior of family members and their visible strategies of action in everyday life point to the conclusion that the family institution has central importance in the lives of Serbian citizens. Is this importance also recognized in their consciousness?

Asked "How important your family is to you?", 96% of respondents answered positively. Moreover 83% said it was "very important", while only 0.9% responded that their family had little or no importance to them. Family obviously represents the absolutely *irreplaceable* part of life in the individual consciousness of the Serbian society in these turbulent times. We may assume that this consciousness is generated from three sources: first, the ideological, i.e. deposits of family tradition which have for centuries served as the basis for the life of the Serbian nation; second, the awakening and highlighting of this tradition by the unfortunate events of the past decade which brought the Serbian society and nation to the brink of a disaster; and, finally, the response to the present reality wherein the family is the main pillar of individuals' support.

The question which brings us closer to the individual understanding of the family comprises a battery of three questions we used in the hope of obtaining more nuanced responses about the meaning of the family as a community for the respondents themselves: namely whether they considered the family as the source of pleasure which motivates them to new and continuing strivings, or a source of their perpetual exhaustion and frustration, or else identify it with both the pleasures and frustrations.

The prevailing majority of respondents opted for an absolutely positive relation towards the family, considering it the undeniable place of pleasure and inspiration; almost a fifth (18.7%) are somewhat more reserved, saying the family is indeed a source of pleasure, but that, in addition to it, they also have some other pleasures in their lives. Finally, only 5.1% of respondents say the family for them has little positive meaning, if at all. Thus, in this case again, family turned out to be the positive option for most respondents, i.e. the *only* and *main preoccupation of their life*. We may thus conclude that the first principled attitude towards the family as an institution is reinforced by the more specific personal commitment of most respondents.

Although the percentage of respondents who have negatively evaluated the family, or placed it on the same level with certain other preferences is low, it is still interesting to observe both these attitudes against the background of their family characteristics, i.e. their personal, socio-economic and professional characteristics. The analysis reveals some interesting details in the predominantly positive attitude towards the family.

It so appears that disinclination towards the family is manifested substantially more strongly compared with other categories by respondents belonging to households of childless married couples (7%), and still more by respondents from single households (even 12%) and one-parent families. Inclination towards sharing family pleasures with other preferences is in particular expressed by celibates, followed by respondents from pre- and post-marital and family unions, of whom as many as 45% have a reserved attitude towards the family. Contrary to them, respondents who live in lasting extramarital unions with children, register a maximum percentage (86%) of those who say that their family is for them the only, main and primarily pleasure in life. In terms of this attitude towards the family these family groups do not manifested larger differences compared with married families, which clearly reveals that our environment, too, starts to differentiate its relation towards the family not only on the basis of formal criteria (marriage, legality, children, etc.), but on the basis of intimate personal expectations and their attainment in the family union.

Observing the positive attitude towards the family depending on the factor of socio-professional position of the respondents and the socio-economic status of households the distribution obtained takes the form of a reversed **U** curve. Satisfaction is lower on its poles, and the strongest in the middle, which confirms the known fact that family is essentially a middle-class mentality construct and reality. However, when negative reactions towards the family are concerned, they are above average registered among the lower strata, and are not found among the highest strata at all, although in their case the family much more frequently competes with other needs and interests of individuals.

Attitudes towards the family also vary depending on what the respondents expect from it: those who have positive attitudes towards the family seek and find in it primarily internal family harmony and stability (58%), and interest for childcare. Contrary to them those who manifest a doubtful or outright negative attitude towards the family, in the first place look for material values (successfulness), as well as certain traditional values of family organization (order and authority). Bearing in mind that both latter values are today jeopardized it is quite clear why these respondents more often express a reserved, if not entirely negative attitude towards the family.

In line with the previously adopted positive attitude towards the family, the alternative negative approach to it is rejected by 60% of respondents, 20% agree with it, while a substantial number shows a dilemma (17%), i.e. does not have a clear answer. A look at the distribution of responses to this question depending on the respondents' households, once again reveals a reverse **U** curve, with lower values for rejection of this attitude on the poles and the extremely high percentage of agreement (50%) in the middle, i.e. with the middle (or more precisely lower middle) stratum. Other variables do not reveal more specific or important variations.

The exception is the gender variable where the difference is clearly distinguished: women twice more often than men agree with the statement that family is only a burden, but also reject it twice more often than men. In other words, women are polarized on the issue of the attitude towards the family, while men's positive opinion is in this case more clearly manifested. These responses are obviously highly correlated with the practice of family life of women and men in Serbia. What the women have from the family are primarily responsibilities and dissatisfaction, while what men find it in are conveniences and pleasure.

We can thus conclude that the majority of respondents in Serbia have a doubtlessly positive attitude towards the family institution and family, and recognize it as the irreplaceable, primary and only reliance individuals identify with. Those who approach it with challenges and doubts are individuals with negative family experience. This is clearly evidenced by the following facts: the negative attitude towards the family as a burden, i.e. absence of pleasure, is most often found among those who see the deficiencies or failures of their own family life in the structural shortcomings of the family, family conflicts or the absence of modern values in their family life. Thus, these are the respondents who have personal experience of family instability and maladjustment to individual wants and desires.

Still, it is necessary to stress the fact that almost a quarter of respondents (23.8%) expressed critical views of the family, revealing a substantial shift in the ideological attitude towards the family. If the percentage of this, leastways critical attitude, is compared with some previous surveys of satisfaction with the family (Burić et all, 1980; Milić et all, 1979), regardless of the differences in the contexts and methodological approaches, we may still draw an encouraging conclusion that individual orientation and attitude towards the family are breaking through the deposits of the traditional, collectivistic ideology and consciousness. The negative social experience on the general level creates higher sensitivity for relations in the private sphere, i.e. open the space for the nourishing of a less idealized and idolizing attitude towards the family. That is a promising beginning, no matter to what extent this partial awakening may be attributed to the objective standstill or even regression in the actual practical modernization of the family. This prospect is corroborated by certain views related to family strategies.

2. Strategies and risks of family life

Individuals' valuation of the family and their attitudes towards it, based on their experience of success or deficiencies of their personal family lives, indirectly aim at identifying the primary strategies and risks in their family lives and adjust their behavior, actions and work accordingly. The respondents were in both cases offered a fairly elaborate list of possible options, along with a possibility to add their personal comments.

Most individuals thought that a successful family strategy resulted in achievements which reflect modern values and patterns of family life, such as "good atmosphere in the family", "emotional closeness and trust among family members", "understanding in the family", etc. (48%). A minor part linked this achievement with the traditional value preferences such as the "family reputation" or "respect of authority in the family" (12%). Still less valued are such achievements as the "quality of family life" (5.7%) or material standard of the family (1.9%). And, finally, higher ranked, but still substantially below the level registered for the attainment of spiritual and emotional values of family life, are the achievements related to the respondents' children seen most often (20.8%) in the children's careers (education, job, marriage) and substantially less in their caring and attentive attitude towards their parents (7,8%).

A division of attitudes as expressing essentially modern or traditional values will show that 74.5% of respondents see their largest success in the family in the characteristics related to and belonging to the modern family habitus, while only a fifth of them identify with the attainment of traditional value achievements. This information is very important since it confirms that on the level of concrete choices, ideas and expectations most respondents have clearly taken modern positions, expecting from the family in the first place the benefits on the internal intimate, personal and interactional level.

If this perception is compared with the objective conditions and behavior or respondents in their family life, where we noted the stagnant or even regressive trends and phenomena, we will probably be right to conclude that this negative phenomena are the expression of specific objective difficulties most families and individuals have found themselves in without their own will, more than a conscious shift towards the traditional and obsolete views and expectations from personal and family life. This interpretation of is largely encouraging bearing in mind that it allows us to observe the above-mentioned regressive phenomena as transitory and temporary standstills or strayings reflecting the necessity of adjustment in critical situations and only to a very small extent as the expression of personal values and expectations.

This conclusion is further supported by the analysis of responses to the question of what the respondents consider the largest deficiency or risk in their family life. Two responses which give a combined share of 67.5% refer to the current social situation which prevents the individuals from resolving the basic existential problems: the shortage of money and housing. Other responses reflect internal family or personal circumstances of respondents, such as:

1. lack of time for one's family (14.6%)
2. absence of traditional values in family life (3.0%)
3. absence of modern values (4.3%)
4. structural deficiencies of the family (1.9%)
5. conflicts in the family (3.2%)
6. no deficiencies or weaknesses (1.9%).

A reference to the index of socio-economic positions of households (Graph 4) is somewhat clarifying. It shows that the quality of life is valued more the higher the economic status of the household is and vice versa. Valuation of children is in reverse proportion with the households' status: the lower their position is, the more frequently they point their children and their qualities as their highest personal success (2/3 of respondents on lower and lower middle positions and only 1/5 of the highest). We could note that children compensate for the low achievements of parents in terms of social success. A similar ratio is established with respect to declaration for traditional family values and expectations (order and authority).

Graph 4: Success in family life and economic status of households



Finally, the choice of modern aspirations reveals a reverse **U** curve, with substantially lower share of these options on the two poles of the socio-economic status than in the middle, which is again indicative of middle classes as the strongest proponents of modern values. The respondents' education has a very similar effect on the choice of family life achievements.

PART IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS

All surveys carried out in last 15 years indicate that the Serbian family was influenced by extremely dramatic and stressful social events which brought about numerous negative and destructive changes in the lives of individuals and their families (Milić, 1995; 2001; Tomanović - Mihajlović,1997, 2001; Bobić, 2003). The negative effects were manifested at two family levels: 1) the level of existential needs through the dramatic impoverishment of the population and families, which affected almost all population parts and groups, except the small elite stratum; and 2) through the human losses. The latter were brought about by several factors: (a) increased mortality, especially of the middle-aged population; (b) abandonment of the family by some of its members in consequence of emigration, exile, war and divorce, and (c) forsaking or postponing the entry into the process of bio-social reproduction (childbearing and marriage).

All these factors resulted in substantial shifts in the structure of family forms and households on the global plane compared with the modernizing level achieved in the previous period. Specifically, this means a remarkably high increase in family structures dominated by the elderly (single households, old married couple households, one-parent family households with growth up children), as well as a visible decrease in the number of nuclear families which are not only the source of biological reproduction, but also the central modernizing category, and, finally, a significant growth of an archaic form of family life linked with the period of proto and early industrialization – the extended family as a form of a complex community built on relations of traditional family solidarity and reciprocity.

These shifts in the structure of family households testify not only to the "stalled" transition, but also of a regressive development in the sphere of family relations and the reversal of family members to the outdated form of struggle for survival with the help of kinship solidarity. The consequences of these trends are twofold: first, the young remain connected to their parental family with an "umbilical cord", postponing their emancipation and creation of their own families (Tomanović, Ignjatović, 2004); and second, this leads towards the strengthening of informal kinship and other networks of solidarity and links which tend to close the channels of promotion and innovation in society and enhance susceptibility to corruption in the public sphere.

It is not by chance that in such a social enviroment individuals see the family as their only, irreplaceable and main support and purpose of their whole life. The privatistic orientation and familistic ideology dominant in the consciousness of most individuals merely supplement and encourage the rushing process of radical privatization in social life and the negation and destruction of all public institutions and values. This constitutes, and at the same time renews, a society wherein the struggle for survival permits agressive and barbaric behavior of individuals and their informal, interest clans, cliques, groups and alliances.

Still, we must note that these utterly irregular social circumstances not only produce spiritual, emotional and material poverty but also generate resistance and non-acceptance of the existing situation in the society as a whole, as well as in the specific social relations. Our survey has shown that these circumstances have a positive impact on the appearance and expansion of critical attitudes towards the family which no longer stands for the inviolable obligation towards the collectivity and social institution but is also required to provide full personal, individual satisfaction. To the extent that the family, caught in the struggle for survival, oversees individual requirements and needs, the dissatisfied individuals try to find the new ways and means for their intimate satisfaction. This opens the paths to "unblock" the modernizing courses in the intimate sphere. Naturally this delay in the family transformation has a very high human cost: it entails significant and large intimate dissatisfaction, troubles and frustrations for the present as well as a series of future generations.

Smiljka Tomanović

PARENTHOOD IN TRANSFORMATION

ABSTRACT: The analysis presented in the article is based on the data referring to a sub-sample of 510 parents from the national representative sample of households in Serbia, used in the survey carried out in November 2003. Some results are compared with the findings of two British studies.

Material deprivation, i.e. lack of economic capital, is the feature that profoundly marks parenthood in Serbia: from general perceptions of families, to sociability and support for *parenting, to the perception of problems in parenthood. Since material problems are not equally prominent in all social strata, they structurally differentiate the content and perception of parenthood.*

Parents in Serbia rely heavily on help and support from their families (their parents in particular), especially in material resources (financial assistance, housing), practical help in childcare, and emotional support (the latter mostly from friends). Speaking of the cultural background, the tradition of strong social integration within primary relations (families and friends) in the social context of prolonged crisis has stimulated even higher expectations concerning help and support from families and friends. Support for parenting based on primary relations indicates strong "bonding" social capital, which has a significant compensatory function for parents in Serbia. There is inequality in the distribution of social capital between respondents from different social strata: intensity of sociability, as well as the strength of social networks is lower for poorer and less educated parents. It indicates a kind of (self)isolation – social exclusion as a result of material deprivation.

Like parents in other countries, parents in Serbia perceive the danger of alcohol and drugs as the major problem in parenthood. Significant stress placed on material problems is what makes parenthood in Serbia specific as compared with other countries. The financial aspect, whether it is perceived as a problem of parenthood or a failure in family life, or it emerges as help expected from social networks – it is the leitmotif of this study.

Through combining the effects of structural constraints and strong tradition in a specific cultural context, the transformation of parenthood in Serbia overall is not directed towards detraditionalization and individualization; it is rather marked by certain features of retraditionalization. Since the evidence from the study has showed that parenthood is a strongly differentiated phenomenon, it is to be expected that the degree of individualization of parenthood is different in different social strata and groups. This issue needs to be explored in a further study.

KEY WORDS: parenthood; capitals; support for parenting; differentiation; retraditionalization; individualization.

The aim of this paper is to examine certain characteristics of parenthood transformation in Serbia on the basis of a survey carried out in November 2003 within a project “Transformation strategies of social groups in Serbia” on a representative sample of households. The initial motivation to look into the characteristics of parenthood transformation using a survey method derives from the wish to compare the findings with those of two British research efforts: “Support for Parenting: The views of parents of 8 – 12 year old children”[1] (Edwards, Gillies 2004) and “Listening to Parents: Their worries, their solutions”[2] (NFPI, 2001). Due to the nature of the method applied, a survey based on a questionnaire with multifunctional objectives, the research had to be reduced to only a few aspects of the complex phenomenon of parenthood.

With a view to analyzing and interpreting the results so obtained, the paper, first, reviews the transformation of the family and family relations in contemporary society. The concepts of cultural and social capital underlying the research are linked with parenthood and its transformation. Having established the conceptual framework, the paper also outlines the context for the interpretation of research findings: characteristics of parenthood in post-socialist transformation in Serbia based on the results of previous studies.

Transformation of family, intimate relations and parenthood in late-modern societies

There is no doubt that the contemporary family is faced with the reconstruction of its form and contents, i.e. structure and relations. In structural terms, the family is, in contemporary society, exposed to changes in its composition – decomposition of its kinship nucleus in consequence of divorce, extramarital childbirth and forsaken parenthood. On the relational level profound transformations are registered in the sphere of intimate relations, expanding their definition from partnership to friendship and parenthood (Gillies, 2003). Despite the theoretical agreement that families are swept by detraditionalization and individualization processes prevalent in societies of late modernity, there is no consensus as to the consequences of these processes for the contemporary family as a whole, or its individual segments (partnership relations, parenthood, childhood, etc.). The relevant literature is dominated by three specific views: one, that

[1] The survey was carried out on a nationally representative sample of 1112 parents, as the first stage of the project “Resources in parenting: access to capitals” pursued within a research programme on Families and Social Capital Research Group of the London South Bank University, UK. I wish to thank Prof. Rosalind Edwards, project leader and Dr. Val Gillies for their cooperation and the possibility to use the instruments and findings of their research.

[2] Survey carried out for the National Family & Parenting Institute by MORI in July 2001, on a nationally representative sample of 1391 parents with children of different age.

the above-mentioned changes adversely influence family transformation, another that this influence is predominantly positive, and another still that essentially nothing of any substance has been changed (Edwards, Franklin, Holland 2003).

In highly developed societies wherein constant and fast changes are immanent, family life is exposed to numerous pressures. Changed work patterns and longer working hours, ineffectiveness of public services, growing poverty, increase in divorces and fragility of partnership relations, market pressure on children and the young, are only some of the problems facing the parents (NFPI, 2001).

The specificity of parenthood in contemporary society is also reflected in different kinds of dangers (risks) threatening the children. Perception of the environment as being risky is, in particular, manifested in the "moral panic" associated with "traffic danger" and "stranger danger" (Scott 2000). Some authors believe that the very concept of contemporary parenthood revolves around protecting the children from the damaging influences of the environment, because the huge and primary responsibility of parents for the life and well-being of their children lies at the very core of the ideology of familism (Beck-Gernshaim 1992).

In one of his most quoted works, Bourdieu distinguishes three types of mutually interlinked manifest forms of capital: *economic capital*, which is directly and immediately convertible into money and may be institutionalized through ownership rights; *cultural capital*, which is, under certain conditions, convertible into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications, and *social capital*, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is, under certain conditions, convertible into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility (Bourdieu, 1986: 243). Additional to these is symbolic capital representing a construction of other capitals when they are perceived as symbolic and recognized as legitimate.

There is a problem with defining and operationalizing the concept of social capital; many theoreticians agree that it is vague and may denote different things, but yet does not have to denote anything (Morrow, 1999; Baron *et al.* 2000; Field, 2003; Silva, Edwards, 2004). In most general terms, social capital describes important social processes and networks – informal support networks, friendships, neighbourly cooperation, trust and voluntary activities, as well as aspects of local community development, partnership of the public, private and voluntary sectors and civic spirit development. A particularly important contribution to the operationalization of social capital was given by Michael Woolcock's classification into: 1. "bonding" social capital, related to the ties between similar people in similar situations, e.g. closest family, close friends and neighbors; 2. "bridging" social capital, including more distant ties between similar persons, such as friends and colleagues; and 3. "linking" social capital which reaches dissimilar people in different situations, such as those entirely outside the community, and enables the participants to use a wider spectrum of resources than otherwise available to the community.[3]

[3] Woolcock, M. (2001) "The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes", *Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research,* 2, 1, 1-17; quoted from Field 2003.

Social capital, according to Bourdieu, comprises social networks and connections: ’contacts or group membership which through the accumulation of exchanges, obligations and shared identities, provide actual or potential support and access to valued resources’ (1993: 143), as well as sociability – relations through which the networks are maintained.

Of the three most important conceptualizations of social capital, Putnam, Coleman and Bourdieu’s, the latter two see the family as one of the central places for the genesis and reproduction of social capital (Edwards, Franklin, Holland 2003).

Social capital in the narrow sense (“bonding”) – networks based on closest kinship and friendships – has a compensatory role for the economically underprivileged and is an important part of “survival strategies“.[4] On the other hand, social capital in its wider sense (“bridging”) may promote inequality because access to different forms of networks is unevenly distributed, i.e. some people’s links are more valuable than those of others.

Based on the summary of previously stated arguments and some British research findings (Edwards, Gillies 2004) it is possible to offer a few basic theses about the relationship between the transformation of family, parenthood and social capital. First off, we may assume changes in attitudes towards lower expectations of assistance from one’s relatives, as opposed to friends. It is also possible to assume changes in terms of different expectations from different groups, so that practical help is expected and obtained from relatives, emotional support from friends, and financial and advisory assistance from formal organizations. The links are also of different intensity depending on the type of relationship and expectations, becoming more intensive with friends and weaker with relatives. As for formal organizations changes are revealed in reduced expectations and trust.

Parenthood in post-socialist transformation in Serbia

Summing up the results of domestic research focusing on families in the socialist period, Anđelka Milić concluded that the family parents-children subsystem underwent by far more important changes than the one of marriage, thereby becoming the source of family instability. The patriarchal authoritarian pattern of relations towards children has been replaced with the parternalistic (especially in adolescence) contributing to the traumatization of generational relations inside and outside the family, while in practice the permissive model of upbringing prevails (Milić 1994: 105, 106).

Research into the family life in the period of post-socialist transformation reveals the duality of its reality. On the one hand, the family was vulnerable and, caught “in the whirlwind” of profound and anomic social changes, most often ended up with a negative balance of “gains” and “losses” (Milić, 1995; 2002). On the other

[4] See, e.g., R. Jarett’s research into Afro-American families in Chicago, Jarett, 1986.

hand, its, even if false, cohesiveness and support and assistance networks, cushioned the blows at individuals, supported the strategies of survival and even enabled progress.

Sustained networks of primary support and assistance have always had specific importance for families in Serbia, regardless of the structural strata differences in terms of their types and contents (Milić, 1991). In that respect, families in Serbia belong to the south-European cultural model, characterized by a special kind of intergenerational links, based on a strong moral obligation of the parents to support their children throughout their life (Wallace and Kovatcheva 1998: 147). This includes financial aid in education, provision of housing space, setting up of a household, childcare and nursing. Thus intra-family ties remain strong throughout the life of an individual, extend across both types of families and are based on a firm principle of reciprocity.

Research findings reveal the key role of women in keeping and developing informal support and assistance networks (Milić, 1994). It is a specific type of "emotional capital" investment (Nowotny) into the reproduction and development of social capital, which is simultaneously one of the basic sources of women's self-realization in a still dominantly patriarchal society.

The security base provided by the socialist system collapsed in the post-socialist period, and family became perhaps an even more important supplier of resources (material as well as nonmaterial). All recent efforts to look into the reality of families in Serbia (Bolčić, Milić 2002), point to the increasing importance of primary relations and networks, the so-called bonding capital, for the survival of individuals and groups (families), but they also reveal a concurrent conflictiveness of intra-family relations (Milić, 2002; Miletić – Stepanović, 2002; Tomanović, 2002b).

The dominant characteristic of family life in Serbia in the past two decades is seen in its being heavily burdened with material deprivation and social crisis reflected in the hardships of everyday life. In addition to causing the frustration of individuals and acting as a source of conflicts in the family, the social crisis is also reflected in the dominant process of retraditionalization (contrary to detraditionalization) of family relations. The only just initiated processes of individualizing all relations are arrested: parenthood (Blagojević, 1993a, 1993b; Petrović, 1993; Milić, 1994; Tomanović, Ignjatović 2004), partnership (Bobić, 2004), transition to adulthood (Milić, Čičkarić 1998; Petrović, 2002; Tomanović, Ignjatović 2004).

In this period, parenthood is marked by devastating spending of huge resources – material as well as other: energy, time, emotions, health (Blagojević, 1997; Tomanović – Mihajlović, 1997; Tomanović, 2002b). A special, sacrificial model of parenthood is formed, hinging on the traditional norm of sacrificing for one's children. It has a specific positive connotation in motherhood, where a "sacrificial micro matriarchy" becomes the domain for the self-realization of a large number of women (Blagojević, 1997). Ambivalence between pleasure and obligation, inherent in the parental role, becomes more pronounced in fatherhood, where structural limitations in fulfilling the traditional role of the family breadwinner become the source of internal, and often also family conflicts (Tomanović – Mihajlović, 1997; Tomanović, 2002b).

Transformation of parenthood in Serbia is, in this paper, observed through the following dimensions: 1. possession of different types of capital; 2. support to parenting – attitudes and relations; 3. problems of parenthood and perception of risks for the children.

Consequently, the analysis has the following objectives:

1. to use the available data to identify certain elements of the parents' cultural and social capital;
2. to identify the type of links, relations and networks forming the parents' social capital and its characteristics;
3. to identify certain problems of parenting and risks for the children as perceived by their parents.

Analysis of findings

Socio-cultural position of parents

Out of 1638 respondents, 510 form the subsample of parents – respondents with at least one child below the age of 18. The respondents-parents comprise 60.5% of women and 39.5% of men.[5] Fifty eight percent of them live in nuclear and 42% in extended households, and they most often have two children (58%), then one (29%), three (11%), and, substantially less frequently, four or five (2.5%).

Most parents have secondary education (58%), elementary and lower (28%) and, finally, higher and high education (14%). Bearing in mind that the overall sample is dominated by respondents with elementary and lower education (45%), closely followed by those with secondary (44%) and only then higher and high education (11%), parents clearly have a higher educational level than the balance of respondents.

Compared with the whole sample, the households of interviewed parents have a slightly better economic status (measured by the economic status index); they are somewhat less represented in two lower and a bit more in two middle groups, with an equal share in the highest status group.

Cultural capital and investing into children

The use of one's leisure time also represents a dimension of lifestyle (externalized habitus) indicating different cultural capitals of individuals and groups (e.g. a family).

[5] All analyses further on in this paper relate to the weighted basis.

Parents, just like other respondents frequently spend their free time associating with relatives and friends - 55% “often” (several times a week), and 32% “occasionally” (several times a month; the combined frequency of these two options in the overall sample is 85%). There is only one other activity referred to with some frequency, namely press reading: 39% parents do it “often“, and 27% “occasionally“. Press and book reading, attendance at cultural events, sports and recreation, and even socializing with relatives and friends are strata characteristic: all these activities have a (statistically significant) correlation with the educational level of the parents, as well as with their economic status. Social engagement in various associations, political organizations and movements, in view of its very small share (only 7% of parents engage in such activities frequently or occasionally, compared with 6% in the whole sample), reveals no correlation with social status indicators or the economic status index. Leisure activities, as characteristics of a lifestyle – family habitus, represent a form of cultural capital (resource), which defines everyday life and forms the habitus of a child (Tomanović, 2002a; 2004). Once again it turned out that these activities are substantially conditioned by the respondents’ belonging to specific social strata.

According to the parents, most children below the age of 15 engage in sports (still only 22% - yes, 63.5% - no, while 15% do not have children younger than 15), learn foreign languages (21% - yes), and to a lesser extent apply themselves to computers and arts or learning of various technical skills.

Investment into children through additional activities is essentially different in the case of parents of different socio-economic statuses. According to the economic status index, involvement of a child in any activity progressively grows with the increase in the economic standing of the household. Taking a look at parents of lower middle and higher middle economic statuses (with even shares of children below the age of 15) it turns out that 14,5% of children with parents of lower middle status learn foreign languages (in their spare time) compared with 33% of children with parents of a higher economic status, while 8% and 19% of children in the lower-middle and higher-middle status groups respectively learn computer skills.[6]

Consistently, there is a correlation between the parents’ education and children’s engagement in additional leisure activities. Although the increase in the level of parents’ education is accompanied by increased involvement of children in all of the above mentioned activities, the statistically most important link is the one between the parents’ education and children’s learning of foreign languages and computer skills.

The weakest relation is the one between economic status and children’s engagement in sports, but there is a (statistically significant) correlation with their parents’ education. As demonstrated by my previous research works, engagement in sports is fairly widespread among children, and has different variants – ranging from the sporadic and recreational to regular and competitive training, so that the question is whether it could be interpreted as a form of investing into children at all

[6] The correlation is statistically important measured by Pearson’s chi square test.

Learning of foreign languages and computer skills are revealed as discriminatory activities by both characteristics (economic status and education). These activities definitively represent cultural capital invested into children. Engagement in arts is a problematic category since it may include anything from occasional singing in a school choir, to everyday attendance of a music school, while the learning of technical skills is scantly represented and cannot be analyzed as a form of cultural capital.

Social capital: sociability and networks

Sociability

Parents feel somewhat less lonely and neglected by others, compared with the balance of respondents in the sample: 21% and 25% respectively feel so occasionally, and 6% i.e. 12% mostly. However, the feeling of loneliness among the respondents-parents varies depending on their economic status and education. Parents of lower economic status speak of feeling lonely occasionally or mostly far more often than those of middle and high economic standing: low – 49% (mostly 23%); lower – 36%; middle - 16%; higher – 14%; and high – 17% (all occasionally and none mostly).[7] A similar trend is revealed by the distribution of answers according to the parents' education: those with lower education more often mention that they feel lonely occasionally (28%) or mostly (13%) than do the parents with secondary (21% occasionally and 4% mostly), and especially higher and high education (8.5% occasionally and 1% mostly).[8]

A kind of social isolation of poor respondents is also indicated by their responses concerning socializing with relatives and friends when asked about their leisure, since as many as 28% of respondents of low economic status say that they never socialize (compared with 0% and 1.4% of high and higher-middle status), as is also the case of 11% of parents with lower-level (compared with 1.4% of those with higher and high) education.[9]

Asked to state who they associate with the most, the largest number of parents selected the option "all equally" (39%), followed by friends and godparents (22.5%), while household members and relatives were mentioned less often (15% and 13% respectively). There is a (statistically important) link between the forms of sociability and different economic statuses of parents: leaving aside those who responded "all equally", with similar shares across all strata, parents of low economic status most frequently associate with their household members and then neighbours, those of lower-middle standing with relatives outside the household, followed by friends, while parents of middle, higher-middle and high economic status most often associate with friends and household members. The share of friends in sociability

[7] The correlation is statistically important measured by Pearson's chi square test.
[8] The correlation is statistically important measured by Pearson's chi square test.
[9] Both correlations are statistically significant, measured by Pearson's chi square test, although the one of economic status is stronger.

networks increases, while the importance of relatives and neighbors decreases the higher the educational level of the parents is.

Support networks

Parents are the least inclined to rely on others in order to enroll their children into school, resolve their housing problems and deal with administrative affairs. They most often prefer financial assistance, advisory help and emotional support (of relatives and friends equally). Friends are perceived as an important source of assistance in finding jobs, access to health institutions and in financial matters. Financial borrowings are the only case where parents expect greater help from relatives (31%) than friends (27%).

The intensity and types of assistance and support networks substantially differ subject to the economic status of respondent-parents. Parents of low economic standing by far more often state that they would not ask anyone's help (depending on the type of assistance from financial - 57%, to enrolment of children into schools - 89%) compared with those of high economic status (from 30% for assistance in accessing health institutions to 67% in school enrolment).[10] The only type of a relation, which does not display a significant difference in intensity –compared with the option of seeking no one's help -, has to do with advisory assistance and emotional support. In this respect however, there is a difference in the type of the relation: while parents of higher and high economic standing incline towards the supports of friends, and then relatives, those of low and middle economic status tend towards the support of relatives first and friends next. As for other kinds of support, universal regularity in terms of the type of relation cannot be established, except that in most cases better off parents tend to turn to their friends (from 17% to resolve housing problems to 40% to find jobs), while those of low economic standing count on relatives (from 2% for assistance in school enrollment to 43% seeking advice and emotional support).

Dissimilarities in the intensity and quality of networks are also obvious when the responses about the types of support are correlated with the parents' education, since, descriptively speaking, there are differences between the highest and the lowest education level, which are statistically significant for four out of eight types of assistance (finding a job, access to health institutions, solving the housing problem and administrative matters). Parents with lower education state that they seek no one's assistance more often than those with higher education, and the difference in frequency is the largest with responses to the question concerning access to health institutions (63% to 38%).

These results allow us to conclude that there is a kind of social (self)isolation, social exclusion of the poor and less educated parents. As indicated by numerous

[10] Relations which reveal statistical significance are those of the economic status index with financial assistance, help with access to health institutions and assistance in finding a job.

research projects carried out abroad as well as in these parts, social exclusion of parents has major and adverse repercussions on childhood (UNICEF, 2004).

Social capital: Support for Parenting

Following the questions put forward in the British research "Support for Parenting: The Views of Parents of 8 -12 Year Old Children", we asked the parents if they obtained more, less or same support from their families compared with the past? The distribution of responses shows that 35% of parents think the support they have today is smaller, 28% find it greater and 37% the same.

In order to measure the perception of significance of the support given to parents today, we could use a yardstick called "consensus baseline" establishing the existence of a normative consensus (Finch and Mason, 1991).[11] Bearing in mind that our question offered three response options, the consensus baseline is drawn at 50 percent, which means that the surveyed parents display no consensus on the issue of assistance obtained from their families.

The British sample reveals some normative agreement (just over 50%) that parents obtain less assistance and support from their families than before, and the normative consensus is stronger among middle-class parents (57%) but non-existent among those of the working class. In our sample, a normative consensus on this issue does not exist in a single stratum, viewed either by economic status index (five strata) or the level of education (three strata). In terms of frequencies, some strata differences are noted: among the parents of low economic status those who think that they obtain less assistance are somewhat more numerous (47% within the stratum), as are those who think they have more support among the parents of high economic standing (39%). According to education, parents with lower education level are more often of the opinion that the scope of assistance has remained the same (41%), while those with higher and high education find it reduced (36%). These differences, however, are not statistically significant.

Due to the specific characteristics of our socio-cultural context, the responses obtained by the British research could not be used to explain the attitudes about the scope of assistance our parents receive from their families today. The respondents were, instead, asked to explain the answer they gave in their own words, i.e. to say why they thought that parents today obtained less, more or same support from their families. A qualitative analysis of responses was used to form the categories listed bellow according to the frequency of answers:

1. less, no money, worse economic situation (33)

[11] "The logic that we have followed is to say that where our questions have offered two options, then for either option to accrue more than 50 per cent of responses would indicate a simple majority. If either option accrues half as many responses again (that is, 75 per cent for two-option question), we will regard that as an initial indicator that we have a notable level of agreement. The corresponding figure for a three-option question is 50 per cent, for a four-option question it is 37.5 per cent and so on. We refer to this as our 'consensus baseline' " (Finch and Mason, 1991: 349-50).

2. same, it is a tradition (respect, understanding) which does not change (13)
3. less, the way of life is different (7)
4. more, more resources (better economic situation) (7)
5. more, greater need for assistance (greater dependence) (5)
6. more, more dedicated parents (5)
7. less, due to alienation (selfishness, indifference) (4)
8. less, assistance less required (greater independence) (2)
9. less, children are different today (1)

It should be noted that parents are not consistent – the response to the question about the quantity of assistance is accompanied by an explanation inconsistent with that answer. Thus, for instance explanations given for the response "same" are fewer than the response itself. An observation deriving from fieldwork and the analysis of responses is that the surveyed parents often could not decentre from their own situation: they responded from their experience instead of generalizing for all parents today (as the question warranted). This indicates that, in contrast to Great Britain where parenting has become a public issue, it is, in Serbia, still a private matter of an individual and a family.

A normative consensus exists that today parents obtain less assistance from friends than before, i.e. that is what 52% of respondents think, while about a third (36%) believe that the quantity of assistance is the same, compared with 11% who find it greater. The consensus is somewhat stronger among the parents of lower (56%) and low (53%) economic statuses than those of high (52%) economic standing, but is nonexistent in the remaining two strata.[12] Normative consensus is registered among parents with secondary education (55%), borderline among those with higher education (50%) and nonexistent in the lower education group (47.5%).

These results are essentially different from British findings, where a consensus does not exist and the responses are almost evenly distributed over the three categories ("same" - 35%, "less" - 30% and "more" - 24%). Despite the fact that the findings are not consistent either with the thesis about the collapse of friendly relations or with their increased importance, the authors took the liberty of combining the responses "same" and "more" to conclude that one could say that the importance of friends for parents was growing (Edwards, Gillies 2004). That conclusion definitely cannot be drawn from our research.

Let us now take a look at how the surveyed parents interpret the reasons for the declining support of friends:

1. less, no money (bad economic situation) (30)
2. less, alienation (everyone looks after his/her own interests) (21)
3. more, greater importance (exchange of assistance, support and advice) today (8)
4. same, these relations do not change (7)
5. less, such are the times (social situation) (7)
6. same, they have never helped anyway (4)

[12] The correlation is statistically significant measured by Pearson's chi square test.

7. less, changed way of life and habits (3)[13].

The most frequent answers to the question “What kind of support the parents need from their families and friends” are:

- rank I – financial assistance (52%), emotional support (17%) and help in minding the children (12%);
- rank II – emotional support (23.5%), help in minding the children (20%) and practical help in housework (19%);
- rank III – health-related assistance and advice (18%); assistance in child rearing (17%) and practical assistance in housework (17%).

In view of the essential differences in the perception of family and friends in our parent sample, it would be in order to look into the different expectations from these two groups. However, for the purpose of comparability with the British survey the question has been put in the same form, i.e. jointly for the family and friends. The results are substantially different: while financial assistance is of greatest importance in Serbia, British parents do not find the family, and especially friends, an appropriate source of financial assistance, either in generalized sense or in specific circumstances (Edwards, Gillies 2004).

The type of assistance expected from family and friends is correlated with the parents’ economic status.[14] The higher the economic status of the parents is the lower the expectations of financial assistance become (from 63% in the low to 20% in the high status group), as opposed to expectations of emotional support (11% and 40% respectively). A similar tendency, although less strongly manifested, is also observed when parents of low and high education are compared.

The most frequent answers to the question “What kind of support from social organizations is the most important for parents?” are the following:

- rank I – financial assistance (79%),
- rank II – health related assistance and advice (21); assistance with child rearing and education (20) and practical assistance with housework (17%),
- rank III – assistance with child rearing and education (27) advice concerning child behavior and caregiving (12).

Parents from Serbia expect formal organizations to provide primarily financial support and then, to a somewhat lower extent, advisory assistance in relation to health, childcare and upbringing. As anticipated, there is a relation between the expected type of assistance and the parents’ social status. Thus expectances of financial support decrease with the increase in the economic status of parents, while expectances of advice on child behavior and care, as well as health-related assistance grow.[15] A similar trend is revealed by the distribution of responses according to the

[13] 10.9% “don’t know”, 8.9% “other”. The same comment on inconsistency and self-centeredness also applies to these responses.

[14] The correlation is statistically significant measured by Pearson’s chi square test.

[15] The correlation is statistically significant measured by Pearson’s chi square test..

parents' education, although the differences are less manifest and statistically important.

Bearing in mind that our survey does not inquire into the views on assistance expected from formal organizations, a direct comparison with the British sample is not possible. We cannot be confident about the extent of requests by parent from Serbia for professional advice and assistance in child rearing.[16] The fact is that primary health care for children is fairly well developed and functional in Serbia, which is not the case with educational and psychological aspects of child rearing. As for the latter sphere, a lot depends on the child's involvement in (pre-school and school) institutions, as well as the quality of relations between the parents and professional staff. Material assistance (financial, housing, etc.) of the society in Serbia is very weak and targeted at the most endangered social groups.

The results of our survey on the whole indicate an obviously increasing distrust in other people and institutions of the social system, which offers a poor basis for integration on institutional and political levels.

Risks and problems

The questionnaire was supplemented with a few questions based on the findings of a study "Listening to Parents: Their worries, their solutions" (NFPI, 2001). The parents were offered twelve categories of answers to select the first, second and third most important thing causing their concern in relation to children.

The phenomena which cause the largest anxieties are the risks from alcohol and drugs (rank I – 27%; rank II – 21%; rank III – 16%); financial problems (rank I – 17%; rank II – 10%; rank III – 15%) and children's health (rank I – 15%; rank II – 18%; rank III – 19 %). Parents also mentioned the traffic danger and the risk of their children being attacked and molested.

Parents of low economic status are much more concerned over financial problems (37% compared with 3% and 3.5% of those of higher and high economic status) than over the risks of drugs and alcohol abuse (14% compared with 40% and 38% respectively).[17] A similar but less manifest and statistically important difference is revealed with respect to the parents' education.

Parents from Serbia share their British counterparts concern over the risks of alcohol and drug abuse (which is, generally speaking, higher in Serbia), but are more worried about their children's health than their behavior (second most important concern of British parents). Due to the specific characteristics of the social context they worry about financial problems more, but also share the Britishers' concern over violence (danger that their child may be attacked and molested). Compared with British parents, those in Serbia are much less troubled about reconciling ob-

[16] The British survey does not register normative agreement as to whether the parents need professional advice and assistance in child rearing although 61% do not find this kind of assistance necessary (with consensus base of 75%).
[17] The correlation is statistically significant measured by Pearson's chi square test.

ligations at work and in the family, the quality of education and the fact that their children spend too much time in front of a TV set or a computer, but are more apprehensive of the traffic danger.

In order to find out about the strategies parents use in dealing with the above-mentioned risks and problems, I asked them who they (would) turn to if faced with the problem they said was their largest worry. The first choice of the parents is their spouse (60%) and then professionals and teachers (15%), while their second (next) choice was a professional service (24%) and then professionals and teachers (23%). Interestingly enough, parental parents rank high as a source of support (8% as the parents' first choice and 16% as the next one), a bit ahead of friends (5% first and 17% next choice). Parents are more important for people of low and lower economic status, which is consistent with their emphasis on financial problems as the largest concern. The crossing of responses to the questions about the person to turn to for support and the type of concern, reveals that parents are perceived as the most important source of assistance with financial problems (46%), professionals and teachers with the risks from alcohol and drugs (35%), professional services with alcohol and drugs (33%) and traffic danger (37%), while the dominant reason to turn to the category of friends is of financial nature (64%).[18]

Our finding that one's spouse is perceived as the first source of support in facing the problems corresponds with that about the British parents who believe that spending time together and talking with each other and the children is essential for a successful family life. British parents are most likely to seek information (first), from family and friends and then from local services, like their doctor, local school or nursery (NFPI, 2001: 3), which is also consistent with our research findings.

Concluding remarks

The lack of economic capital, material deprivation, is a characteristic which has left a strong mark on parenthood: from sociability and support to parenting to the perception of problems the parents face. Bearing in mind that economic problems do not affect all strata equally, they structurally differentiate the contents and perception of parenthood. Thus parents with a low economic status have a somewhat less positive understanding of the family (most often perceived as a "burden", in addition to "pleasure"), which is presumably related to their perception of insufficient funds as the major deficiency in family life.

The intensity of sociability and the strength of social assistance and support networks are lower among less educated parents, indicating a specific kind of (self)isolation, i.e. social exclusion as a consequence of material deprivation.

Cultural capital viewed in terms of spending one's leisure time is also structurally differentiated according to the economic standing and education as indicators

[18] The correlation is statistically important measured by Pearson's chi square test.

of the social status of interviewed parents. Leisure activities indicative of a higher level of cultural capital, such as visits to cultural events, book and press reading, are far more represented among parents with higher level of education and economic status.

Children's involvement in out of school activities as an indicator of cultural capital invested into children, as well as the cultural capital of the children themselves, increases in parallel with the education and economic status of parents. Foreign language and computer skills learning, in view of the importance of the way they tie in with the characteristics of the social status, may be taken as discriminatory activities in measuring the level of the parents and children's cultural capital.

The above-mentioned results tend to confirm the thesis that unequal capitals: economic, cultural and social, differentiate parenthood and consequently also childhood. They also tend to confirm Bourdieu's thesis that unequal distribution of capital fuels continuing reproduction of inequalities, which necessitates a further in-depth study.

Results of numerous research projects indicate that parents in Serbia largely rely on the assistance and support of their families, especially parents, primarily for material resources (money, housing), practical assistance in caring for their children and emotional support. The intensity of these networks has, if anything, been heightened, in view of the fact that an increasing number of families live with their parents – almost half the parents interviewed in our survey (42.5%) live in extended households.

Although the quantity of assistance parents actually obtain is certainly greater compared with other societies, parents have still higher expectations of assistance and support from their own parents (first) and friends (second). The thesis of reduced expectations from relatives, or that of higher intensity of relations with friends at the expense of relatives, has not been confirmed. Based on the parents' attitude that they today receive less assistance from friends than before, which obtained a normative consensus, we may conclude that expectations of assistance and support from friends are greater as opposed to the actual relation.

The results of inquiry into the expectations from primary relationships (relatives and friends) by type of assistance are essentially different from theoretical assumptions. Financial assistance is what is expected from one's relatives the most, and less so practical aid. Friends are, as presumed, perceived primarily as sources of emotional support.

Other findings of this survey suggest decreasing trust in and lower expectations from the formal organizations within the social system. They are still, at least hypothetically, perceived as a possible source of financial and advisory assistance.

Networks of support to parenting point to strong and intensive primary links, the so-called "bonding" social capital, which has an important compensatory function.

Judging by their above-mentioned features, social networks outlined by interviewed parents have the nature of "production networks" characteristic of Third World countries. In contrast to social networks of reproduction type, with the character of emotional support, the former are networks of utilitarian nature and enable individual/family's survival.[19]

Parents in Serbia see the largest problem of parenting in the risks from drugs and alcohol and are in this respect no different from parents in other countries. Moreover, the problem of drug abuse has been referred to in a variety of recent analytical and action research,[20] so much so that a research to establish to what extent it reflects the real danger or "moral panic" is necessary.

Specific for our social context is the insistence on financial problems, which are not ranked high by surveys in other countries. The material aspect of family life, whether perceived as assistance expected from social links and networks, or a problem of parenthood, is the leitmotif of this research. As expected, it is a more significant characteristic of parents of lower economic and education status, who account for the majority of the respondents.[21]

The most general conclusion of the research is that parenthood transformation in Serbia is specifically characterized by a still strong influence of the socio-cultural context. On the one hand, there is the influence of the social context marked by a prolonged crisis and, on the other, a cultural context characteristic of the south-European (Mediterranean) cultural circle, implying a tradition of strong social integration in primary relations (family and friends). Exposed to the combined effects of structural limitations and a strong tradition, transformation of parenthood does not develop towards detraditionalization and individualization. Instead, some retraditionalization is noted in this domain of family life. Since our research indicates that parenting is in many ways extremely stratified in terms of both characteristics of the social status,[22] this monosemic conclusion should be considered relative. Knowing that parenthood can no longer be treated as a single but rather as a differentiated phenomenon, we may assume that the degree of its individualization is different in different social strata and groups, and should certainly be addressed by future research efforts.

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[19] B. Wellman (1989) *The Place of Kinfolk in Personal Community Networks,* Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Research paper No. 176; quoted from Milić, 1991: 137-8.

[20] For instance in the survey "Children and parents and their needs in urban space: Belgrade in transformation period" carried out by an ISI team in 2003/2004, or in the consultations for the adoption of the National Plan for Children in the autumn of 2003.

[21] 53% of the surveyed parents have a low or lower-middle standing according to the economic status index..

[22] Stronger according to economic status.

Mirjana Bobić

TRANSFORMATION OF MARRIAGE – STRATEGIES OF CONSERVATION AND DELAY OF CHANGES

ABSTRACT:The paper analyses the structure of the surveyed Serbian population by partnership status, comparing it with the data of the latest census in order to establish the prevalence of a particular type of status and to reveal the changes in the population's behavior towards the declining universality of marriage. For that purpose, the data of the latest census are compared with those of the past three decades, in order to understand this tendency as comprehensively as possible, on aggregate level.

The second part the paper focuses on a detailed analysis of the so-called consensual unions (steady intimate relations of young adults, SIRYA, pre-marital cohabitations, with and without children, and postmarital cohabitations). After establishing their relative frequency in the surveyed sample, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of their content, i.e. the peculiar features of persons inclined to alternative styles of partnership (their socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, education, occupation), quality of life (housing and family situation, economic standard, strategies towards improving the level of living), social capital, gender positions and roles within unions, etc. Special attention is also paid to two major findings: firstly, an evident change in attitudes towards consensual unions, indicating a departure from the traditional value system, as well as a certain value confusion, and even anomie. This, nevertheless, along with the effect of demographic factors, stimulated changes in the behavior of individuals, couples, and social groups. Secondly, in addition to an evident postponement of marriage and childbearing (ageing of nuptiality and fertility), a significant increase in the share of celibacy (people who never married) was also registered, suggesting that an empirical research into the reasons for this lifestyle would be in order. Bearing in mind that this paper is preceded by a detailed qualitative analysis of a multiple case study of consensual unions, published in a book by this author, the findings of the prior study are compared and combined with the data of this representative survey of Serbia's population.

KEY WORDS: marriage, consensual unions, change, strategies, celibacy, gender, quality of life

Introduction

The paper analyses the marital behavior of the Serbian population on the basis of a 2003 survey and the results of the 2002 census. Another purpose of the paper is to establish whether the transformation of marriage in Serbia and its substitution with fragile "partnerships" has started and if so, to what extent? Finally, the third objective is to inquire into the lifestyle of the few couples who live in alternative partnerships.

But, before addressing the empirical evidence it would be appropriate to make a few comments on the post-modern processes of marriage transformation (conjugal dyads). References to the change of marriage imply a complex process which has been developing in the contemporary populations of the West for some time already, and boils down to a **move from marriage as an institution to partnership as the so-called pure relationship** (Giddens, 1992, Mills, 2000, Milić, 2001). What kind of changes are these?

The natural growth of the European population in the mid-20th century managed to provide for the simple replacement of generations; the increase was even, so that the volume of the population assumed a theoretically desirable stationary model. Suddenly, during the 1970s, after the oil crisis that swept the world causing internal economic difficulties in the developed European states, a decrease in the universality of marriage is documented, first in the leaping divorciality, and then also a decrease in the overall first nuptiality, postponement of marriage to later years, greater share of higher-order marriages, as well as of the consensual or extra-marital unions (cohabitations) of different types and age models (premarital, postmarital and alternative, permanent), all of which caused a further drop in fertility below the simple population replacement level.[1] Therefore, the epicenter of the shock is located in the very core of the family, inside the conjugal dyad (Milić, 1994, 2001). The family center of gravity thus shifts from parenthood to partnership due to diverse factors: secularization, increasingly intensified individualization, aspirations of self-realization and even hedonism, which is why certain authors have long referred to the birth of a "culture of narcissism".[2] Profession and career become personal objectives and preferences of both women and men, since owing to "perfect" contraception, conception and childbearing may be planned and postponed (for when and with whom a woman wants to have a child). As a consequence of medical technological innovations in terms of contraception and its widespread dissemination and use, marriage and/or entry into a partnership union are not directly linked with the beginning of reproduction, which consequently affects the overall fertility. Therefore, while until the mid-1960s decreasing natality was "owed" to the control of marital fertility, the drop of childbearing in the following decades has been associated with the change

[1] The average overall fertility rate in the EU at present is 1.37 children per 1 woman (Demeny, 2003).

[2] Anđelka Milić draws the attention to the destructive side of individualism: "Individualization increasingly loses orientation and brakes, every form of solidarity and compassion for others disappears (stress is mine) and an individual becomes self-sufficient, enamored of his powers… (Milić, 2001: 127)

in the marital structure of the population, i.e. substantially downsized population in classical marriage (Castiglioni and Zuanna, 1992, Prinz, 1995). Some states, notably in northern Europe, registered an increase and then stabilization of high shares of extra-marital childbirth in total fertility (e.g. Sweden where one is each two children is born by unmarried mothers), which is considered indicative of higher stages in marriage transformations, when cohabitations becomes completely legitimate choices of alternative lifestyle, practiced by ever growing numbers of people and social strata (Prinz, 1995), enabled by the welfare state.

It is known that marriage is defined as a socially (legally) ratified sexual relationship of partners the main purpose of which has (thus far) been to produce offspring. In that sense, three elements of marriage are essential: copulation (procreation), cohabitation (living together) and legitimation, i.e. social permission and control of conjugal (sexual) relations and acknowledgement of children born in that relationship (Milić, 2001). Thus, the modern post-industrial societies are undergoing a process of the so-called sexual and natality decomposition of marriage, i.e. the separation of partnership and parenting, which initiated a plurality of marital and family forms and relations (Milić, 2001:122-128).[3]

The concept of partnership includes highly diverse, more or less lasting relationships of men and women (living in a couple), essentially based on affective attachment between the partners (mutual exchange of the feeling of love, eroticism and other pleasures). The affection of love cements the intimate life of couples, which is why partnerships and even marriages easily break once this feeling is lost. According to Andjelka Milić, that is the modern substance of marriage which ultimately makes it fading away (Milić, 2001:124, und. MB).[4]

Partnership is in literature usually linked with extra-marital relations, although the quality of relational links insisted upon by most people today does not have to be in any way related to the formal legitimacy and in that sense represents the concept of "pure relationship" inaugurated by Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1992).

Due to the ever increasing practice of couples to live in extra-marital partnerships, the most often used concept is the one of "cohabitation" defined as "a union of two people of opposite sex living together, sharing 'bed and table', without being in a formal, legally sanctioned marriage" (Avramov, 1993:105). This life style is most often practiced by young generations, but it may also be found among the middle aged and older ones. Demographic data, surveys and even qualitative studies indicate that cohabitations are predominantly premarital arrangements (ibidem, Bobić,

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[3] Anđelka Milić sees the causes of this decomposition of marriage in modern society (2001: 126) in: the sexual revolution of the 1960s, emancipation of women and the above-mentioned individualization. She believes that the process started with structural and social changes in most developed societies, but soon moved to less developed environments.

[4] Similar to the previous view, I also belive that emotons are definitely not enough to be the sole cement of a lasting relationship (if it is the objective by itself), but that persons affected by the relationship must, in addition to emotions as highly changeable entities, be prepared for devotion to both themselves each other in a mutual relationship, which implies the so-called mature dependence, i.e. the relinquising of the fealing of personal self-sufficienty, omnipotence and aspiration towards hedonism (momentary satisfaction of needs and desires) (Bobić, 2003). This clearly explains the instability of modern partnership communities.

2003), although there are also postmarital (after divorce and in old age) as well as lasting forms of extra-marital partnership (forms of living in couple alternative to marriage, most often found in Scandinavian countries).

In addition to cohabitations, fairly widespread among the population of developed European and North American states are the so-called LAT ("Living apart together") arrangements. The term was first used in Netherlands in the early 1980s to denote couples who did not live together (in the same household), but not necessarily singles either (usually the student population) (Trost, 1986). Today, these arrangements are practicized by minority of couples who have an intimate relationship but maintain- either temporarily or permanently – separate households. In majority of cases LAT union is a result of occupational or other compelling circumstances, less often a conscious choice and a very expensive one, that can be afforded only by affluent population (Cliquet, 2003). The form itself is indicative of the contents (dimensions) of these relations. Due to the increasingly spreading LAT forms throughout the developed West, some authors think that they should be statistically recorded and monitored (Klijzing and Macura M.M, 1997).

Finally, modern society includes another smaller population category - people who permanently forsake parenthood, but not living in couple. These are couples who made an advance agreement not to have children (so-called voluntary or sociological sterility). Based on empirical evidence a typical married couple without children is described as one of young, healthy, highly educated people who highly value mutual closeness, but also seek personal autonomy. They are referred to as the DINKS ("double-income-no-kids") (Avramov, 1993).

Finally, in addition to all the above-mentioned numerous behavioral models of private and family life arrangements, a phenomenon of giving up partnerships on a lasting basis ("committed singles") was also registered (Bobić, 2003, 2003a). Numerous authors caution that globalization will not only cause an increase in deliberate childlessness ("sociological sterility", "childlessness") due to the evidently declining trend of state support to families and children, but may also polarize the population into family and non-family households (Hoffmann – Nowotny and Fux, 2001).

1. Structure of the Serbian population by partnership status

The focus in this part of the text will be shifted to analyzing the structure of the Serbian population, by marital status, on the basis of the survey and census data. In view of the fact that the 2003 empirical survey used a wider classification, which in addition to the conventional division of the marital statuses (unmarried, married, divorced, widowed), also included other variants of extramarital partnerships, the relevant data will be presented and analyzed separately. The survey deployed wider classification of partnerships that encompassed following extramarital unions: 1) SIRYA, 2) cohabitations and 3) extramarital families. Having in mind that the meaning of the last two types of unions mostly correspond to the above mentioned forms that are widespread in West), at this place I will turn the attention to the first one, so-called SIRYA, that is our, Serbian speciality. I use this term to denote *steady intimate relationships of young adults.* Individuals become attached to one another on the basis of a romantic complex (love, sexual attraction), but the essential dimensions of a "firmer" union go missing: residential (shared housing), functional (household) and socio-demographic (reproduction, socialization, personalization). Partnership is in the process of emerging, through the measuring each other's desires, expectations, re-examination, planning, all of which may also apply to cohabitations. These unions can last for a very long time due to the specific compelling circumstances, and lack of resources in a society in transformation.

Empirical research findings reveal that marriage is still the predominant form of life in a couple and a framework of childbearing (Table 1). As many as 63.3% of the respondents are married, followed by those who have not been married so far (celibates) and widows/widowers, while the fewest are the divorcees (5,4%).

Table 1. Serbian population, by marital structure, 2003

	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Others	Total
%	17.6	63.3	5.4	12.3	1.3	100.0

Source: Calculated on the basis of the 2003 empirical research

Table 2. Partnership status of PEOPLE OUTSIDE MARRIAGE, Serbia, 2003

		Cohabitations			
	SIRYA	Premarital cohabitations	Postmarital cohabitations	Extramarital families	Total
%	1.9	0.8	0.6	0.8	4.1

Source: Same as Table 2

However, the use of a wider partnership status classification, thus including the above-mentioned unions, steady intimate relations of young adults (SIRYA), cohabitations (premarital and postmarital) and extramarital families, gives the total of 13.5%[5] of "genuine" celibates (partnerless at the time of the survey). On the whole, very few respondents (merely 4.1%) practice alternative partnership lifestyles, which confirms the thesis about the slow transformation of the conjugal-family paradigm. Furthermore, a qualitative research of partnership unions in Belgrade, using the method of case study revealed that these unions were "modernized" only in terms of their form, rather than essence, i.e. that everyday life in a couple was highly traditional, with asymmetric gender roles and patriarchal perspectives where the planning of life-courses of men and women were concerned (Bobić, 2003).

[5] The difference between the 17.6% (never married) and the cited 13.5% "genuine" celibates emerges because all respondents who are not officially married have been classified into the first group in Table 1, which thus also includes the SIRYAs, one-parent families with children born out of wedlock, cohabitations and extramarital families.

Let us take a look at the situation with respect to the entire population, i.e. the data of the 2002 census (Table 3). At the same time, these data will be compared with those of the censuses of the last three decades with a view to testing the hypothesis about the gradual, albeit very slow, decrease in the universality of marriage,[6] along with another one about the aging of its model.

Table 3. Population structure by marital status, Central Serbia, Vojvodina and Belgrade (over 15 years of age) 1971-2002, in %

	Central Serbia				
	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Total
1971	20.8	68.6	8.1	2.2	100.0
1981	19.2	69.5	8.3	3.0	100.0
1991	20.0	68.2	8.4	3.3	100.0
2002	24.1	61.4	10.6	3.9	100.0
	Vojvodina				
1971	22.2	66.0	8.9	2.7	100.0
1981	20.4	67.1	9.2	3.3	100.0
1991	20.0	66.3	9.8	3.9	100.0
2002	25.4	58.7	11.5	4.4	100.0
	Belgrade				
1971	23.7	65.1	7.0	4.1	100.0
1981	21.4	65.9	7.0	4.8	100.0
1991	23.6	62.9	7.4	5.0	100.0
2002	27.7	56.7	9.9	5.6	100.0

Source: Calculated on the basis of the census data for the relevant years

The table reveals a substantial downward trend for the category of the married, along with a mild and somewhat stronger increase in the respective shares of the divorced and the widowed, while the number of the unmarried registers the highest growth with a leap of full 4-5%. A more thorough investigation into the influence of 1) the demographic factor (changes in the age-gender composition of the marital contingent, as a consequence of the secular fall in natality over a longer period), separate from 2) behavioral changes (the population's attitudes towards life in a marriage, measured by marriage rates), would require a standardization process for isolated observation of effects of each of the causes. This will not be done in this text due to limited space but there is no doubt that the result would reveal a combined effect of both factors in the same direction (only with different intensity), thereby confirming both the above-mentioned assumptions.

[6] The concept implies a biheviourial model whereby the entire adult population seeks marriage, meaning low shares of celibates, divorcees and widows/widowers. The model is charactgeristic of pre-industrial and developed industrial societies all the way until the 1960s, when the conjugal dyad enters a stage of large turbulence, instability and decline. This situation in the developed countries has been retained to this date.

2. Extramarital partnership unions in Serbia (general characteristics)

I will start analyzing the empirical evidence of the survey into partnerships by stating the reasons for non-marrying or postponing marriage. In the first place it is necessary to underline that preferences for married life are still strong. Only 0.5% of unmarried respondents said that they "did not wish to live in a marriage". The largest number of the respondents opted to say that they "are not interested in marriage at the moment" (6.7%). They are followed by the category of those who claim that they are not ready for marriage yet (4.3%). This means that almost one in each ten celibates does not think about marrying and having a family for the time being. The shares of respondents who see some obstacles for making this step in objective circumstances (lack of material possibilities, and probably also housing), and those who explicate subjective factors (absence of partners) are even (1.7% and 1.8% respectively), which is indicative of their combined effect.

Therefore, the survey results point to the obvious discrepancy between the still strong pro-familistic values (attitudes) and individualist behavior, also registered in other, more developed societies (Eurobarometer, 1993, Bobić, 2003). In the case of Serbia, this has to do with the absence of freedom of choice (forced celibacy), given to individuals in welfare states, as evidenced by papers on the expansion of voluntary celibacy ("committed singles").

Bearing in mind that the majority still prefers life in a couple, it is logical to examine whether what we have in Serbia is a case of deflection from the traditional institution of marriage. Changes are obvious at the level of attitudes and values. First, all respondents are clear about their personal attitudes towards couples living together without being married, which means that they have already come across this life pattern and thought about it. Over a half of them approve of this lifestyle (58.4%), compared with 30.8% of strongly opposed and 10.5% of undecided. The group of those with a positive approach differentiates between: 1) respondents who accept that for others, but not themselves (20.1%); 2) those who think it is the same thing as marriage (15.6%); 3) respondents who would live like that themselves (11.4%) and, finally 4), almost an equal number of those who agree with this option until childbirth (11.3%).

Further on in this paper I will apply myself to analyzing the quality of life in extramarital partnerships, focusing on the three forms of "consensual" unions shown in Table 3. Clearly the most numerous are SIRYA unions (1.9%), which is entirely in agreement with the data on the increased celibacy and postponement of marriage, as well as prolongation of the so-called "social childhood". Follow cohabitations (1.4%) differentiated (by age, sex and previous marital status) in two variants, namely the premarital (0.8%), including younger men as well as women of middle and higher education and economic status, and postmarital (0.6%), preferred by older, divorced and women of the same social milieu. Extramarital families are represented the least (0.8%), and are more preferred by younger middle-aged women, of medium-level education and economic status, which is not unusual knowing that women with high human capital are actors of modernizing behavior.

Accordingly, we may conclude that, although presently precious few, extramarital unions are the lifestyle of younger, more educated population of medium and higher social status, which concurs with the findings of other empirical, both quantitative and case studies, confirming that the strata of the so-called urban "non-conventional intelligentsia" are more often inclined toward consensual unions (Prinz, 1995, Bobić, 2003).

Consensual unions covered by the survey are also more often found in urban environments, although their spread from the center towards the periphery (from Belgrade) towards other (urban) environments are noted. SIRYA unions thus reveal an almost even distribution in downtown Belgrade (0.4%) and its suburbia (0.3), in other towns (0.6%), and also in the villages (0.7%). Cohabitations, too, are evenly distributed in Belgrade (city center and periphery), in other towns (0.4%) and in the villages (0.4%). I think that this is a glaring example of a clash between modernism and traditionalism, the spreading of the type approaching modern forms of democratic gender relations of men and women in urban environments, and the preservation of the traditional marriage form in rural parts (Petrović, R, 1981).

As for the age-sex structure, people who live in SIRYAs are predominantly young, 18-29 year old men and women in almost equal proportions. They are almost seven times less numerous in the next age group of 33-44. Their sex structure is almost even with more or less the same inclination of men and women. From the point of view of education and occupation, SIRYA unions are characteristic of people with secondary, as well as higher and high professional education, students and the unemployed, as also confirmed by my qualitative research. In terms of kinship composition, respondents living in SIRYA unions are mostly co-resident members of their families of origin, and share their middle economic status, which is certainly a better starting position in a society undergoing transition, and explains the reasons for the slow individuation of these young people, i.e. their slow emancipation from the family of origin.[7] Accordingly, in terms of their <u>housing standard</u> individuals who practice these unions predominantly live in their parents or grandparents' apartments (1.8% in total) - as confirmed by the results of my qualitative research - which may be attributed to their lower age and the fact that many among them are still in the process of acquiring education (students), although their ranks also include a number of the unemployed.

In terms of <u>sex structure</u> cohabitations are equally preferred by men and women aged 18-29 and 33-44, which indicates their predominantly trial or premarital nature, identified and addressed in detail in my case study (Bobić, 2003). As for educational characteristics, most respondents have secondary, higher and high education, which may also be explained by their somewhat older age implying a higher level of human capital. From the point of view of their occupation, the unemployed and students prevail, followed by entrepreneurs, professionals/low level managers and workers.

[7] That, however, is not specific of our society, stuck in transformation processes. Other more developed states have also noted the phenomenon of faster biological than social maturing, and a tendency of the young to leave the blessings of the parental home as late as possible (Hoffmann – Nowotny, 2001, Avramov, Cliquet, 2004).

Half of the total number of cohabitating couples own their apartments, followed by those who live in the flats of their grandparents or in-laws. This finding is also consistent with the results of my qualitative research, although it noted that those who spoke of "their" own units actually lived in the apartments of their parents, they were granted the use of or expected to inherit.

The case study in Belgrade also located premarital cohabitations among the young educated members of middle strata who, owing more often to family resources (additional housing space) and somewhat less to enormous work engagement, managed to leave the family nest and start a new life with their partners.

Extramarital families are a bit more characteristic of women (0.6% of the total of 0.8%), and more frequently take the form which includes progeny born in that union (0.7% to 0.1%). They are twice more frequent in the 18-29 than in the next 33-44 age group, which is probably due to the temporariness of these unions (over time they, too, transform into married families). In terms of educational characteristics, respondents who adopt this lifestyle predominantly belong to the category with secondary and high education (0.5% of 0.8%), but when it comes to their occupation they are mostly unemployed or housewives (0.6% of 0.7% in total), which may be explained by the status inconsistency characteristic of societies undergoing post-socialist transformation (disharmony between education, profession and income). As for economic status as a synthetic indicator, extramarital unions are almost evenly distributed among those of low, lower middle, middle and higher statuses, although, in sum, they are most often of a middle status (0.5% of 0.8% in total). This may be understood in the context of marital (partner) heterogamy, i.e. the practice that women who opt for this social sidestep pair with partners of higher social rank, as well as the reality that individuals in such unions probably have higher social origin and accumulated resources (economic, social, cultural, psychological), (Bobić, 2003), providing them the prerequisites for survival in a situation of lower social acceptance compared with marital unions. A similar, qualitative research in Belgrade addressing extramarital unions had only women respondents,[8] who came from formerly middle or higher middle class families and, having been socialized in a parental family of a middle or higher middle strata, not only managed to accumulate more economic resources (ensured to inherit apartments etc.) but also to acquire a more desirable degree of socio-psychological capital (self-awareness, developed "locus controli").

3. Lifestyle of extramarital partnerships in Serbia

The following part of the paper will offer a qualitative analysis of the essential contents of everyday life of couples living in extramarital unions. The SIRYAs will, for the most part, be left out of this exercise, bearing in mind that they lack the es-

[8] International empirical evidence warn that in the process of the registration of consensual unions, there occure a problem related to the subjective feelings of couples. Namely, many individuals tend to equalize their union with marriage, especially if they have children, and therefore declare themselves as officially married, while they actually are cohabiting (Prinz, 1995).

sential functional and interactional dimensions (housing, joint household economy, everyday life arrangements, housework, concern and care, etc.).

The analytical paradigm which will be the pillar in the interpretation of empirical evidence is the sex-gender system (Bobić, 2003), which is defined as a complex of a joint life in a couple, and is built gradually, by pooling the resources, human and social capital of both actors, along with individual and joint life strategies practiced over a longer period of joint life ("the process of partnership"). The sex-gender system is operationally examined through the following dimensions: housing and material, authority (power in taking the key decisions in everyday life) and interpersonal (relations in a couple). Bearing in mind that the first two dimensions have been addressed above, I shall apply myself to the remaining dimensions, i.e. the power (authority), mutual relations in a partnership, social and human capital, and the strategies towards increasing the quality of life. With a view to obtaining a deeper insight the analysis of cohabitations shall, in addition to the results of a multiple case study, also include a comparison with married family unions.

House budget is predominantly formed as a joint, conjugal fund both in the case of cohabitations and extramarital and marital family unions. However, cohabitations (premarital and post-marital) reveal a high degree of variants where spouses retain a certain sum of money for their purposes (40%-50% of cases), while married family unions register this option in only about 10% of cases. The decision about the allocation of funds is taken by the respondent (in 50.5% households), who is, presumably, predominantly personified in an adult male (head of the family), while the option of joint, democratic decision-making is almost negligible in all types of unions, with only 2.9%. Observed individually by type of union, (premarital) cohabitations, married childless unions and married families display an almost even distribution of patricentric and matricentric decision-making, while the patriarchal paradigm is more pronounced in postmarital cohabitations and extramarital unions (two and seven times more respectively), which may be attributed to the average older age of partners. In line with these is also the finding about whose word prevails in a conflict concerning major investments, which reveals that the patriarchal "final say" is more pronounced with all types of extramarital as well as marital unions.

As concerning housework (cooking, washing, ironing, caring for the children, the elderly and the sick, supervision of children's school obligations, the largest burden is born by women (wives, mothers) in almost 2/3 of surveyed households. Far behind this option is the one where this burden is shouldered by all, registered in 5-9% households. In this respect a bit more headway has been made in caring for small children and overseeing school children's homework, involving all members of almost one in each five households, thereby relieving the woman's burden a little bit (to 65%). Reducing "the price of motherhood" by involving men and other persons is one of the known strategies for unburdening women (in addition to the decreasing norm of the desirable number of children and various forms of daily childcare), (Avramov, 1993, Blagojević, 1997).

A comparison of the organization of housework in primary and secondary families gives interesting results. On the whole, 1/3 of all unions (marital and extramarital) fail to reveal any progress in this respect, i.e. the domestic work has remained practically the exclusive province of the female members. Still, almost one in four households reveals greater involvement of men, and the fact that some advance with respect to housework has been made is confirmed by my qualitative research in Belgrade. As for (premarital) cohabitations, in every fourth household, both in the family of origin and the present one, the two sexes are evenly burdened, while just as many households reveal essential changes in terms of greater male engagement. Extramarital families display polarization into two types, namely those who register no change (women still carry a larger burden) and those with evident pro-egalitarian practices.

However, despite the fact that the use of female resources is still very large, almost 2/3 of women (70%) are satisfied with the existing state of affairs, which the authors of feminist provenance assign to "women's self/sacrificial micro matriarchy" (Blagojević, 1997), out of which women derive numerous "secondary benefits" (the power of managing the private sphere, destinies of their household members, immanent woman's need to care for and attend to her closest kin as a "*modus vivendi*", etc.) (Blagojević, 2002).

The remaining group of women who are dissatisfied with their lives, being overburdened by housework, concern and care, try to relieve the burden by resorting to the following strategies: talking with partners concerning their involvement (50.1%), and then turning for help to female (8.7%), i.e. children regardless of their sex (8.2%). One in each five dissatisfied women does nothing, probably because she is stuck with the patriarchal system of values, and also because she doubts the success of change, so the viscous circle of the same practice and the women's (dis)satisfaction is renewed. Talks with one's husband turns out to be the least efficient result of attempts to find the optimum solution to overcome the hardships of everyday life (a mere 1.1% of men change their behavior in this way!). The most efficient strategy proves to be the one of <u>reducing the work to the minimum</u> ("doing only the essential", 37.6%), followed by activation of children (almost a third, i.e. 28.5% of surveyed households). The fact that the patriarchal paradigm stubbornly persists, or at least changes slowly, is evidenced by the attitudes of women themselves, as well as those of other household members, who treat domestic work as "women's" and see their participation in it as "assisting the women" (sic!). Thus, 42.4% of women, both married and unmarried, do all the work themselves, trying to organize it well or, as seen above, do only what is essential. Paid assistance is affordable to only 2% of women. Fully consistent with this is the empirical finding that 72.6% of women (both married and those living in extramarital unions, with or without children) are dissatisfied with the amount of money appropriated from the household budget to facilitate housework (purchase of appliances, equipment, chemical agents, etc.).

No special explanation is required to see just how dysfunctional this practice is from the point of view of system reproduction, and especially a future market model, which will require increased engagement of female resources, abilities and skills of networking in the modern economy of services, global networking and flexibilization of working hours and careers (Bobić, 2003a).

4. Strategies towards improving the quality of life, social capital, cultural taste and consumption

In the sample of the unemployed respondents in central Serbia and Vojvodina of 12.8%, a third are continuously out of work (33.3%). Another third of respondents are jobless either due to redundancy or a closedown of a private employer (30.8% in total).

As for the possibility to take up a supplementary job or any kind of work in the event of unemployment, 2/3 of the respondents viewed as a whole (in marital and extra-marital unions) reported the absence of such prospects, which is revealing of a very low action potential.

Asked how they went about looking for jobs, the overwhelming majority responded that they still relied on the Unemployment Bureau (36.5%), and then also informal channels (relatives and friends, 28.2%). As many as a fifth of respondents do not look for a job at all, adopting a passive strategy of expecting others to assist them, which is definitely anti-modernizing. Moreover, this approach may favor the preservation of authoritarianism (and radicalism) in political affiliations. Passive behavior is particularly manifest in extramarital unions, while proactive strategies are more often found in marital-family unions (monitoring announcements of vacancies, looking for jobs through cooperatives, enlisting relatives and friends, etc.).

Those who have supplementary or occasional jobs (the total of 39.2%), refer to the economy of survival (greater certainty of satisfying the needs) as their main motive, while a higher living standard is the objective of one in each 5 households (22.9%). Personal satisfaction or hobbies as reasons for additional engagement are referred to by one in ten proactive respondents (11.5%). The latter option is, as expected, somewhat more often mentioned by partners in SIRYA unions, since they are co-residents in their parents' households and are, therefore, relieved of concerns of everyday existence. Premarital cohabitations show an even distribution of all the above-mentioned motives, while all other (marital and extramarital) unions reveal a greater presence of compulsion to ensure bare existence. As for strategies towards improving the quality of life, the most numerous are those who do not know what they could do (37%). They are followed by respondents who opt for work strategies (finding a job, private entrepreneurship, doing several paid jobs, etc.). Respondents who live in extramarital unions (except post-marital cohabitations) most often go for work strategies, investment into their own education and emigration, which may be attributed to their age characteristics (members of the younger middle generation). Partners in extramarital unions are more inclined to work strategies (0.5% of 0.8). In contrast, childless marriage unions and conjugal families have developed a whole series of different strategies: from work, through the so-called "push factors", change of place of residence in search of a job, emigration abroad, education, sale of apartments, investment into children, etc.

The deep social crisis, sustained and occasionally deepened over the past two and a half decades, influenced the destruction of the basic social tissue, <u>the basic trust of people into one another</u>, as also noted by other research efforts, especially scientific public opinion research (Pantić, 1998). In that sense, Pantić (ibidem: 232) draws the attention to the state of <u>anomy</u> in value attitudes of the population in all countries undergoing post-socialist transformation, resulting from a conflict between traditionalism and modernism, i.e. between the aspirations for safety and equality and inclination to take the risk and responsibility, between egalitarianism and differentiation, collectivism and individualism, xenophobia and openness to the world, orientations towards state and private ownership, authoritarian and democratic personality syndromes.

Given this axiological context, the low degree of social capital established in our 2003 empirical research is hardly surprising. Over half the respondents <u>have no one to turn to</u> when it comes to resolving important personal problems: finding a job (56.7%), admission to health institutions (54.4%), school enrolment (87.0 %), resolving housing problems (79.0%), dealing with municipal administrative affairs, the police, courts (69.6%), finding of reliable persons for household services (52.8%). Solidarity is somewhat greater with respect to emotional support and advice (35.7% have no trusted person) and financial borrowings (42.5%).

If we take a look who the respondents may occasionally count upon, we will, in addition to what has remained of the traditional model of informal links (relatives, neighbors), also see the elements of new, more modern ones including, e.g. colleagues from work and friends. Thus, for instance, the total of 23.8% of respondents in our survey rely on friends. In cases involving the finding of a regular, supplementary or better job, respondents in SIRYA unions mostly rely on friends and relatives (1.0% of 1.9%). Partners in premarital cohabitations turn to friends and relatives in equal measure (0.4 of 0.9%). Extramarital families are predominantly left to themselves, so that the share of those who have "important others" is small (of the total of 0.8%, 0.5% turn to no one and 0.3% to a friend of relative). Respondents in post-marital cohabitations rely on friends and neighbors to a somewhat greater extent (0.4% of 0.6%), which is understandable given their more advanced age. Contrary to informal or consensual unions, conjugal family unions may count on a much wider support of friends (13.8% of 63.4% of all), relatives (8.7%) and neighbors (2.4%).

As concerning access to treatment in health institutions one in each five respondents in both types of unions may rely on a relative (20.2%), and immediately after a friend (18.2%), which is probably the consequence of the deep-rooted fear of illness and concern for health as the last resources we have left (if so?) after all the years of war, poverty, sanctions, bombing… Here again we have a polarization into the informal and formal marital sector, so that all unions, with the exception of SIRYAs, are more or less left to their own devices. Bearing in mind that SIRYAs are preferred by younger people, students, grown up "children" in their parental families, it is quite clear that they are "under the protection" of the family of origin (their friends, relatives, neighbors, acquaintances). Where it comes to enrolment of children into schools, parents in extramarital unions are almost completely marginalized and cannot count on anyone at all (0.7 of 0.8%), in contrast to those from marital unions, who, on the whole, have a small but still wider social support (friends, relatives, neighbors, acquaintances, 8.3% of 58.8%).

Housing is one of acute social and individual problems in post-socialist transformation, and the citizens cannot count either on individual or state assistance to solve it. Some, minimal assistance of relatives (presumably meant to include members of extended families and in-laws, 9.2% in total) and friends who probably come to aid in finding apartments to rent in the private sector and/or paying the landlords (8.6%). Conjugal family unions, as well as other forms (such as the divorced, one-parent families, widowed) are once again in a better position compared with extramarital unions, which are in our parts still socially less acceptable and supported.

When it comes to financial borrowings, almost a third of all households may count on relatives (29.8%), and then friends (21.1%). In this respect, extramarital families are somewhat more confident (0.5 of 0.8% may rely on friends, acquaintances and relatives) probably due to the existence of children. Premarital cohabitations practically cannot count on anyone (only 0.2% of 0.8% may turn to their relatives). Every second respondent in a post-divorce cohabitation can rely on a friend, acquaintance or a relative. Conjugal family unions are favored, so that their members can reckon with the material support of relatives (17.6% of 63.5%) and friends (13.7%). The situation is similar with other forms of life arrangements derived from marital unions (the divorced, widowed, one-parent families – assistance of relatives and friends in 10.5%, 6.6%, respectively). Emotional support is the only form of social capital possessed by all to a greater or smaller degree. The psychological advisory function is predominantly performed by relatives 33.2% of cases), and friends (25.1%). Thus it may be concluded that this is the single aspect of everyday life in respect of which the informal and formal partner unions are in an equal position.

The next set of questions relates to the sphere of sociability, i.e. social networks. Members of most households in their free time associate primarily with friends and godparents – one in 5 (19.7%), and then with neighbors and closest kin (15.9 and 15.1% respectively). Fourth ranked are household members – the single contact for one in each ten households (11.6%), which together with the previous types of contacts testifies to a confined social sphere, and closing into the narrow circle of one's closest kin (traditionalism). In that context it is hardly surprising that colleagues from work (partners) rank last (2.8%). The above-mentioned empirical results apply to both forms, the formal and informal lifestyles of male-female couples, and are consistent with the findings of the qualitative research in Belgrade, which confirmed that consensual unions are still subjected to the dominant, traditional (patriarchal) ideology reflected in their everyday life. That is probably the reason why most respondents feel neither lonely nor neglected by others (74.5% in total), which clashes with the already described scope of their available social capital, but that is probably the case of reduced social expectations both from others and themselves (blocked transformation has obviously paralyzed personal as well as civic initiative, i.e. the non-traditional types of links). That is also why the social engagement of respondents from both marital and extramarital unions in citizens associations, political organizations and movements is almost negligible (a mere 6.1%).

Finally, a few words about cultural tastes and consumption. The most frequent forms of cultural consumption, again regardless of the type of union, are (passive) association with relatives and friends (94.8%), followed by the reading of the press and books (71.5%), while visits to cultural institutions (theatre, cinema, concerts), sports and recreation are less frequent (33.3% and 28.3%). The majority of marital and extramarital households engage in the activities referred to with greatest frequency, such as press and book reading and association with relatives and friends (individualized, passive leisure) almost on everyday basis, or several times a week. In contrast to that, visits to cultural institutions (cinemas, theatres, concerts) are rare. One in five respondents goes to these places only a few times a year, which may also be attributed to the high (market) costs of tickets.

A matter of concern, in my view, is the finding that the lifestyle of most citizens offers very little or insufficient space for a healthy way of life, i.e. for recreation in their free time. A healthy way of life, activity, sports and recreation, with a healthy and diverse diet, are a natural way to fend off stress and illness, and increase longevity. There is no doubt that promotion of health and recreation, along with anti-smoking campaigns should find the way into the political programs and actions of state and government bodies, all the more since modernizing changes can be realized by a healthy and active (working) population.

5. Conclusion: Transformation of marriage – unblocking the change

A summary review of the results of a survey preceded by a multiple case study of consensual unions (SIRYAs, cohabitations, extramarital families) allows for a few common findings.

1) It is evident that the universality of marriage is on a decline, which is in Serbia taking place with a time lag of about four decades compared with the developed European states. The changes in Serbia unfold very slowly, under conditions of a deep, long-drawn-out social crisis, destruction of society and a highly "arduous" establishment of the new, market model. This social context is marked by a value anomy, i.e. confusion and conflict of values of traditionalism and modernism. Still, the sequential phases of marriage transformation develop in line with the theory of the "second demographic transition" (increase in divorces; greater share of higher order marriages and the appearance and spreading of consensual unions and extramarital childbering; plurality of partnerships and family forms, instead of the prevailing modern, nuclear family, etc.; changed family focus from parenthood to partnership; individualization, etc.).
2) The proponents of change in partnership behavior are young, urban, highly educated men and women (non-conventional intelligentsia), descendents of

urban families of the former middle class. The most widespread forms are SIRYAs, due to numerous objective circumstances (shortage of apartments, unemployment, low material standard, uncertain future of the young, permanent political crises, thoughts of emigration), as well as subjective reasons (wish not to repeat the marriage model of one's parents, especially in an extended household, absence of partners, need to postpone marriage and childbirth, dissatisfaction with one's self for various reasons, etc.).

SIRYA unions are, in terms of frequency, followed by premarital and post-divorce cohabitations and finally, the least represented, extramarital families.

3) Just like the case study in Belgrade, this representative survey in Serbia has confirmed that consensual unions are a step forward in the formal, but not substantial characteristics (contents) of partnership, which is still under a strong influence of the ideology of patriarchy. The sex-gender system is asymmetric, with a pronounced male authority while the private sphere is still very much filled with the model of women's sacrifice and care.
4) The social capital of consensual unions is very limited, although that, true to a somewhat lesser extent, also applies to other forms of conjugal family unions, which is not unusual knowing that the Serbian society is in a very deep social crisis, wherein the basic confidence of people into each other has been seriously undermined, as well as their trust of official institutions, all of which necessitates the crystallization of new forms of rationality in personal and social action, as well as different types of modern, interest-based links, outside the narrow circles of one's relatives and neighbors.

Vesna Miletić-Stepanović

STRATEGIES OF MANAGEMENT OF GENDER/FEMALE RISKS IN SERBIA

ABSTRACT: The paper aims at providing an insight into the social structure by analyzing social inequalities arising as a consequence of traditional, i.e. patriarchal gender risks. The focus is on the most traditional element of women's social position, that is, on their status and role within the private sphere. The social position of women in patriarchy is highly risky and ambiguous. On the one hand, women are objectively integrated or, more precisely, forcefully integrated in the system, constantly exposed to systemic risks, and forced to play a feudal role in the system. On the other hand, and in spite of this difficult situation, women manifest a high level of subjective integration in the system and remain unaware of their objectively risky position. The existence of ambiguities has been confirmed in the following areas: family policy of intergenerational allocation of family material resources; organization of subsistence production performed in the household; as well as in the vertically extended households as patriarchal communities. The ambiguous situation has also been confirmed in the area of managing patriarchal risks in subsistence production among married women: although the data show these strategies to be relatively underdeveloped, women report a comparatively high degree of satisfaction with such activities.

KEY WORDS: patriarchy, gender risks, forced integration of women, ambiguity, natural production, women's feudal role, women's strategies, women's subjective integration

1. Women as the basic resource of society in transformation blockade

The paper aims at providing an insight into the social structure by analyzing social inequalities arising in consequence of traditional, i.e. patriarchal gender risks, by focusing on the analysis of the social position of women in the private sphere. The social positions of genders are highly differentiated in the entire society and in particular in the private sphere, and result in huge inequalities.

The riskiness of the social position of women in the private sphere shall be determined on the basis of the following indicators which, in our view, have great importance in the sphere of gender risks and strategies to overcome them. These include: 1. risks in the sphere of family property inheritance policy; 2. risks in the sphere of patriarchal organization of subsistence production; 3. women's strategies of managing patriarchal risks in the sphere of subsistence production; 4. risks of vertically extended families (VEFs) as patriarchal communities; 5. subjective integration of women into patriarchy.

The basis of the prosystemic strategy of reproduction of our society is the reliance on the human resources of women, subsistence production and human reproduction done by the women in households, which makes them extremely conservative and unmodern. Consumption of women's human resources in global society goes through a system of mediators, which diminish its visibility. Although women are the pillars of the system and their actions have overall-social importance, the system treats them incorrectly and irresponsibly: the relationship between the global level and an individual, especially women, is a one-way affair, rigid and inadequate. The system's re-channeling of public resources towards the takeover of responsibilities for housework is minimum and lacks interactivity, mutuality and reciprocity. The social position of women is ambiguous, i.e. alienated: in reality ambivalence objectively exists, since women are simultaneously important basic actors of the system's reproduction and hold its key lever in their hands, but they are also a group with a highly risky social position, being constantly exposed to the effects of systemic risks, unconnected and objectively unintegrated into the system in the reproduction of which they invest all of their resources. However, in view of the high degree of subjective integration of women, they remain unaware of their objectively ambivalent position, and in that case we speak about the ambiguous social position. If they decide to engage in any activity leading to a change, women are forced to rely on their individual and informal strategies.

2. Prosystemic strategy of multiple ambiguities[1]

The entire society is, in this paper, observed as essentially unmodernized and one which, in our view, should be defined as a mixed type of patriarchy (Papić, 1997), i.e. modern patriarchy (Pateman, 2001). While the traditional patriarchy (the social system which existed before the modernizing processes, i.e. until the 18th century) up to a point insisted on the domination of man starting from the position of a father as a social position, what we have in the modern system is a purely biological characteristic, gender as the basis of domination: man can attain their domination only on the basis of their gender. Modern society is so conceived that capitalism and patriarchy are partners, linked with the "civil enslavement" of women (Pateman, 2001). We see that this is only a superficial modernization of modern society by the fact that the whole of modern capitalism, the leader of modernization, substantially relies on the non-tradable subsistence production of women in households (Michel,

[1]According to Lefebvre individuals and groups in everyday life most often live in the way of ambiguity. Ambivalence is present if an individual or a group becomes aware of the existing conflict. However, ambiguity exists when individuals are indifferent, when they are not conscious of the controversies and accept them. The suppression of controversies creates alienation: individuals and groups are unable to learn and master their own lives.

1997), which has assumed such proportions that it accounts for up to 45% of total production in the developed countries. We may assume that this percentage is much higher in our society, wherein production in the public sphere is practically nonexistent, while the institutionalization of care for children and domestic work is not only inadequate but reduced to the minimum? Patriarchy is in both its Behemoth (organized chaos of instable transition societies) and Leviathan (patriarchal order of stable societies) images highly consistent in its attitude towards women: they are the new and the old underclass, excluded from distribution and consumption and forcibly included in the overall production of the society.

Modern society rests on the reproduction of huge inequalities between genders, by means of manipulations within the capital-risk system, in the symbolic, economic, social and cultural spheres. Observing the society from the gender perspective, the quantity of resources individuals and groups produce or invest into a system, and the quantity of resources they avail of are in a reverse proportion, to the disadvantage of women and the benefit of men. The power of the principle of gender differentiation is especially manifested in the private sphere, where the huge inequalities in the social positions of genders are reflected in the ways of their participation in the processes of social production, reproduction, distribution and consumption of the capital-risk system (economic, symbolic, cultural and social) wherein the risks "belong" to women and the resources to men. At this point, we can add something to the basic deficiency of the concept of social reproduction and especially social capital, where the role of women is generally kept silent. Namely, here too, a concealed contradiction exists: if the strategies of social reproduction are defined in the above-mentioned way, the modern society is then intensively oriented **towards** women's human resources in the process of production-conversion of all types of capital, but **away** from women when the distribution and consumption of created resources are concerned. That is where the basic antagonism is reflected, which stimulates the system towards the women, i.e. their forcible integration into patriarchy (Beth Denich, 1993). Carole Pateman who criticized the theory of the social contract as the fundamental concept of civil society from the feminist point of view, attaches key importance to the marriage contract. Precisely that marriage "contract" is the element that questions the existence of civil society, by immobilizing up to a half of the adult population, discriminatively on gender basis. Married women are in particular in a paradoxical, risky situation: they are both the main resource and the main producer of resources, but of a patriarchal system.

Women have almost no legal chance to use the global, or even local resources, due to the specific social policy of most modern societies and their own unawareness. Prosystemic strategies normally use global resources for the purpose of militarization and accumulation of wealth in the hands of few individuals of the male sex. Women are thus exposed to the action of a triple system of powerful limiting factors, **the system of three-tiered risks**: on the global level these are budgetary priorities and the social policy of a pro/patriarchally oriented society, on the mezzo level it is a complex system of economic and cultural risks, and on the individual level, primarily the self-will of the husband, i.e. the male kinship/fraternal network, and the patriarchal mental stricture - a way of thinking imposed on women. This paper will, in the first place, address the **mezzo risks** (the system of inheriting family property, division of housework in the family, vertically extended family as a survival strategy of the family as a group, which is risky for a woman as an individual) and **micro risks** (male self-will, patriarchal way of thinking of women – subjective integration).

1. One of the basic strategic orientations of the reproduction of patriarchy is the reproduction of patrilocality and the limiting of neolocality and matrilocality. Feminist analyses (Michel, 1997) say that male domination over women for the first time in history emerges precisely at the time when the institution of permanent residence also appears. Modern patriarchy has built an entire **political economy of intergenerational allocation of family material resources**, because it takes great care of sustaining the patrilocal permanent residence, as one of the key pillars of social reproduction. In this way women are deprived of economic capital, which could be crucial for their economic position and individualization and needlessly reduce their possibilities for individual strategic action to fight the systemic risks, already dangerously diminished by the system.

2. No social system has ever managed to become so modernized and build the institutions such as would enable it to stop using the private sphere as its own most important resource. Therefore, household work represents primarily social work, and then also a risky social area. The main difference between social systems is revealed in the degree they rely on subsistence production, i.e. the unpaid work of women. Non-tradable production in the private sphere is considered the main pillar of economic reproduction of the global system. Furthermore, we also consider that it is taking place in completely untransformed, feudal conditions, and testifies to the schizoidia of the modern society. The persistence of so drastically non-transformed conditions for economic operation and the powerful economic inconsistency brings into question the existence of the modern commodity-monetary economy! By doing subsistence production, the female group gives the global social system its everyday initial momentum, activation, harmonization and relaxation. It is a kind of "**social infusion with a feudal prefix"**, which must be injected into the modern patriarchal system in a non-modern manner, or else it would soon become inoperational. The private sphere displays feudal roles of genders, which pose the most conservative obstacle to the modernization of social relations and structure.

The most recent theories have demonstrated that the gender division of household work is the essence of the gender habitus and social reproduction of patriarchy (Bourdieu, 2001), and that the position of women is thus the key indicator of transformation and element of social reconstruction. Household economy is, in systemic terms, completely informal and gray but it increases the level of overall welfare and performs the role of the main (if not the only) **social stabilizer.** Practically the entire social group of women is included in this kind of production while, on the other hand, the society on the global level, and the male group on its special level, display a completely irresponsible behavior towards the basic functions.

Resources engaged in subsistence production are homogenized and centered on individual human and family resources, education of cadre is informalized, and the provision of the means for work done on market principles.

Division of housework is observed as a social relation, part of social capital. Gender division of labor has a negative, **excluding dimension;** it represents a systemically introduced risk and limits women in managing the assaults on their primarily human resources. The social position of women in the structure is such that, while doing the work of overall social importance, they are, on the one hand, forced to endure the effects of firmly and consistently linked risks, while, on the other, they cannot expect practically any support from the unconnected, devastated and single resources of the lowest level.

This produces a specific structure of social networks and relations under the influence of the following risks: non-existence of a consensus, absence of reciprocity and interaction; seriously endangered, and not infrequently entirely prevented, implementation of the social contract; inadequate breadth (horizontal dimension); inadequate height/growth (missing vertical structural dimension). All these are elements confirming **social poverty**, i.e. social exclusion, scarcity of social relations and social support, which mostly affect the women.

3. **Women's strategies of defense against systemic risks:** The very existence of these strategies among women speaks of women’s activation to change their primary environment, but only on individual level. The practicing of strategies itself means the investment and creative use of a large quantity of personal resources with an uncertain outcome and for a long period of time. Women's strategies are necessarily of incomplete structure and informal forms, and always only on the level of individual organization and individual family, running a high risk of uncertain outcome. Cultural capital is itself so conceived that even women consider domestic work their obligation and part of their identity. We expect the domination of individual, informal strategies of a weak growth, with a maximum upward reach of kinship assistance networks. However, even this lowest level of linking entails a risk: the institutionalized voluntarism of men and male members of the kinship group.

The nature of women’s strategies for defense against risks is ambivalent: on the one hand, they are active since they imply the creation of a social informal environment and creative use of resources, but, on the other, produce fragmentary results within “family brackets” (A. Milić), because they intervene in the sphere of family and everyday life and are sufficient only to maintain existence. In addition the strategies cannot have a developed structure, since they are at the outset limited to an individual, most often female atom, and occasionally a family network.

We shall also address the reflections on strategies, assessments of the success and satisfaction with the quality of life: despite all the strong and rigid, frustrating and limiting systemic mechanisms, a relatively high level of women’s satisfaction with the forcible patterns of everyday life is expected, as well as the mislocated causes of the poor quality of life, falling short by a few notches. Some of the results (division of house work, conflicts) shall be compared with the findings of my 1991 survey.

4. **Vertically extended households (VEHs)**, as a specific coupling of capital and risk, represent a strategy of survival under conditions of social devastation. These are communities of traditional orientation, created in the process of retraditionalization, in consequence of objective and subjective circumstances. Objective circumstances include the grave impoverishments which befell our society, the real exclusion of young couples from the possibility to obtain housing resources, as well as the actual impossibility of the old to have any kind of security and solidarity in a society with a malignant social policy. However, the influence of subjective circumstances, manipulation and voluntarism of the parental family, is not negligible. Overt or concealed voluntarism of the parental family does exist, which in one way or another avoids to give up part of its material resources or rechannel them towards the family of their children's orientation. The result is a **progerontocratic allocation of family resources**. Parental families, primarily those of husbands, seeking to attain the traditional objectives (domination, increase of symbolic capital, social promotion in the private sphere, attainment of security in old age) are inclined to apply Machiavellian principles. They manipulate with the resources they have, primarily material family resources (apartment, house) the relative importance of which is increased in a devastated society, so that the relative importance of this property surpasses its absolute, market as well as use value. The parental family is in a situation to own **scarce resources** and is very much inclined to manipulate with them in a society which does not orient its global resources towards the care for the old, while on the other hand, the family remains the irreplaceable, single resource they can avail of. A young family, i.e. the young wife and mother undertakes the care for her husband's old parents and in this way stabilizes the global system by reducing the risk of old age and infirmity. I think that the important strategy of old parents is to do whatever they can to remain in the family union of a vertical type, primarily with their son, until their death.

The nature of this community is ambiguous: on the one hand, it accounts for synergy, horizontal networking and pooling of family resources, human as well as material, in terms of survival strategies. On the other hand, especially in relation to the emancipation and individualization of not only individuals, but also the young family of orientation, there is also the multiplication of mezzo risks, which primarily affect the young family of orientation and the young wife-mother.

5. **Subjective integration of women into patriarchy:** The treasury of gender type inequalities is the cultural sphere, with a symbolic production that conceives traditional gender identities as latently antagonistic. The function of traditionally conceived gender identities is revealed in their strong insrumentalization for the purpose of social reproduction, so that everyday life of both genders is marked by alienation. The traditional patriarchal ideology successfully interferes with the reflections of individuals, suppressing and concealing the true importance of the processes it is based on. By accepting the forcible patterns of everyday life, women passively accept the forced integration into the traditional system, consenting to traditional inequalities. Subjective integration of women into the patriarchy is the very essence of the alienated and forcible way of their life: although it actually represents a micro

risk, it strongly influences the destruction of the social position of women. Women, on the one hand, themselves reproduce the process of forcible integration while, on the other, they are not aware of either its importance or their own role in the social reproduction.

After the disintegration and massive destruction of the public sphere in our society accompanied by the ruin of institutions, in line with the retraditionalization process, the main strategy of survival of the global society represents a powerful assault on the private sphere and its resources.

The global plane of differences in our society has two levels: the first level of risk is primarily revealed in the absence, and then also in the poor quality, inadequacy and ill adjustment of institutions in this sphere to the population's needs. The second level of the risk is the lacking or inferior network of systematic public informing.

The insight into the risky position of women should be heightened by the information on the great exposure of women to domestic violence (Miletic-Stepanovic, 2002).

Methodologically, the examined characteristics will be analyzed in terms of the following social position indicators: village-town, number of members, kinship structure of household, type of household by activity, occupation of respondents, employment of respondents, ownership of housing units, economic status of household, gender, education, region, marital-partnership status and age.

Theoretically, the paper will link the following theories: feminist theories on the patriarchy, primarily Carole Pateman and Chantal Mouffe's concept of a women friendly society; Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction which sees the gender division of labor and concealed antagonism as the substance of the problem; Wallerstein's systemic theory, stressing the role of households in the world system. Strategies are defined as established patterns of action, aimed at the production, acquisition/conversion, (re)distribution and consumption of resources. Resources are viewed as forms of capital which are possible to accumulate, invest and convert.

2. Global assaults on group and individual women's resources

One of the basic results is the fact that the inequalities we discuss appear in a system of **multiple variations**: inequalities are particularly strong in the relation between the female and male social groups. Naturally, whenever we deal with the phenomena characterized by a high degree of homogenization, the results will reveal multiple differences: inequalities are expressed in relations of several hundreds (even 45 in the case of division of housework). In addition, despite the doubtless fact that social position in this sphere within the woman's group itself may experience a multiple deterioration or improvement under the influence of certain other powerful lines determining the social position, gender inequalities are so strong they could only be only mitigated (by a third at most), but not overcome by developments of that kind. There is no line of social specificities producing inequalities in this kind of subsistence production which is stronger than the one of gender inequality.

3. 1. Political economy of intergenerational allocation of family material resources

The survey examined the subjective integration of respondents of both genders into the system of patriarchal policy of inheriting family property. On the level of the whole sample we have registered a large homogenization of satisfaction: as many as 95% of the respondents were satisfied with the policy of inheriting the property of their parental families, as opposed to only 5% who were not.

The projection of the policy of inheriting family property in the future looks as follows: a third of all respondents would divide the family material resources to children of both sexes equally/according to their needs, which is not negligible, since they account for about 60% of respondents who have children of different sexes. This category is mostly evenly distributed by all the examined lines. However, at the level of the whole sample, six times more respondents, accounting to about 18% of those with children of both sexes, aim to channel the largest part of the family's material resources, or all of them, towards their male progeny. Gender exclusion has reached large proportions in families with children of both sexes so that female offsprings in the whole population will in future find themselves in a risky position six times more often than their male siblings, with respect to this important resource.

This systemic risk is halved in the towns, but **tripled in the villages**, which practically excludes female children in rural families with progeny of both sexes from inheriting the material resources of their parental family (18 times greater risk).

The number of family members influences the observed phenomenon in an ambivalent manner. This risk is more than twice reduced in one-parent families, which is attributed to the fact that these are mostly self-supporting mothers. Twice lower risk is registered among the widowed and divorced, as well as respondents with medium-level education. The influence of the economic status is ambivalent: the risk is three times greater at the medium level, two times greater at the high level, but two times lower on the higher middle level. Education reveals its enlightening influence: the risk is increased twofold among the respondents without education, about 50% with those with elementary school, but is twice lower among those with secondary education and even three times among the highly educated respondents. As for the influence of the marital-partnership status the risk is lowered among the never married, divorced and widowed, but increased in extramarital and marital unions. The difference and the risk are reduced twofold only among the young people of up to 29 years, but are almost tripled among all older (old-fashioned) respondents above the age of 30.

3.2. Subsistence production and strategies of its reorganization

3.2.1 Sexist division of housework and women's individual strategies to fight the systemic risks

The analysis of the division of housework was done integrally for the following types of work: cooking, dish-washing, laundering, cleaning, pressing, caring for small children, control of school obligations; the division of work was classified into three sub-groups: traditional, transitory and modern. This area reveals small differentiation of the population, i.e. a large homogenization in the division of housework in our households:

- traditional group, where all the work is done by one or more women is represented with almost 70% in about three quarters of the population (60% one women - wife-mother; and 10% several women);
- transitory group, accounts for about 20% (around a fifth of the population) and includes three subdivisions: cases where the bulk of the work is done by a wife-mother, while others members join in (13%), those when most of the work is done by a wife-mother and her partner joins in (3.5%), and cases with an equitable division of work among the numerous family members (3,5%);
- modern group of only 1% (equal division of work between partners 0.5%, paid help 0.5%).

These facts are revealing of the patriarchal organization of subsistence production. If we compare them with the results of my 1991 survey we will note an increased homogenization due to the largely reinforced traditionality: the traditional division of housework has been doubled, the transitory reduced threefold, while the modern one has been decimated. The results indicate a high gender consistency and fixation, as well as a major deflection in gender behavior. The division of work wherein a wife/mother does not participate is extremely exceptional, while the husband/father does not participate in housework in general, in about 70% of families, and the differences are the largest with respect to such work as cooking, washing and cleaning, thus the kind of work that is the hardest and of life-long routine type. These facts point to over 45 times higher risk for the women, i.e. capital for men in this fundamental social sphere.

If this characteristic is linked with the husband's alcoholism, which is a frequent phenomenon, **male escape from everyday life is twofold**. In addition, we should note that production of food and beverages, sewing and knitting, minding the children, and the nursing of the sick and the old are done in nearly every second household. We may, therefore, realistically assume that this is done predominantly by women, which puts another major strain on female resources. We may also note a large disruption in family roles, along with mass abstinence of fathers' and husbands, the absence of male participation in the working family group. This reveals an almost complete horizontal limitation and unconnectedness, i.e. social exclusion of women.

Belgrade is ahead of others in the modernization of housework division: it registers three times higher paid help, and the periphery of Belgrade additionally reveals twice greater equality of partners. Other cities register paid help twice more often, but twice less frequently refer to the transitory division between partners. The rural areas alone have nine times less paid help.

According to the number of members, smaller families display a relatively modern division of work. Four-member families already register the modern division of work, i.e. use of paid help, twice less. Large families reveal a transformed division with five-member families reporting the existence of work division among partners twice more often, while six-member families register two times higher division among several female members and family members in general (but at the same time twice less paid help). Still, we cannot say that this is a relief for the women, because a large number of family members implies a large increase in the overall volume of housework.

One-parent families are modern and have three times larger paid help. Horizontally extended families are also more modern since, in addition to the transitory division, i.e. increased share of the division of work including all family members, they also register a stronger modern equal division among partners.

Nuclear families are mostly of transitory type, with a twice greater share of the partner division of work. Vertically extended households are also transitory: they reveal a twofold increase of two transitory divisions: the one including several women and all family members, as well as the modern division involving both partners equally. On the other hand, they register three times less cases where all the work is done by a husband-father, so that it also stabilizes the man's position in the family, because men start doing housework only when they grow old or are single!

Occupations show a relatively strong differentiation. In the families of managers the division of housework is modernized to the maximum extent. The share of the traditional division is halved, while the transitory (family) and modern (partner) divisions are three times higher. Finally, the factor that separates these families the most is their even 15 times greater share of paid help. Entrepreneurs have marked a shift towards the modern division with six times higher paid help, as well as the self-employed with three times larger partner equality (maximum) and nine times more paid help, and professionals who two times more often register family division and even four times more often equal engagement of partners, which is the highest score for this type of division of labor. Clerks/technicians come second in terms of the frequency of transitory division tending towards partner equality (3-fold increase). Workers show greater equality in terms of the family division of work which is consistent with the finding of my 1991 survey that the workers are included in transitory or even modern models due to working in shifts which takes women out of the hose and forces men to work in it. Farmers are very traditional, with a mildly increased traditional division (all women) and twice higher traditional division among several women, but they also twice more often register the transitory (family) division. On the other hand, they have three times lower - overall the lowest – modern division between partners, as well as five times lower equal division among family members. Pensioners have twice lower division wherein all housework is done by several women and the division which tends towards family distribution of work, but also register a twice higher frequency of families where everything is done by the husband, as well as single households. The unemployed are relatively modern with twice higher share of equal division among spouses, which is increased only in this and the case of the self-employed, but they also twice less often register equal division among family members and paid help. Families of housewives have three times lower transitory division with equal participation of partners.

The economic status has a proportionate influence on the division of housework: characteristic in that context are the findings for families with the lower middle status which register seven times less paid help, and the excellent results of the middle and higher middle status families with twice higher share of transitory division involving both partners, modern equal division between partners and paid help. High economic status registers large – eightfold - increase in paid help.

Education influences increased transformation in the sphere of housework, i.e. the growing share of the transitory division of labor between the partners. Uneducated respondents register eight times less cases of this type of transitory division and have twice more single households. Respondents with elementary education show three times less cases of transitory division between partners. Respondents with secondary education fit into the average, while those with higher/high education have three times higher transitory division between partners, and a mildly increased equal division among partners (40%0 and family members (20%).

Young people aged up to 29 have twice higher equalitarian division in the family, while those over 60 have two times less traditional distribution of housework to several women, and twice more often register families where all the work is done by the husband/father (70% of single households in the sample are over 60 years old).

It is interesting that in the case of the modern division with equal participation of partners we register paid assistance as the second strategy for doing housework thirty times more often than in the whole sample, which is revealing of a largely reduced volume of work left to be divided: men who take equal participation in household labor actually do very little, since the largest part of it has been transferred to paid help. In addition, families who use paid assistance, twenty times more often tend to purchase various household appliances.

3.2.2 Women's satisfaction with the division of work between spouses-partners in extra/marital unions

In this part we shall see the extent of the existing subjective integration of women in the system of the division of housework. We expect that the data will not show the real, dramatic situation, but rather the picture of reality seen through the patriarchal optics that may be blinding, which is apparently what has already happened to quite a few! The data we obtained confirmed this assumption: on the level of the whole sample, almost three quarters of women are satisfied with the division of labor, and only one in five is dissatisfied. The structure of female discontent with the division of housework between the partners is shown in Table 3.

Almost ten percent of women acknowledge being under the overt, direct influence of patriarchal authority voluntarism. Based on my experience, I am inclined to argue that the sincerity of the population responding to questions related to the private sphere is such that the real number is at least three times higher: at least one in four women should be subjected to the arbitrariness of her husband or his parents. Furthermore, how can it be possible that three out of four women are satisfied with the division of household labor which has to be of a kind that gives the reverse results (one in four is satisfied)?

The lack of the husband’s time as a reason for a woman's discontent decreases with the increase in the economic status: this is probably the case of material resources offsetting the man's work. Work as the reason preventing men to tackle household chores is most frequently registered among farmers, entrepreneurs, respondents with elementary school and those in the 30-44 age group, and the least among those over 60 years of age. Voluntarism, combined with material deprivation is over ten times more conspicuous in the center of Belgrade and among the highly-educated female respondents, three times more among the self-employed and those over 60, members of mixed and urban households. The influence of husbands’ parents is widespread by all the examined lines: quite surprisingly it is the strongest among female entrepreneurs, but also among clerks – technicians and respondents with elementary school, in Belgrade, with large households, agricultural families and low-educated respondents below the age of 29.

It is interesting that over 50% of women in the sample do all the work alone and are still satisfied with the division of labor! All groups of transitory divisions are less satisfied than the traditional. The most dissatisfied (almost ten times more than the average) are women who live in families with equitable division in the family, which is most often the case of vertically extended families. Women who put up with the overt voluntarism of their husbands unwilling to do housework, are generally only partly dissatisfied and are in an ambiguous situation.

3.2.3. Women's satisfaction with family budgetary policy

This part addresses the women's satisfaction with the family budgetary policy, compared with the investments into subsistence production (chemical agents, tools and devices, appliances). The very possibility of women's influence on the budgetary policy indicates a certain quantity of women's symbolic capital. Relevant literature (Vujović, 1989) refers to examples that the budget is preferably channeled into luxurious consumption (satellite dishes perched on hovels without electricity or water supply, luxury cars), while investments into non-tradable production are totally neglected, which is revealing of the ambiguity and chaos prevailing in the policy house budget allocation. Results reveal that few women are satisfied (one in five), but that most of them (three quarters) believe that economic deprivation is the cause of this, obviously inferior, situation. The question is what accounts for so high a frequency of alcoholics, mass attendance of football matches, large number of smokers, owners of mobile phones, if the family budgetary policy is inadequate and the funds are not invested in personal consumption? However, women themselves are not free of preferences to spend their money for personal purposes (cigarettes, cosmetics, jewelry, luxurious clothes), without seeing the problem of household production, which rests primarily on their shoulders. We believe that the family budgetary policy which favors the purchase of alcoholic beverages, thus stimulating alcoholism, and cigarettes, affecting the health of the entire family (direct and second hand smokers alike), especially in a situation of such impoverishment as ours, represents the height of risk and alienation. Thus, only about 4% of women realize that they are exposed to the overt effects of the patriarchal authority voluntarism, which interferes with the relevant changes.

The greatest satisfaction is registered among female entrepreneurs (fivefold increase), women living in households with a high economic status and one-parent families, and respondents from Belgrade, female professionals and manageresses, highly educated and living in households of higher middle economic status.

The negative influence of husbands' voluntarism in shaping the family budgetary policy (spending the money on the purchase of alcoholic drinks) is most often noted by retired women, those from the center of Belgrade, workers and women living in households with a high economic status, in two-member families. This phenomenon is non-existent in all extramarital partnerships (thus, exists only in marriage), in households of low and higher middle economic status and female entrepreneurs, self-employed, professionals and farmers. Husbands who do not allow investments into subsistence production are found in a wide social spectrum: this most often happens to female clerks, but also women in mixed households, farmers, married childless women, middle-aged women (44-59). On the other hand, this phenomenon is non-existent in just as a broad social spectrum: in Belgrade, in two-member, agricultural households, with female entrepreneurs, professionals, workers, housewives, women in households with a high economic status. The influence of parental voluntarism on the preservation of an inadequate family budgetary policy is increasingly frequent once again in a wide social spectrum: in large families, families living in parental housing, in horizontally extended households, among housewives, workers, unemployed, women in Vojvodina, and those in the 30-44 age group. The same phenomenon is not registered in just as diverse social areas: in Belgrade, in two and three-member families, with female entrepreneurs, self-employed women and professionals, women engaged in free professions, clerks and pensioners.

3.3. Women's strategies of managing gender risks in the sphere of subsistence production

3. 3.1. Women's strategies of doing subsistence production

On the level of the whole sample, the most frequently used strategy is the one of assistance of households members, registered with almost one in two women. The ambiguous situation of women and their inferior sensitization for the perception of risks is confirmed by the fact that actually almost one in every four women does the whole work alone, but claims to have large assistance from household members! The 1991 survey may illustrate this situation of ambiguity, which has obviously persisted: while interviewing a respondent I saw that only when she started answering to the question about the division of labor she actually became aware that she had been doing almost all the housework, believing that it was equally divided between her and her husband! When they started their joint life, the married couple discussed it, and the man said that he would do all the work outside the house, and she inside the house, to which she agreed without understanding the problem!

The distribution of risks in terms of the examined characteristics is the following: the strategy of family members' assistance is the most represented in Vojvodina. In addition, it is used only by women with the worker, professional and managerial occupations.

In the whole sample, every fifth women uses the strategy of good organization: it is most often found among women living in the center of Belgrade, in three-member families, those who are better educated and unemployed housewives. Not one woman living on the periphery of Belgrade uses this particular strategy.

Furthermore, one in five women uses the strategy of reducing the housework, and the distribution is relatively even by all the examined characteristics.

One in ten women in the sample is forced into the passive strategy of putting up with large difficulties in coping with the housework. That is, most often the case of women with low economic position and married childless women. In terms of occupations, this strategy is found only with farmers, housewives and pensioners and speaks volumes of their difficult situation.

The strategy of paid help is, in the sample, found only exceptionally, although at points on opposite sides of the social ladder; most often with women in households of high economic status, in cohabitation as well as in the lower part of the ladder, among uneducated women, which indicates the inconsistency of social positions; furthermore, this help is also registered with childless women, in two-member and nuclear households. The strategy is least frequently used by women in vertically extended households, and then it is again intensified on the opposite sides of the social scale: among women with high education, as well as those from families with a low economic status.

3.3.2 Women's strategies of change in the sphere of subsistence production

The decision to use a strategy that introduces a change in the patriarchal organization of subsistence production which are bound to alter its patriarchal organization is by itself yet another job for the women, overburdened as she is. In addition, women often run a large risk that a strategy of this kind will not be worthwhile and will yield no results.

One in two women resorts to only monostrategic actions. This fact speaks that women inadequately use even the resources available to them, in order to horizontally expand their network of support and thus facilitate subsistence production. Limited as these possibilities may be (vertical linking is systemically precluded, and horizontal expansion reduced to the family-household), in a difficult situation such as these women are facing, every assistance, however small, has large importance. Still, women make poor use even of what they could, under the influence of a mental structure which is so strongly internalized that it keeps the feeling of duty on a high level. One of the strategies of the system in this division of housework is reflected in the cultural capital which links cooking, cleaning and washing with fertility, and fertility with femininity. Also unfavorable is the fact that one in five women applies several strategies to change the sphere of subsistence production and that again one in five applies no strategies of this kind at all.

Every second women resorts to the strategy of talking with her husband, either within a mono or a multi-strategic orientation. That, on the other hand, means that institutionalized male voluntarism exists in every second family. Implicitly, this has to do with the attitude that housework is a woman's job, and that husbands who occasionally manifest understanding and provide some help fulfill their role of husbands and fathers.

Activation of children, female twice more than children of both sexes, is also one of the strategies. However, the most important thing here is that one in five women (about 20% in the whole sample) does nothing and is completely passive. Furthermore, only 20% of women use the second strategy, and that is most frequently the one of including children (female 10% and regardless of their sex 30%).

3.3.3 Evaluation of success of female strategies to change subsistence production

We wanted to see how women assess the success of their efforts to change subsistence production? A third of them think they have achieved complete success, which is arguable in view of the findings presented so far. Partial satisfaction with their efforts is registered with about 40% of women. But, 15% of women think they have failed in their strivings to bring about a change. That could be the true measure of the strong voluntarism (due to the insensitization of women – the week and moderate probably go unnoticed) women are exposed to in this sphere, as well as the measure of failure in mobilizing the resources whether social (assistance of family members), or material (appliances, chemical agents, various aids and tools, paid help).

The women who find their efforts the most successful are unmarried, and the least successful are predominantly those of a low status (lower middle economic position, uneducated and over 60 years old). Not a single women engaged in a private business of a free profession found her efforts a failure.

The finding which indicates great alienation is the fact that one in four women in the sample believes that she has fully succeeded in changing the division of labor, despite the fact that she does all the work alone.

3.4. Vertically extended family household: antagonism under the mask of synergy; progerontocrartic allocation of resources

In order to illustrate the risk of the vertically extended family and its place in the local cultural capital, we shall mention the examples from a program for farmers broadcast on Channel II of the state TV on September 5, 2004, which had to do with the results of a competition in cheese making (from Mt. Zlatar). Commenting on the household of one of the successful producers of potato and cheese, the reporter said that he "lived in a household with his father, mother, wife and children"! The next household, according to the reporter "has everything but a bride, and not only one but three, for three unmarried sons…. since their mother makes the cheese alone and needs help".

Position of vertically extended households

Vertically extended households account for about 15% of the sample.

The table shows that the distribution of vertically extended households by strata largely coincides with the distribution of the strata in the sample, i.e. that it is minimal at the ends and increases to reach the maximum in the middle. This means that it is found in even one in four families of skilled workers and clerks-technicians, one in five families of farmers, one in six families of unskilled workers and one in ten families of professionals. This kind of a strategy is used less in families with greater abundance of other resources (on the top of the structure, among entrepreneurs and the elite), as well as in the part of the structure which lacks the resources to pool (at the very bottom, non-existent in the underclass).

In terms of the number of members, it is a risky community, comprised mostly of large households (25% of all 5-member households, 75% of 6-member, 80% of 8-member , 90% of 9-member and a 100% of 10-member households).

Furthermore, in terms of the number of children, these households bear the largest burden: although their share in the sample is 15%, they account for only 6% of all childless households, but 22% of households with one child, 30% of those with two children, 25% with three, even 50% with four and 40% of all households with five children.

In terms of the housing surface per member these households are also classified as risky, since they account for as many as 30% of all household with 1-10 square meters per person, about 30% of those with 10-15, 20% with 15-20, and only 9.6% and 8% of those with 20-30 and over 30 square meters per person respectively.

In terms of their economic position vertically extended families have a satisfactory status: they account for 8% of all households of the low economic status, 12% of lower middle, 20%of middle and higher middle each and 16% of the high economic status. About 70% (almost two quarters) of these households are inland Serbia outside Belgrade, i.e. 50% in the rural and about 40% in urban areas.

On the basis of these data we can see that a vertically extended household actually amounts to a survival strategy, i.e. a family union with a function of stabilizing the material position of the population and increasing both the material and human resources of households.

3.4.1.Subjective integration into a vertically extended household: satisfaction with life in a family community

The data indicate that the subjective integration of all vertically extended families is large, without gender differences, which is consistent with the prevailing ambiguity.

However, a look at the structure of the capital and risks will take us deeper into the analysis of unawareness.

Capital increase in a VEF for both families is noted in almost 70% of them, i.e. three quarters. Increase in social capital is registered in over 60% of VEFs. Social capital is, in this case, revealed in such values as “assistance” and “family concord”, traditional by virtue of their contents. Mutual assistance as increase in social capital is referred to only by women, which confirms the fact that men do not engage in housework. As for the social capital in the form of mutual assistance its distribution among women is even. Capital in the form of family concord is more frequently noted in the center of Belgrade, while its frequency in Vojvodina is below the average for the sample. In the subsample of men, concord is less represented only in Belgrade and Vojvodina, and this actually has to do with a patriarchal community where harmonious relations among women engaged in subsistence household production are in the man’s interest!

Increase in economic capital for both VEF families is registered in about 5% of cases. Compared with the social position, the financial-housing capital is consistently augmented among respondents with elementary school (fivefold increase), as well as with highly educated female respondents, but is somewhat reduced in Vojvodina and among the young.

About ten percent each see the advantages for only one of the families forming the community, and that is where we can speak of antagonisms. According to the families which form this VEF increased capital is to the advantage of the parental family, mostly self-perceived.

Heteroperception of VEFs advantages for young families is only noted by older mothers, presumably appreciating their participation in the division of housework!

Self-perception of a VEF’s values for the parental family is found among men, consistently with its patriarchal nature, most often by those with low-level education (even 10 times more than the average), and men over 60 years of age, as well as respondents with secondary education and urban dwellers. Self-perception of increased VEF capital for the parental family in the female subsample is most often noted by highly educated women.

Self-perception of VEFs advantages for the parental family is found more among women from five-member families, poorly educated, over 60 and with a low economic position, which indicates that this is a strategy of parental families of the lower strata.

Self-perception of the increased VEF social capital for young families is most often mentioned by respondents of high social status (highly educated, those of a higher middle or high economic status, aged 18-29, in Vojvodina, in the center of

Belgrade): life in a vertically extended family is for them a strategy of status conservation, but also prolonged dependence and postponed emancipation and individualization. Self perception of increasing capital among young men is more frequent in the high economic status strata, aged 29-44, in Vojvodina and in Serbia, as well as in five-member families.

Barely represented is the view that there is no capital increase (4%). Respondents who think so are more often of low social status (low economic position, elementary school), living in the center of Belgrade, and also in five-member families, objectively forced to live in a community. On the other hand, men twice more often believe that there is no capital increase in this type of households; four times more often these men come from the lower strata (uneducated and with a low economic position), where again we see a strongly manifested objective inhibition – the lack of material resources.

As for the risks, most respondents think that there are none (one in four). Moreover, one in four respondents think that the existing risks are of material nature. It is symptomatic that even in every fifth VEF there are social risks-conflicts in relations between its constituent families, which is a significant destabilizing factor of family relations, especially if placed in the context of the data on the frequency of domestic violence against women (Miletic-Stepanovic, 2002).

It is also interesting that all deficiencies seem to crash on the young family and frustrate it, either as a risk of the lack of privacy (14% in total- self perception), or lack of independence (much less represented with about 2%), totaling over 15%. Thus, if we put together the conflicts and specific risks affecting only the young family it turns out that it is exposed to systemic risks in **one of three VEFs**. In addition, the qualitative analysis of advantages has demonstrated that the advantages for the parents are primarily revealed in the satisfaction they find by having their children grow up in their midst! However, what the parental family considers the advantage is the shortcoming for the young family of orientation.

Differentiation by the examined characteristics has revealed the following: material risks, lack of privacy for the young and the risks in the form of conflicts are **evenly distributed** in the sample , with somewhat more intensified conflicts only in the families of the high economic status. Self-perception of non-independence of young families is stronger among men than women, while heteroperception of non-independence of young families exists only among mothers. However, differences are much greater in the female and male subsamples. Material deficiencies are more often perceived by women living in the center in Belgrade and less so by women of high economic status. Self-perception of the lack of young family's privacy is heightened among younger women of the middle and high economic status and is non-existent among women living in the center of Belgrade. Self-perception of the risk of frustrated privacy is the highest among women of low economic status, aged 45-59, and with high education! Women with higher middle economic status are bothered with conflicts the most and those on the lower middle and low economic position the least. The most conspicuous fact is that the risk of non-independence is perceived by highly educated women almost ten times more often and about five times more often by those with a high and higher middle economic status.

Heteroperception of the risk of non-independence for the young family is the strongest among mothers from households with a higher middle economic status, although it remains unclear why the emancipation of the young family of orientation goes missing, in view of the relatively favorable material conditions. Men display consistency between views and positions, since with the increase in the economic status the frequency of perception of material risks decreases. Self-perception of risks of a frustrated privacy of the young family is the strongest on the periphery of Belgrade, among the respondents with higher middle economic position, aged 30-44. Heteroperception of the same risk is the strongest in Belgrade among the higher economic strata. Heteroperception of the risk of non-independence of the young family is stronger in the towns, among the households of medium economic status and with a broad age spectrum of 18-44.

Idealization of the VEFs expressed in the view that they carry no risks is heightened among respondents with low-level education.

That is why, in the whole sample, we have as many as 41.9% of respondents in an ambiguous situation who at the same time believe that there are no advantages to the VEF but are also satisfied with it, which confirms the initial hypothesis on the efficiency of the prosystemic strategy of ambiguity. It is interesting that the existing ambiguity is more strongly manifested among men than among women.

On the other hand, members of the young families express dissatisfaction with the risk of interference with their emancipation, independence and privacy eve ten times more often, but the increased dissatisfaction is registered only among men.

The data show that risks prevail over capital in the case or VEFs and thus confirm the hypothesis on the risky nature of this type of community. Increase of social risks is registered in even one in every five families. The controversial capital-risk combination is called ambiguity due to the high degree of satisfaction with this type of community among the population. Alienation is seen in one in each four VEFs.

The reality which incorporates capital and risk in a social system reveals ambiguity with both genders, only the ambiguous combination of "concord ad conflict" is higher among men and "assistance and conflict" among women. Men twice more often than women idealize the reality, believing that there is only increase in social capital (concord without faults), but mostly women see the increase in capital reflected in "assistance without faults". One in every four women speaks of the famous assistance of mothers-in-law in housework, without problematizing their relation with their husbands, and without thinking about including them in house work to win a little of the joint partner space!

3.5. Subjective integration of women into the private sphere.

In order to examine the overall subjective integration of women into patriarchy, we have analyzed dissatisfaction through the index of women's dissatisfaction. The

index of women’s dissatisfaction is formed by combining four components: family policy of intergenerational allocation of family material resources, life in a vertically extended household, organization of subsistence production and family budgetary policy.

The data obtained for the sample reveal a relatively high subjective integration of women in the patriarchy: as many as 10% of women are completely satisfied, about 85% are low on the index of dissatisfaction, assigning their discontent mostly to objective circumstances (poverty of the society, overworked husbands), while only about 5% of women are on the medium dissatisfaction index. The high index of dissatisfaction does not appear in the sample.

Differentiation is in this case brief and clear: the most satisfied are women who live alone (over five times greater satisfaction, one in two in total), in households without a family core and one-parent families (five times, also one in two) (all outside the marriage!) with high economic status, young (up to 29 years), from Belgrade, with secondary and high education. The most dissatisfied are women (median index of dissatisfaction twice higher than the average, one in ten women) who live in the famous vertically extended families and have a with low economic status.

4. Concluding remarks

The results show highly manifested social inequalities among genders as social groups in the examined risk areas, which emerge in consequence of effects of patriarchal risks. The female social group is on the special and individual level , in addition to the economic, particularly exposed to the powerful social poverty, which in certain points reaches the proportions of complete separation from the social system – social exclusion.

There is a large, almost complete, subjective integration of respondents of both genders in the system of actual patriarchal policy of intergenerational allocation of family material resources.

Subsistence production is organized in a patriarchal way and risky to the extent that we could say the household is a prosystemic institution for the most intensive and massive economic exploitation of women and the realization of feudal gender roles.

The real situation is such that there are conditions for only one of four women in the population to have elements for satisfaction with the division of house work, but the subjective integration has reached such proportions that the reality is inverted: in the total population almost three of four women are satisfied with the division of housework. The sample includes over 50% of women who do the subsistence production alone and are satisfied with the division of labor.

Individual women's strategies of change are pursued relatively weekly and without success with a large use of monostrategic actions, which reveals that women are on individual level forced to accept the passive strategy of “social mimicry” along with enforced and alienating patterns of the everyday life. In this context we must also have in mind the institutionalized voluntarism of men, as well as the strong micro risk, which limits the action of any one women's strategy to change the organization of subsistence production.

The vertically extended family is indeed a patriarchal community of risky and ambiguous character, especially for the young family: increase of social risk is registered in one in each five and alienation in one in four VEFs. While, on the one hand, they show the burden of subsistence production and risk for the young family of orientation - and especially women - on the other hand, man and women display a high degree of subjective integration into the system.

The data on the index of women's dissatisfaction reveals that they largely apply the strategy of subjective integration into the global system, turning mostly towards the minimal dissatisfactions, thus reproducing the ambiguous manner of their own life.

Andjelka Milić

OLD PEOPLE AND FAMILY CARE

ABSTRACT: The rapid aging of Serbia's population has demographic, economic, political and social consequences for the Serbian society, which has only just begun to recover from the heavy blows of the war and disintegration. The survey is focused on the impact of the process of demographic aging on the changing forms and structure of families and households, as well as on the attitude towards the old in this environment.

The survey revealed a fundamental and unexpected fact that over two-thirds of families (households) in Serbia in one way or another, passively or actively care for the elderly. In other words, over two-thirds of families are involved in caring for old people on a daily basis, through everyday contacts, various forms of support and assistance, including the spending of their leisure time with them. This, of course, does not apply to all family members equally, since this sort of care is still mainly, and almost exclusively, a woman's task.

Finally, the findings of this survey have shown that the attitude towards the elderly and care provided to old people by the families they live in or to which they are closely related, measured by all the observed parameters, are strongly dependent on the socio-professional status of family members and on the family's economic status. The higher the status, the more old people can expect that their conditions and approach to their needs by other family members, relations and other actors in the informal network will be better. And vice-versa: the poorer they are, the more likely it is that they will be lonely, abandoned and miserable. In this way, and against the backdrop of the huge pauperization of Serbia's population, social inequalities accompanying individuals in their lifetime are not only perpetuated, but actually sharply increased with their aging, so that ever-larger groups of old people become poverty-stricken.

Naturally, the question is how can the society relieve or eliminate these unfavorable social tendencies related to the demographic aging of its population?

KEY WORDS: old people, family care, social inequalities.

Introduction

The Serbian population ranks among the oldest in the world. Serbia takes the 10th place on the world scale (in terms of median age), after Japan, which ranks first and several European countries, including two from the Balkans: Bulgaria and Greece. According to demographic projections, Serbia shall retain this place until 2051, and even climb up a notch higher (ranked ninth) (Panev, 2002).

A definition of old age says it is “a minority group almost evryone joins”(Russel-Hochschield, 1974). Viewed in that light the previously mentioned facts about the Serbian population should not seem alarming. But, under one condition, namely that in terms of all other social, economic and political parameters Serbia at least approximates the level of other European societies. However, since that is not the case, the high old age is a factor fraught with multiple risks for Serbia and its society.

Ad 1. The Serbian society is in a critical stage of global social transformation when it has great need for vital, creative and energetic driving forces to overcome the decades of crisis and destruction. A creative and energetic breakthrough of this kind is difficult to make in a situation marked by a rapidly aging population, since it objectively imposes quite specific engagement and expenditures which run counter to reform requests, especially in the economic sphere (cutbacks in the state budget and spending on welfare, sharper market competition, etc.)

Ad 2. In contrast to other European countries which, as already noted, have been facing the aging of their population for some time already, this process in Serbia has gathered speed during the past decades. In less than half a century Serbia has “managed” to overtake even the more developed European countries. In the 1950-2000 period the share of people over 65 years of age was quadrupled (to almost 1 million at present), compared with the increase of 137% elsewhere in Europe, i.e. by only a third of the number in the initial period (Demografski pregled, 2002).

The fast increase in elderly people in Serbia is the result of a twofold effect on the old age phenomenon: from the top of the age pyramid, with the increased share of the old population due to the longer lifespan, and also from the bottom of the pyramid, due to the decreasing number of the young, i.e. the natality and fertility insufficient for population renewal.

Rapidly aging population generates changes in the essential social characteristics and behavior on the global level of society, while the social conscience is not able to recognize these changes, face them and make the appropriate adjustments. That accounts for the generational gap increasingly visible on the political level in the last decade (radicalism of the young and conservatism of the old).

Ad.3. An important characteristic accompanying the aging of the Serbian population is the deprivation of the socio-economic position of the old. In contrast to other European and even Balkan countries, which register the same phenomenon, population aging here coincides with a drastic impoverishment of society (Avramov, 2002).

In the case of Serbia, due to the decades of lagging behind in the transition processes, aging inevitably means not only social marginalization, but also a sharp drop of the economic and living standard, which is directly contrary to the needs of old age, requiring a far higher quality of life to be supportable to both the individuals concerned and the society in general. Research into the living standard of the population shows that senior citizens are threatened by poverty almost twice more often than the young (14.8% and 9.7% respectively) (“Danas”, 8-9 May 2004).

The above-mentioned specific characteristics of developments and position of the old people in Serbia give rise to the question of efficient postulation and resolution of the problem of population aging in general, and then also of the specific position of old people in the present day Serbian society.

The demographic process of aging can clearly be stopped only in the long term (although, as thing stand, even that appears a rather utopian expectation), but that is why the society's attitude towards old age and aging must be urgently changed, both for humane reason of improving the position of the old, and the need to utilize the still significant resources of the old for social transformation.

It is also a fact that all - actually precious few - institutional solutions to improve the position of the old people offered so far have failed, except the pension system which enabled "the preservation of at least the minimum standard for the old people" during the past disastrous decade ("Danas", 8-9 May 2004, p.16). On the other side, the increasingly faster pace of population aging in the forthcoming period with an almost completely ruined economy and the economic system entering the most delicate transition stage, warns that the only institutional "straw" the old population clutches at to survive may be "broken". This view of the certain future shows the dramatic proportions of the question of the ways, means and price of providing the minimum standard, care, nursing and accommodation to the elderly, knowing that catering to the needs of the old requires not only substantial financial investments but also a large and genuine emotional commitment and engagement of the entire social community?

Leaving this sensitive issue to the evaluation and action of politicians, this paper shall try to perceive the present and future situation of the old in the most direct and important context for these people – that of their family life and household framework. That is because in our circumstances the number of old people who live outside this primary living framework is almost negligible (only 9000, mostly bedridden old people are in nursing homes; ibid.)

Starting from that social and living framework of the elderly we would like to examine the following:

- First, how is the accelerated process of population aging reflected on the structure and form of families and households in Serbia, i.e. does it affect certain other essential demographic and socio-economic characteristics of families and households in Serbia, especially those we define as "old households?
- Second, what are the primary ways of providing nursing and care for the old people in Serbia in the present situation and who are the caregivers?
- Third, some basic attitudes and strategies related to aging and the attitude towards the old in the present social context.

We believe that only after a detailed examination of this kind, will it be possible to propose some more adequate and efficient, individual and collective, strategies such as could forestall still greater risks of the already advanced process of population aging in Serbia.

1. Aging and its influence on the demographic structures of households and their social characteristics

In order to provide a clear review of the influence of population aging on the characteristics of the primary family sphere of life and its functioning we have constructed a multidimensional indicator based on the following assumptions:

Old age by itself, without any additional problems, brings about specific, primarily limiting effects for the people entering that age and, on the other hand, requires the adjustment of their closest environment to the reduced potential of the old age. But, quite often, and especially in a situation marked by inferior overall social conditions, old age brings additional problems and difficulties; in the first place infirmity and then also various types of physical and mental defects which incapacitate such people for independent life.

Bearing these consequences of old age in mind, we have identified the families, i.e. households in our sample, which include individual members characterized by old age and its afflictions, and thus obtained the following distribution:

Graph 1: Shares of 65+, ill and disabled respondents in the sample



Thus, 61% of surveyed families and households are "burdened" by old people, not a small number of whom have additional problems due to illness and appreciable disabilities. However we choose to view this figure, it speaks of a remarkably heavy burden of old age most families and households in Serbia "carry on their shoulders". Even assuming that all other functions and responsibilities of the present-day family in Serbia are in the best way supported and facilitated by the social community (which is far from being the case), this burden related to elderly people would alone represent an extremely heavy weight both for the community and specifically the families concerned and the success of their transitional adjustments.

To conclude, almost two thirds of families and households are in a situation to, more or less alone, cope with the complex problems of old aged people who find in them not only their *primary* but most often also *the only support.*

Let us now take a look at the distribution of old people by types of households they live in:

Graph 2: Households by shares of the old, ill and disabled



These data lead to the conclusion that all types of households are burdened by nursing and care for the ill, old and disabled members. Furthermore, we see that they are not equally burdened by the presence of members who need special care and attention, and in that respect may distinguish between two groups of households:

The first group of households includes those where old persons share with over 60%. These are e.g. single households, households of married childless couples, i.e. old spouses and both sub-types of extended families, i.e. multiple-family households. Furthermore, these households put together account for two thirds (65.8%) of all, which again evidences that Serbian households are heavily burdened with the age component.

A smaller part of households are those where old people are less frequently or rarely represented. These are in the first place nuclear family households, with the share of old and ill members below 15%, and then also two groups of households where the relevant share of such persons is about a third (one-parent and non-kin households). However, it is interesting to note that the smaller presence of the old and ill household members in all these three groups is accompanied by an increased number of such persons they care for outside their households. The share of caregiving to the elderly outside one's own household ranges from 8% of one-parent families, to 15.6% of nuclear families and full 17% of multiple-member, non-kin households. In other words, households without old members often have to take care of old people outside their homes.

We can therefore conclude that rapid aging of the population has a direct or indirect influence on the global structure of households, in terms of their composition and size, and then also the characteristics and functioning of almost all types of households in Serbia.

If we take a look at the size of households and presence of persons requiring care, we note an interesting polarization. Most households with members of this kind are found in two size-wise extreme groups: households with 1 or 2 members, on the one hand, and those with 8 or more members, on the other. Moreover, 80% of largest households report the existence of old and/or ill and disabled members in their midst. This confirms the previous findings that households of singles and married childless couples are actually old households, and that multiple family households gather the oldest, middle and youngest generation in a single home.

The presence of old people compared with the socio-professional composition of households also reveals some interesting links. By far the least burdened with old persons are the households of professionals, clerks and technicians (about 40%, although this percentage may be treated as fairly high), as opposed to those of pensioners which register a very high percentage of 87%. Other households are in between these two groups, although the closest to pensioners in terms of their respective shares are the households of dependents and farmers, and, as an exception, those of large entrepreneurs, i.e. directors. But this professional group accounts for a very high share of indirectly present old and ill persons who live in individual households and are related with the respondents' households. In addition to these households, indirect presence such persons is most often registered among professionals and small entrepreneurs, i.e. lower managers.

The link between the household economic status and the presence of old and/or ill and disabled members reveals quite clear statistically important regularities, distributed as follows:

Graph 3: Presence of old/ill and disabled members by economic status of households



There is a reverse proportion between the economic status of households and the presence of old and/or ill members in or outside the household. Namely, the lower the position of a household is the more frequent the presence of old people in it will be, and vice versa. Such persons are found in three quarters of households with low material position, compared with half the households with a high position (although this share is also high). On the other hand, households with better material standard, much more often care for the old and/or ill and disabled persons they are related with, but who live in separate households, than it is the case of households placed lower on the economic status scale (12% and 1.5% respectively). In other words, the richer strata have the resources allowing them to care for such persons outside their own households, which is not the case of the poorer groups.

The distribution of the old, ill and disabled was also observed in terms of the rural-urban location of households. This exercise revealed some interesting variations. In the first place, there is almost no difference in the presence of the old and ill between rural and urban households. Due to the longer average lifespan the towns now accumulate older generations. The combination of the old and ailing in households is the most frequent in provincial towns and less so in the villages, while the old are most often found in households on the periphery of Belgrade, which is probably the result of individual housing in homes with multiple-family households. Finally, Belgraders are the most frequent caregivers to the elderly living outside their households (Chart 4).

Graph 4: Share of old and disabled according to residence.



Summing up the demographic findings so far we may propose the following general conclusion: although, on the whole, the majority of 60% of households have something to do with the old and/or ill and disabled members, their presence across the households is not even: a much higher density of the old and ill members in registered in households with fewer members, inferior material situation, lower education level and position further down the ladder of socio-professional hierarchy and vice versa. Households with a larger (although not the largest) number of members, better educated and ranked higher on the socio-professional and economic status scales are less weighted with caring for the old and ill members or have better resources to cope with the problem. In any case, these data suggest that the conditions of life in old age are structurally determined. But, it is not impossible that in our situation of overall pauperization and destruction of society, old age by itself inevitably means greater poverty and desertion both on the part of society and one's family and relations. That is what we shall try to examine in the following analyses.

2. Caregiving and nursing the elderly – who, how and to what extent?

In developed societies, care for the old people seems to be on a constant swing between the state and its institutions, family and paid market services. But, regardless of differences in social policies and approaches to meeting the needs of senior citizens, all analyses point to one general fact: it is the family that assumes the largest burden of this care and for a longest period of time. Precisely that contributes to the reality that the family responsibility to care for the old is taken for granted, as something that is implied and only normal. In line with that it is assumed that the “caregiver imlies that the care is given freely,either at no cost,or at the costs he is capable and willing to shoulder”(Harrington-Meyer, 2000:2). On the other hand, all sociological researches warn of the modern societies’ growing deficit of persons who are capable or prepared to attend to the caregiving and nursing needs of the elderly in view of the number of the old who expect them (Hochschield, 1997). In other words, nursing capacities become very important but increasingly scarce in post-modern conditions, which is why the society and the state, as well as individuals, will have to change their relation towards this resource and give it greater respect and material compensation

But, that is the future! Under our circumstances, as already noted, family is still considered to be and act as the “natural” and only support to the elderly; over 60% of households is in everyday contact with old people who need more or less special care. Naturally, not all of them are incapacitated by old age and infirmity to such an extent that they need this special care on daily basis. Moreover, a significant number of them are senior citizens who not only manage to take care of themselves, but also of their younger descendents by doing all sorts of housework and, in particular, by minding their grandchildren.

But no matter how healthy and vigorous the elderly may feel, and however active they still are in their households or out of them in relations with their kin, old age by itself requires special care on the part of one’s closest environment: on the one hand, so that the old people would not feel useless and isolated and, on the other hand, to support their material and physical existence due to the highly reduced material and financial means in our present situation.

As for this later consideration, certainly the most favorable is the situation of those old people who live in the same households with their descendents and closest relatives, since, however poor they may be, they have the feeling that they share that poverty and deprivation with all others. This accounts for the definitely increasing number of extended family households in our midst over the past decade. For all that there should be no doubt that precisely the old people accept these communities more readily than their younger relations who hope to become independent.

But, the question is what happens with most old people who are not provided in the above-mentioned manner and live their last years completely alone (in single households) or in households of old married couples. Are they left to the risks and helplessness of old age or if not, who helps and supports them, how and to what extent?

All respondents were requested to say who among the members of their household takes the greatest care of the old, ill and disabled relatives, whether they lived in the shared or separate households. Since their answers proved unreliable, we turned to the old people themselves (Chart 5).

Graph 5: Aged, ill and disabled according reliance on.



As anticipated, just over a half of old people count on and obtain assistance from their closest kin, which is in our situation only expectable, both because of the still traditionally high family solidarity and because of the need for reciprocal use of the social capital owned by family networks, by both the old and younger generations. A prominent role in caring for the old is also registered with another traditional resource group, i.e. neighbors - much more than friends. Should this be assigned to the traditionalism of older generations who rely on the customarily fostered social networks, or the actual fact that in any circumstances neighbors can come to their aid sooner and substitute for the absent relations at least initially? Finally, we must bear in mind that at an advanced age it is difficult to maintain reciprocity with groups of friends, while neighbors are always "close by". A number of old people are still capable of maintaining his/her social networks in full, without depriving themselves of relations with any group in their environment, but their share in the total is insignificant (5,6%). In contrast to them twice as many senior citizens practically count on no one's assistance in their old age and the problems it causes. They are truly abandoned and live in social isolation. Later on in this text we shall try to answer how this came about. And, finally, there is yet another stratum of the elderly who count on the assistance of others, but reserve their help only for "emergencies" when they would really be incapable of helping themselves in any way. In their case we may rightly speak about a part of the old population who have fully modernized their approach to the networks of family and friends and believe that they are "entitled" to rely on them, but only if there is no other way out and family and friends become their "last resort".

If we tried to judge the solidarity towards the old in our society, on the basis of the above mentioned answers, we would conclude that it is still fairly high, especially in traditionally formed network relations. To check this still further we shall try to identify certain interesting and important variations pointing to a specific position and behavior of particular groups of the old and their environment.

Very interesting and regular are variations in expectances of assistance depending on the households economic status index: the poorer the household the more oriented it is towards its closest kin (49.6% compared with 20% of households with the highest status), and vice versa: friends' assistance to poorer households is insignificant (1.8%) compared with households with highest position where this kind of assistance exceeds the average (13%). Interestingly enough expectances of neighbors' help are evenly distributed regardless of the household's economic position, which doubtlessly points to social advantages of this network in our social and mental makeup.

3. Old age and loneliness

Old age, for many reasons, objectively results in the reduction of social connections and relations. The main reason for that is the reduced possibility to sustain reciprocity in communications, and reciprocity first disappears from generational relations with friends and colleagues. But, on the other hand, some relations and links may be strengthened in old age due to the creation of stronger attachments between individuals, either according to an intergenerational (e.g. relations between grandparents and grandchildren) or territorial criterion (proximity of neighbors). Actually, we can agree that isolation and loneliness in old age primarily depend on the social environment (Russel-Hochschield, 1985).

We wanted to find out who the old people mostly associate with in their free time and expected to use their answers to indirectly measure their isolation and loneliness. It turns out that the elderly most frequently associate with relatives (33.6%), more than the young or middle-aged respondents, which only confirms the attachment of the old to the family circle, only this time from another angle. The second group the elderly associate with, which just about reaches a third (29.2%), are neighbors, with the old almost twice ahead of the young and middle-aged. But that is why they associate with colleagues and friends almost twice less often. Finally, some say that they associate with all of the above-mentioned categories equally. Judging by the responses to this question one could not say that the elderly are lonelier or more isolated than the young. Obviously, both the old and the young incline towards their appropriate environments, but do not suffer from the shortage of such relations.

On the basis of answers to a direct question whether they felt lonely, some, we'd say moderate, differences between age categories were revealed. The elderly somewhat less (46%) than the young and the middle aged say that they are "not lonely" (60-67%), but that is why they feel "mostly" lonely twice more often (24%) (Chart 6).

Graph 6: Feeling of loneliness by aged.



Obviously the differences are not very large, in view of the objectively poor status situation of the old. On the other hand, we could conclude that social networks, especially those oriented towards association in everyday life, largely make up for the highly unfavorable, if not hopeless, objective position and social status of senior citizens in the Serbian society.

This clearly shows that social networks of informal association, communication and exchange of services are in the present situation important social capital for the survival of individuals in the cruel reality, which has for long time now been used by the society and state, transferring almost the entire burden of caring for the old to their families, relations and other informal relational networks. Just like any other "capital" this one, too, is not exactly evenly distributed either. Although old age affects the rich and the poor alike, those who have greater wealth, education and larger family background, as well as city dwellers, have better chances of surviving and coping with their old age than those whose social capital is low or nil. The only thing they have left is hope of society's assistance, which is apparently almost non-existent.

Two thirds of respondents who have reached the stage when they should think about and provide for their old age actually do not do that at all. Most of them think that they still have plenty of time, while others cannot spare a moment for that purpose. Unfortunately, they will probably let the years go by until they become aware that they have already grown old.

A quarter of respondents obviously try to rationally approach their future, by seeking to preserve their health or provide for themselves materially. These are certainly the most desirable strategies in the current situation as well as in the future. A small number of respondents think about their old age innovatively, by contemplating a change in their present way of life (move to another place, take up a hobby or a engage in work of different kind). These strategies offer the greatest pleasure and independence to people in old age, but are obviously difficult to apply under conditions such as we have here. And finally, a tenth of respondents do nothing about their old age and passively expect that others – their descendants – will care for them. It doesn't take much of an explanation to see how erroneous this reckoning is. It is obvious that this is the case of respondents who are otherwise more attached to traditional values.

It turns out that readiness to prepare for one's future in old age substantially depends on current material resources, but in a highly specific manner. In the first place, in contrast to the value codes in prosperous societies, which as a rule impose greater care and planning of one's own life the larger the wealth of an individual or a family is, this regularity is not shown in our midst. On the contrary, those who most often say that they do not think about old age belong to households ranked the highest on the index of households' economic status.

Generally speaking, this carefree attitude towards one's own future is also confirmed by responses concerning rational strategies of approaching old age. The poorest as well as the wealthiest much less than those on middle levels place their hopes in rational preparations for the coming old age (health care and material provisioning). Both apparently believe that neither of the two resources depends on them and will turn out as their good or ill fate would have it. It is interesting that the difference between individuals of lowest and highest ranks on the household economic status scale appears only with respect to active strategies, which are used by the members of the latter group, as opposed to the former where not a single such case has been registered And, finally, responses revealing passive reliance on one's children come from individuals belonging to the lower middle stratum.

The distribution of attitudes towards planning one's old age in terms of the educational level of respondents is somewhat more specific. In this respect only the group of respondents with the lowest education is distinguished from all others, with its overwhelming preference of the passive, essentially traditional variant of relying on their children in as many as 62% of cases. Somewhat less than a third of respondents say that they would like to make plans but have nothing to do it with (28%), while, this response is registered with only 13% of respondents with university degrees. Naturally, active strategies are used almost exclusively by individuals with medium and high education, because it is precisely their education that gives them an alternative view of their personal positions and possibilities in old age. On the other hand, rational strategies of caring for one's health and financial assets are not a matter of education so much as common sense, which is presumably more or less evenly distributed.

Therefore, just as in the previous case, status inconsistence, highly topical in transition societies, has its effect: the wealthy behave more irrationally than the poor, while the educated and uneducated do not reveal large differences in the ways they think about their old age, but rather in the actual resources they have to plan and achieve their objectives

4. Conclusion

The rapid aging of the Serbian population is a phenomenon with multiple effects although we are primarily interested in its family aspect, namely the influence of increasing population aging on the family and domestic structure in the Serbian society, care for the old and attitudes towards them and old age in general.

The survey has resulted in a surprising and in every respect significant information concerning the influence of population aging on the shifts in the distribution of households and families in terms of their structure and forms. Close to two thirds of households in Serbia (61%) have an elderly member or care about an old person living outside their home. Out of that a large number of families and households care for gravely ill, old and disabled persons. This is surely a unique finding and doubtlessly worrying from the point of view of a general assessment of the situation and prospects of family life in Serbia.

Namely, this fact means that most of our families are not only burdened with the struggle for everyday survival, but are also heavily pressured and additionally exhausted by caring for the old people. Finally, this fact testifies to a fundamental inversion of family functions here: instead of being largely turned towards reproduction and the upbringing of their progeny, families in most cases represent the last resort to their members reaching the end of their life course. At that, families sheltering old people appear in two forms: as - most numerous - households of singles or married couples, who live independently and often isolated from their closest family or other relatives, and as complex multiple-family communities which gather relations along generational and/or lateral lines. This other complex category of households registers an upward trend compared with the situation before the 1990s.

We identified a strong link between the economic status of households and the presence of old people in them. The lower their economic position, the larger the representation of isolated and single old households is, while higher positions are accompanied by increasing numbers of those who care for the old outside their own households. On the whole, however, old people in our situation mostly count on the support and assistance of their closest kin, whether they live alone or together with their relatives in the same household. The second reference group old people count on are their neighbors, while all other forms of informal support account for a negligible share.

Naturally, obtaining support and assistance is linked with the socio-professional status, i.e. economic status of households where old persons live. The higher these positions are the better and more regular the support and assistance obtained from informal network of relatives and neighbors will be. Family support almost entirely comes from female members. In the case of as many as 50% of very old and ill persons, the support they receive is manifested in the time-wise unlimited engagement of their female relations. We can conclude that women in our society not only "sacrifice" as mothers and wives, but quite obviously, substitute the entire missing institutional apparatus of caring for the old: they are caregivers, partners and entertainers, social workers, nurses, therapists and psychiatrists. Family care for the elderly, as well as the density of the informal network surrounding the old reduces their potential ghettoization and loneliness, especially in a society where institutional care for the old is continuously declining and increasingly limited.

The experience of close everyday contact of the old and young generations, whether living under the same roof or not, is reflected in the manner in which the present day young and middle-aged generations think about their future in old age.

Namely, most of them do not think about the problem at all, ostensibly expecting that things will follow their "natural course", i.e. that they, too, will find shelter in their family bosom. But such expectations are justified only if family resources are sufficiently lasting and "viable" in material as well as moral and energy terms. The fact is however, that only a minor part of families meets these conditions while for the majority of others whose existential dependency(in old age-A.M.) is located in individual families they "serve as yet another method that sustains or even magnifies the socio-economic inequalities". (Harrington-Meyer, 2000:3). I am afraid that most individuals today, just like the social community as a whole, do not accept this kind of thinking about the future of Serbia's senior citizens.

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